少星天外 Note: This article is longer (more than 11,000 words), if you want to see the conclusion, please skip to the end of the article.
Last month, the newly appointed U.S. Marine Corps 38th Commander-in-Chief David Berger (David Berger) issued two documents, namely "38th The Intention of the Commander-in-chief (hereinafter referred to as the "Intention") and The Planning and Guidance of the 38th Commander-in-Chief (hereinafter referred to as the "Guide") . Although there is nothing novel about this process, most of the new Marine Corps commanders in the history of the United States will release similar documents or information. What is surprising is the content of these two documents. If Admiral Berger's intentions and guidance are implemented, it will completely change the organization and operation of the US Marine Corps.
Admiral Berger’s vision will also have a significant impact on how the Marine Corps purchases weapons, what weapons they purchase, how the U.S. Navy purchases amphibious assault ships to support the Marine Corps, force structure and operations. In the end, it will inevitably spark a renewed debate about the overlapping roles and tasks between the Marine Corps and the Army. In general, these two documents by General Berger are the most visionary, destructive and transformative guidance issued by all Marine Corps commanders since the end of the Cold War.
Replay the old tune? The
"Guide" document firstly reaffirms the U.S. Marine Corps as the most flexible and responsive military force in the United States, the traditional role of .
" The U.S. Marine Corps will be trained and equipped as a sea expeditionary force ready at all times, ready to fight in the controversial ocean space to support fleet operations. In crisis prevention In response to the crisis, the Marine Corps in the fleet—as an extension of the fleet—will be the first to appear at the scene of the crisis, be the first to provide assistance, be the first to curb the deterioration of the crisis, and if necessary, be the first Go into battle.”
Admiral Berger regards the Marine Corps as a maritime emergency response force, which is basically the same as the way the US Navy and the Marine Corps have fought together since World War II. The U.S. Marine Corps is stationed on the amphibious assault ship known as the "Alligator Navy" for rotation deployment and as a force ready to respond quickly in a crisis.
In recent history, the combat operations of the U.S. Marine Corps have been compared to "kick the door" — establish and ensure a bridgehead in a disputed area until the following U.S. Army can The quantity builds a stronger and more lasting presence. This approach is consistent with what Admiral Berger advocated here.
Marines on the landing ship "Arlington" are listening to the amphibious operation briefing as part of the "Spell Sabre" exercise
The US Marines are used to accomplish various The main unit of the military mission is Marine Air-Ground Task Force (Marine Air-Ground Task Force, MAGTF) . The most common form of MAGTF is Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) stationed on the navy Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) .
MEU usually includes a Ground Combat Element (GCE) , including an infantry battalion reinforced with armor, artillery and combat engineers. There is also a Air Combat Element (ACE) , including rotor/tilted wing aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft-AV-8B "Harrier" or F-35B "Lightning II" fighter. At last, There is also a Combat Logistics Element (CLE) , which provides a series of important support functions for expedition missions.
The composition of the Marine Corps Air-to-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
At any given time, the US military has at least one MEU, usually two, deployed on duty at sea. In addition, there is a forward-deployed MEU with better combat readiness in Japan. These MEUs can be deployed in the shortest time. MEU is also the smallest standard MAGTF unit. One level higher than MEU is Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) , and the largest MAGTF unit is Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) .
As an example of how the MEU was prepared during the rotation deployment period: In August 2001, the amphibious assault ship "贝里lau (Peleliu) " (LHA-5), "Dcb01#Dubuque (Dubuque) " (LPD-8) dock platform landing ship and "Comstock (Comstockdcb01)#) " (LSD-45) "Peleliu" amphibious combat readiness brigade composed of dock landing ships carried the 15th MEU and left the west coast of the United States for combat readiness. After the "9-11" terrorist attacks, the 15th MEU subordinate detachment merged with the 26th MEU. From the aforementioned warships and other naval vessels located in the northern Arabian Sea, they flew 400 miles (640 kilometers) north to Afghanistan by air transportation. About 100 miles (160 kilometers) southwest of Kandahar.
