Share interests, spread happiness, increase experiences, and leave beauty. Dear, Here is LearningYard Academy! Today, the editor brings you the latest money newspaper (64), specifically reads the literature tweets (journal papers) "A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate" Welcome to your careful visit! This issue's tweet lasts about 9 minutes, please read it patiently. Share interest, spread happiness, increase knowledge, leave beautiful. Dear you, This is LearningYard Academy! Today Xiaobian brings you the latest money report (64), Specifically for the intense reading of literature tweets (journal papers) A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and Rebates Welcome your heart visit! Thisweetwilltakeabout9minutes to read, please be patient. Today, the editor shared a journal article "A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and The decentralized decision-making part of rebate》, the editor will introduce this part from three sections: mind map , intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement. Please learn from the editor! 
Today Xiaobian shares the decentralized decision-making part of A journal paper "A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and Rebates". Xiaobian will introduce this part of the content from the mind map, intense reading content, knowing supplement three plates, please readers to learn with Xiaobian!
. Mind map
The mind map of decentralized decision-making in this paper is shown in the figure Below:
. Intensive reading content
Scholars' decentralized decision-making part studies the situation under the leadership of manufacturers, where manufacturers are the leaders in the supply chain, so manufacturers have priority in pricing decisions. After observing the manufacturer's pricing decisions, retailers make the best pricing decisions with the goal of maximizing their own interests. The solution method adopted by scholars is reverse induction. First, judge the concaveness and convexity of the retailer's profit and determine whether there is a maximum value (the small residual 0 after the quadratic derivative is the concave function, and the second-order Heiser matrix calculation is greater than 0, which is the concave function). Then, directly solve the first derivative equals 0 and directly solve it or solve it in conjunction to obtain the optimal reaction function of the decision variable. Furthermore, the optimal function of the decision variable is brought to the manufacturer's profit function, and then the quadratic derivative of the decision variable in the manufacturer's profit function is used to determine its concave convexity and convexity, and the conditions that satisfy the concave function are then made equal to 0. The joint solution is obtained to obtain the optimal solution of the decision variable in the manufacturer's function. Next, the optimal solution is brought into the previously calculated optimal reaction function, and the optimal solution of all parameters can be obtained. Finally, bring the optimal solution into the requirement function and profit function.
In the part of decentralized decision-making, schools study the situation dominated by the manufacturer, in which the manufacturer is the dominant player in the supply chain, so the manufacturer has the priority in the pricing decision. After observing the manufacturer's pricing decision, the retailer makes the optimal pricing decision for the purpose of maximizing its own interests. The solution method adopted by schoolsrs is backward induction. First, judge the concavity of the retailer's profit to determine whether there is a maximum value (small residual 0 after quadratic derivative is a concave function, and the second order Hesse matrix calculation greater than 0 is a concave function). Then directly set the first derivative equal to 0 to solve directly or simultaneously to get the optimal reaction function of the decision variable. Further, the optimal function The decision variable is introduced into the manufacturer's profit function, and then the second derivative of the decision variable in the manufacturer's profit function is calculated to judge its convexity, and the condition of meeting the concave function is determined. Then the first derivative of the decision variable is set equal to 0, and the optimal solution of the decision variable in the manufacturer's function is obtained simultaneously. Then, the optical solution can be obtained by substituting it into the optical reaction function previously obtained. Finally, the optical solution into the demand function, profit function can be.
Two conclusions are drawn from the schools' part:
Conclusion 1: When both the manufacturer and the retailer provide rebates, find the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the optimal online product price and the optimal offline retail price. From the solution results, it can be found that the manufacturer's wholesale price, online direct sales price and retailer's price are all related to the rebate and the perceived value of online evaluation from the online comments.
Conclusion 1: When both the manufacturer and the retailer provide rebates, the manufacturer's optical wholesale price, the optical online product price and the optical offline retail price are obtained. From the solution results, it can be found that the manufacturer's wholesale price, the online direct selling price and the retailer's price obtained from the online review are correlated with the perceived value of the rebate and the online evaluation.
Conclusion 2: In decentralized decisions, when both manufacturers and retailers provide rebates, the wholesale price of manufacturers is positively correlated with the perceived value of online reviews. When consumers' perceived value of online evaluation and the cross-price elasticity coefficient meets certain conditions, the manufacturer's wholesale price is positively correlated with the rebate, otherwise it is negatively correlated.
Conclusion 2: Under decentralized decisions, when both manufacturers and retailers offer rebates, manufacturers' wholesale prices are positively correlated with the perceived value of online reviews. When consumers' perceived value of online evaluation and cross-price elasticity coefficient meet certain conditions, the wholesale price of manufacturers is positively correlated with rebates, otherwise it is negatively correlated.
Under certain conditions, the wholesale price of the manufacturer will increase with the increase in rebates. This is because when retailers’ prices rise with rebates, manufacturers will also raise wholesale prices in order to make more profits. In addition, wholesale prices for manufacturers are rising because the value of perceived online reviews increases because the perceived value of online reviews affects their wholesale prices by affecting the manufacturer's online price.
