In early June, Wang Jingwei, Tang Shengzhi, Feng Yuxiang and other so-called "leftists" met in Zhengzhou to divide the spoils and negotiated the Zhengzhou Agreement. Feng Yuxiang occupied Henan and Tang Shengzhi returned to Wuhan.

From Wuhan to Jiujiang

After the “Fifth National Congress” of our party, the domestic political situation became more tense. First, and Feng Yuxiang fell over, and he "gifted" all the political workers out. Liu Bojian and many other comrades came out of Feng Yuxiang's army at this time.

In early June, Wang Jingwei , Tang Shengzhi, Feng Yuxiang and other so-called "leftists" met in Zhengzhou to divide the spoils and made the Zhengzhou Agreement. Feng Yuxiang occupied Henan and Tang Shengzhi returned to Wuhan. In this way, Chiang Kai-shek , Wang Jingwei, Feng Yuxiang, Tang Shengzhi, etc. all got together and pointed the finger at the Communist Party. Our original plan to rely on Wang Jingwei to counter Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist coup was shattered.

The situation is very unfavorable to us, and the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is a foregone conclusion. what to do? The only way out is to hold an armed uprising and resist the Kuomintang's massacre policy. However, there was a fierce debate within the party about whether to engage in armed resistance or compromise. Chen Duxiu was firmly opposed to armed struggle. At this time, the Central Committee conveyed to us the instructions of the Communist International, proposed a non-capitalist future for the Chinese revolution, and asked us to arm ourselves and organize a team of 50,000 people. This played a strong role in promoting our determination to launch the Nanchang Uprising. Unexpectedly, this instruction from the International was shown to Wang Jingwei by International representative Luo Yi, which caused Wang Jingwei to accelerate the conspiracy to suppress the Communist Party. This also prompted us to launch the Nanchang Uprising as soon as possible.

In mid-July, the Central Committee formed a five-member Provisional Political Bureau, eliminated Chen Duxiu's erroneous leadership, issued the July 13 Declaration, and determined the general policy of armed struggle.

The Nanchang Uprising was decided by the central government at a meeting in Wuhan in mid-July. I didn't attend that meeting. That night, Comrade Enlai went to the Military Commission after the meeting and conveyed it to several comrades working in the Military Commission. The main message he conveyed was that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were split, and we had no other choice but to revolt. Today, a decision was made at the Central Committee meeting to hold an uprising in Nanchang, China. Comrade Enlai also said that the meeting decided to organize a committee of former enemies and designated him as its secretary. After he conveyed the message, he appointed He Chang, Yan Changyi and me to form the Former Enemy Military Committee, with me as the secretary. The task is to go to Jiujiang first to inform our comrades so that they understand the central government's intentions and prepare for an uprising. But when to launch an attack, we must obey the orders of the central government.

At that time, our troops in Jiujiang included Ye Ting's 24th Division and He Long's 20th Army. Other units of Zhang Fakui's Second Front Army are also in the Jiujiang area. There were many Communist Party members in these troops.

We left a week earlier than Comrade Enlai. I attended the Jiujiang Talks on July 20 mentioned in a report written by Ye Ting after the Nanchang Uprising.

Before and after Wang Jingwei openly betrayed the revolution, due to the tense situation in Wuhan, many responsible comrades of our party arrived in Jiujiang. The talk meeting on the 20th that Ye Ting mentioned was actually a meeting of some central leaders. Ye Ting and I were together at that time, because we decided in Wuhan that we would be the first to notify Ye Ting when we arrived in Jiujiang. After we arrived in Jiujiang, we stayed at Ye Ting's headquarters.

Attending the 20th talk were Tan Pingshan , Li Lisan, Yun Daiying, Deng Zhongxia and other comrades, as well as some Central Committee members and Comrade Ye Ting. At the meeting, Li Lisan and other comrades were impatient and advocated immediate action. I said no, we must wait for the central government’s order. He said that since it had been communicated to the troops and the uprising work had been organized, all he had to do was issue an order! I said, it's not that simple. Our mission here is to be prepared to organize the troops to revolt, and preparations are also very important. However, several Central Committee members advocated doing it immediately without waiting for orders from the Central Committee, especially Li Lisan, who said that I was a slaver, cowardly, etc. I said that when it came, Comrade Enlai made it clear that there must be orders from the central government and that we cannot act freely. Li Lisan also said, you must listen to the Central Committee members. I said, they are all members of the Central Committee. Which Central Committee member should I listen to? Central Committee members must also listen to the Central Committee. After some debate, the meeting finally decided to wait for the central government's order.

After we arrived in Jiujiang, we communicated it to each unit, because the uprising plan was very secret. It was mainly communicated to the comrades in charge of each unit. Some units communicated it more widely. We introduced the entire situation to these cadres, explained the tasks, and pointed out that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were split, and we had no other choice but to revolt. Then, tell them to make all preparations and act immediately as soon as they receive the central order.

During this period, I also took a trip to Lushan . At that time, Boroding was in Lushan and asked me to brief him on the plans and preparations for the Nanchang Uprising. I quickly went up the mountain and briefed him on the central government's decision and the troops' preparations. At that time, Comrade Zhang Tailei was the translator. The reason why Borodin came to me to understand the situation was because he was about to return to China and wanted to know what our party would do next so that he could have an explanation after he returned. Therefore, after listening to my introduction, he did not express any opinion. Soon, he was transferred back to China. Many years later, Comrade Enlai asked me, was it Borodin or Luo Minaz that I saw in Lushan Mountain? I said Borodin.

According to the tasks given by Comrade Enlai, I also made a special trip to notify Comrade Liu Shaoqi. In Jiujiang, I learned about Comrade Shaoqi's residence through Comrade Lin Boqu's younger brother Lin Zulie (I can't remember the specific location). He seemed to be recuperating from lung disease at the time. After meeting with him, I informed him that the Central Committee had decided to stage an uprising in Nanchang, and asked him to be prepared and pay attention to his own safety.

I returned to Jiujiang from Lushan and continued to communicate to various troops according to the original plan. In addition to Ye Ting's 24th Division, there are also some other units under Zhang Fakui, especially Li Hanhun's 25th Division, which I went to more often.

After receiving our notice, some troops gathered towards Nanchang one after another. Ye Ting's 24th Division, He Long's 20th Army, and Cai Tingkai's 10th Division marched toward Nanchang separately. The 12th Division and the 25th Division remained in the Jiujiang area, and the 25th Division was one of the main forces scheduled to participate in the uprising. The entire preparation work was carried out relatively carefully. Because our party has continuously dispatched a large number of party cadres to the army since the founding of the National Revolutionary Army, almost all branches of the army have our party's strength. Therefore, once the instructions for the uprising were conveyed, everyone quickly made preparations according to the party's requirements. The work of our former enemy's Military Commission went relatively smoothly and the scheduled tasks were completed.

　At Mahuiling

　When we were almost finished conveying the message to the troops, Comrade Enlai arrived in Jiujiang. At that time, the date on which the uprising would be held had not been finalized. The task enlai gave us before going to Nanchang was to try to bring the 25th Division to Nanchang to participate in the uprising, and to be responsible for picking up the troops and scattered personnel who arrived in Jiujiang in the future, so that they could arrive in Nanchang in time. How to contact people after the Nanchang Uprising started? We did not have a radio station at that time, and we were afraid of using civilian telegraphs because they were unreliable. In order to solve the communication problem, Enlai and I agreed that as soon as there was an attack in Nanchang, a train would be sent to Mahuiling. As soon as the train arrived, we would first transport the baggage and heavy trucks away, and then the troops would drive to Nanchang.

After Enlai left, we decided that I would go to Mahuiling to pull the 25th Division, and Comrade Yan Changyi would stay in Jiujiang to handle the response work. Because of this arrangement, Yan Changyi later went directly to Shanghai instead of Nanchang.

