Du Yuming recalled the Battle of Huaihai in his later years. He first fought Liu Bocheng to win, but was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek

2020/12/2415:05:10 history 714

Du Yuming is one of the more strategically minded commanders in the Kuomintang army. Before the Huaihai Battle, he had made accurate judgments on the trend of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in the East China battlefield and the possible wars. However, Chiang Kai-shek and did not plan the war according to his analysis, so Du Yuming refused to admit defeat after being captured and wanted to commit suicide. Later, after education and reform, his thinking finally turned a corner. After

​​was pardoned, Du Yuming recalled the history of the Huaihai Campaign. The original strategy of the Huaihai Campaign involved a plan for combat in the middle field, which aroused the amazement of many senior generals in our army. Z5z


Du Yuming recalled the Battle of Huaihai in his later years. He first fought Liu Bocheng to win, but was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek - DayDayNews

1. Du Yuming would like to fight against Su Yu

After the end of the Battle of Eastern Henan in 1948, the East China Field Army posed more and more threats to the main force of the national army in the direction of Xuzhou. On the broad front of the center, the sense of panic was increasing day by day, and I wonder when Su Yu will attack south again. In order to reverse the disadvantages, the Kuomintang army carried out strategic planning. The main host of this plan was Du Yuming, then deputy commander of the Xuzhou Anti-Japanese Army and commander of the Second Corps.

​​Du Yuming believes that although the East China Field Army has conquered Jinan, its overall strength is not as good as Xuzhou’s face-to-face national army. The national army still has the ability to initiate an offensive. The only worry is that if the national army takes the initiative to attack Huaye, Liu and Deng’s army in the middle field will take advantage of it. And into the offensive Xuzhou.

​​To this end, he developed a general strategy.

First, shrink the forces of the Xuzhou Suppression Headquarters, look for opportunities to attack the Huaye Section, surround it with surprise tactics and annihilate it. The specific attack direction was in southern Shandong, Yanzhou, Jining, and Dawenkou in the southwest of Shandong. This place is the closest to the headquarters of Xuzhou, and it is the place where the Huaye East and West Corps divide forces to catch the gap.

Second, the Huazhong Suppression Chief sent the main force to attack southern Henan and southwestern Henan, stumbling Liu and Deng's army in the middle field. If Liu Deng moved closer to East China quickly, the Xuzhou Suppression Chief and the Huazhong Suppression Chief would both stop and block, preventing the two major field armies from joining together. Later, as Du Yuming said, Bai Chongxi launched a raid on southwestern Henan in an attempt to contain Liu Bocheng, but Liu and Deng's army did not take advantage of this set and continued to attack the northeast.

Third, after breaking the first section of Huaye, the camera adopted a tactic of sticking to a certain point, luring Huaye’s main force to attack, and when its offensive frustrated, it would launch a full-line counterattack, and then regain the Jinan and Taian lines.

​​In all fairness, Du Yuming's strategy is still possible. His prediction can be said to be almost the same as that of Su Yu, the actual initiator of the Huaihai Campaign.

​​After our army conquered Jinan and won the battle of eastern Henan, its combat effectiveness declined to a certain extent. Due to the long-term continuous combat, the troops needed to rest and replenish, unable to support a comprehensive main decisive battle. Therefore, Su Yu's initial determination was to first fight the Z1z Huang Baitao Corps or Qiu Qingquan Corps, which are the most powerful in the Xuzhou Suppression Center, to break one of them and paralyze the overall situation, rather than to open the air and start a full fight with the Xuzhou National Army Corps. In Su Yu's plan,

​​indeed estimated that if the Huaihai Battle is to be a decisive battle, the middle and the wild must be combined into one, and all the troops must be concentrated in the final battle against Xuzhou.

​​It is conceivable that if Du Yuming continues to implement his strategy in Xuzhou, attacking southern and southwestern Shandong, he will inevitably use offense instead of defense, forcing Huaye to retract the main battlefield to Shandong. It is well known that the burden of the masses on the Shandong battlefield during the fierce war of liberation for several years has been very heavy. If the war is transferred from the outside to the inside again, even if the Huaye can still fight, it is difficult to say whether the liberated area can continue to support it.


Du Yuming recalled the Battle of Huaihai in his later years. He first fought Liu Bocheng to win, but was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek - DayDayNews

​​At this time, the Northeast battlefield suddenly changed. Wei Lihuang was in a panic in the Northeast Vietnam War. Chiang Kai-shek, regardless of the fear of changing the battlefield, transferred Du Yuming to the Northeast battlefield. The Xuzhou battlefield was still under the command of Liu Zhi. Liu Zhi was ridiculed as a pig by his colleagues in the National Army. He had no commanding ability. As soon as Du left, the military in Xuzhou actually came to a standstill. The so-called active counterattack also became empty talk, and Hua Ye was able to calmly rest and replenish troops.