The U.S. Navy’s Amphibious Warfare Group is usually composed of an amphibious assault ship, a dock platform landing ship and a dock landing ship
where they established the code name “Rhino” "The forward operating base", also known as the "Rhino Battalion", was the first land base established by the United States in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. This is a textbook example of how the organizational structure of the MEU can play a role in actual combat: the 15th MEU has normally implemented peacetime rotation deployment from the beginning, and after the crisis, it quickly transformed into a system based on its existing personnel and equipment. Combat operations force.
So far, Admiral Berger’s opening statement on "The U.S. Marine Corps will be a sea expeditionary force ready at all times" is basically consistent with the doctrinal wording we have heard for decades, just doing Made some minor adjustments. It may be slightly different from the previous Marine Corps commander in terms of explanation, but in essence, it is the same thing. It seems that everything is like the beginning of another ordinary day. But shortly thereafter, the views of the new commander of the US Marine Corps became very interesting.
The "Peleliu" amphibious combat readiness group carrying the 15th MEU was organized in 2010
A challenge to the long-standing assumptions about the structure of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps
According to a large number of studies and evaluations, the Marine Corps has long insisted that two Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelon (Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelon, MEB AE) must be retained in order to ensure the "power attack" capability. In order to meet this requirement, the Navy needs to maintain 34 amphibious warships, that is, to allocate 17 for each MEB.
When the requirement to support two MEB AEs is added to the requirement that exists in the Japanese front, the total number of supporting forces of the Navy will increase to38 amphibious assault ships . This is the first hypothesis that Admiral Berger challenged in his guidance, which stated:
"We will no longer use &x27;2 MEB requirements&x27 ; As our basis for the construction of amphibious ships, determining the necessary loading capacity of required vehicles or other equipment, or the basis of arguments related to prefabrication at sea . We will no longer refer to the '38 ships implemented since 2009 The Memorandum of Ship Needs' or the'Evaluation of Force Structure' made in 2016 serves as the basis for us to demonstrate the needs and rationality of the force structure."
It is difficult to express the situation of Admiral Berger. How big is the impact of the argument. He basically denied the basic assumption that the Marine Corps had been using for a long time to establish its troop organization structure and the Navy’s requirements for amphibious assault ship support in . These assumptions will no longer be used to guide future operations and procurement plans.
The U.S. Marine Corps procurement plan is to make the operational architecture centered on the MEU deployed on the amphibious assault ship work.
Although, the MEU and the amphibious assault ship will not be there. They disappeared overnight, but they will no longer be used as the main basis for planning the structure of the Marine Corps. Since the end of the Vietnam War, most U.S. Marine Corps procurement plans are to enable the purchased equipment to play a role in the operational architecture centered on MEUs deployed on amphibious assault ships.
and General Berger is removing the restrictions on this plan and procurement.
The reality of amphibious assault ships and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles
You may be wondering why Admiral Berger wants to overthrow the long-term foundation of the Marine Corps MAGTF and the Navy's amphibious assault ship structure. One of the most obvious reasons is the development of modern anti-ship cruise missiles.
In the twentieth century, in order to sink a modern warship, you need something very large, such as another warship, a submarine, a group of warplanes, or a large minefield. The first systematic attack of anti-ship cruise missiles on modern warships occurred during the Falklands War in 1982. , Argentina used the air-launched “Flying Fish” missiles on the “Super Flag” aircraft to sink two Royal Navy ships. Ship, and wounded the third one. At that time, anti-ship cruise missile technology was very expensive and immature, and at the same time the countries possessed were very limited. Therefore, the threat of anti-ship cruise missiles is not so great.
During the Falklands War in 1982, the British destroyer "Sheffield" was sunk by the "Flying Fish" missile launched by Argentina.
It should be clear that since the 1970s Since the mid-term, the Soviet Navy has a huge anti-ship cruise missile capability, but this capability is almost entirely sea-based. Soviet cruise missile submarines and surface ships will have to go to sea and sail far away from their home ports in order to effectively attack US naval ships. This specific anti-ship cruise missile threat is easy to detect and find ways to avoid or eliminate it.