During the two or three days I was in Mahuiling, my work was very stressful. The scope of communication about the uprising was further expanded, individual or collective talks were held many times, preparations for the uprising were mobilized, and various specific plans for the uprising were formulated.

On the afternoon of August 1, a train arrived from Nanchang. We are very happy to know that Nanchang has taken action. Fortunately, I had informed my comrades in advance and made preparations, so once I took action, I was busy but not in a hurry. After discussing with Comrade Zhou Shidi (who was the commander of the 73rd Regiment of the 25th Division at the time), I decided to immediately transport the heavy equipment train away, and the troops then concentrated on De'an . Li Hanhun, the commander of the 25th Division, was a close confidant of Zhang Fakui. The division had jurisdiction over the 73rd, 74th, and 75th regiments.

From Wuhan to Jiujiang

After the “Fifth National Congress” of our party, the domestic political situation became more tense. First, and Feng Yuxiang fell over, and he "gifted" all the political workers out. Liu Bojian and many other comrades came out of Feng Yuxiang's army at this time.

In early June, Wang Jingwei , Tang Shengzhi, Feng Yuxiang and other so-called "leftists" met in Zhengzhou to divide the spoils and made the Zhengzhou Agreement. Feng Yuxiang occupied Henan and Tang Shengzhi returned to Wuhan. In this way, Chiang Kai-shek , Wang Jingwei, Feng Yuxiang, Tang Shengzhi, etc. all got together and pointed the finger at the Communist Party. Our original plan to rely on Wang Jingwei to counter Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist coup was shattered.

The situation is very unfavorable to us, and the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is a foregone conclusion. what to do? The only way out is to hold an armed uprising and resist the Kuomintang's massacre policy. However, there was a fierce debate within the party about whether to engage in armed resistance or compromise. Chen Duxiu was firmly opposed to armed struggle. At this time, the Central Committee conveyed to us the instructions of the Communist International, proposed a non-capitalist future for the Chinese revolution, and asked us to arm ourselves and organize a team of 50,000 people. This played a strong role in promoting our determination to launch the Nanchang Uprising. Unexpectedly, this instruction from the International was shown to Wang Jingwei by International representative Luo Yi, which caused Wang Jingwei to accelerate the conspiracy to suppress the Communist Party. This also prompted us to launch the Nanchang Uprising as soon as possible.

In mid-July, the Central Committee formed a five-member Provisional Political Bureau, eliminated Chen Duxiu's erroneous leadership, issued the July 13 Declaration, and determined the general policy of armed struggle.

The Nanchang Uprising was decided by the central government at a meeting in Wuhan in mid-July. I didn't attend that meeting. That night, Comrade Enlai went to the Military Commission after the meeting and conveyed it to several comrades working in the Military Commission. The main message he conveyed was that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were split, and we had no other choice but to revolt. Today, a decision was made at the Central Committee meeting to hold an uprising in Nanchang, China. Comrade Enlai also said that the meeting decided to organize a committee of former enemies and designated him as its secretary. After he conveyed the message, he appointed He Chang, Yan Changyi and me to form the Former Enemy Military Committee, with me as the secretary. The task is to go to Jiujiang first to inform our comrades so that they understand the central government's intentions and prepare for an uprising. But when to launch an attack, we must obey the orders of the central government.

At that time, our troops in Jiujiang included Ye Ting's 24th Division and He Long's 20th Army. Other units of Zhang Fakui's Second Front Army are also in the Jiujiang area. There were many Communist Party members in these troops.

We left a week earlier than Comrade Enlai. I attended the Jiujiang Talks on July 20 mentioned in a report written by Ye Ting after the Nanchang Uprising.

Before and after Wang Jingwei openly betrayed the revolution, due to the tense situation in Wuhan, many responsible comrades of our party arrived in Jiujiang. The talk meeting on the 20th that Ye Ting mentioned was actually a meeting of some central leaders. Ye Ting and I were together at that time, because we decided in Wuhan that we would be the first to notify Ye Ting when we arrived in Jiujiang. After we arrived in Jiujiang, we stayed at Ye Ting's headquarters.

Attending the 20th talk were Tan Pingshan , Li Lisan, Yun Daiying, Deng Zhongxia and other comrades, as well as some Central Committee members and Comrade Ye Ting. At the meeting, Li Lisan and other comrades were impatient and advocated immediate action. I said no, we must wait for the central government’s order. He said that since it had been communicated to the troops and the uprising work had been organized, all he had to do was issue an order! I said, it's not that simple. Our mission here is to be prepared to organize the troops to revolt, and preparations are also very important. However, several Central Committee members advocated doing it immediately without waiting for orders from the Central Committee, especially Li Lisan, who said that I was a slaver, cowardly, etc. I said that when it came, Comrade Enlai made it clear that there must be orders from the central government and that we cannot act freely. Li Lisan also said, you must listen to the Central Committee members. I said, they are all members of the Central Committee. Which Central Committee member should I listen to? Central Committee members must also listen to the Central Committee. After some debate, the meeting finally decided to wait for the central government's order.

After we arrived in Jiujiang, we communicated it to each unit, because the uprising plan was very secret. It was mainly communicated to the comrades in charge of each unit. Some units communicated it more widely. We introduced the entire situation to these cadres, explained the tasks, and pointed out that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were split, and we had no other choice but to revolt. Then, tell them to make all preparations and act immediately as soon as they receive the central order.

During this period, I also took a trip to Lushan . At that time, Boroding was in Lushan and asked me to brief him on the plans and preparations for the Nanchang Uprising. I quickly went up the mountain and briefed him on the central government's decision and the troops' preparations. At that time, Comrade Zhang Tailei was the translator. The reason why Borodin came to me to understand the situation was because he was about to return to China and wanted to know what our party would do next so that he could have an explanation after he returned. Therefore, after listening to my introduction, he did not express any opinion. Soon, he was transferred back to China. Many years later, Comrade Enlai asked me, was it Borodin or Luo Minaz that I saw in Lushan Mountain? I said Borodin.

According to the tasks given by Comrade Enlai, I also made a special trip to notify Comrade Liu Shaoqi. In Jiujiang, I learned about Comrade Shaoqi's residence through Comrade Lin Boqu's younger brother Lin Zulie (I can't remember the specific location). He seemed to be recuperating from lung disease at the time. After meeting with him, I informed him that the Central Committee had decided to stage an uprising in Nanchang, and asked him to be prepared and pay attention to his own safety.

I returned to Jiujiang from Lushan and continued to communicate to various troops according to the original plan. In addition to Ye Ting's 24th Division, there are also some other units under Zhang Fakui, especially Li Hanhun's 25th Division, which I went to more often.

After receiving our notice, some troops gathered towards Nanchang one after another. Ye Ting's 24th Division, He Long's 20th Army, and Cai Tingkai's 10th Division marched toward Nanchang separately. The 12th Division and the 25th Division remained in the Jiujiang area, and the 25th Division was one of the main forces scheduled to participate in the uprising. The entire preparation work was carried out relatively carefully. Because our party has continuously dispatched a large number of party cadres to the army since the founding of the National Revolutionary Army, almost all branches of the army have our party's strength. Therefore, once the instructions for the uprising were conveyed, everyone quickly made preparations according to the party's requirements. The work of our former enemy's Military Commission went relatively smoothly and the scheduled tasks were completed.

　At Mahuiling

　When we were almost finished conveying the message to the troops, Comrade Enlai arrived in Jiujiang. At that time, the date on which the uprising would be held had not been finalized. The task enlai gave us before going to Nanchang was to try to bring the 25th Division to Nanchang to participate in the uprising, and to be responsible for picking up the troops and scattered personnel who arrived in Jiujiang in the future, so that they could arrive in Nanchang in time. How to contact people after the Nanchang Uprising started? We did not have a radio station at that time, and we were afraid of using civilian telegraphs because they were unreliable. In order to solve the communication problem, Enlai and I agreed that as soon as there was an attack in Nanchang, a train would be sent to Mahuiling. As soon as the train arrived, we would first transport the baggage and heavy trucks away, and then the troops would drive to Nanchang.

