In 1950, facing the " United Nations Army " that approached the Sino-North Korea border, the Central Military Commission decisively ordered the preparations to send troops to fight against the United States and aid Korea.
Although Lin Biao was unable to lead troops to fight due to physical reasons, he recommended Deng Hua to Volunteer Army commander Peng Dehuai as an assistant.
It is said that there are many famous generals in the four regiments of the Fourth Field Army. Many people did not understand Deng Hua at that time.
But the facts prove that neither Lin Biao nor Peng Dehuai read it wrongly. He played a role that others could not replace for the final victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea [1].
Peng Dehuai and other
The Fourth Field Army troops became the vanguard of resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea. Lin Biao was unable to fight and could only be led by Peng Dehuai
1949 After the end of the Liaoshen Campaign, the Northeast was backed by two allies of North Korea and the Soviet Union, which was the safest rear base in China at that time.
So the Fourth Field Army Command and the main force went south together, and later developed into the Central and South Military Region among the six major military regions. Even the 42nd Army and other troops who remained in the Northeast were preparing to be transferred to a reclamation force during the first disarmament of the People's Republic of China.
However, no one at that time realized that the Korean Peninsula would become the largest powder keg in East Asia. On June 25, 1950, war finally broke out between North Korea and South Korea, which had long been hostile to each other.
. The United States publicly intervened the day after the war broke out. At the same time, its Seventh Fleet entered Taiwan Strait prevented our army from launching a landing war against Taiwan.
Chairman Mao was keenly aware that once the United States intervened in the Korean civil war on a large scale, the entire situation would undergo a fundamental reversal. Therefore, on July 7, it was officially decided to form the Northeast Frontier Defense Force at the Central Meeting chaired by Zhou Enlai.
Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou
At the same time, they urgently ordered the 13th Corps headquarters in Guangdong to go north to the Central Plains region, and then the three armies under their jurisdiction also quickly headed north to stand by.
Because the battlefield is close to the Northeast, whether in terms of adapting to the environment or the actual situation of our army, it is most appropriate for the Fourth Field Army troops to participate in the battle into North Korea. Chairman Mao also considered the overall adaptation of the Fourth Field Army team into the later leadership organization of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army.
However, Lin Biao, who was renamed the commander of the Central South Military Region at this time, was very ill, and the conditions for entering North Korea were likely to be more difficult than during the previous War of Resistance. Although there are many famous generals of the Fourth Field Army, no one has the ability to command super large regiments to fight except Lin Biao.
Chairman Mao thought of the deputy commander of the Third Field Army who was planning to fight against Taiwan before, Su Yu , but Su Yu quickly said that his body was difficult to get on the formation.
Chairman 0Chairman
Chairman Mao thought about it repeatedly and found that based on the overall situation of our army, only Peng Dehuai, who was in charge of the northwest at that time, was able to serve as the commander of the Volunteer Army.
First of all, Peng Dehuai served as the deputy commander-in-chief of the First Red Army and the deputy commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army for a long time, and was second only to Zhu De, and had the ability to command hundreds of thousands or millions of troops to fight.
, and Chairman Mao also considered that once he was transferred from other field troops to the ace troops, he might only have Peng Dehuai's qualifications and prestige to suppress the arrogant soldiers and generals from different field troops.
So on October 4, 1950, when Peng Dehuai came to Beijing to report on his report on the construction of the Northwest, Chairman Mao directly asked him to attend the enlarged meeting of the Politburo discussing whether to send troops to North Korea.
Peng Dehuai immediately understood Chairman Mao’s intention and expressed his acceptance of this burden the next day.
Peng Dehuai
The temporary replacement of the 13th Corps has no adverse effects, and Deng Hua is more suitable for fighting with powerful enemy troops
. But at this time, Lin Biao suggested: should be the command body of the 13th Corps, which has already gone to the Sino-Korean border and supplemented The 42nd Army , as the command body of the troops entering North Korea, but the commander of the 13th Corps Huang Yongsheng must be exchanged with 15th Corps Commander Deng Hua.
Lin Biao's statement was beyond the expectations of most people. Fortunately, the former political commissar Luo Rongheng expressed his support and was approved.