In any case, the fact that a modern Western navy suffered heavy losses in the face of weak opponents equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles has sounded a wake-up call for the US Navy. The threat of anti-ship cruise missiles is no longer limited to competitors of the same level as the Soviet Union. The US Navy deployed Aegis air defense and anti-missile combat systems on its Ticonderoga-class cruisers to defend against anti-ship cruise missiles from multiple potential opponents. The first ship of this class, the Ticonderoga (CG-47), entered service seven months after the end of the Falklands War. By May 1987, only four ships of this class were officially equipped with troops. That month, at the peak of the oil tanker attack during the Iran-Iraq War, an Iraqi Dassault "Phantom F1" fighter jet launched two "flying fish" to the "Perry" class frigate "Stark" cruising in the Persian Gulf. missile. These missiles killed 37 U.S. Navy sailors, injured 21 others, and severely damaged the frigate.
During the Iran-Iraq War, the US Navy’s Stark frigate was accidentally injured by the Flying Fish missile launched by Iraq.
Therefore, after the 1980s, the US Navy’s The operational hypothesis is that under any hostile conflict, the large, slow, and vulnerable amphibious assault ship will be escorted by the "Ticonderoga" class cruiser and later the "Arleigh Burke" class destroyer . These escort ships are believed to have powerful capabilities to defeat anti-ship cruise missiles that attack amphibious assault ships. Although it was reasonable in the past to assume that Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyer escorts can protect amphibious assault ships against the threat of anti-ship cruise missiles, two recent developments have made this assumption no longer Established.
First of all, some "Ticonderoga" class cruisers and "Arleigh Burke" class destroyers have been modified to obtain the "Aegis" ballistic missile defense system capabilities. The ship responsible for the ballistic missile defense mission needs to be on standby in a specific sea area to perform the mission, making it impossible to escort the amphibious assault ship. The current demand for the US Navy to provide ballistic missile shields is very large, and the deployment of ships is a zero-sum game. No matter how powerful the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers are, they can only appear in one place at a time.
In addition, although ships equipped with Aegis can perform ballistic missile defense tasks and provide anti-ship cruise missile defense at the same time, switching between these two modes requires some time and well-trained crew . Only a few ships with the latest "Aegis" upgrade can perform two tasks at the same time.
The two "shield" ships of the US Navy, the Ticonderoga-class cruiser and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer
Secondly, the countermeasures faced by the amphibious assault ship The threat of ship-to-ship cruise missiles has become more powerful, widespread and decentralized . Today, many countries can mass-produce technologically advanced, reliable, and relatively inexpensive mobile anti-ship cruise missiles. As an example, 30 years ago, Iran’s anti-ship cruise missiles were all fixed and very easy to detect. Today, the Yemeni Houthi armed forces supported by Iran are maneuvering around with anti-ship cruise missiles, threatening Red Sea shipping. The Houthis are far from the only non-state actors using anti-ship cruise missiles. During the Lebanon War in 2006, Lebanese Hezbollah forces used anti-ship cruise missiles to attack and damage Israel’s Sal-5 frigate. In other words, the combat operations of amphibious assault ships may not only be threatened by state actors, but also by less predictable and more hostile non-state actors.
"Goodman Richard" helicopter dock landing ship launches Sea Sparrow missile
In short, the development speed of anti-ship cruise missile has exceeded that of the amphibious assault ship itself Self-defense ability . The current hard-kill self-defense capabilities of American amphibious ships include "Phalanx" close defense weapon system (this is a radar-guided "Vulcan" machine gun that can fire about 100 rounds of 20mm shells per second ), RIM-116 "Ram" missile (a kind of light short-range missile) and RIM-162 "evolved sea sparrow" missile (a larger type of amphibious assault ship and helicopter dock Medium-range missiles equipped on the landing ship). In addition, in terms of "soft kill" defense, Mk 53 Nulka missile decoy system and AN/SLQ-32 electronic warfare kit were deployed.
Mk 53 The Nulka decoy system helped the U.S. warship escape multiple Houthi-armed missile attacks.
Although all these defense systems have good defense capabilities, they are already close to them. The maximum technical limitation of the effectiveness, so that can not provide enough protection to resist the threat of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, especially in the face of saturation attack . versusAt the same time, the "Aegis" ships that should protect amphibious assault ships are increasingly performing other tasks elsewhere.