After Enlai left, we decided that I would go to Mahuiling to pull the 25th Division, and Comrade Yan Changyi would stay in Jiujiang to handle the response work. Because of this arrangement, Yan Changyi later went directly to Shanghai instead of Nanchang.

During the two or three days I was in Mahuiling, my work was very stressful. The scope of communication about the uprising was further expanded, individual or collective talks were held many times, preparations for the uprising were mobilized, and various specific plans for the uprising were formulated.

On the afternoon of August 1, a train arrived from Nanchang. We are very happy to know that Nanchang has taken action. Fortunately, I had informed my comrades in advance and made preparations, so once I took action, I was busy but not in a hurry. After discussing with Comrade Zhou Shidi (who was the commander of the 73rd Regiment of the 25th Division at the time), I decided to immediately transport the heavy equipment train away, and the troops then concentrated on De'an . Li Hanhun, the commander of the 25th Division, was a close confidant of Zhang Fakui. The division had jurisdiction over the 73rd, 74th, and 75th regiments.The predecessor of the 73rd Regiment is the Ye Ting Independent Regiment. The 75th Regiment is a newly formed unit. The leader of the 74th Regiment is not one of ours. Our foundation in this regiment is relatively poor, and we are not sure about pulling them into an uprising.

In Mahuiling, we first pulled out the 73rd Regiment and asked the 75th Regiment to follow. The leader of the Seventy-fifth Regiment is a student of Sun Yizhong, Huangpu, Anhui, and is a very good comrade. However, because they were with the division headquarters and had difficulty moving, they decided not to bring backpacks, luggage, or food burdens, but only weapons and ammunition, and pulled the troops out in the name of fighting in the wilderness. We only brought out one reconnaissance company from the 74th Regiment. The commander of the reconnaissance company was a member of the Communist Party and a native of Qiongya. I can’t remember his name clearly. He led the reconnaissance company to participate in the uprising.

Before the Seventy-Fifth Regiment had finished walking, and only halfway through, Zhang Fakui came by train. He knew that the 73rd Regiment was our unit, and now that the 75th Regiment was moving again, he felt nervous. He stood at the door of the train and shouted: "What are you doing? Stop!" There was only a railway bridge between me and him. Zhang Fakui's train was parked on the other side of the bridge. I could clearly see it was him. I analyze that besides wanting to stop the actions of the 75th Regiment, Zhang Fakui would not dare to mobilize the 74th Regiment to fight against us. Because the 10th Division and the 24th Division have left, only the 12th Division and the 25th Division are left. The two regiments of the 25th Division were also pulled out by us. What else can he do! However, Nanchang is taking action and cannot let him pass.

So, I immediately said to Platoon Leader Li (whose name I forgot, who was also a work-study student in France and had studied in the Soviet Union) who was following me: "Let them drive quickly! If he didn't drive, he fired into the air." The commander immediately yelled at them to drive, but they didn't move. I said, "Let go!" A row of guns was fired, and Zhang Fakui jumped out of the car in a panic and ran away. Also jumping out of the car with him were Li Hanhun and a few others. Later, Comrade Ye Jianying told me that he was also there when Zhang Fakui jumped out of the car. Zhang Fakui ran in a hurry and left his guards and some things in the car, and we captured them all. Comrade He Chang was also on that train. After the train arrived in De'an, Zhang Fakui sent a staff officer with a letter from him, requesting that his telescope be returned to him. I said, yes. Even his guards were sent back because we had not completely broken with Zhang Fakui at that time.

The entire operation was a success. Almost all organized troops were pulled out. We have almost mastered the basic strength of the 25th Division. With slight additions, it was organized into a complete organic division under the 11th Army. During the southern march, it was one of the main forces of the rebel army.

Later, Zhou Shidi and I divided the work. He led the 73rd Regiment and I led the 75th Regiment and quickly headed towards Nanchang. After we arrived in De'an, the train was blocked, so we walked to Nanchang overnight. We arrived at the foot of Nanchang City at dawn the next day, just before dawn.

　In Nanchang

　On the day we arrived in Nanchang, the weather was very hot. I bought a big watermelon and ate more than half of it in one go. At that time, I was young, strong, and energetic, and the fatigue of the journey and the heat of the weather were over in one go.

In Nanchang City, I found Enlai’s residence. I remember it was in a school. I reported the situation to Enlai, and he said, "The operation was successful! I didn't expect it to go so smoothly, and most of the 25th Division was pulled out." Then, he told me about the victory of the Nanchang Uprising. During the Nanchang Uprising, our army eliminated 4,000 to 5,000 enemy troops and surrendered more than 5,000 guns, more than 700,000 rounds of ammunition, and other weapons, equipment, and supplies.

The Nanchang Uprising was victorious, but what to do after the victory? According to the central government's predetermined plan, the troops immediately went south, occupied Guangdong, and obtained Haikou in order to obtain international assistance and then launch the second Northern Expedition. Under the strategic policy of the central government, they only wanted to go south and gain time to reach Guangdong. They ignored everything else, so the rebels left Nanchang in a hurry.

The second day after I arrived in Nanchang, that is, August 3, some troops began to set off. The troops participating in the uprising did not get a rest, and more importantly, they did not reorganize the troops.Because some troops are not reliable yet, and some have been pulled over reluctantly, they should all be seriously rectified. Two of the regimental commanders in the 24th Division were unreliable. They wanted to replace them, but there was no time to make arrangements. It wasn't until the Central Committee took measures on the way south that the two men were reassigned as deputy division commanders and left the troops under his control. Other troops did not even have such reorganization.

Take the Tenth Division as an example. This unit originally belonged to Chen Mingshu and was later commanded by Zhang Fakui. The division commander Cai Tingkai was a close confidant of Chen Mingshu. At that time, he did not sincerely support our party. The troops arrived in Nanchang only one or two days before the uprising. It should have been adjusted so that we could grasp it with certainty, or at least not be able to act alone as an avant-garde. The thirty-fourth of the Tenth Division, the regiment commander Fan Xin, fought very well in Henan during the Northern Expedition, and the unit was very famous. Fan Xin was not only a famous regiment commander, but also a very loyal Communist Party member. I conveyed to him the central government's decision on the uprising in Jiujiang. There are also some Communist Party members in this regiment working at the battalion and company levels. As long as we make arrangements, we can completely control the entire regiment.

In addition, there are also some of our comrades in the 29th Regiment. Therefore, as for the Tenth Division, it can be controlled as long as we are vigilant, make appropriate adjustments to the cadres or transfer some troops, change the composition of the troops, and make careful arrangements among the party members. However, after the victory of the uprising, there was no timely rectification and no adjustment of cadres. Although some people have expressed opinions on this, Ye Ting believed that Cai Tingkai had no problem and blindly trusted him. He also believed that Cai Tingkai was enthusiastic about returning to Guangdong and was willing to obey orders. What? No measures were taken. When setting off, Cai Tingkai was asked to lead the 10th Division as the vanguard, but Cai Tingkai took advantage of the opportunity. The division set off on August 3, and on the 4th arrived at Jinxian and defected to his old boss Chen Mingshu. In this way, one of our divisions was wiped out in one fell swoop. Those thirty-four, what a good unit they are! Due to mistakes in our work, we were dismissed. We were very sad to hear the news when we set off from Nanchang.