2. Du Yuming saw that Guo Rugui was a spy.

At the end of October 1948, the overall situation of the Northeast was determined. Du Yuming was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to organize the retreat of the Northeastern Army in Huludao.

​​Chiang Kai-shek concocted a plan for the battle of Xu Beng, intending to withdraw the first-line national army from Xuzhou to the south bank of the Huai River, with Bengbu as the core, andThe 600,000 troops of the Xuzhou Suppression Headquarters were all gathered and fought against Huaye. This plan of

​​is far from the active offensive strategy that Du Yuming originally intended. It is purely passive defense. Therefore, he is very reluctant to go to the Huaihai battlefield to take over this mess. Therefore, he repeatedly used the excuse that the Northeast event was over and wanted to wait until the withdrawal of troops was over before returning south.

​​Du Yuming recalled in his later years that the first reason was that he did not want to bear the charge of giving up Xuzhou, because Chiang Kai-shek always liked to find a scapegoat afterwards. Abandoning a big city like Xuzhou, it is better to win in Bengbu. If you lose the battle, as the actual commander, you will certainly be in the wrong. Therefore, he wanted to wait for the national army to leave Xuzhou before going south.

​​Second, suspect Guo Rugui. At that time, Guo Rugui was the director of the Department of Operations of the National Defense Ministry of the Kuomintang, and he was mainly responsible for formulating the general combat plan of the national army. He joined the CCP in 1928 and later lost contact with the party. However, contact with the party has been restored during the Liberation War and has been secretly providing top-secret information to our party. He has been under Chen Cheng. Because of his outstanding combat command ability, he was appointed by Chen Chengcheng and then trusted by Chiang Kai-shek.


Du Yuming recalled the Battle of Huaihai in his later years. He first fought Liu Bocheng to win, but was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek - DayDayNews

Guo Rugui

​​Du Yuming suspected that he was a spy, but due to the lack of actual evidence, he could only continue to report to the Chief of Staff Gu Zhutong that Guo Rugui was suspected. Du Yuming sometimes went to Nanjing to report to Chiang Kai-shek about his battle plans, and even asked Gu Zhutong to not let Guo Rugui know in advance. Although Gu Zhutong thought it was reasonable, he did not dare to tell Chiang Kai-shek.

​​Du Yuming believes that this kind of useless plan might have been revealed to the CCP by Guo Rugui long ago, and even this kind of plan itself was Guo Rugui's attack on Chiang Kai-shek. This way, the cards are clearly displayed, and it is impossible to play.

, as expected by Du Yuming, even this relatively safe plan was not implemented afterwards. Guo Rugui took advantage of Chiang Kai-shek's suspicious character and suggested to him that he should fight in Xuzhou, which lengthened the distance between the various ministries of the national army and created opportunities for the Chinese army to wipe out the enemy in the movement.

3. Du Yuming's eyes are on Zhongye Liu Bocheng

. This is the case. Du Yuming still believes that as long as he manages properly, he has a chance to defeat Huaye and Zhongye.

​​When Huang Baitao Corps was besieged, the situation of the enemy and us in Huaihai was roughly east, center, and west. On the east line of

, Su Yu besieged the Yellow Corps, and used the main force to fight back, attracting the national army in Xuzhou to stay away. Hua Ye prepares to fight for a decisive battle with Xuzhou Suppression. In the middle line of

, Du Yuming commanded Qiu Qingquan , Li Mi, Sun Yuanliang, Liu Ruming and other corps. They guarded Xuzhou and fought with various departments in China. Holds considerable initiative, can attack the east, can also attack the west, can also hold on. This is also the key to Du Yuming's confidence in defeating Su Yu. On the west line of

, the Huangwei Corps marched towards Fuyang day and night, trying to make peace with Du Yuming in Xuzhou.

​​As an afterthought, we of course know very well the intentions of the enemy and our forces and the deployment of our forces. However, at the time, the top ranks of the national army were in great chaos, and they did not know the situation at all.

​​When Huang Baitao was besieged, Su Yu sent a partial division to attack around Xuzhou. Even the militias and guerrillas were used, and they were all named the main column.

​​Qiu Qingquan Corps fought with our army and judged that the main force of Huaye was to the west or northwest of Xuzhou, and the troops in the east of Xuzhou continued to report that the main force of Huaye was in the east. At that time, the masses on the periphery of Xuzhou were very cooperative with the Huaye operations and did not provide true information to the national army. Liu Zhi, the commander-in-chief of Xuzhou Suppression, and Li Shuzheng, the chief of staff, were at a loss for the intelligence coming from all directions. The main force of the Communist army was everywhere. Where was the main attack direction of the Communist army? They are not clear at all.

