Beginning in the autumn of 1933, Chiang Kai-shek assembled one million troops and launched the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign with 500,000 specifically targeting the central base areas. At the beginning of the "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the enemy's ta

participated in the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign

Beginning in the autumn of 1933, Chiang Kai-shek assembled one million troops, with 500,000 specifically targeting the central base area, and launched the fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign.

At the beginning of the "encirclement and suppression" campaign, the enemy's tactics changed, that is, they built bunkers around the central base area. This is a strategic change. Instead of marching straight in, it adopts the fortress tactic of "step by step", building bunkers as it advances. It moves only two or three miles a day on average, but it advances step by step towards our central area and the location of the main force. It requires that military operations should be closely coordinated with political needs, which is what Chiang Kai-shek said: "three parts military and seven parts politics." In line with the "step-by-step" tactics, politically reactionary policies such as rural clearing, Baojia system, continuous rule of law, and political softness were implemented, coupled with the economic blockade. Its overall purpose, in the words of Chen Cheng, commander of the North Route Army, is to "drain the water in the pond and catch the fish in the pond" from all aspects of military, political, and economic aspects, eliminate the Red Army, and eliminate the base areas.

Faced with this situation, if our party's leadership still did not make mistakes as it did during the first, second, third, and fourth counter-campaigns of "encirclement and suppression", we would have been able to defeat the enemy. But this is not the case within the party. Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism has developed to a dominant position, preventing us from taking correct and effective countermeasures to this strategic change of the enemy. Instead, we adopted the wrong strategic policy of first adventurous attack and then passive defense. , resulting in the loss of the central base area, and the Red Army had to make strategic shifts. In early 1933, the Provisional Central Committee moved into the central base area. The heads of the Provisional Central Committee, Bogu , Luo Fu and other comrades arrived in Ruijin successively. Li De, a German military adviser sent by the Third International, also arrived in Ruijin in September 1933.

The arrival of the Central Committee and these comrades enabled Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism to be further implemented in the Central Base Area and its neighboring base areas. The Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in January 1934 brought Wang Ming's "Left" adventurism to its peak. They made an extremely wrong assessment of the situation, saying that a "direct revolutionary situation" already existed in China, and that the fifth counter-campaign of "encirclement and suppression" was a struggle for the complete victory of the Chinese revolution; in the struggle against the enemy, they adopted completely wrong guidance. policy. All these directly contributed to the failure of the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign.

At the beginning of the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, Bogu, Li De and others implemented an adventurist policy during the offensive. This is how this policy came about: On September 28, the enemy occupied Lichuan. The "Left" adventurists did not adopt the policy of "luring the enemy deep, gathering them and annihilating them" which had been effective in the past, but ordered the Red Army to go north to attack the enemy in an attempt to restore Lichuan and protect the "national gate". At this time, our three regiments had an encounter with the enemy Wu Qiwei's three regiments of the 6th Division and 18th Brigade at Xunkou in the northeast of Lichuan. We opened fire before the enemy, deployed first, occupied the position, and overwhelmed the enemy. We then pursued the enemy and captured all the cars in which the enemy's senior officers were inspecting the front. In this battle, more than two enemy regiments were wiped out and a brigade commander was captured. The battle was well fought. This was originally a surprise and caught the enemy off guard. At that time, the enemy's strength was many times greater than ours and the general situation was that a strong enemy was pressing the border. It was somewhat accidental.

However, the "Left" adventurists do not see it this way. They insist on exaggerating its universal significance and use it as evidence to advocate widespread deployment of the edges of the military base areas and the implementation of the combat policy of "defending the enemy outside the country's borders." From early October to mid-November, the "Left" adventurists even ordered the main force of the Red Army to attack the saltpeter, Zixi Bridge, Huwan and other strongholds in the white area that were heavily guarded by the enemy. As a result, they all suffered failures. In the event of failure, we did not look for reasons from the subjective guiding ideology. We also blamed the failure on the leading comrades of the front army for interfering with their correct determination and the lack of firmness of each legion to implement their instructions.