Because we did not stay in Nanchang, some other

troops who came to participate in the uprising did not catch up with us. For example, the Wuhan branch of the Central Military and Political School (including the girls' team) is under our control. Many of the Communist Party members among them also decided to participate in the uprising. After setting off from Wuhan, they first arrived in Jiujiang and were disarmed by Zhang Fakui. After Comrade Ye Jianying suggested to Zhang Fakui, the school should be reorganized into the Second Front Army Teaching Corps. Comrade Jianying personally served as the leader of the regiment. With Zhang Fakui's consent, the unit was retained. This group later came to Guangzhou and participated in the Guangzhou Uprising. Comrade Chen Yi was the party secretary of the Wuhan branch at the time. He also came to participate in the Nanchang Uprising. When he arrived near Jiujiang, he found that the situation had changed, so he tried to get rid of the enemy and ran to Nanchang with several other comrades to find us. Because we left early, we didn't catch up with him when we arrived in Nanchang. He didn't catch up with the troops until they were on the southern march.

In addition, when we were in Wuhan, we established the Second Front Army Guard Regiment, which was responsible for guarding the National Government . This regiment was formed by transferring some companies from the Ye Ting Independent Regiment. The regiment leader, Comrade Lu Deming, was originally a student of Huangpu Phase II and served as company commander and battalion commander in the Ye Ting Independent Regiment. This unit originally decided to participate in the Nanchang Uprising. However, when they arrived at Huangshi from Wuhan, they learned that we had left Nanchang and Jiujiang was controlled by Zhang Fakui, so they diverted to Xiushui and headed towards Nanchang because Unable to catch up with us, we stopped at Xiushui and later participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Comrade Mao Zedong.

After the success of the Nanchang Uprising, our army was organized into three armies: the 9th, 11th, and 20th armies. They continued to use the old designations and were still called the Second Front Army. Comrade Zhu De was appointed deputy commander of the Ninth Army, Comrade He Long was appointed commander of the 20th Army and acting commander-in-chief of the Second Front Army, Comrade Ye Ting was appointed commander of the 11th Army and commander-in-chief of the former enemy, and concurrently commander of the 24th Division. I was appointed to the 11th Army Party representative. There are fifteen regiments in the rebel army.

　Going south

On August 3, our army began to move south.

Expeditions are a taboo for military strategists, and it is a hot summer day with the scorching sun.The troops marched southward non-stop under the scorching sun. On the way, supplies, drinking water, etc. were poorly managed, and they were exhausted and sick, resulting in serious attrition. Not only did they lose their cannons, but they also lost a lot of other weapons and ammunition. In addition, one of Cai Tingkai's divisions ran away as soon as they left Nanchang, and the mood of the troops could not help but be affected.

On the way south, we passed through Linchuan , Yihuang , Guangchang and other places, and on the way to Ruijin , we fought a battle in Rentian City. This is our first battle since going south. The vanguard was Comrade He Long's 20th Army. After encountering the two regiments of the enemy Qian Dajun's unit, they fought fiercely. Although they drove the enemy away, they themselves suffered heavy losses.

After the battle of Rentian, our army marched into Ruijin. I heard that there was a division of Qian Dajun in Huichang and Rentian's enemies also retreated to Huichang, so we concentrated our efforts to attack Huichang. The battle in Huichang began on August 30. The battle was fierce. The main participating troops were the 24th Division and the 25th Division, and the 20th Army also participated. Enlai, Ye Ting, Bocheng and I were all commanding on the same hilltop. After fierce fighting, although Qian Dajun's main force was defeated, our army suffered more than a thousand casualties, and cadre casualties were also heavy. Comrade Chen Geng was seriously injured in this battle.

After defeating Qian Dajun’s main force, we will occupy Huichang. One day after occupying Huichang, I was taking a nap when I heard another fighting outside. Later I found out that it was Huang Shaohong's troops coming from Luokou and encountered our army. As soon as we discovered the enemy, we organized a counterattack and at dusk, we drove the enemy back. After these battles, I deeply feel that the bravery of the rebels is not a problem, but we are all young and lack combat command experience. When we encounter the enemy, we fight hard, so we often drive the enemy away in one battle. He didn't kill many enemies, but he suffered a lot of casualties.

After the battle in Huichang, we gathered in Ruijin again. At that time, there were two roads in front of us: one was to go south via Huichang, from Gannan to Xunwu and other places to Hailufeng, and then to Guangzhou. This road was a shortcut and the shortest distance. But we did not take this route. The main reason was that there were thousands of wounded people and a lot of baggage, which made transportation very difficult. So we had to turn back to Ruijin and enter Fujian. We took the waterway through Tingzhou and Shanghang to transport the wounded. The troops and baggage were all loaded onto the ship and sailed down the Tingjiang River and Hanjiang River without encountering any enemies.

On September 24, our army occupied Chaoshan. However, when marching towards Chaoshan, the decision was made to divide the troops. Comrade Zhu De commanded Zhou Shidi's 25th Division to stay at Sanheba to contain the enemy. In fact, looking at it today, it is completely inappropriate to leave behind our strongest main division to defend Sanheba. In Chaoshan, the troops were further divided, leaving the Third Division of the 20th Army (division commander Comrade Zhou Yiqun) to guard Chaoshan. As a result of this dispersion of forces, the main force of our army that finally marched towards Jieyang was only the 24th Division of the 11th Army and the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 20th Army (these two divisions were not full), less than six Thousands of people entered Tangkeng and encountered the enemy Xue Yue 's troops. The battle was very fierce and the stalemate continued.

When our army was fighting fiercely with the enemy here, Huang Shaohong led two divisions and commanded the rest of Qian Dajun's troops to attack our Chaozhou and Sanheba. Its purpose is: attacking Sanheba is to restrain our army and prevent it from going south; capturing Chaozhou can threaten Shantou , cut off the communication between our various ministries, and divide us, which will help him defeat our army one by one. The third division guarding Chaozhou was a newly formed unit with poor combat effectiveness. Chaozhou was captured by Huang Shaohong, and our army in Sanheba was isolated. Later, when our army was defeated in Tangkeng, fierce fighting also broke out in Sanheba. Comrade Zhu De led the 25th Division to withdraw southward, intending to get closer to the main force. However, he heard news of the main force's setback midway. Before reaching Shantou, he diverted to Raoping and retreated north to Wuping area in Fujian Province.

In the battle of Tangkeng, our troops were very brave.The two sides were separated by a small hilltop, and they saw each other repeatedly. You hit me with a grenade, and I hit you with a grenade. You rushed over, and I rushed over. I remember that there was a battalion commander in the 24th Division named Liao Kuaihu, who was very brave. He commanded the troops and the enemy to repeatedly fight for position. The enemy rushed up and all the troops were exhausted. He sat on the position and would rather die than retreat, and perished with the position. In this way, after a fierce battle, both the enemy and ourselves suffered heavy casualties. We were exhausted and had to withdraw from the battle. We withdrew, but the enemy was frightened by the bravery of our army and did not dare to pursue us, so he also withdrew.

What should I do after it is removed? The Revolutionary Committee and the Staff Group did not issue an order to retreat, nor did they give instructions on where to go. At the beginning, we originally planned to occupy Tangkeng and Fengshun. Since we could not even occupy Tangkeng, we had to change our mind and retreat to Chaozhou. However, on the way, I met an adjutant of Comrade He Long. He said that Chaozhou was lost, Shantou could not be saved, and the Revolutionary Committee had been transferred to Hailufeng. Ye Ting and I discussed where to go? Ye Ting said that going to the sea and Lu Feng was not an option because the 24th Division suffered too many casualties, and the 25th Division was separated at Sanheba and lost contact. We went to the sea and Lufeng, and the farther we went, the further away from the 25th Division. This would not work. .

He said, go to Fujian, where the enemy is weak. There is only one division of Zhang Zhen, which does not have much combat effectiveness. We can find the 25th Division and take them with us. I think Ye Ting's idea is correct. When he followed Sun Yat-sen, he worked in Fujian for a while. He understood the situation there and it was a good idea. However, as a party representative, I cannot but consider it further. After much thought, I finally said that this would not work. We had not received an order. If we left like this, wouldn't it mean that we were all going our separate ways and acting alone? It’s not okay to act without orders! Let's find out the reasons behind this.

