On January 25, 1951, not long after the end of the third battle of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the newly appointed commander of the 8th Army of the US Army, Li Qiwei, started "Operation Thunderbolt" and launched a counterattack against the volunteers. This was the beginning of the fourth battle.
Domestic books generally say: "Neither Chairman Mao nor Peng Dehuai foresee the attack."
This sentence is a major war to resist the US and aid Korea. problem. My old readers know that I use numbered serialization, and I stop here. The next is a jump serial. Now I can write this question. The reason is very simple. Now I am researching this field in China to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and I have already gained a certain reputation, so I can write about it. In the past, it was just an unknown person. According to the "tradition" of our academic circles, an unknown person cannot refute all researchers' remarks on such a major issue.
Let’s look at two telegrams first.
1. Chairman Mao’s famous telegram
These two telegrams are closely related, so I quote the full text, please read it carefully.
After Li Qiwei launched the attack, Peng Dehuai sent a telegram to Chairman Mao at 0:00 on January 28, 1951:
(three follow-up regiments unknown) It was divided into three lanes, Yuejinyangchangli, and Suwon Line North, and there were cameras capturing Seoul City and Jiangbuk’s bridgehead position in an attempt to stabilize the current serious chaos within the United Nations. In order to increase the contradictions in the imperialist camp, can the Chinese and North Korean armies support a limited truce? The People’s Army and the Volunteers will withdraw 15 to 30 kilometers north from the Osan, Taipingli, and Danqiuli lines (all south of the Han River)If you agree, please broadcast from Beijing.
(2) The enemy continues to attack from the north. I will not attack with all my strength and eliminate more than one division. It is very difficult to maintain the bridgehead position; the attack will destroy the training plan and postpone the spring offensive. At present, there is no supplement of ammunition and food. Can barely be dispatched at the beginning of the month. I temporarily abandon Incheon and Qiaotou positions, whether the political situation at home and abroad is permissible. It is now planned that the One and Two Five Divisions will attack Changhuyuan and Wonju, and the One and Two Divisions will attack the southwestern area of Lichuan, seeking to eliminate one of the puppet troops and try to contain the enemy from marching north. If it is impossible to stop the enemy’s northward advance, and politically forbidden to abandon Seoul and Incheon, he must be forced to deploy a counterattack. However, considering all aspects, it is very reluctant. Which one is right, I look forward to your reply. "Peng Dehuai Chronicle" page 469.
At 7 pm on the 28th, Chairman Mao gave Peng Dehuai a call:
All orders have been received.
(2) Our army must immediately prepare to launch the fourth battle, with the goal of annihilating 20,000 to 30,000 US Li forces occupying Daejeon and the area north of the Andong Line.
(3) During the preparations for the battle, it is necessary to maintain the bridgehead fortresses of Incheon and Seoul on the south bank to ensure Seoul and attract the enemy's main force in the Suwon and Icheon areas. When the campaign was launched, the main forces of the Chinese and Korean armies should take a plan to break through Wonju and develop toward Rongju and Anton.
(4) The Chinese and North Korean armies retreat 15 to 30 kilometers north, and it is inappropriate to publish news supporting a limited armistice. The enemy is hoping that our army will retreat to a certain area, block the Han River, and then cease the war.
(5) After the fourth battle, the enemy may have peace negotiations with us to resolve the North Korean issue. The negotiations will be beneficial to China and North Korea at that time. The enemy wants to restore Incheon and Seoul’s South Bank Bridgehead Fortress now.The blockade of the Han River puts Seoul under the threat of enemy fire, that is, a truce with us to negotiate peace, which puts China and North Korea at a disadvantage. And this is something we must never allow.
(6) Our army has no replenishment and lack of ammunition. It is indeed very difficult. However, it is still possible to concentrate the main force on Wonju and Yeongju and wipe out several parts of the US army and four or five South Korean divisions. Please give an explanation at this senior cadre meeting. This meeting should serve as a meeting to mobilize for the fourth battle.
(7) After occupying Daejeon and the area north of the Andong line, the Chinese and North Korean armies will carry out preparations for another two to three months, and then conduct the fifth battle with a final nature. In all aspects, it is more advantageous.
(8) The Song Shilun Corps should be moved to Pyongyang, Seoul, Incheon, and Suwon for rest, and serve to consolidate the area to prevent the enemy from landing in Incheon and Jinnampo. In the fifth battle in the future, the corps will serve as the battle of the Western Campaign.