For this reason, on November 20, in the name of the Military Commission , a letter was sent to the commanders above the division level to criticize us.At this time, the First Army Corps had been ordered to rush from the Yongfeng area to the vicinity of Nanfeng in early October to restrain the enemy from advancing eastward, so as to ensure that the Third Army Corps and the Fifth Army Corps were fighting in the east. Afterwards, the Central Military Commission wanted to restore Lichuan, so we rushed to the vicinity of Lichuan to cooperate with the three armies in the battle. Until mid-November, we moved between the enemy's fortresses and heavy troops in search of operations. However, the enemy would not easily leave his fortress area, so we entangled the enemy and fought to the death. The battles were generally not fought well, but instead exhausted and depleted one's own troops.

In mid-November, our 1st and 9th Army Corps were ordered to break through the enemy's blockade near Tangyin and go north to attack the enemy. Between November 17 and 19, we fought in the battles of Yungai Mountain and Daxiong Pass. The battles were very difficult. First, Wu Qiwei discovered that our army had advanced to the north of the blockade, so he attempted to use five divisions to encircle and annihilate our army from the east and south. Our army retreated urgently to the Yungai Mountain and Daxiongguan areas and launched a fierce battle with three enemy divisions. We used the 14th Division of the 9th Army to attract the enemy from the front of Shengang, and used the 1st and 2nd Divisions to cover it from both sides. However, when the 5th Pioneer Regiment of our 2nd Division arrived at the mountains near Dangkou, we found that the enemy had already occupied Muyu southeast of Daxiong Pass before us. The dangerous commanding heights near Sheng.

As we attacked this commanding height, we came under heavy bombardment from enemy aircraft and crossfire from the ground. The political commissar of the Second Division Hu Alin died. Comrade Hu Alin was originally a worker in Shanghai. In order to strengthen the backbone of workers in the Red Army, he was trained by the party as a political commissar. He had high prestige in the army. He died heroically this time. Xiao Taoming, leader of the fourth regiment, also died in this battle. In addition, the commanders of our first and second divisions were both wounded. Finally, we retreated and the enemy also retreated.

Before this battle, I was sending malaria and did not break through the blockade. When the troops return from outside the blockade, I ask Comrade Cheng Zihua to lead the 14th Division to cover the withdrawal of the troops. Afterwards, we passed through Tianyan Mountain, Shengang and Dangkou and arrived at Tangfang. At Tianyan Mountain, I saw enemy planes flying low and strafing along the valley. From above, they looked like a line of cars. In Tangfang, we commanded the battle of Daxiong Pass.

When moving to the southwest from Daxiong, near the Junfeng Mountain , we had to pass through the fortress area of ​​the enemy Mao Bingwen's 8th Division. We were shot by Mao Bingwen's troops, which put the corps headquarters in danger. That day, as soon as we crossed the enemy's bunker line, the enemy rushed to the legion headquarters. Not only was the legion headquarters directly threatened, but the Second Division at the rear was also in danger of being cut off by the enemy and unable to get out of the pass. I saw the enemy coming up, and I was really anxious. I said: "Everyone with fighting ability, whether they are cooks or breeders, will go into battle!" Some cooks said: "Mao Bingwen is our defeated general. If you are not afraid of him, go up!" While we organized resistance on the spot, we went to Later story: "The fourth regiment came up quickly!" It was not until the fourth regiment came up that the danger was saved! In late November, a major event occurred that shocked the Chiang dynasty. Cai Tingkai's 19th Route Army united with some anti-Chiang forces and launched the "Fujian Incident". This forced Chiang Kai-shek to deploy part of his troops from the North Route Army that "encircled and suppressed" the Red Army to suppress the Fujian People's Government. This is the key to changing the situation of counter-"encirclement and suppression" in the base areas. At that time, the Party Central Committee grasped this key politically and secretly signed an armistice agreement with the 19th Route Army.

What is strange is that the "Left" adventurists only know how to grasp this key politically, but do not understand at all that only by using the Fujian Incident both politically and militarily can we help us smash the five "encirclement and suppression" campaigns.