Then, we turned around and headed west, passing through Jieyang to Liusha, where we found the Revolutionary Committee and Comrade Enlai. He was suffering from a high fever and was in a coma. Many leading comrades are here. When we arrived, they were already having a meeting. So, we also attended the meeting. At the meeting, Ye Ting did not advocate going to Hailufeng. He said that there were already enemies in Hailufeng. At the same time, when we got there, we were attacked by enemies coming from two directions, Guangzhou and Tangkeng, and it was a small area. It was a battle against the water, and the terrain was unfavorable. I think Ye Ting's opinion is correct. It seems that he has realized that the 25th Division was isolated, the 24th Division suffered heavy casualties, and the Tangkeng battle was not won. It would be difficult to continue the fight.

However, we learned that Comrade He Long’s 20th Army had already advanced towards Hailufeng, and everyone was talking about it.

At this time, Enlai was still suffering from a fever and couldn't even eat gruel. Sometimes he was delirious and even shouted "Chong!" Go! I advised him to take a good rest.

While we were discussing, we received a report that the two divisions of the 20th Army in front had surrendered.

This incident once again gave me a profound understanding: in order to transform the old army into a new revolutionary army, it must undergo a thorough transformation. Otherwise, if there is any storm, we will not be able to withstand it.

After getting this situation, everyone’s opinions are even more inconsistent. Just when I was nervous, there was another fight outside the town.

　After the defeat

　The enemy attacked, and after the fighting near the quicksand, the troops were in chaos. The troops that had withdrawn from the 24th Division were mixed with the people from the Revolutionary Committee. The units were so messed up that not a single organic unit could be found. There was no way to adjust the machine gun . There was no way to find the barrel. Gun rack, what a mess. Under such circumstances, Ye Ting and I always followed Comrade Enlai. In the end, there were only a few of us left. We were not familiar with the road and did not understand the local language. We only had one small pistol in total and were not even capable of self-defense. Thanks to Comrade Peng Pai's work foundation here, the farmers were very kind to us and no accidents occurred.

We managed to find Comrade Yang Shihun. He was one of the leaders of the local party organization and we had known each other in the past.I told him, you are familiar with the local situation, but you can't leave us. We don't even understand the local dialect. You have to find a way to escort us to Hong Kong, and you are familiar with the relationships along the way. Comrade Yang Shihun was very kind and agreed wholeheartedly, and then he started working with us.

We moved to a small village not far from Liusha. In the evening, Comrade Yang Shihun found a stretcher and carried Comrade Enlai on it, and then transferred to Jiazi Port in Lufeng. Here, he found another boat and took us out to sea.

That boat is really too small, it’s really a boat. The four of us - Enlai, Ye Ting, Yang Shihun and I, plus the boatman, packed the boat full. We arranged Enlai to lie down in the cabin, and there was no room for another person in the cabin. The three of us and the boatman had to huddle on the deck. The boat was too small, there wasn't much space on the deck, and the wind and waves were so strong that the boat shook violently, making it difficult to stand or even sit firmly. I tied my body to the mast with a rope to prevent it from being shaken into the sea. This journey was quite difficult. After two days and one night of bumping and fighting in the vast ocean, we finally arrived in Hong Kong.

After arriving in Hong Kong, Comrade Yang Shihun got in touch with the Provincial Party Committee and arranged for Comrade Enlai to stay for treatment, and then he left.
When Yang Shihun left, we were in a hurry and failed to ask for the secret code for contacting the provincial party committee. Ye Ting and I went to the provincial party committee to negotiate. Since we didn't know how to negotiate and were not dressed appropriately, the comrades in the organization didn't know who we were and wouldn't communicate with us. We didn't dare to walk on the street, and we didn't even dare to enter a restaurant, so we found a small rice stall, bought two bowls of rice and some Cantonese sausage, ate it in a hurry and left. Where to go? I had no choice but to find a small hotel to stay in, bought clothes and shoes, changed them, took a shower, and had my hair cut, and then I dared to go out on the streets.

There is a joke here. I had no experience at that time and didn’t know how to bring some money. I didn’t have any money, so how could I live? Comrade Ye Ting has experience. He carries a lot of money with him and a lot of notes in his waist. One time, he took out a one hundred Hong Kong dollar to buy something. The merchant looked at it and said that the note was fake. Ye Ting got angry when he heard it. He took the note and tore it into pieces in a few strokes. I pulled him aside and whispered, Boss, why are you doing this? When people see that you don't care so much, and you casually took a hundred-yuan note, don't you doubt us? He explained that my lie was reasonable. Otherwise, if he suspected that I used counterfeit bills, it would be more troublesome to call the police. If I lied, it would be fine. With that said, we quickly left there.

Later, we changed hotels again, changed our clothes, and then started to contact the organization.

Ye Ting plans to settle down in Hong Kong and will soon bring his family to Hong Kong from Shanghai. I am alone and it is very convenient for me to move around. After establishing a relationship with the Provincial Party Committee, I was transferred to the Guangdong Provincial Military Commission.

The main force of the Nanchang Uprising suffered setbacks in Tangkeng and Liusha. However, the two divisions of the 11th Army did not collapse due to the strong foundation of the party's work. Under the leadership of Comrade Dong Lang, the remaining troops of the 24th Division arrived in Haifeng, , and integrated with the local peasant movement to open up and maintain the Hailufeng base area. Regarding the situation of the 25th Division, not long after I arrived in Hong Kong, Yang Xinyu of the 25th Division came to Hong Kong. He reported to me the situation of the division after the failure of the uprising: They retreated to Wuping and were attacked by Qian Dajun's 10th Army. When the Eighth Division pursued, our army originally had the advantage, but the division commander ordered a retreat, and the retreat was poorly planned, resulting in heavy losses. At this time, there were more than 1,500 troops and more than 1,500 guns. Retreating to Xinfeng, the troops were extremely tired. Comrade Zhao Zixuan, whom we sent to pursue the troops, failed to arrive again. Zhou Shidi and other division and regiment cadres left the team one after another (Comrade Zhou Shidi came to Hong Kong soon), and some middle- and lower-level officers and soldiers also left the team voluntarily.

Faced with this difficult and chaotic situation, Comrade Zhu De was very determined. He organized the army into four detachments and said to everyone: "If you don't want to continue to struggle, you can walk out. There are only ten or eight guns. I still have Want revolution." After hearing this, I deeply admired Comrade Zhu De. At the same time, I was worried about him, fearing that the troops would lose control and collapse.I immediately wrote a report on these situations to the Central Military Commission and suggested to the Central Military Commission that the 25th Division should enter Hunan to join the local peasant movement in order to develop. Later, under the leadership of Comrades Zhu De and Chen Yi, this unit fought hard and passed through southern Jiangxi to Shonan, where it launched the Shonan Uprising. Finally, it went to Jinggangshan, where it joined forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Comrade Mao Zedong and became the main force in Jinggangshan. one.

Generally speaking, the Nanchang Uprising has great historical significance. It fired the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries and marked a new stage of the Chinese revolution led by our party - the beginning of the first second domestic revolutionary war . From then on, the Chinese people's own army was born. Many of our cadres also gained experience in revolutionary armed struggle and useful lessons from the practice of the Nanchang Uprising. However, looking back from today's perspective, the Nanchang Uprising also has profound lessons.

First of all, the strategic policy of going south to Guangdong is wrong. What are the particularly good conditions in Guangdong that make me want to go back? No, there are no particularly good conditions. The people of Guangdong have played a great role in various struggles against imperialism and warlords. However, since the "April 15" counter-revolutionary incident, the workers and peasants in Guangdong, especially the striking workers' organizations in Guangdong and Hong Kong, have been severely suppressed, and the revolutionary forces have been severely suppressed. Suffering severe damage, Guangdong, which was the base of the Northern Expedition, has changed its color. At that time, the plan was to use Guangdong as the base to regroup and launch another Northern Expedition. Under the overall situation of a strong enemy and a weak enemy, and a huge disparity in power, it was unrealistic. To say that victory or defeat is a common matter for military strategists is to talk about tactics. If the strategy is wrong, it will cause serious losses. The failure of the Southern Expedition proves this point.

