This article is about The Ukrainian Civil War in 2014-2015. The current war must wait until it is summarized and summarized later.
In the Ukrainian civil war from 2014 to 2015, the Russian army used a small number of regular troops to support the operations of the East Ukrainian militias, which also happened to test the results of the Russian army in electronic warfare since the military reform in 2008.
The military reform of the Russian army in 2008 was influenced by the experience in the Russian-Georgian war that year. The Russian army established a vertically integrated electronic warfare command and control system, which is what the US military calls C2. After the reform, all infantry, Electronic warfare companies have been established in tank , airborne and special forces brigades/divisions.
The Russian army's electronic warfare in the Ukrainian civil war mainly includes five directions:
destroys Ukrainian army's communication equipment,
intercepts Ukrainian army's communications,
interferes with radio stations (the frequency bands are mainly concentrated in 137-180 and 400-470 MHz ) and military GPS,
used hacking methods to invade the Ukrainian army’s smart electronic devices and key network facilities, and
spread false, wrong or malicious information to the Ukrainian army.
Electronic warfare equipment
(Note that the electronic warfare equipment here uses Russian numbers. The weapon nickname uses free translation instead of the transliteration , so it may be different from what the "big Vs" wrote.)
Russian army and East Ukraine militia There are several types of electronic warfare equipment mainly used:
1. РБ-341В "Rail-3" system
In addition to the electronic equipment installed in the wheeled truck, this system is also equipped with a Seahawk-10 (Орлан- 10) Drones, the two work together to interfere with wireless signals of the GSM standard (approximately equivalent to a 2G mobile phone), and have been conducting interference operations many times since the spring of 2015.
"Rail-3" interior
"Seahawk-10" UAV
2. РB-301B "Borisoglebsk-2" system
is installed in the MT-LB tracked armored vehicle and is designed to interfere with radio communications, Especially high frequency/ultra high frequency radios are aimed at tactical-level mobile terminals (such as mobile phones) and trunked radios.
first appeared in Donbass in November 2014. US military consultants commented that this electronic warfare equipment played a decisive role in the battle of Debaltseve in January 2015, which suffered extremely heavy losses to the Ukrainian army.
Borisoglebsk-2
By the way, Borisoglebsk is a city in Voronezh Oblast .
3. Р-934У "Tit" system
is a fully automatic jamming station, which can automatically detect and interfere with and suppress aviation's VHF radio communications and tactical aviation guidance systems, wheeled truck platforms.
"Tit" system
4. Р-330Ж "Resident" system
The Russian army has adopted this electronic warfare system since the 1996 Chechen War and installed it on a wheeled truck. It may be because the model is older and mainly operated by the Eastern Ukraine militia.
"Resident" system
5. Р-381Т "Battering Ram"
This is The radio monitoring station developed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s
is mainly used to search for the location of the Ukrainian army's radio communication equipment. It can use 7 vehicles The vehicles form a formation, among which:
1 vehicles Р-381Т3 are responsible for automatically processing the search radio model,
4 vehicles Р-381Т2 search for enemy communication signals of 30-100 MHz,
2 vehicles Р-381Т1 search for enemy forces 1.5-30 MHz , 100-400 MHz (aeronautical radio) and 300-1000 MHz (radio relay) signals.
"Battering Ram"
In the direction of Donetsk , especially in the famous Battle of Donetsk Airport, the East Ukrainian militia was operating Р-381Т.
6.ПСНР-8 "Creed"
is a portable ground reconnaissance station. It mainly detects targets on the ground and water. It generally cooperates with Russian artillery operations and is used in the Lugansk area.
"Creed"
Combat Methods
After sorting out the statements of the Ukrainian army, American consultants summarized the electronic warfare methods used by the Russian army and the East Ukrainian militia in the Ukrainian civil war.
1. Collection and interception of radio communications
The Russian army and the East Ukrainian militia used the various electronic warfare equipment mentioned above to search and intercept the communications of the Ukrainian army in various military frequency bands.
also targets communication networks used by the Ukrainian army such as GSM, CDMA2000 (similar to China Telecom 2G) and UMTS (similar to China Unicom 3G).
The Russian army is also actively searching for equipment that the Ukrainian army uses the US military version of GPS, and has also interfered and deceived GPS.
According to the Ukrainian army's own statistics, because of this, the Ukrainian army has lost approximately 100 small drones as of 2017.
3. Electronic communication suppression
The Russian army's electronic warfare troops often make the Ukrainian army's radio communication signals suddenly disappear, weakening the GSM radio signal to the point of being unusable, and connecting to the GSM communication network and the Ukrainian army's mobile phone network.
then uses these models to discover the location of the Ukrainian army, especially the location of the anti-artillery radar, and use long-range firepower to destroy it if necessary.
3. Electronic psychological warfare
After suppressing the Ukrainian army's own communications, the Russian army sometimes uses the РB-341В "Rail-3" electronic warfare system combined with the "Haiyan-10" drone to simulate a false communication network, and then Simulate disinformation on both sides. On the one hand,
simulates the Ukrainian army's communications corps , sending false information to the Ukrainian army's own troops. On the one hand,
takes over the mobile phone communication network and sends false text messages and other content to the mobile phones of Ukrainian soldiers.
These contents are usually completed with the help of local people who support the East Uzbek militia, or the Uzbek army soldiers who surrendered to East Uzbekistan, so they can sometimes be confused with the real ones.
Of course, the Eastern Ukraine militia and the Russian army also showed some shortcomings in electronic warfare:
1. The communication frequency bands of the two combatants are sometimes the same. Therefore, when the Eastern Ukraine militia and the Russian army carried out electronic interference, they themselves were unable to use these frequency bands, and they did not find any effective solution.
2. Drones are severely underused. The number and performance of the drones the Russian army invested in the Ukrainian civil war were insufficient. This was mainly due to the fact that the types and performance of the drones invested by the Russian army were insufficient.
3. In the long run, the effectiveness of electronic psychological warfare will decline.
With the help of Western consultants, the Ukrainian army formulated countermeasures against the psychological warfare in Eastern Ukraine. After the Ukrainian army became accustomed to the Russian army occupying the communication channel and sending various messages, it no longer feared these contents.
However, once the war goes against the Ukrainian army, these psychological operations will still play a role in demoralizing the Ukrainian army.
Generally speaking, US military consultants believe that the Russian military’s intervention in the Ukrainian civil war was quite limited, and its actions in electronic warfare were mainly a test of its electronic warfare capabilities. Therefore, the electronic countermeasures on this battlefield can only provide a narrow observation channel for the relevant combat capabilities of the Russian army. As for the potential of the Russian army in the field of electronic warfare, it remains to be analyzed and observed.
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