Although there are some promising technologies, such as laser and microwave anti-missile systems, which may eventually provide stronger self-defense capabilities for amphibious assault ships, these have not been confirmed in actual combat. Therefore, U.S. Navy is currently unable to fully protect the amphibious assault ship , which is full of Marine Corps and its equipment. This is why Admiral Berger hopes that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will find a better way to deploy the Marine Corps. Reasons to be near the potential crisis area.
Russia’s Bal shore-based defense missiles will limit the enemy’s amphibious assault formations beyond their attack range
Anti-access area denial weapons are a bigger problem
Although, the proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles is already a very difficult problem to deal with. The more complex " Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) " weapon that has recently emerged is a more difficult challenge. A2AD should actually be said to be an ability or characteristic rather than a specific weapon system, and the aforementioned anti-ship cruise missiles are also part of it. But for the US military, it may mainly refer to the anti-ship ballistic missile that has been tested and deployed by some countries. In addition, these countries are also developing hypersonic missiles, and may form initial combat capabilities in the near future.
Amphibious terminal landing ship "John P. Murtha" and "Arleigh Burke" class guided guided-missile destroyer "Mosen" sailing in the East Pacific
in order to deal with anti-ship With the dual threat of ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles, the U.S. Navy will continue to purchase more advanced versions of "Arleigh Burke" destroyers in the foreseeable future. These ships have powerful and effective defense against anti-ship cruise missiles and the ability to perform ballistic missile defense missions, and through continuous upgrades, they can provide effective defense against anti-ship ballistic missiles. However, the existing anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles, combined with future hypersonic missiles, can provide a complementary comprehensive strike capability, even the most advanced "Arleigh Burke" class destroyers cannot defense.
U.S. Marine Corps Commander Admiral Berger confessed the high cost and fragility of amphibious assault ships. He wrote that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps cannot continue to follow the current strategy of "investing heavily in expensive And the platform for excellence, because they are being threatened by the opponent's optimized asymmetric means..."
China’s first anti-ship ballistic missile "Dongfeng-21D" has been in the National Day parade Public appearance
The first anti-ship ballistic missile to achieve combat capability is China's Dongfeng-21D. Now, we have a more reliable, more accurate and more remote Dongfeng-26. These missiles, combined with my country's rapidly developing space sensor technology and unmanned aircraft, can detect and attack enemy amphibious assault ships 1,000-2,000 nautical miles away from the launch point.
my country’s anti-ship ballistic missiles can only be launched by land-based mobile transport/elevator/launch vehicles. Models launched from aircraft, and even surface ships and submarines should be under development. Therefore, not only the anti-ship ballistic missile threat itself is of great significance, but based on the diversified and decentralized launch platform, is hardly affected by any preemptive strike . Except for the anti-ship ballistic missiles currently in service, the hypersonic weapons under development are more difficult to defend than the former.
The S-26T submarine sold by China to the Thai Navy has AIP function (Source: Ship Knowledge)
Does not rely on the development of air propulsion (AIP) submarine technology to make this problem change It's more complicated. In view of the fact that the amphibious assault ship must be relatively close to its target to release the smaller beach landing craft, this means that under the anti-ship cruise missile, anti-ship ballistic missile, submarine and modern surveillance capabilities, the amphibious assault ship must pass through.A vulnerable zone of hundreds of kilometers can reach the point of attack. This is really unacceptable.
Organizational structure is no longer a limiting factor
General Berger’s "Guide" not only no longer regards the amphibious assault force structure paradigm as a planning requirement, but does not regard MAGTF as the preferred organizational structure. Until now, MAGTF has been the organizational element on which all Marine Corps combat plans are based. If the Marine Corps is going to perform a mission, the first thing they do is to develop a plan for the mission according to the MAGTF organization chart. In the future, this will no longer be a default choice.
Berger wrote: "Similarly, we are not required to use any specific organizational structure- Marine Corps Air-to-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) cannot be our only solution to all crises. "Like an amphibious assault ship, MAGTF will not disappear anytime soon. But Marine Corps force planners will no longer assume that MAGTF is their only available option.