After our uprising is victorious, if we don’t leave quickly, will we be in danger of being surrounded and eliminated? I don't think so. In fact, the situation is not that serious and the enemy is not that powerful. As far as the enemy situation is concerned, one is Zhu Peide's Third Army, the other is Cheng Qian's Sixth Army, and then there are Zhang Fakui's remaining troops. These are the total forces. The main force of Cheng Qian's Sixth Army is not near Nanchang, and only one of its regiments is in Nanchang; part of Zhu Peide's Third Army has been wiped out by us, and the rest are scattered. It will take some time for him to gather them together. , this unit is not strong in combat effectiveness and is easy to deal with; as for Zhang Fakui's unit, our party is very strong, and each regiment has some party members and members of the Peasant Association. This time, apart from the troops who participated in the uprising, he did not have many remaining troops. They only had the 74th Regiment of the 12th Division and the 25th Division. There are also many of our comrades in these two divisions. Therefore, Zhang Fakui's troops are not difficult to deal with.

Why must we go south? At that time, they also emphasized occupying Haikou in order to win foreign aid. Looking at it today, this idea lacks the spirit of self-reliance and is also wrong.

Originally, we did not necessarily have to go south. If we were to deploy our power near Nanchang or in the rural areas of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, facing the farmers, we could integrate with the local peasant movement, mobilize the masses, arm the masses, and rely on the masses. , we will be able to promote the agrarian revolution, carry out guerrilla warfare , and create revolutionary base areas. At that time, the Kuomintang was not unified. The new warlords were competing with each other for supremacy and there were many contradictions. As long as we are good at using their contradictions, we can continuously eliminate the enemy and defeat them one by one. Of course, this is just a current assumption. In fact, at that time, we lacked the idea of ​​​​agrarian revolution and did not realize the importance of encircling the cities from rural areas and establishing rural revolutionary base areas. Rural work was very weak; on the other hand, the composition of the insurgent army was very complex and no revolution was carried out. It is also impossible to combine the reform with the peasant movement. Therefore, it is actually impossible to do this.

Despite this, the general direction of the Nanchang Uprising, which is to use armed struggle to oppose the massacre policy of the Kuomintang reactionaries, is completely correct. It is just that our party is still young and we, the people, are also young and lack experience in struggle, especially experience in armed struggle. Therefore, it is inevitable to suffer setbacks and losses.

Because some troops are not reliable yet, and some have been pulled over reluctantly, they should all be seriously rectified. Two of the regimental commanders in the 24th Division were unreliable. They wanted to replace them, but there was no time to make arrangements. It wasn't until the Central Committee took measures on the way south that the two men were reassigned as deputy division commanders and left the troops under his control. Other troops did not even have such reorganization.

Take the Tenth Division as an example. This unit originally belonged to Chen Mingshu and was later commanded by Zhang Fakui. The division commander Cai Tingkai was a close confidant of Chen Mingshu. At that time, he did not sincerely support our party. The troops arrived in Nanchang only one or two days before the uprising. It should have been adjusted so that we could grasp it with certainty, or at least not be able to act alone as an avant-garde. The thirty-fourth of the Tenth Division, the regiment commander Fan Xin, fought very well in Henan during the Northern Expedition, and the unit was very famous. Fan Xin was not only a famous regiment commander, but also a very loyal Communist Party member. I conveyed to him the central government's decision on the uprising in Jiujiang. There are also some Communist Party members in this regiment working at the battalion and company levels. As long as we make arrangements, we can completely control the entire regiment.

In addition, there are also some of our comrades in the 29th Regiment. Therefore, as for the Tenth Division, it can be controlled as long as we are vigilant, make appropriate adjustments to the cadres or transfer some troops, change the composition of the troops, and make careful arrangements among the party members. However, after the victory of the uprising, there was no timely rectification and no adjustment of cadres. Although some people have expressed opinions on this, Ye Ting believed that Cai Tingkai had no problem and blindly trusted him. He also believed that Cai Tingkai was enthusiastic about returning to Guangdong and was willing to obey orders. What? No measures were taken. When setting off, Cai Tingkai was asked to lead the 10th Division as the vanguard, but Cai Tingkai took advantage of the opportunity. The division set off on August 3, and on the 4th arrived at Jinxian and defected to his old boss Chen Mingshu. In this way, one of our divisions was wiped out in one fell swoop. Those thirty-four, what a good unit they are! Due to mistakes in our work, we were dismissed. We were very sad to hear the news when we set off from Nanchang.

Because we did not stay in Nanchang, some other

troops who came to participate in the uprising did not catch up with us. For example, the Wuhan branch of the Central Military and Political School (including the girls' team) is under our control. Many of the Communist Party members among them also decided to participate in the uprising. After setting off from Wuhan, they first arrived in Jiujiang and were disarmed by Zhang Fakui. After Comrade Ye Jianying suggested to Zhang Fakui, the school should be reorganized into the Second Front Army Teaching Corps. Comrade Jianying personally served as the leader of the regiment. With Zhang Fakui's consent, the unit was retained. This group later came to Guangzhou and participated in the Guangzhou Uprising. Comrade Chen Yi was the party secretary of the Wuhan branch at the time. He also came to participate in the Nanchang Uprising. When he arrived near Jiujiang, he found that the situation had changed, so he tried to get rid of the enemy and ran to Nanchang with several other comrades to find us. Because we left early, we didn't catch up with him when we arrived in Nanchang. He didn't catch up with the troops until they were on the southern march.

In addition, when we were in Wuhan, we established the Second Front Army Guard Regiment, which was responsible for guarding the National Government . This regiment was formed by transferring some companies from the Ye Ting Independent Regiment. The regiment leader, Comrade Lu Deming, was originally a student of Huangpu Phase II and served as company commander and battalion commander in the Ye Ting Independent Regiment. This unit originally decided to participate in the Nanchang Uprising. However, when they arrived at Huangshi from Wuhan, they learned that we had left Nanchang and Jiujiang was controlled by Zhang Fakui, so they diverted to Xiushui and headed towards Nanchang because Unable to catch up with us, we stopped at Xiushui and later participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Comrade Mao Zedong.

After the success of the Nanchang Uprising, our army was organized into three armies: the 9th, 11th, and 20th armies. They continued to use the old designations and were still called the Second Front Army. Comrade Zhu De was appointed deputy commander of the Ninth Army, Comrade He Long was appointed commander of the 20th Army and acting commander-in-chief of the Second Front Army, Comrade Ye Ting was appointed commander of the 11th Army and commander-in-chief of the former enemy, and concurrently commander of the 24th Division. I was appointed to the 11th Army Party representative. There are fifteen regiments in the rebel army.

　Going south

On August 3, our army began to move south.

Expeditions are a taboo for military strategists, and it is a hot summer day with the scorching sun.The troops marched southward non-stop under the scorching sun. On the way, supplies, drinking water, etc. were poorly managed, and they were exhausted and sick, resulting in serious attrition. Not only did they lose their cannons, but they also lost a lot of other weapons and ammunition. In addition, one of Cai Tingkai's divisions ran away as soon as they left Nanchang, and the mood of the troops could not help but be affected.

On the way south, we passed through Linchuan , Yihuang , Guangchang and other places, and on the way to Ruijin , we fought a battle in Rentian City. This is our first battle since going south. The vanguard was Comrade He Long's 20th Army. After encountering the two regiments of the enemy Qian Dajun's unit, they fought fiercely. Although they drove the enemy away, they themselves suffered heavy losses.