According to what I knew at the time, the Fujian People's Government had sent Wu Ming (ie Chen Gongpei) as a representative to negotiate in the base area first. Wu Mingyuan also participated in the French work-study program and was a graduate of the second phase of Huangpu . He joined the third party after the failure of the Great Revolution and was sent by Li Jishen. People said that the people we negotiated with him scolded him and sent him away. It is not surprising that such a statement was made at that time. Because, under the shroud of "left" adventurism, among our people, sometimes even ordinary people, there is indeed a kind of empty talk dogmatism preaching popular.It is said that the third force can confuse some people, so it is worse than Chiang Kai-shek. Others say that Chiang Kai-shek is a big warlord and the Fujian People's Government is a small warlord. Why should we act as a shield for the small warlords?

When the Fujian People's Government sent representative Xu Minghong to Ruijin for negotiations for the second time, the central government considered that in order to promote the 19th Route Army to resist Chiang and resist Japan, it formed an anti-Chiang and anti-Japanese alliance with them and signed an armistice agreement.

However, the "Left" adventurists at that time still did not know how to use the Fujian Incident militarily to crush the enemy's fifth "encirclement and suppression" campaign.

In early December, when Chiang Kai-shek deployed the northern "encirclement and suppression" troops to suppress the Fujian People's Government, its third and ninth divisions, led by Chiang Dingwen , marched from the south of Nanfeng to western Fujian . Our first regiment had just finished the battle at Daxiong Pass and was resting nearby. We are on the enemy's flank. When the enemy moves, we can see it very clearly, moving all the way, just in time to hit. Everyone said that if we don’t fight at this time, we will fight. If we don’t fight, the chance will be gone. But the higher-ups don't call it a fight. If they call it a fight, it means helping the little warlord. They just let the enemy go. Later, the main force of the Red Army was divided, the third army was placed in Fujian, and the first army was placed on the northern line of the central base area, saying that it was "to attack the enemy with two open fists." They also did not adopt Comrade Mao Zedong's suggestion: decisively advance the main force of the Red Army into the Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangxi regions centered on Zhejiang, fundamentally get rid of the blockade cage created by Chiang Kai-shek, transform strategic defense into strategic offensive, and force the enemy to return to support it. basic area to crush its attack on the central base area.

During the Fujian Incident, our first regiment was transferred westward to fight in the Yongfeng area on the northern line of the Central Base, in an attempt to break through the enemy's fortress blockade there. In terms of tactics, Li De emphasized the need to carry out "short assaults" from fortress to fortress. To this end, the Military Commission issued a special order in late November for the troops to use this tactic to fight. This tactic means that when the enemy builds bunkers, we also build bunkers. When the enemy comes two to three hundred meters away from our bunker, we use short assaults to destroy the enemy. By adopting this tactic, our army consumes a lot of money and achieves no results.

The Dingmaoshan battle started on December 25, 1933, south of Yongfeng. It was with Song Ziwen 's two art-equipped tax police regiment and Tang Yunshan 's 93rd Division. beat. Facing the fort line they built, we also built forts to fight against them. We fought for more than a week. The result was a war of attrition that outweighed the gains. The enemy has aircraft and artillery. The Kuomintang army bought several Prussian mountain guns, field guns, and several 102-caliber heavy mortars from Germany. The number was not large, but the mobilization was very flexible. Once they detected where my main force was, they would It's coming. Our troops fought heroically, but suffered heavy casualties.

At that time, the First Army Corps was mainly fighting against the enemy with the Red Division . The division commander was Comrade Li Jukui and the political commissar was Comrade Tan Zheng. The Second Division is responsible for guarding Yongfeng and Jiangkou. In addition, the Guard Division and the 13th Independent Regiment participated, and they were unified under the command of me and Lin Biao. The first division attacked the enemy's bunker group from the northeast to the south. Some are gained and lost again, and some are lost and regained. I was also on the ground at that time. The battlefield was filled with smoke. There were nine companies in the three regiments, but thirteen company-level cadres were killed. At that time, someone heard Ruijin, an old man from the Third Regiment who was a platoon leader, complaining: "I don't know what the trouble is! We stayed up all night to build a fortress, and they knocked it over with one shot; but for their fortress, we only had Bite it with your teeth! We don’t have heavy firearms, and we compete with others every day. What the hell are we doing!” Later, in the summary of the Zunyi Conference, this battle was classified as a “desperate” battle.