The Marine Corps anti-tank team uses "Javelin" anti-tank missiles to simulate counter-armed assault dinghy
Berger Admiral then observes that " has no current Marine force To be organized, trained, or equipped to support the Navy. " In other words, the current organizational structure only includes allowing the Navy to transport marines to deployment or combat locations. Berger believes that the proliferation of anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missile weapons is so important that the Marine Corps will have to start thinking about how cooperates with the navy at sea to fight instead of just performing sea-to-land operations .
As an example, the Marine Corps has been testing the loading of the M142 "Haimas" high-mobility rocket launcher system on an amphibious assault ship, not only as a cargo transported from one place to another, but from Auxiliary weapon system launched on board. As shown in the figure below, the Marines aboard the "Wasp" (LHD-1) amphibious assault ship recently demonstrated that they can tie the LAV armored vehicle to the deck and use its 25mm gun as the ship's auxiliary weapon system.
The Marine Corps deployed its own LAV on an amphibious assault ship as an auxiliary defensive weapon
There is reason to believe that in the new deployment model, the US Marine Corps will also Use "Haimas" rocket launchers, LAV armored vehicles, UAVs and other mobile systems to verify its combat capabilities in severe and remote areas. Remote islands and inland airstrips will increasingly become places that the US Marine Corps needs to capture and garrison so that other troops can set off from these places.
Just like what the article said, the "Guide" issued by General Berger after taking office is the most destructive and largest transformation of the guidance issued by any military commander since the end of the Cold War. This raises the question, what is driving this effort to fundamentally change the working and fighting of the US Marine Corps and the Navy? Rare Star is considered to be a more scattered and powerful future threat than today. In response, the US Marine Corps is undergoing a large-scale, fundamental reorganization and modernization. To this end, it is willing to abandon the existing force structure and legacy platforms to free up funds for changes. Berger wrote in his "Guide":
"Troop design is my top priority. If I have the opportunity to obtain additional modernization funds in exchange for changes to the troop structure, I will do it without hesitation... ...However, this is not easy. This will require stripping off traditional forces that cannot be adjusted economically to meet future needs, while also taking risks in certain areas. "
Large amphibious warships full of Marine Corps equipment and soldiers have long been the cornerstone of the U.S. Marine Corps strategy.
The ability to carry out amphibious assaults from sea to land was lost before World War II. Defined as the basic capabilities of the US Marine Corps. Admiral Berger is willing to give up an important part of this abilityIn order to transform the Marine Corps to perform tasks that he believes are more likely to be related to the future. He believes that the Marine Corps is currently recruiting personnel, training, and equipped weapons that make it capable of performing amphibious assault missions, but the ability of will become irrelevant or unable to perform in the near future.
So what will replace the amphibious attack? What is the new defining ability?
It needs to be clear that US Marine Corps did not give up operations from sea to land, but under the command of their new commander, they will conduct these operations in a different way.
Simply put, if Admiral Berger’s "Intent" and "Guide" are implemented, what will happen is that The US Marine Corps will carry on several expensive amphibious assaults from one ship The relatively large forces on the ship (such as MEU) have been transformed into a large number of smaller forces distributed to more and cheaper ships, and possibly even existing supply and logistics ships. Obviously, in the foreseeable future, the "Alligator Navy" will continue to support the Marine Corps, but it will look different and the overall scale may become smaller.
As the general wrote:
"It is illogical to continue to focus our power on some large ships... We need to use a smaller, more deadly, and more The new fleet of anti-risk platforms is designed to change this formula...The navy will continue to promote the development of many small, stealth, and affordable platforms that can economically carry a range of lethal and non-lethal payloads. "
According to the National Defense Magazine, the head of the US Marine Corps Combat Development Command 埃里克·Smith (Eric Smith) recently stated that the unmanned system will be in the new combat mode Play a central role.
"We are interested in all platforms-surface, underwater and air... (we hope) unmanned systems can reach a certain number, because in this regard, the amount of change will happen to a certain extent Qualitative change. We are looking for something that can be used for reconnaissance and radio relay. At the same time, we are also looking for some lethal payloads."