​​Du Yuming dragged it around until the Huludao army had withdrawn before he went to Nanjing to accept the combat mission. When he found out that the plan to retreat to Bengbu had been changed, and knew that it was Guo Rugui's idea, he was furious. But he was helpless. Guo was Chen Cheng's confidant, and Gu Zhutong did not dare to offend him.

​​After Du Yuming arrived in Xuzhou, Liu Zhi, as if seeing a great savior, gave Du Yuming the situation and various information in Xuzhou and asked him to make a decision.

​​Du Yuming is an expert after all, and he can tell at a glance that the military reports are false. Even if Hua Ye was able to fight again, he was covered in iron and could hit a few nails. There are main forces everywhere, it must be an illusion, Su Yu has one and only one main attack direction. He judged that the focus of the war must be in the direction of the Huang Baitao Corps, and the rest were small groups of Communist troops. What about

?

​​Du Yuming doesn't want to follow Su Yu's fingerSwinging his club, he was still the original idea, and must not let the central and Chinese field armies join forces and must separate them. Not only to separate, but also to concentrate the superior forces to eliminate the middle field first, and to eat Liu Bocheng, the Huaye army is not a concern.

​​He proposed two plans:

​​first, use Huang Baitao Corps to defend Nianzhuangwei for seven to ten days, use the 13th Corps to defend Xuzhou, use the 72nd Army as the general reserve, and use the Second Corps and the 16th Corps to defend Xuzhou. The Twelfth Corps of the Corps first defeated all six columns of Liu and Deng's army. However, he returned to the east to break through the wild fields and break Huang Baitao's siege. The

​​program is very powerful, and Du Yuming's skill is also very visible. Du Yuming almost abandoned Xuzhou, with most of the main force, formed more than twice the strength of the army, and hit Liu Deng with all his strength.

​​From the perspective of the national army, there are three possible outcomes:

The optimal result is that Huang Baitao on the east line can hold, and the main force of Du Yuming on the west line can encircle Liu Deng and annihilate it. The more acceptable result of

is that Huang Baitao was hit hard, and Liu Deng was hit hard. The national army paid a small price for the result that the central and the Chinese could not converge. The worst result of

was that Huang Baitao was annihilated, and Du Yuming failed to defeat or severely damage Liu Deng.

​​If Du Yuming served as the commander of the Xuzhou Suppression in the past, he would have no choice but to take orders from the foreign emperor, and directly march westward and fight Liu Deng's army with all his strength, then the situation may change. It's a pity that he is only a deputy commander, and Liu Zhi is a person who can't handle it. Beforehand, Chiang Kai-shek had a strict order that Huang Baitao's siege must be resolved. How dare he take the risk to abandon Huang Baitao and beat Liu Bocheng first? What's more, what kind of person is Liu Bocheng? How about you, Du Yuming, who said that you can be wiped out?


Du Yuming recalled the Battle of Huaihai in his later years. He first fought Liu Bocheng to win, but was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek - DayDayNews

​​Under Liu Zhi’s doubts and fears, Du Yuming reluctantly proposed a second plan, defended Xuzhou with a corps, and the rest of the main force moved out to relieve Huang Baitao’s siege to the east. At the same time, Huang Wei's 12th Corps rushed eastward. The

​​plan seems to be able to cope with all aspects. Even if Huang Baitao cannot be saved, at least it is saving, and it will not arouse Chiang Kai-shek's anger afterwards. After the second plan was submitted to Nanjing, it was naturally approved. Guo Rugui risked his life and passed the plan of the national army to our army.

​​Huaihai National Army has since lost the only chance to reverse the situation.

​​Liu Bocheng keenly noticed that the pressure in the direction of Xuzhou had dropped sharply, and stopped moving east to support Huaye. Instead, he stumbled the Huang Wei Corps on the spot, so he was able to boldly block forward and chase afterwards, with his less dominant force and Huang Wei The fierce battle of the Corps greatly reduced the pressure on Su Yu's subordinates.


Du Yuming recalled the Battle of Huaihai in his later years. He first fought Liu Bocheng to win, but was rejected by Chiang Kai-shek - DayDayNews

Huang Wei was captured

​​Du Yuming was later captured, but he couldn't figure it out. He drew his gun and committed suicide and hit his head with a brick. It is true that Du's life for Chiang Kai-shek was politically unwise, but his military strategies and judgments all hit the situation accurately. This is undeniable.

​​After he was pardoned, he and the Kuomintang generals recalled various decisions that year. The only move that he returned to the division to attack Liu Deng's army in the middle field was praised by both generals. Some veterans in the middle field learned that there was still such a thing, and they all said that it was fortunate that Jiang did not listen to Du Yuming, otherwise the Huaihai battle would not know what it was.

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