I am still deeply impressed. In the Dingmaoshan area, our struggle was very difficult and military work was very busy, but the legion did not have a good chief of staff. The legion originally had a good chief of staff, Comrade Xu Yangang. Xu Yangang worked together with Comrade Huang Gonglue. Huang Gonglue admired him very much and said that he was "capable of doing staff work and a commander, and he is versatile in both civil and military affairs."Later, the Second Division was short of a division commander, so the Military Commission ordered him to serve as the division commander of the Second Division. Comrade Xu Yangang, who had been a military commander, did not care and took up his post happily. He was truly capable of both promotion and promotion, and had excellent party spirit. He also excelled as a division commander in the Second Division. At the beginning of the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, he was transferred to Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi as commander. After our Long March left, Comrade Xu Yangang died in Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi. At the end of the year, the Military Commission appointed Comrade Zuo Quan as the chief of staff of the army to fill Xu Yangang's vacancy. We wanted to express our gratitude to the new Chief of Staff, so we prepared a meager New Year's dinner during the Chinese New Year. However, this New Year's dinner was also bombed by the Kuomintang's planes, and the New Year's dinner was not finished.

Because we missed the opportunity to deal with the Fujian Incident, after Chiang Kai-shek suppressed the Fujian Incident, he turned around and restarted his attack on our central base area. That is, the Central Army will advance centripetally towards our central area from the east, west, north and west, while the Guangdong Army will defend against blockage from the south.

At this time, the "Left" adventurists were still unwilling to implement the policy of active defense. Instead, they changed from adventurism in offense to conservatism in defense. They set up defenses everywhere and vigorously promoted bunkers against bunkers and "short assaults." . They transferred several main regiments of the Red Army here and there. At the end of January 1934, our first regiment was transferred eastward to the area north of Jianning. At this time, all legions, from combat units to directly affiliated agencies and detachments, were assigned the task of building fortresses in an attempt to carry out "short assaults" based on the fortresses. They even dispersed the five legions into companies and platoons to defend the fort. Because they adopted this method of warfare, from late January to the end of March 1934, the Red Army conducted a series of campaigns and battles. The results were that they were either defeated or retreated midway. During this period, the First Army fought battles such as Fengxiang Peak, Sanjiazhang, and Qianchang Bridge. Fengxiang Peak destroyed a battalion of the enemy Fan Songfu's 79th Division, and Sanjiazhang was a typical battle in which our troops resolutely resisted and defeated several times the enemy, and were praised by the army.

Sanjiajiao, in the southwest of Lichuan. Starting from February 25, the First Army Corps and neighboring troops fought fierce battles with several enemy divisions in this area for three days in the process of defending Jianning. The enemy sent the 94th Division with all its strength to pounce on Sanjiazhang, the commanding heights on the flank of our army. The people responsible for guarding the three promontories are our 1st Division and the 1st Red Regiment. The leader of the Red Group is Yang Dezhi, and the political commissar is Fu Zhuting. The second battalion of the first regiment was guarding the main position, and the battalion commander was Chen Zhengxiang. This battalion defeated the enemy's 94th Division's multiple multi-pronged attacks. The sound of enemy aircraft and artillery bombardment shook the whole valley. Our second battalion was beaten to only a hundred people, but the position remained unmoved. The last regiment cooperated with our assault force to completely defeat the enemy's attacking first division troops, ensuring The security of our legion's flanks. In order to praise this battle, I wrote an editorial "Continue to carry forward the tenacious resistance spirit of the first regiment" and published it in the 31st issue of "Red Star".