This is the most recent one from the US Marine Corps. The first message seen in the series of changes, it provides more details than Admiral Berger's "Guide". More and smaller ships, equipped with many small unmanned systems, can operate in the air, on the surface and under water. These drones will be able to collect information, serve as communication relays, and have attack capabilities.
The first iteration of this capability will be a vertical take-off drone equipped with radar, and there will definitely be other variants and capabilities in subsequent iterations. Currently, the U.S. Marine Corps' MUX (Multi-Function Vertical Takeoff Combat UAV) project seems to directly meet Lieutenant General Smith’s vision.
Concept art: "San Antonio" amphibious dock transport ship equipped with Bell's MUX drone
In general, I have heard a lot about distributed warfare before. Action news. This should be its model. The smaller-scale Marine Corps members of fight on various ships and operate drones and other agile systems that can be easily migrated between these platforms.
The US Navy is currently purchasing Expeditionary Sea Transfer Dock (ESD) ship and Expeditionary Sea Base (Expeditionary Sea Base, ESB) ship. Both types of ships are designed to provide mobile sea bases to provide logistical and operational support for rotating troops. If the port is unavailable, the ESD ship will basically act as a marine terminal to facilitate cargo transshipment at sea. Although ocean-going ships cannot replicate the full capabilities of the port, ESD ships provide sufficient functions to maintain operational operations logistically in a low-threat environment.
Expeditionary transfer terminal ship "Montford" (ESD-1, right) and car-cargo roll-on ship "Bob Hope" (left) together
ESB ship has a larger business focus, can carry helicopters and personnel for a long time, and serves as the "mother ship" of small ships. ESD and ESB platforms will jointly provide mobile expeditionary support for the new U.S. Marine Corps deployment model.
As an example in this regard, in 2017, the Navy deployed the "Lewis·B·Puller" (ESB-3) maritime base ship in the forefront of the Middle East. "Puller" is the first ESB ship specially built by the US Navy (for details, please refer to my previous article " Expeditionary Sea Base as a non-combat ship, why the US Navy favors it and builds ") . In view of the fact that ESD ships and ESB ships are almost twice the size of the largest amphibious assault ship currently owned by the US Navy, and lack any self-defense capabilities against anti-ship cruise missiles or anti-ship ballistic missile weapons. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the US Navy will deploy surface combat ships near them for escort, in order to provide a large amount of external protection .
"Lewis·B·Puller" (ESB-3) offshore base ship
Although it uses super large, slow speed, difficult to maneuver like ESD and ESB, and does not Vessels with stealth capabilities seem to be the exact opposite of what Admiral Berger is looking for, but from the context, it can be found that these support ships are consistent with this statement:
"The focus of future integrated naval power will be from the traditional The new challenges associated with continuing to maintain the forefront of the navy’s power projection shift to achieve maritime control and blockade operations.”
These giant ships provide distinctive durability and require only the purchase cost of amphibious assault ships. a small part of. They are very flexible and can bring other equipment into a certain area for military demonstrations in a shorter period of time.
This is also in full compliance with the content advocated by many strategists in the distributed war theory. The scattered combat elements make these forces more defensive, survivable and lethal. The US Navy is already developing the so-called adaptive deck launcher (ADL), which will provide small ships and even supply ships with the same missile launch capabilities as high-end surface combat ships. Of course, the smaller, cheaper, and more ships operating in the distributed warfare model will not be equipped with as many missiles as naval surface combat ships, but they may use ESD or ESB as a storage hub for reloading missiles at sea. .
Conceptual model of the US Navy’s adaptive deck launcher
In short, the maritime base concept and the use of smaller and more forward-deployed ships instead of most of the Marine Corps Resources are only used for the traditional "crocodile navy" combat concept and the procurement strategy to support it, providing more choices, flexibility and power flexibility. 其也可以 Makes potential enemies out of balance tactically and strategically , because increasing the procurement priority to have more deadly ships in more places will pose more challenging questions for opponents, and The current troop structure better faces the unknown threat .
Does this redefine the relationship between the Army and the Marine Corps?