(9) In the fourth battle, please consider dividing the main forces of the Chinese and Korean armies into two echelons, each with five days of dry food. The first echelon will serve as a breakthrough and one-stage pursuit, and the second echelon will serve as another one. Pursue, so that the battle can last ten to twelve days, and annihilate more enemies.
(10) How do you expect your opinion? "Mao Zedong Chronicles (1949-1976)" Volume 1, Pages 294-295.
2. The long-lived statement
These two telegrams are what all the books on the War of Resistance against U.S. America and Aid Korea said-Chairman Mao and Peng Dehuai in the fourth battle Major disagreements.
is indeed a major disagreement. Peng Dehuai suggested to withdraw and even suggested that Beijing publish a broadcast supporting the armistice.Chairman Mao asked Peng Dehuai to hit the third and sixth lanes.
At that time, the Volunteer Army had suffered serious personnel losses and had not been replenished after three battles, lack of food and bombs, fatigue of the troops, and urgent need for rest. The combat effectiveness had actually been greatly reduced. To put it bluntly, the volunteer army had lost the ability to fight again. In this case, Chairman Mao also forced Peng Dehuai to fight to the third or sixth line. This is obviously because Chairman Mao did not understand the situation on the front line and commanded indiscriminately. This is what all the books, all the scholars, all the experts told the public.
Combining these two telegrams with the situation of the volunteers at that time, there is absolutely no problem with this conclusion.
But, is this true?
3. Put all historical materials on the table, don’t take them out of context!
To answer the above question, my answer is: this is fake!
I have always said that in the field of literature and history, there is no authority. Many scholars in China have a big problem. They first draw conclusions and then pile up arguments. Instead of deriving conclusions based on historical data.
This will cause a very big problem, that is to take out of context, to be straightforward, is to spread rumors!
As mentioned earlier, in accordance with the practice of all books, putting two telegrams together, it seems that Chairman Mao made a mistake. And the original files are listed, which seems to be in line with academic norms.
Actually, this is an academic fraud.
Many people believe after reading the book, but there are also many people who have questions. How could a military strategist like Chairman Mao make such a low-level mistake?
because these two telegrams are not all,If you list all the telegrams, the facts presented are completely different from the facts presented by the two telegrams alone.
In the previous articles, I have explained why the third battle had to fight the 38th line. See the previous two articles: The famous story between Chairman Mao and Peng Dehuai in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. It is necessary to make it clear
In order to keep this article complete, but also to clarify the issues described in this article, I will briefly state it again.
On December 24 and 26, 1950, Chairman Mao sent two telegrams to Peng Dehuai, asking the Volunteers to retreat after crossing the 38th parallel, and asking the Second and Fifth Army of the People’s Army not to go deep. Behind enemy lines. "Mao Zedong Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" page 733, "Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic of China" pages 734-735.
On the 28th, Peng Dehuai replied to agree, "Peng Dehuai Chronicles" page 360.
However, on January 4, 1951, Peng Dehuai changed his mind. He believes that if the enemy still guards the south bank of the Han River, controls Gimpo Airport and uses the Incheon port to maintain transportation, Seoul will still be under enemy aircraft and artillery fire at any time, which is very detrimental to our preparations for the spring offensive. If I take advantage of the victory and gather strength to continue to wipe out one enemy, I will not only consolidate Seoul, but also gain access to Gimpo Airport and control the Port of Incheon. This will create more favorable conditions for me to prepare for the spring offensive. "Peng Dehuai Military Selected Works" p. 360.
Here to pay attention, Peng Dehuai made the decision to occupy the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River on January 4, 1951.Not only did he deny Chairman Mao's request for the Volunteers to withdraw to the north of the 38th parallel, he also retracted his consent on December 28, 1950.
On January 8, Peng Dehuai chaired a party committee meeting at the Volunteer Army headquarters. Du Ping, director of the Volunteer Army Political Department, recalled: "(The meeting proposed) After the start of the next battle, we will continue to fight and wipe out the enemy , All liberate Korea." "At the Volunteer Army Headquarters", author Du Ping, p. 136. Du Ping wrote later in the book: "It reflects that our headquarters did not know enough about the enemy's situation at that time." The "iron proof" of China proves that China's strategic purpose is to help unify North Korea. In fact, this was only proposed by the Volunteer Army Headquarters during its own meeting, and it was not approved by the Central Committee. And the strategic intentions of Chairman Mao and the Central Committee on October 23, 1950, when the volunteers had just entered the DPRK before they started fighting, they telegraphed Peng Dehuai: "The possibility of forcing the United States to conduct diplomatic negotiations with me." "Mao Zedong Military Selected Works" (Volume 6)" page 141.