Victory in individual battles cannot save the passive situation of the entire fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. In order to find another way out tactically, on February 14, our Corps, signed by Lin Biao and I, submitted a "Proposal on Using Mobile Warfare to Destroy the Enemy" to the Military Commission, stating the position of the First Corps in the northwest of Jianning at that time. The defensive positions were dozens of miles long and horizontal. The defense lines were too wide, the troops were weak, ammunition was lacking, and the fortifications were not strong. They were fortified everywhere but weak everywhere. After a breakthrough, the fortifications were often exploited by the enemy. It is recommended that in the future we should not build fortifications everywhere and strive to eliminate the enemy in mobile warfare. If we build fortifications, we only build them on predetermined fronts and in a focused manner. This suggestion, from what we see today, naturally has great historical limitations. However, even this limited suggestion was not accepted by the Military Commission. The Central Military Commission replied to the call, only admitting that we were right in principle, and at the same time warned us to resolutely obey the Central Military Commission's orders. We found various excuses and refused to admit that we had made mistakes in tactical guidance, let alone that it was a mistake in strategic policy.

In mid-March, when the 1st and 3rd Corps were fighting at Sanxi and Sankeng in Nanfeng, they lost the opportunity to attack the enemy before his foothold was stable because the enemy's fortifications had been built solidly. The three armies attacked Zhumazhai and hit a big nail, causing more than 2,000 casualties.We attacked Nanfeng from the southwest. Due to the unfavorable terrain, our troops had not yet deployed when we received a telegram from Comrade Peng Dehuai asking for our support. At that time, the first and third regiments were thirty miles apart. It was already evening, it was raining, and the road was narrow and slippery, making it difficult to walk. We ignored this and urgently led the headquarters to move closer to the Third Army Corps in the dark. The troops then moved in to rush for reinforcements. When we arrived about ten miles away from the original position of the Third Army Corps, it was already dark. Seeing the light of flashlights everywhere on the position, we judged that the enemy had occupied the original position of the Third Army Corps and ordered the troops to stop advancing without straying into the enemy group. middle. Sure enough, soon we saw the radio stations and troops of the Third Army retreating in twos and threes, and we were there to accommodate and cover their retreat. In the Battle of Xinqiao north of Taining on March 25, because the enemy got into the bunker fortifications previously built by the Fifth Army Corps, we could not attack and did not fight well.

In mid-April, the enemy concentrated the forces of 11 divisions and attacked Guangchang in two directions along the Ganzhu River. The political order to defend Guangchang was issued on April 21, 1934, jointly signed by Bo Gu of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Zhu De, Chairman of the Military Commission, and Gu Zuolin, Acting Director of the General Political Department. The order still emphasized what Li De said: "My fulcrum garrison is the backbone of my battle order. They should unswervingly support the enemy's artillery fire and aerial bombardment in order to shoot with disciplined firepower." and brave counterattacks to destroy the enemy's vital forces. "It is completely pure positional warfare. Li De once personally went to the front to take command. Bogu also came to the front to support him, but still stuck to their passive defense. They mobilized nine divisions from the 1st, 3rd, and 9th Corps, the main force of the Red Army, to fight the enemy decisively. The fighting lasted for 18 days from April 10 to April 28, and the troops suffered heavy losses. In the end, Guangchang was lost.

Some of the battles fought by the First Army Corps when defending Guangchang, such as the battle of Ganzhu, etc., resulted in relatively large casualties and consumption. It was only more than twenty miles from Ganzhu to Guangchang. The closer the enemy got to the hinterland of the base area, the more cautious they became. They only advanced half a mile to one mile every day. Every step forward, they built roads and built bunkers. Under the erroneous slogans of "defending Guangchang" and "fighting for every inch of territory", we fought a so-called "defensive war" for eighteen days. This means that we still defended our position despite repeated bombardments from enemy aircraft and artillery. If we engage in a "short assault", we will wait for the enemy to come out of the fortifications and advance dozens or hundreds of meters away from our fortifications, and then we will pounce on them like tigers to attack them. But once the enemy retreated to the bunker, we had to be exposed to the fire net of enemy aircraft and artillery. The most typical one is the battle of Gulonggang fought by the 1st and 3rd Corps in the west of Ningdu on June 5. We originally wanted to concentrate the main force and ambush part of the four divisions of Xue Yue's column. However, due to the implementation of "short assault" tactics to prevent the enemy from going deep, our troops attacked only five miles away from their bunker line, exposing the main force of the Red Army and causing the enemy to immediately retreat to the bunker stronghold. As a result, the battle that could have achieved a great victory ended with the destruction of only one enemy battalion. We also suffered many casualties of our own.