Lin Biao's proposal surprised Commander Liang Xingchu of the 38th Army of the 13th Corps, Commander Wu Xinquan of the 39th Army, and Commander Wen Yucheng of the 140th Army of . They were also confused because they could not find Commander Huang Yongsheng.
Although Huang Yongsheng and Deng Hua are of similar age and have similar revolutionary qualifications, Huang Yongsheng is more familiar with the commander of the 13th Corps. Moreover, the war is about to be fought, but the generals are replaced at the moment. Lin Biao's move is indeed a bit contrary to military common sense.
Lin Biao
But Lin Biao believes that although the 13th Corps has strong combat effectiveness, he has been recuperating in the Soviet Union for several years and has carefully studied the relevant combat methods of the Soviet army.
and the main forces of our four field army, including the 13th Corps, only had the experience of fighting with the Kuomintang US Armed Forces in the case of regular battles.
Huang Yongsheng participated in Red Army with his style of rushing to make many achievements. But I have to say that it is because it is only a test of the enemy whose firepower is not too strong and whose fighting will is relatively weak.
. In North Korea, facing the US military that is stronger than the Soviet army, such a warrior seems to be "more brave and lack of wisdom." If you blindly apply the experience of civil war, if you don’t do it well, the volunteer army will suffer huge losses.
Volunteer Army
In addition, Huang Yongsheng often lacks tacit understanding when cooperating with other troops in combat, which is acceptable as an ordinary military chief; but as the commander who commands the operations of large corps from different units, it is also indispensable to coordinate the members of the troops and strive for sincere cooperation.
, in comparison, Deng Hua is more calm and is better at thinking about problems from a global perspective. This has something to do with Deng Hua receiving education since childhood and working as a political cadre after joining our army for many times.
, and Deng Hua took the lead in practicing the "Party's absolute leadership over the army" after Gutian Conference , and his extraordinary political literacy impressed both Lin Biao and Chairman Mao.
Moreover, Deng Hua's military command ability is not inferior to Huang Yongsheng. In April 1947, the former Liaoji Military Region troops were upgraded to the Seventh Column of the Northeast Field Army Deng Hua became the commander.
Resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea
In June 1947, our army's 1st, 6th Column and Ximan Column of Northeast China attacked the enemy's heavy troops, and according to intelligence, it was believed that the enemy defended only more than 20,000 people.
However, at the combat meeting, Deng Hua inferred that the number of enemy defenders might be more than 30,000, and suggested to Lin Biao that a column should be added.
But Lin Biao thought Deng Hua was worried at the time, so he placed all his main force outside the city to block the aid. Unexpectedly, our army still failed to conquer the enemy's last position after 14 days. The enemy outside took the opportunity to form a counter-encirclement force against our army and had to retreat.
This time, our army lost more than 20,000 people but made Chen Mingren's reputation. Lin Biao regretted it when he recalled it later [2].
Lin Biao
However, Deng Hua's 7th Column could only be a partial division in 1947. The Northeast Army launched an autumn offensive and the task given to him was only to destroy the railway line and restrain the enemy reinforcements. After analyzing the enemy situation in front of him, Deng Hua believed that although the enemies of Zhangwu , Xinlitun and Faku were not in the combat plan, not taking down these cities will affect future combat. Other leaders of the
Ka7 Column all believed that siege would be responsible without orders, but Deng Hua finally convinced everyone that "as long as you win the battle, President Lin would not blame him."
So the 7th Column conquered Faku, Zhangwu, Xinlitun, Fuxin , Xinqiu
cities within 17 days. Lin Biao later commended the 7th Column's active offensive behavior.
At the end of 1948, Deng Hua personally went to the front line to survey the terrain, and then suggested to Lin Biao that he would give up Tanggu and attack Tianjin first. This time, Lin Biao immediately adopted Deng Hua's suggestion and appointed him as the commander of the siege East Group. The conquest of Tianjin 29 hours a day led to the peaceful uprising of Peking 1.
Deng Hua
Liberate Hainan Island and Han Xianchu have differences, but the overall plan is Deng Hua's contribution
But why is Deng Hua not so famous among the Fourth Field Army and even the senior generals of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and many people even do not know that he once led the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea?