On January 9 and 11, 1951, Chairman Mao sent two telegrams to Peng Dehuai, asking the volunteers to withdraw, and for the first time proposed that the People’s Army should assume the defense of the south bank of the Han River. "Peng Dehuai Chronicle" page 465, "Peng Dehuai Chronicle" page 466.
On January 14, Chairman Mao sent a telegram to Peng Dehuai to analyze the current war situation and point out the next possible actions of the US military. In the third possibility, Chairman Mao pointed out: There is another possibility, that is, the objective situation forces us to fight a battle in February." "The Chronicle of Resisting US Aggression and Aid Korea," p. 67.
As a result, Li Qiwei started counterattack on January 25,It is only 6 days away from Chairman Mao's prediction. At the beginning of this article, I listed it. The books generally read: "Neither Chairman Mao nor Peng Dehuai foresee this attack." It is worth pointing out that Chairman Mao proposed three in total in this telegram. Possibly, the third one may predict that the US military will counterattack in February, and 99% of the books deliberately do not mention it. Let's look at the screenshot below.
Fortunately, I just listed the original message. Obviously, the authors of various books "eaten" the third possibility that Chairman Mao said. This is natural. Without "eaten" the third possibility that Chairman Mao said, how can the author write the next sentence? : "It is undeniable that Mao Zedong overestimated the capabilities of the Volunteers in strategic judgment."
The facts are very obvious. Chairman Mao foresaw the attack. All kinds of books and experts deliberately ignored them and did not tell the readers, just to echo their following-Chairman Mao made a mistake.
On January 18, Chairman Mao also transferred to Peng Dehuai the opinions of Nie Rongzhen and General Adviser Shakhanov of the Soviet Army in China, pointing out that the defense of the bridgehead on the south bank of the Han River was too weak and demanded to increase The two armies of the People's Army strengthened their defensive forces. "Peng Dehuai Chronicle" page 467.
Peng Dehuai convened a meeting of senior generals of the Volunteer Army and concluded: "The enemy has no attempt to attack the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River." "Far East Korean War," p.548.
So Peng Dehuai replied to Chairman Mao on January 22, denying the opinions of Nie Rongzhen and others: "My next battle is mainly along the banks of the Techuan, Danyang, and the east of the Luodong River, and first capture Daegu and Qing State, cut off the main retreat of American troops west of the Nakdong River. Therefore, the position at the south bridgehead of the Han River should not be deployed with more troops."The Chronicle of Peng Dehuai," page 468.
We can see that before the U.S. counterattack, Chairman Mao asked the Volunteers to withdraw four times, and twice asked the People’s Army to assume the defense of the bridgehead on the south bank of the Han River, but Peng Dehuai did not implement it. _Span2span
After these telegrams, it was Peng Dehuai that was mentioned at the beginning of this article that gave Chairman Mao a power generation at 0:00 on January 28 and asked to withdraw. At 7 pm on January 28, Chairman Mao called back and refused to withdraw. And asked Peng Dehuai to hit the third and sixth lanes.
After reading all the telegrams, is it very interesting?
Chairman Mao’s long-standing opinion is: the volunteers should withdraw to the north of the 38th lane, don’t stay in Korea, more Do not occupy the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River. It was not until Peng Dehuai repeatedly failed to implement that Chairman Mao made a compromise. On January 11, he agreed to the volunteers to stay on the front line of Seoul, but the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River had to be handed over to the People’s Army. In a telegram on the 18th Through the mouth of General Nie Rongzhen and Shakhanov, he asked Peng Dehuai to strengthen the defense of the bridgehead, and pointed out that the People’s Army should be pulled to strengthen it.
Peng Dehuai’s long-standing opinion is: the volunteers should occupy the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River, so as to facilitate the next time.
The campaign’s southward offensive. And never implemented Chairman Mao’s suggestions.
But on January 28, the situation was completely reversed, and Peng Dehuai asked for a retreat, and Chairman Mao asked for a southward offense. Isn’t it very interesting? _Span2span
So experts cannot and will not list all the telegrams. List them all. The facts presented are completely different from the "facts" they want to express.
After Li Qiwei counterattacked, Peng Dehuai changed his attitude and turned to support Chairman Mao’s previous request to withdraw.It is very easy to understand. The offensive of the US army was very fierce. Peng Dehuai originally planned that the volunteers would rest for at least two months. Peng Dehuai wanted to avoid a decisive battle with the US army by retreating and win rest time.
