Prussian Military theorist Karl von Klausewitz believes: "Political intention is an end, war is just a means, and there is never a means without a purpose. Therefore, politics not only determines the plan of the war, but also constantly affects the progress of the war."
1. There is no strategy, only strategy
However, if we talk about Russia's military actions in Ukraine in this situation, it is obvious that Russia has no clear strategy, no clear plan. Withdrawing from the "food transaction" and returning to the "food transaction", he issued a statement that "Russia will always be in Kelsson " and took the initiative to give up Kelsson: It seems that a completely illogical decision is being made. But if we base it on Russia's lack of strategy, then it can be said that there is still some logic in these actions.
For example, abandoning Khlsson means Putin chooses strategic defense and pursues the "minimum goal" of retaining the land corridor leading to Crimea , while trying to negotiate with the West and Ukraine.
This cannot be called a strategy - it is a strategy that is constrained by current reality. Putin found that the Russian army had less and less advantage over the Ukrainian army supported by NATO . On the contrary, it was inferior to them in many aspects (equipment, reconnaissance, communications, troop command and control, etc.).
Many people have a logical question - if the city was long destined to be abandoned, why would Putin hold a referendum to join Russia? Why assure people that Russia is always there? Now the Ukrainian Special Forces and Security Agency will begin looking for anyone who works with the Russian government, because not everyone evacuated from the city, and many people did not believe that Khlsson would be abandoned by the Russian army until the end.
The fact is that, as unbelievable as it sounds, one of the targets of the referendum is clearly Putin's goal to "strengthen his negotiating status with the West and Ukraine." Everything else is secondary. However, in reality, Russia's negotiating stance was and is weak in the past and present, and abandoning Khlsson led to its further weakening.
2. Ideological emptiness
Russia not only failed to gain military advantages over Ukraine, but also failed to mobilize Russian society, for several reasons.
First, from an ideological perspective, the 2014 Dongwu Uprising was more popular than the special military operations in 2022.
2014's resistance was bottom-up, Donbas and the vast majority of people in Russia believe that this is the beginning of Russian unification and the beginning of imperial rejuvenation. Donbas' uprising against the Kiev authorities is not social, but national—people want to be part of the Russian people and part of Russia.
But the cautious Putin gave up the opportunity and only took back Crimea.
22's military operation is top-down, and since many people do not understand the purpose of the operation, the war is not popular in Russia and does not form an ideological goal of the war.
DeNazization? Demilitarization? Desatanization? These are abstract and non-specific terms that are difficult to resonate with people. Protect Donbas? This is certainly good, but if the goal is to protect Donbas, what does Russia do to occupy Khlsong and Zaporozen regions? If the goal is to protect Donbas, why does Donetsk continue to be bombarded violently? The people are laymen, and they cannot understand this.
In contrast, Ukraine has expressed its goal - to integrate politically into " Western world ", that is, integrate into EU and NATO to build a nation-state. Return to the 1991 border militarily.
3. The West no longer fears Russia, and believes that negotiations are meaningless
Over time, the US government realized that it could provide Ukrainians with larger, more capable, long-range and heavy weapons, and the Russians did not respond. Russians can only bluff. The U.S. government's fear of angering Russians has diminished.
The West is no longer afraid of Russia. There are several reasons for this.First, they assess the true status of the Russian armed forces, and second, the intimidating remarks of Russian politicians are often inactive and are actually a scarecrow – therefore, not worthy of being taken seriously.
Republican Even if they win the U.S. election, it is unlikely that they have any impact on Ukraine's military conflict. Khlsson's escape without fighting weakened the negotiating status of Moscow . Russia cannot win a compelling victory in the war, so it is impossible to activate supporters of peace negotiations with Russia in the United States (think Korean War , without the victory of the first and second battles, will the Americans propose negotiations?). Kherson's abandonment will not be a step towards peace, maybe it will be a step towards a temporary truce in winter, but strategically speaking, a temporary truce will not fundamentally change the existing balance of power.
Overall, Russia is at a deadlock and retaining the corridor to Crimea seems to be the most realistic option right now, but the main question is not answered - how will Russia win the military conflict in Ukraine or at least get rid of it without losing face.