After the battle of Rentian, our army marched into Ruijin. I heard that there was a division of Qian Dajun in Huichang and Rentian's enemies also retreated to Huichang, so we concentrated our efforts to attack Huichang. The battle in Huichang began on August 30. The battle was fierce. The main participating troops were the 24th Division and the 25th Division, and the 20th Army also participated. Enlai, Ye Ting, Bocheng and I were all commanding on the same hilltop. After fierce fighting, although Qian Dajun's main force was defeated, our army suffered more than a thousand casualties, and cadre casualties were also heavy. Comrade Chen Geng was seriously injured in this battle.

After defeating Qian Dajun’s main force, we will occupy Huichang. One day after occupying Huichang, I was taking a nap when I heard another fighting outside. Later I found out that it was Huang Shaohong's troops coming from Luokou and encountered our army. As soon as we discovered the enemy, we organized a counterattack and at dusk, we drove the enemy back. After these battles, I deeply feel that the bravery of the rebels is not a problem, but we are all young and lack combat command experience. When we encounter the enemy, we fight hard, so we often drive the enemy away in one battle. He didn't kill many enemies, but he suffered a lot of casualties.

After the battle in Huichang, we gathered in Ruijin again. At that time, there were two roads in front of us: one was to go south via Huichang, from Gannan to Xunwu and other places to Hailufeng, and then to Guangzhou. This road was a shortcut and the shortest distance. But we did not take this route. The main reason was that there were thousands of wounded people and a lot of baggage, which made transportation very difficult. So we had to turn back to Ruijin and enter Fujian. We took the waterway through Tingzhou and Shanghang to transport the wounded. The troops and baggage were all loaded onto the ship and sailed down the Tingjiang River and Hanjiang River without encountering any enemies.

On September 24, our army occupied Chaoshan. However, when marching towards Chaoshan, the decision was made to divide the troops. Comrade Zhu De commanded Zhou Shidi's 25th Division to stay at Sanheba to contain the enemy. In fact, looking at it today, it is completely inappropriate to leave behind our strongest main division to defend Sanheba. In Chaoshan, the troops were further divided, leaving the Third Division of the 20th Army (division commander Comrade Zhou Yiqun) to guard Chaoshan. As a result of this dispersion of forces, the main force of our army that finally marched towards Jieyang was only the 24th Division of the 11th Army and the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 20th Army (these two divisions were not full), less than six Thousands of people entered Tangkeng and encountered the enemy Xue Yue 's troops. The battle was very fierce and the stalemate continued.

When our army was fighting fiercely with the enemy here, Huang Shaohong led two divisions and commanded the rest of Qian Dajun's troops to attack our Chaozhou and Sanheba. Its purpose is: attacking Sanheba is to restrain our army and prevent it from going south; capturing Chaozhou can threaten Shantou , cut off the communication between our various ministries, and divide us, which will help him defeat our army one by one. The third division guarding Chaozhou was a newly formed unit with poor combat effectiveness. Chaozhou was captured by Huang Shaohong, and our army in Sanheba was isolated. Later, when our army was defeated in Tangkeng, fierce fighting also broke out in Sanheba. Comrade Zhu De led the 25th Division to withdraw southward, intending to get closer to the main force. However, he heard news of the main force's setback midway. Before reaching Shantou, he diverted to Raoping and retreated north to Wuping area in Fujian Province.

In the battle of Tangkeng, our troops were very brave.The two sides were separated by a small hilltop, and they saw each other repeatedly. You hit me with a grenade, and I hit you with a grenade. You rushed over, and I rushed over. I remember that there was a battalion commander in the 24th Division named Liao Kuaihu, who was very brave. He commanded the troops and the enemy to repeatedly fight for position. The enemy rushed up and all the troops were exhausted. He sat on the position and would rather die than retreat, and perished with the position. In this way, after a fierce battle, both the enemy and ourselves suffered heavy casualties. We were exhausted and had to withdraw from the battle. We withdrew, but the enemy was frightened by the bravery of our army and did not dare to pursue us, so he also withdrew.

What should I do after it is removed? The Revolutionary Committee and the Staff Group did not issue an order to retreat, nor did they give instructions on where to go. At the beginning, we originally planned to occupy Tangkeng and Fengshun. Since we could not even occupy Tangkeng, we had to change our mind and retreat to Chaozhou. However, on the way, I met an adjutant of Comrade He Long. He said that Chaozhou was lost, Shantou could not be saved, and the Revolutionary Committee had been transferred to Hailufeng. Ye Ting and I discussed where to go? Ye Ting said that going to the sea and Lu Feng was not an option because the 24th Division suffered too many casualties, and the 25th Division was separated at Sanheba and lost contact. We went to the sea and Lufeng, and the farther we went, the further away from the 25th Division. This would not work. .

He said, go to Fujian, where the enemy is weak. There is only one division of Zhang Zhen, which does not have much combat effectiveness. We can find the 25th Division and take them with us. I think Ye Ting's idea is correct. When he followed Sun Yat-sen, he worked in Fujian for a while. He understood the situation there and it was a good idea. However, as a party representative, I cannot but consider it further. After much thought, I finally said that this would not work. We had not received an order. If we left like this, wouldn't it mean that we were all going our separate ways and acting alone? It’s not okay to act without orders! Let's find out the reasons behind this.

Then, we turned around and headed west, passing through Jieyang to Liusha, where we found the Revolutionary Committee and Comrade Enlai. He was suffering from a high fever and was in a coma. Many leading comrades are here. When we arrived, they were already having a meeting. So, we also attended the meeting. At the meeting, Ye Ting did not advocate going to Hailufeng. He said that there were already enemies in Hailufeng. At the same time, when we got there, we were attacked by enemies coming from two directions, Guangzhou and Tangkeng, and it was a small area. It was a battle against the water, and the terrain was unfavorable. I think Ye Ting's opinion is correct. It seems that he has realized that the 25th Division was isolated, the 24th Division suffered heavy casualties, and the Tangkeng battle was not won. It would be difficult to continue the fight.

However, we learned that Comrade He Long’s 20th Army had already advanced towards Hailufeng, and everyone was talking about it.

At this time, Enlai was still suffering from a fever and couldn't even eat gruel. Sometimes he was delirious and even shouted "Chong!" Go! I advised him to take a good rest.

While we were discussing, we received a report that the two divisions of the 20th Army in front had surrendered.

This incident once again gave me a profound understanding: in order to transform the old army into a new revolutionary army, it must undergo a thorough transformation. Otherwise, if there is any storm, we will not be able to withstand it.

After getting this situation, everyone’s opinions are even more inconsistent. Just when I was nervous, there was another fight outside the town.

　After the defeat

　The enemy attacked, and after the fighting near the quicksand, the troops were in chaos. The troops that had withdrawn from the 24th Division were mixed with the people from the Revolutionary Committee. The units were so messed up that not a single organic unit could be found. There was no way to adjust the machine gun . There was no way to find the barrel. Gun rack, what a mess. Under such circumstances, Ye Ting and I always followed Comrade Enlai. In the end, there were only a few of us left. We were not familiar with the road and did not understand the local language. We only had one small pistol in total and were not even capable of self-defense. Thanks to Comrade Peng Pai's work foundation here, the farmers were very kind to us and no accidents occurred.

We managed to find Comrade Yang Shihun. He was one of the leaders of the local party organization and we had known each other in the past.I told him, you are familiar with the local situation, but you can't leave us. We don't even understand the local dialect. You have to find a way to escort us to Hong Kong, and you are familiar with the relationships along the way. Comrade Yang Shihun was very kind and agreed wholeheartedly, and then he started working with us.

We moved to a small village not far from Liusha. In the evening, Comrade Yang Shihun found a stretcher and carried Comrade Enlai on it, and then transferred to Jiazi Port in Lufeng. Here, he found another boat and took us out to sea.