Chairman Mao changed his attitude, it seems difficult to understand. Peng Dehuai finally agreed with his own opinion. Why did Chairman Mao suddenly change to agree with Peng Dehuai's previous opinions and ask to go south to attack? In fact, it is easy to understand. Chairman Mao was angry: On December 24th, 26th, January 9th, and 11th, I told you Mr. Peng four times to withdraw and withdraw. You began to agree, but later refused to implement it. You must occupy the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River in order to Yu attacked southward. On the 14th, I told you General Peng that the US military is likely to counterattack. On the 18th, I told you General Peng that the defense on the south bank of the Han River was too weak, and the U.S. military would be unable to withstand a counterattack. As a result, you insisted on occupying the position at the bridgehead on the south bank of the Han River, but refused to strengthen the defense and replied that the enemy had no intention of attacking. As a result, now that the US army has fought over, you, General Peng, who has always been fearless, finally knew that he was wrong. Then you don’t want to change it, continue to fight the American army according to your previous ideas, and continue to attack southward. Chairman Mao is really angry with Mr. Peng.
Peng Dehuai also knows that Chairman Mao’s telegram is a spiteful element, so the plan for the fourth campaign did not follow Chairman Mao’s telegram. Instead, he formulated a combat plan for fighting from the west to the east, intended to contain the US military The offensive, after reporting to Chairman Mao, Chairman Mao agreed, and did not continue to talk about going to the third or sixth line.
In summary, the disagreement between Chairman Mao and Peng Dehuai is not Peng Dehuai's request to withdraw, and Chairman Mao's request to hit the third or sixth line. Instead, Chairman Mao always asked the volunteers to withdraw to the north of the 38th parallel, and Peng Dehuai insisted on occupying the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River. But this is only the surface.
4. What is the real difference?
The real difference is the strategic guiding ideology.
Chairman Mao has always asked the volunteers to withdraw to the north of the 38th parallel. This is because the strategic guidance set by Chairman Mao and the Central Committee is "Resisting U.S. Aid Korea,Protecting the home and defending the country.” Volunteers sent troops because the United States did not listen to Premier Zhou’s warning and flagrantly crossed the 38th Parallel and approached the Yalu River, threatening China’s national security. That’s why the volunteers sent troops into North Korea to fight. Given this strategic guiding ideology, The Volunteers have achieved their strategic goals by advancing the front to the 38th Front. Chairman Mao asked the Volunteers to fight across the 38th Front in order to teach the U.S. and South Korean forces, to show the strength of the Volunteers, and to force the U.S. to enter into armistice negotiations. "Forcing the U.S. to enter into a truce "Negotiating", Chairman Mao told Peng Dehuai in the telegram at the beginning of the Volunteer Army’s dispatch.
Peng Dehuai has not implemented Chairman Mao’s suggestion that the Volunteers should withdraw to the north of the 38th parallel, except for the last article The reason for the People’s Army mentioned. The more important reason is that Peng Dehuai’s strategic guiding ideology is to drive the U.S. troops to the sea and liberate all of Korea. Why occupy the bridgehead position on the south bank of the Han River? In order to facilitate the next attack. What is the purpose of the next attack. Hit the U.S. army and the Korean army to Nakdong River. After hitting Nakdong River, the next step is Busan. President Peng is going to sweep South Korea.
This is the fundamental difference. Peng Dehuai violated Chairman Mao and The central government’s strategic guidance for defending the country and fighting a war of self-defense. China is just self-defense. It is not our strategic goal to help North Korea reunify. Needless to say, most people can understand the reason.
Peng Dehuai is The military strategist I admire most is not only because he led the volunteer army to defeat the world’s number one U.S. military, but also because of his great personality. But the top military strategist must be a perfect combination of politics and military. At this point, China only had Chairman Mao alone is extremely rare in 5,000 years of world history. Chairman Mao is not a god, he is a human, and he will make mistakes. But on military issues, it is better to listen to him. This is what Premier Zhou said countless times. _Span2span
So we can see that by putting all the telegrams on the table, the facts presented are completely different from the "facts" that have been circulating. These telegrams and historical materials are all public ,I can see that the experts can see it, but our experts have concealed most of the telegrams and historical materials. Then the "facts" presented are naturally taken out of context.
This is a major issue in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and it must be clarified.
About the author: Wang Zhengxing, a special military observer of the Xinhua News Agency’s lookout think tank, a former officer of a field unit of the People’s Liberation Army. And non-war operations have their own unique understanding. His book "This Is War" was recommended in two installments in the "Eight Minutes" section of Phoenix TV in May and June 2014. His public name is also "This is the war", please pay attention to
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