1944's Sino-Japanese Battle of Henan, Hunan and Guangxi ended with the defeat of the Kuomintang army, especially the battle between Henan and Zhongzhong. Tang Enbo's 2.4 million troops were about to collapse at one touch, and even failed to collapse. 48 cities were lost in 30 days. The Japanese army only achieved a great victory in Henan and the Central Plains at the slightest cost of 4,000 casualties.
In the battle of Henan, why did the 400,000 Chinese army lose to the 150,000 Japanese army, and why was it so defeated? What problems did the defeat expose the national army?
American history professor Yi Laoyi believes that there was a problem with the Kuomintang generals, especially the commendable Huangpu generals. He said:
"The incompetent leadership, lack of military discipline and lack of fighting spirit shown in the battle between Henan and Central Henan is not limited to the troops of Henan Province (Tang Enbo was one of the more capable generals of the Kuomintang), nor was it discovered only in the last year of the war. Although these shortcomings were prominent in the stalemate, they were the characteristics of the Kuomintang army that ran through most of the war. For example, the officers from the beginning, from the beginning. Very lack of professional skills: senior commanders who graduated from Whampoa Military Academy received little military education, and most of them graduated from 1924 to 1926. At that time, training was primary, less than six months, and at most one year. Since then, they have rarely benefited from the transfer of management, education or specialized departments of the military, which was common in modern Western armies. In the 1930s, these officers We could have benefited from the advanced training at the Chinese Army University, however, few Huangpu graduates condescend to return to the classroom. And anyway, the training provided by the Army University is still quite insufficient when measured by international standards.
However, there are still a few generals who are commanders with real talents who are commanders with real talents. . But the absurd thing is that Chiang Kai-shek rarely uses them fully because his loyalty to his subordinates is more important than talent and integrity. "
Chen Guanren wrote the book "The Four Real Families" and recorded Lao Chiang's concept of family and country and its influence and role on state affairs and even military victory and defeat. He has a profound analysis and summary of the reasons for his victory and defeat in the 1930s and 1940s. It is a rare historical bestseller.