In July, the enemy began a new attack. At this time, the "Left" adventurists ordered the Red Army to implement "six-way division of troops" and "comprehensive resistance." The Red Army continued to suffer losses in a series of defenses. The First Army Corps moved to the Jianning and Taining areas of Fujian Province and fought many wars of attrition. Only the battle between and Wenfang in early September was better for . Wenfang is now called Wenfang, located in the southeast of Changting. This battle, including two consecutive battles on September 1 and September 3, was fought using mobile warfare tactics in violation of the principle of "short assault". Our army mainly participated in the battle with the 1st Army Corps, the 24th Independent Division, and the 9th Army Corps also participated in the battle, all of which were unified under the command of the 1st Army Corps. The battle went like this. At the end of August, our army had already detected that the enemy Li Yannian had assembled the 3rd, 9th, 83rd, and 36th divisions at the front lines of Pengkou, Juxi, Bizhou, and Yangfangwei, and was heading towards The progress of Tingzhou .At this time, the commander of our 24th Independent Division, Zhou Jianping, and the political commissar Yang Ying had led the division to build fortifications at Zhuzhaoling, Qiaoxia and Xiaofang in the direction of the enemy's advance. While attracting the enemy, they were waiting for the arrival of the first regiment.

On the 31st, the First Army Corps marched quickly to the area. At around 1 o'clock the next day, the enemy Li Yutang two regiments of the 8th Brigade of the 3rd Division were dispatched to defend the blockade built by them. By noon, they had advanced to ten Wenfang, many miles away. While they were building fortifications, they also sent reconnaissance and warning to the Songmaoling position, the commanding heights occupied by our Second Division. In fact, the command position of our army is also located on Songmao Ridge. The enemy did not notice. At this time, we have ordered the 24th Division to send two battalions to covertly and detour between Yangfangwei and Magutou to cut off the enemy's retreat. Because we see that this is indeed an excellent opportunity to destroy the enemy. We have long believed that the enemy's attack does not advance only two or three miles at a time in all places, but depends on the situation. Our main force approached them, but they indeed only advanced two or three miles at a time to build bunkers. But when the enemy discovers that our main force is far away, they will also leap forward or advance farther, so we are not totally without the opportunity to engage in mobile warfare. So this time we urgently ordered Zhou Jianping, commander of the 24th Division, to lead the main force of the division to attack the enemy's right flank in the northeast of Wenfang. We led a corps to attack the enemy from west to east. We placed the Ninth Army Corps in Caofang to suppress the bandits operating in that area and prevent enemy reinforcements. This battle was a night battle, and the troops moved quietly, secretly, and calmly. From nine o'clock in the afternoon on the first day to before dawn on the second day, most of the enemy had been wiped out. Only a few remaining enemies were still clinging to the fortress near Yangbei and the octagonal tower south of Wenfang. So our fifth and sixth regiments cooperated with the 24th Independent Division to eliminate the enemies entrenched in Yangbei, and the fourth regiment was responsible for destroying the enemies in Wenfang Village. Because it was both a night battle and a close-quarters battle, I suffered very little casualties. For example, when the Fourth Regiment eliminated two enemy battalions in Wenfang Village, the telephone lines set up by the enemy were cut by our scouts in advance, which increased our advantage in defeating the enemies one by one. The first battalion was the main battalion attacking Wenfang. During the entire battle, they only consumed 400 rounds of bullets, and their light and heavy machine guns were completely unused. They mainly relied on bayonet grenades to resolve the battle, and they only suffered three injuries. At the end of the battle, only one legion captured more than 1,600 enemies. Two regiments of the enemy's 8th Brigade were wiped out.