The Army and Marine Corps have been in a low-level state of tension in terms of roles and tasks. There is no controversy that the two services have overlapping expertise and business fields . For example, although the Army does not own the advanced amphibious assault ships that the Marine Corps can obtain through the Navy, it does have important beach landing and logistics ships, although the Army recently decided to sell most of these logistics ships.
Although these plans are still changing (the U.S. Army once listed for sale one of the most capable ships of the U.S. Army, the "Robert T. Kuroda", but it was later cancelled. See meThe article " landlord’s house has no food left, demolish the east wall to make up the west wall, the US Army lives by selling ships "), the Army’s fleet obviously only intends to fight in a low-risk environment, and in size, range or combat In terms of capabilities, it is far inferior to the naval amphibious assault ships used by the Marine Corps.
U.S. Army’s landing ship
As an example of this redundancy, in the 18 years since 9/11, the U.S. Marine Corps has been on land far away from the sea. Many long-term combat operations. General Berger’s suggestion is to return the Marine Corps’ center of gravity to the sea, and to work more closely with the Navy through rotating deployment at sea.
Although the Marine Corps did not completely abandon the amphibious assault mission, Berger made it clear that the current amphibious assault fleet of is too expensive to take risks in many confrontational landing scenarios, and it is becoming increasingly unable to resist. Modern anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Marine Corps soldiers perform combat missions in Fallujah, Iraq, far from the coast.
Therefore, the U.S. Marine Corps will start looking for more, cheaper, and more difficult-to-detect ships. . This focus seems to keep the Marines away from the current overlap with the US Army in conducting long-term land operations. If this is the case, this seems to be a change that will actually reduce the tension between the US Army and the Marine Corps in the role and mission of .
Can the "three fires of new officials take office" burn?
Through "Intent" and "Guide", the new commander of the US Marine Corps, Admiral Berger, demonstrated his proactiveness, willingness to take institutional risks, and was able to admit that the current force structure and Marine Corps operational specifications are both expensive and insufficient To deal with future threats. Having said that, he is just a voice in deciding strategy, policy and force structure. The most important strategy and policy guidance is not documents, but budgets.
Every year Congress passes the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of that year. Just like the spread in the US military: " all strategic guidance is just on paper, no one really cares. Do you want to know what the strategy and policy are? Look at the budget of the year. The budget is the strategy and the policy. Everything else is just empty talk. "
This sentence does have its truth. Fei Xing Tian Wai does not want to say that all other strategic and policy documents are irrelevant before the NDAA, but Among all the strategic and policy documents, NDAA is that most reflects the actual situation.
The Marine Corps F-35B joint strike fighter landed on the "Wasp" amphibious assault ship crossing the Coral Sea
All current U.S. military structures are the direct result of the previous NDAA . Every weapon system currently available to the US military, or every alternative capability the US military wants and needs, is also the result of these NDAAs. Therefore, Xi Xing Tian Wai believes that General Berger's "Intent" and "Guide" may have a huge impact on the future NDAA.
If Berger’s "Intent" and "Guide" are paid attention and implemented, it may lead to major and fundamental changes in the future NDAA, namely: The US Navy will purchase fewer large amphibious assault ships and More cheaper, smaller and more flexible ships and offshore base ships . The latest offshore base ship, "Horse Woody Williams" (T-ESB-4) was launched last year and is about to enter service. The fifth ship in the ESD/ESB ship combination, the Miguel Keith (T-ESB-5), was launched recently. In fact, Berger’s vision has partially become a reality-the US Navy has just ordered two more ESB ships, with a third as an executable purchase option. This raises a series of questions. Will the US Navy continue to purchase large amphibious warships? If so, how long will it last? At what rate will they buy?
At present, this kind of change will not happen overnight, and the future NDAA seems to continue to purchase amphibiousAssault ship , although the US Navy has begun to purchase small ships that will supplement the amphibious assault fleet. On the other hand, although the new "Guide" does not seem to completely replace the amphibious assault fleet, NDAA is a zero-sum game. If the NDAA redirects budget funds to the purchase of small ships and drones, then the purchase funds for amphibious assault ships will inevitably decrease.