This is first of all because there are too many famous generals in the Fourth Field Army, so it is easier for everyone to remember those generals with distinct personalities and particularly bravery and good at fighting. In addition, Deng Hua seemed calm in his previous revolutionary career, lacking heroic stories that have been passed down and are talked about.
But Deng Hua's reputation is not very good, which is probably related to the conflict between him and his subordinates when he fought against Hainan Island.
1949, 100,000 remaining troops fled to Hainan Island , and Chiang Kai-shek sent Xue Yue to serve as the commander of Hainan Island's defense to continue to resist stubbornly. In October, the 10th Corps of the Third Field Army rashly launched the Kinmen Battle , which shocked the Central Military Commission. Therefore, Chairman Mao and the Fourth Field Army Command both demanded that they should be very cautious before launching the Hainan Island Battle.
Deng Hua
As the commander of the 15th Corps, Deng Hua, naturally did not dare to underestimate our army's previous lack of experience in crossing the sea, so he made full preparations for crossing Qiongzhou Strait from all aspects.
This way, Deng Hua's advantages may become disadvantages. Being too cautious and cautious in obeying central instructions may miss the opportunity.
. In addition to the 43rd Army of the 15th Corps, the 40th Army of the 12th Corps, which was ordered to launch a cross-sea battle at that time, was also the 40th Army of the 12th Corps, which was commanded by the 15th Corps. His commander Han Xianchu was known as the "Tornado General". From this we can see that he and Deng Hua have a huge difference in command style.
Although Han Xianchu also received the central government's order to postpone the operation, he still asked his subordinates to do the corresponding training. In a battle in March, the 40th Army obtained 300 large ships from , Weizhou Island, .
Deng Hua
At the same time, according to the wind direction, Han Xianchu believed that the action war must be launched before May 1950, but Deng Hua believed that the preparations for 3 army were not sufficient, and the central government also instructed to treat crossing the sea more cautiously.
So Han Xianchu and Deng Hua had differences in whether to postpone or launch the Hainan Island battle in advance, and even crossed the level to ask Lin Biao and Chairman Mao for instructions many times.
Judging from the experience after the outbreak of the Korean War, if the People's Liberation Army did not liberate Hainan Island before June 1950, the consequences would be worrying. So everyone promoted the first contribution to liberation of Hainan Island by Han Xianchu, but gradually forgot that his superior Deng Hua was the actual craftsman of the entire combat plan.
, and Han Xianchu also thought that he had disrespectful to Deng Hua before, and after liberation of Hainan Island, he specially invited him to a meal and apologized.
han Xianchu
actively contributed ideas to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea, and had a noble character and became the deputy commander of the Volunteer Army who succeeded Peng Dehuai
After receiving the approval of all parties, the Central Military Commission appointed Deng Hua as the commander of the 13th Corps, Lai Chuanzhu as the political commissar, Xie Fang as the chief of staff, and Du Ping as the director of the political department. The commander of the 40th Army, Han Xianchu, was the deputy commander of the Corps, and Lin Biao and Deng Hua suggested appointing Hong Xuezhi as the first deputy commander of the Corps.
Although he was not mentally prepared before, the three commanders quickly got used to it when they heard that Deng Hua was transferred to commander of the 13th Corps.
Moreover, Huang Yongsheng and Deng Hua became partners three times during the Red Army era and during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Both were Huang Yongsheng's military chief officials and Deng Hua was political chief officials. Therefore, Huang Yongsheng also expressed his full support for Deng Hua in response to the central government's request to change his posts.
htmlOn October 8, when Peng Dehuai brought a small team from Beijing to Shenyang to convene a meeting to form the Volunteer Army Headquarters, he found that Deng Hua had arranged the work at all levels of the 13th Corps in advance.
Hong Xuezhi
Which Peng Dehuai has never been a direct superior to Deng Hua from the era of the Red Army to the War of Liberation, but he has some understanding of Deng Hua's previous work ability and style.
So he immediately decided to reorganize the 13th Corps headquarters into the Chinese People's Volunteer Army Headquarters, and its four subordinate armies were directly commanded by the Zhisi.After
, Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua became a good partner. The facts prove that the constantly improving Volunteer Army Command has a very rich composition; Deng Hua's calm and communication personality is more suitable for coordination between various troops and communication between commanders than Huang Yongsheng.