On the morning of the 3rd, the enemy's 3rd and 9th divisions assembled three regiments from Pengkou and attacked us again. The leading force was a regiment of the 9th Division, which advanced from Yangfangwei to Wenfang at about eight o'clock. We are determined to eliminate this vanguard group. The First Division was ordered to cut off the return route of the leading regiment, and the Second Division was to attack the enemy from two directions, namely Baqianting and Magutou. The First Battalion of the Fourth Regiment of the Second Division charged six times in succession, occupying eight hilltops and three half-block bunkers. The Third Battalion charged continuously and occupied six enemy positions, becoming a model of resolute and heroic continuous charges. The other troops were also very heroic. The leader of the Second Regiment, Li Miaobao, was dismissed from his post on the first day because he failed to block the enemy's retreat. When pursuing the enemy the next day, he bravely took the lead and died heroically.

In the entire Wenfang battle, more than 4,000 enemies were wiped out. More than 2,000 people were killed and wounded, and more than 2,400 people were captured.

After the battle, Xu Yongxiang, commander of the enemy's eighth brigade, escaped alone and was shot dead by Chiang Kai-shek. The commander of the Third Division, Li Yutang, was demoted from lieutenant general to colonel.

However, victory in individual battles cannot remedy the errors in the overall strategic guidelines. What's more, the individual battle victories achieved in the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign cannot quickly develop into a battle victory like the fourth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign. Because "Left" adventurists often separate the first and third armies and fight on their own. As a result, the Xunkou battles fought by the third army, the Tuancun battle, and the Wenfang battle fought by the first army mentioned earlier could not develop into greater victories.

During this period, I felt very depressed. In the First Army Corps, Lin Biao was particularly active in carrying out "short assaults". The above mentioned "defending Guangchang" in April, "defending Jianning" in May, "defending Changting" in mid-July, and "defending and rejuvenating the country" at the end of September.Our legion made a sudden breakthrough here today, and another sudden breakthrough there tomorrow, revealing all its strength. I don't think this can solve the problem in battle. It cannot solve the problem tactically, it just consumes ammunition and troops in vain. I could only say these words to Comrade Zuo Quan. At that time, Lin Biao suddenly published an article "On Short Assault" on June 17, which was being taken seriously. I did not feel safe saying these words to Lin Biao.

I started to feel surprised when Lin Biao published this article. Thinking about it carefully, it’s not surprising. After the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign began, around early February 1934, Li De visited the First Army Corps once and gave a lecture on positional warfare at a cadre meeting. None of the cadres understood it. Lin Biao said: "You don't understand, and I don't understand this style of play, but if you don't understand, just learn it!" The sudden publication of the article "On Short Assault" was naturally not just about tactics, but actually a political statement of his at this time. statement on.

By October, the central base area was shrinking day by day, the Red Army was becoming increasingly passive, and the purely defensive policy adopted by the "Left" adventurists was completely ruined. They are always unwilling to let the Red Army stride forward or retreat in large strides, and carry out mobile operations. Instead, they propose to "use bunkers against bunkers", defend every piece of "land" in the base area, "fight for every inch of land", and "defend the enemy from outside the country." As a result, the "land" was still lost. The Red Army was forced to make a strategic shift and embark on the Long March.

In short, the failure of the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign was not accidental, but a strategic mistake and a wrong route. It is the inevitable result of Wang Ming "Left" elements squeezing out the correct line leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Central Committee. It is the inevitable result of negating the active defense policy that led to victory in one to four "encirclement and suppression" campaigns and implementing a purely defensive policy. Bunker against bunker. The implementation of "short assault" only focused on pushing back the enemy on the inside and fighting for consumption without concentrating the troops. The so-called two fists hit people and divided the troops on six routes. They did not dare to lure the enemy deep and looked for opportunities to annihilate them. At the same time, they did not accept Comrade Mao Zedong's invasion of the Red Army into Fujian and Zhejiang. The suggestion to mobilize the enemy's reinforcements from outside Jiangxi led to the failure of the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign and the loss of the central base area, making this historic mistake. But as long as the fire of revolution does not go out, the Chinese revolution will still be victorious.