That boat is really too small, it’s really a boat. The four of us - Enlai, Ye Ting, Yang Shihun and I, plus the boatman, packed the boat full. We arranged Enlai to lie down in the cabin, and there was no room for another person in the cabin. The three of us and the boatman had to huddle on the deck. The boat was too small, there wasn't much space on the deck, and the wind and waves were so strong that the boat shook violently, making it difficult to stand or even sit firmly. I tied my body to the mast with a rope to prevent it from being shaken into the sea. This journey was quite difficult. After two days and one night of bumping and fighting in the vast ocean, we finally arrived in Hong Kong.

After arriving in Hong Kong, Comrade Yang Shihun got in touch with the Provincial Party Committee and arranged for Comrade Enlai to stay for treatment, and then he left.
When Yang Shihun left, we were in a hurry and failed to ask for the secret code for contacting the provincial party committee. Ye Ting and I went to the provincial party committee to negotiate. Since we didn't know how to negotiate and were not dressed appropriately, the comrades in the organization didn't know who we were and wouldn't communicate with us. We didn't dare to walk on the street, and we didn't even dare to enter a restaurant, so we found a small rice stall, bought two bowls of rice and some Cantonese sausage, ate it in a hurry and left. Where to go? I had no choice but to find a small hotel to stay in, bought clothes and shoes, changed them, took a shower, and had my hair cut, and then I dared to go out on the streets.

There is a joke here. I had no experience at that time and didn’t know how to bring some money. I didn’t have any money, so how could I live? Comrade Ye Ting has experience. He carries a lot of money with him and a lot of notes in his waist. One time, he took out a one hundred Hong Kong dollar to buy something. The merchant looked at it and said that the note was fake. Ye Ting got angry when he heard it. He took the note and tore it into pieces in a few strokes. I pulled him aside and whispered, Boss, why are you doing this? When people see that you don't care so much, and you casually took a hundred-yuan note, don't you doubt us? He explained that my lie was reasonable. Otherwise, if he suspected that I used counterfeit bills, it would be more troublesome to call the police. If I lied, it would be fine. With that said, we quickly left there.

Later, we changed hotels again, changed our clothes, and then started to contact the organization.

Ye Ting plans to settle down in Hong Kong and will soon bring his family to Hong Kong from Shanghai. I am alone and it is very convenient for me to move around. After establishing a relationship with the Provincial Party Committee, I was transferred to the Guangdong Provincial Military Commission.

The main force of the Nanchang Uprising suffered setbacks in Tangkeng and Liusha. However, the two divisions of the 11th Army did not collapse due to the strong foundation of the party's work. Under the leadership of Comrade Dong Lang, the remaining troops of the 24th Division arrived in Haifeng, , and integrated with the local peasant movement to open up and maintain the Hailufeng base area. Regarding the situation of the 25th Division, not long after I arrived in Hong Kong, Yang Xinyu of the 25th Division came to Hong Kong. He reported to me the situation of the division after the failure of the uprising: They retreated to Wuping and were attacked by Qian Dajun's 10th Army. When the Eighth Division pursued, our army originally had the advantage, but the division commander ordered a retreat, and the retreat was poorly planned, resulting in heavy losses. At this time, there were more than 1,500 troops and more than 1,500 guns. Retreating to Xinfeng, the troops were extremely tired. Comrade Zhao Zixuan, whom we sent to pursue the troops, failed to arrive again. Zhou Shidi and other division and regiment cadres left the team one after another (Comrade Zhou Shidi came to Hong Kong soon), and some middle- and lower-level officers and soldiers also left the team voluntarily.

Faced with this difficult and chaotic situation, Comrade Zhu De was very determined. He organized the army into four detachments and said to everyone: "If you don't want to continue to struggle, you can walk out. There are only ten or eight guns. I still have Want revolution." After hearing this, I deeply admired Comrade Zhu De. At the same time, I was worried about him, fearing that the troops would lose control and collapse.I immediately wrote a report on these situations to the Central Military Commission and suggested to the Central Military Commission that the 25th Division should enter Hunan to join the local peasant movement in order to develop. Later, under the leadership of Comrades Zhu De and Chen Yi, this unit fought hard and passed through southern Jiangxi to Shonan, where it launched the Shonan Uprising. Finally, it went to Jinggangshan, where it joined forces with the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Comrade Mao Zedong and became the main force in Jinggangshan. one.

Generally speaking, the Nanchang Uprising has great historical significance. It fired the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries and marked a new stage of the Chinese revolution led by our party - the beginning of the first second domestic revolutionary war . From then on, the Chinese people's own army was born. Many of our cadres also gained experience in revolutionary armed struggle and useful lessons from the practice of the Nanchang Uprising. However, looking back from today's perspective, the Nanchang Uprising also has profound lessons.

First of all, the strategic policy of going south to Guangdong is wrong. What are the particularly good conditions in Guangdong that make me want to go back? No, there are no particularly good conditions. The people of Guangdong have played a great role in various struggles against imperialism and warlords. However, since the "April 15" counter-revolutionary incident, the workers and peasants in Guangdong, especially the striking workers' organizations in Guangdong and Hong Kong, have been severely suppressed, and the revolutionary forces have been severely suppressed. Suffering severe damage, Guangdong, which was the base of the Northern Expedition, has changed its color. At that time, the plan was to use Guangdong as the base to regroup and launch another Northern Expedition. Under the overall situation of a strong enemy and a weak enemy, and a huge disparity in power, it was unrealistic. To say that victory or defeat is a common matter for military strategists is to talk about tactics. If the strategy is wrong, it will cause serious losses. The failure of the Southern Expedition proves this point.

After our uprising is victorious, if we don’t leave quickly, will we be in danger of being surrounded and eliminated? I don't think so. In fact, the situation is not that serious and the enemy is not that powerful. As far as the enemy situation is concerned, one is Zhu Peide's Third Army, the other is Cheng Qian's Sixth Army, and then there are Zhang Fakui's remaining troops. These are the total forces. The main force of Cheng Qian's Sixth Army is not near Nanchang, and only one of its regiments is in Nanchang; part of Zhu Peide's Third Army has been wiped out by us, and the rest are scattered. It will take some time for him to gather them together. , this unit is not strong in combat effectiveness and is easy to deal with; as for Zhang Fakui's unit, our party is very strong, and each regiment has some party members and members of the Peasant Association. This time, apart from the troops who participated in the uprising, he did not have many remaining troops. They only had the 74th Regiment of the 12th Division and the 25th Division. There are also many of our comrades in these two divisions. Therefore, Zhang Fakui's troops are not difficult to deal with.

Why must we go south? At that time, they also emphasized occupying Haikou in order to win foreign aid. Looking at it today, this idea lacks the spirit of self-reliance and is also wrong.

Originally, we did not necessarily have to go south. If we were to deploy our power near Nanchang or in the rural areas of Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi, facing the farmers, we could integrate with the local peasant movement, mobilize the masses, arm the masses, and rely on the masses. , we will be able to promote the agrarian revolution, carry out guerrilla warfare , and create revolutionary base areas. At that time, the Kuomintang was not unified. The new warlords were competing with each other for supremacy and there were many contradictions. As long as we are good at using their contradictions, we can continuously eliminate the enemy and defeat them one by one. Of course, this is just a current assumption. In fact, at that time, we lacked the idea of ​​​​agrarian revolution and did not realize the importance of encircling the cities from rural areas and establishing rural revolutionary base areas. Rural work was very weak; on the other hand, the composition of the insurgent army was very complex and no revolution was carried out. It is also impossible to combine the reform with the peasant movement. Therefore, it is actually impossible to do this.

Despite this, the general direction of the Nanchang Uprising, which is to use armed struggle to oppose the massacre policy of the Kuomintang reactionaries, is completely correct. It is just that our party is still young and we, the people, are also young and lack experience in struggle, especially experience in armed struggle. Therefore, it is inevitable to suffer setbacks and losses.