Under certain conditions, manufacturers' wholesale prices will rise with the increase of rebates. This is because when retailers' prices go up with rebates, manufacturers also raise wholesale prices in order to make more profit. In addition, wholesale prices for manufacturers go up because the perceived value of online reviews goes up because the perceived value of online reviews influences wholesale prices for manufacturers by influencing their online prices.
From the results of the demand function, we found that the manufacturer's offline demand is related to rebate, but has nothing to do with the perceived value in online comments. However, manufacturers’ online demands are related to both the rebate and the perceived value of online reviews.
From the results of the demand function, we find that manufacturers' offline demand is related to rebates, but not to perceived value in online reviews. However, manufacturers' online demand is related to both rebates and the perceived value of online reviews.
Scholars have clear ideas for solving this part, and their solution process and results are not complicated. However, the editor found that the two factors of online evaluation and rebate considered by scholars are two factors that affect each other. Manufacturers guide consumers to conduct online evaluation through rebates, that is, the cost that manufacturers have to pay in online evaluation is rebate. At the same time, the rebates considered by manufacturers are available after online evaluation.
Scholars have a clear idea of solving this part, and its solving process and results are not complicated. However, Xiaobian found that the two factors considered by schoolers, online evaluation and rebate, are two factors that influence each other. Manufacturers guide consumers to conduct online evaluation through rebates, that is, the cost to be paid by manufacturers in online evaluation is rebate. At the same time, manufacturers consider rebates that are available after online reviews.
. Knowledge supplement
. What is a requirement function? The type of construction of the requirement function in the model? How to establish it specifically?
. What is the demand function? What types of requirements functions are built in the model? How do you set it up?
Requirement function: is used to represent the relationship between the demand quantity of a product and the various factors affecting the demand quantity.
Demand function: It is used to represent the relationship between the demand quantity of a commodity and the various factors that affect the demand quantity.
Requirement function is divided into linear demand function and demand function established through utility functions.
Demand function is divided into linear demand function and demand function established by utility function.
Requirement function is built in two types. One is the linear demand function, and the other is to construct the demand function through utility functions.
There are two types of requirements function construction. One is linear demand function, and the other is to construct demand function through utility function.
Demand function model 1: From utility function construction, it can be divided into direct construction and indirect construction
(1) Direct construction:
(1) Direct construction:
Budget constraints are:
The budgettml6 constraints are:
The budgettml6 constraints are:
The budgettml6 constraints are:
The Budgettml6 constraints are:
The Budgettml6 constraints are:
The utility function is maximized under budget constraints, and the Lagrangian function is used for solving.
In order to maximize the utility function under the budget constraint, Lagrange function is used to solve.
(2) Indirect construction:
(2) Indirect construction:
(2) Indirect construction:
Use the following figure to solve:
Demand function model 2: linear demand function
Demand function Model 2: linear demand function
The common demand function in this paper is: D=a-b*p (a0,b0), a is the market capacity, b is the sensitivity coefficient of demand to price, and then add
The common demand function in this paper is: D=A-b *p (a0,b0), where a is the market capacity and b is the sensitivity coefficient of demand to price, which is then added according to specific factor
. What is sequence game? What are the ideas of manufacturers and retailers leading respectively in decentralized decision-making?
. What is a sequential game? Manufacturers and retailers lead the way in decentralized decision-making?
Sequence game: The gamer may have a certain advantage when choosing an action and then the actions are in sequence or some opponents may take the lead.
Sequential game: Players may have an advantage in choosing their actions and then move in sequence or some opponents may move first.
If the manufacturer leads, the manufacturer takes the lead, and the retailer takes the lead is the retailer takes the lead. That is, when the manufacturer is dominant, the manufacturer makes the decision first, and the retailer decides later; when the retailer is dominant, the retailer decides first, and the manufacturer decides later.
If the manufacturer leads, the manufacturer leads, and the retailer leads. That is, when the manufacturer dominates, the manufacturer makes the decision first, and the retailer makes the decision later. When the retailer dominates, the retailer decides first and the manufacturer decides later.
. Solving the reverse induction method
. What is the solution of backward induction
Inverse induction method is a method to solve dynamic game equilibrium. That is, there is a sequence of actions by the participants in the game, and the participants in the subsequent actions can observe the previous actions.
Backward induction is a method to solve dynamic game equilibrium. That is, there is a sequence of actions, and the later player can observe the previous actions.
reverse induction method is to push back from the last step in dynamic game (the process of backward pushing) to solve the equilibrium result of dynamic game.
The idea of backward induction is to calculate the equilibrium result of the dynamic game by pushing back the last step in the dynamic game.
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Reference: Youdao Translation
Reference: [1] Xia Z, Liu Y, Zhang Q. A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate[J]. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 2022, 21(3): 321-331.
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