The amphibious dock transport ship "Arlington" (LPD-24)
which was still under construction that year, therefore, NDAA will continue to purchase amphibious assault ships in the near future. , In order to maintain the ability of the shipbuilding industry base. However, once the decision is made to follow the "Guidelines" of the new Marine Corps commander, some major changes must occur in its shipbuilding plan.
A new strategy for distributed lethality is taking shape
Admiral Berger’s proposal is to partially reject the status quo and challenge the fundamental transformation of the Marine Corps combat theory. The traditional method focuses on using MAGTF as the main organizational structure and the Navy's amphibious assault fleet as the main carrier, allowing the Marine Corps to rotate and deploy and maintain a forward presence. This will be replaced by the new "Guide". The US Marine Corps will be deployed on smaller, cheaper, and more ships equipped with distributed firepower. When combining this trend with Lieutenant General Smith’s comments on the application of unmanned driving to various systems in various combat operations, we can see that a new distributed lethality strategy is taking shape .
Although General Berger’s intentions are clear, nothing has happened yet. The process of changing from the current mode of deploying MEU on amphibious assault ships to a new mode will be very complicated .
Like its soldiers practicing night search capabilities on naval ships, the U.S. Marine Corps is currently exploring its new strategy in the dark.
For example, put Marines on Is the new method of equipping smaller and more ships with distributed sensors and weapons designed to complement the capabilities of existing amphibious assault ships, or will they eventually replace it? Deploying the Marine Corps on more and smaller ships seems to be a way to reduce the risk of any single ship being injured or sunk by the enemy's actions, but whether these ships have sufficient firepower and defensive capabilities to survive in a hostile environment What about ?
If modern detection capabilities are combined with anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles, the attack zone of the defender can be extended to 1,000 nautical miles (about 1850 kilometers) or more from the coast, then the detection and target attack capabilities Will further development make the new generation of small ships that have not been named and completed the same vulnerable to attack?
075 Is the ship obsolete before launching?
Possible changes in the organization and combat strategy of the US Marine Corps will also affect the combat thinking of other navies in the world. What's interesting is that in the same month that Admiral Berger released his "Intent" and "Guide", the Chinese Navy's 075-class amphibious assault ship became real. Not only its various construction photos frequently appear on the Internet, but also official or quasi-official media such as "Global Times" and "Xinhua Net". At this time, there was news that the U.S. Marine Corps was about to launch a large-scale amphibious assault ship. We couldn’t help asking, is the 075-class amphibious assault ship obsolete before it is launched?
headlines and many online media photos of the 075 amphibious assault ship
Xixingtianwai believes that there is no need to worry about it. We must know that the strategic changes of the US Marine Corps are based on the establishment and possession of a powerful large-scale amphibious combat fleet. Compared with this, the strength of the Chinese Navy in this area is still far behind. This is like When the rich are already talking about eating less meat to keep in good health, what has just solved the problem of food and clothing is to rely on a large amount of protein to increase physical fitness.
In addition, sparsely spaced the issue of "Put the Marines on smaller and more ships.Is the new approach to cloth sensors and weapons aimed at supplementing the capabilities of existing amphibious assault ships, or is it ultimately replacing it? "The answer is more inclined to the former. This is also proven by a lot of military and equipment history. It is like talking about the "tank useless theory" for many years, and the tank is still the "king of the land warfare." Before the old amphibious assault warfare (such as the replacement of battleships by aircraft carriers), could not completely obliterate the role of large amphibious warships in amphibious warfare .
To sum up the two points, Xixingtianwai believes that 075 Class amphibious assault ship is not only not outdated, but also has to be manufactured in batches, so that we can truly embark on the road to prosperity.
The outside world guesses and computer synthesis of the parameters of the 075 amphibious assault ship
Finally, everyone also Don’t limit 075 to achieving the reunification of the motherland and safeguarding the territorial integrity of the motherland . Although the amphibious assault ship is useful in these operations, it will not be decisive. Everyone should look farther. , Look a little higher. 075 is obviously built to create a "blue sea navy". And where is the "blue sea" of the "blue sea navy"? The one with a continental shelf is obviously not.