When many people mention Peng Dehuai, they say that he has a bad temper and often curses senior generals, but he never scolded Deng Hua during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. Deng Hua quickly proved his extraordinary talent, which made Chairman Mao and Peng Dehuai think that he was the most suitable deputy commander of the Volunteer Army.
Peng Dehuai
First of all, Deng Hua believes that the plan for the 13th Corps to enter North Korea in two echelons, underestimating the enemy's powerful force and firepower advantages.
It is possible that the first echelon of the two armies could not stand the ground, and the second echelon could not reach the level because the Yalu River Bridge was blown up.
So after he discussed with Peng Dehuai, he reported to the Party Central Committee and finally changed his plan to enter North Korea to fight at the same time.
On April 16, 1951, Volunteer Army Command held an operational meeting on the fifth battle, Deng Hua reserved his opinions on the plan to "all troops take full strikes." He believed that this battle should also be like the previous three battles, first splitting part of the enemy's troops and annihilation rather than pushing them straight.
Yalujiang Bridge
But Peng Dehuai ordered the entire army to attack on the whole line in order to quickly complete the combat preparations. But unexpectedly, he happened to fall into the trap of the new enemy commander Li Qiwei, and the enemy mechanized troops took the initiative to retreat at high speed and suddenly counterattacked.
The five battles were far from meeting the previous expectations, so that Peng Dehuai later said, "If you don't listen to Deng Hua's words, you will suffer a loss."
On August 8, 1951, the central government decided to launch the sixth battle on the Korean battlefield to capture the enemy-controlled area north of " 38th parallel ". On August 17, Peng Dehuai had ordered all troops to enter the final preparations before the battle.
However, on August 20, Deng Hua, who was negotiating with the enemy in Panmendian , sent an emergency telegram to Peng Dehuai, pointing out that the enemy in front of him has built a very solid defense system.
If you want to launch an offensive battle, you may not achieve any results. Moreover, launching an offensive against the beginning of the armistice negotiations will also give people a handle. It is better to let the enemy attack and fight back, and at the same time, it can also suffocate the enemy's arrogance at the negotiating table.
Peng Dehuai and others
Deng Hua's proposal completely awakened Peng Dehuai, and he quickly stated to the Party Central Committee the current difficulties in carrying out offensive operations.
So after obtaining the approval of the Central Military Commission, Peng Dehuai canceled the sixth battle, avoiding the unnecessary sacrifice of volunteer soldiers. And as Deng Hua expected the enemy launched the "Autumn Offensive" in September, and the volunteers were on high alert and finally won the victory of annihilation of 79,000 enemies.
Although it played an irreplaceable role in the fight against U.S. aggression and aid Korea, Deng Hua always puts his personal interests aside.
After the two sides entered the stage of positional warfare, the central government decided to send Chen Geng to North Korea as deputy commander of the Volunteer Army. Deng Hua believes that Chen Geng’s qualifications and abilities are better than his own, and the commander of the Ninth Corps, , Song Shilun, , is also a famous general in our army.
Chen Geng
He took the initiative to let Chen Geng and Song Shilun be ahead of him, and let him serve as the third deputy commander and be responsible for the 13th Corps with all his heart. But Peng Dehuai wrote a letter to the central government to ask Chen Geng to serve as the second deputy commander and Song Shilun to serve as the third deputy commander. After receiving the telegram, Chairman Mao agreed to Peng Dehuai's request after careful consideration.
Therefore, after Peng Dehuai returned to China in April 1952, Deng Hua naturally took over as the commander of the Volunteer Army.
During the last period of his presidency of the Korean War, he successively won the military power of our army in Shangganling and Jincheng, playing an important role in forcing the enemy to sign the armistice agreement.
It can be said that although Deng Hua is not well-known, as the founding general in 1955, he is still a revolutionary hero.
References
[1] Eternal monument: Invincible in the battles of the south and the north - Deng Hua. News of the Communist Party of China. 2016-08-22
[2] Editor-in-chief Gao Yongchang. Four battles and four levels. Changchun: Party History Working Committee of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1988-08-01: 1-475
[3] Hainan Island Battle: the largest landing war in the Liberation War. China Military Network. 2019-06-30
