Recently, the winning mannequin was lost, and the Russian army was panicked and defeated all over the line. The Russian army was still surrounded by the Ukrainian army on the way to defeat, and the five regiments were almost wiped out, losing a lot of troops.
The defeat of the Russian army aroused strong dissatisfaction in Kadrov, who condemned the Russian army's senior officials for being nepotist. The commander of the Western Military Region appointed by the Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov is simply a general who does not know how to fight. Kadyrov hopes that the Russian army can take measures to use nuclear weapon and resolutely and decisively crush the Ukrainian army's invasion of the four eastern Ukrainian states.
Kadrov's accusation is indeed reasonable. The tactics and tactics reflected by the Russian army in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are very different from those of modern warfare. The Russian army does not use field air defense systems to accompany air defense, nor does it use drones and electronic confrontation facilities to attack the Ukrainian army. During the retreat, the Russian army also retreated in civilian vehicles. The mobilization of its national defense industry had serious problems and even the most basic military vehicles could not be produced.
What is more terrifying is worth noting. More than 200 days have passed since the war started. Although the Ukrainian army suffered more than 100,000 casualties, the Ukrainian army can still invest 10 brigades of regular troops in the direction of Khelson , but the Kharkov-Kungliman front has invested 10 brigades of regular troops. This does not include the Ukrainian army's territorial defense army, reserve force and militia forces.
Why did the Ukrainian army suffer 100,000 casualties? Can the various infantry brigades of the Ukrainian army maintain combat effectiveness?
To put it bluntly, the Russian army failed to annihilate any combat unit of the Ukrainian army at the division level or above.
The Russian army only eliminated the vital forces of the combat troops under the Ukrainian army and the company level, and also destroyed the brigade-level command of the Ukrainian army. However, the Russian army failed to defeat the command structure of the division and army level at the Ukrainian military level or above, and failed to form a system from the army-level command center to the subordinate combat troops to eliminate one division, or a field army or group army of the Ukrainian army, and failed to destroy the highest command center of the Ukrainian army as soon as the war began. In this way, the Ukrainian army can continuously refine and train troops by relying on high-level command units such as the Ministry of National Defense, General Staff, Intelligence Bureau, Military Region Command, and Field Army Command. The Russian army eliminated the lower-class soldiers and officers of the Ukrainian army, and the Ukrainian army recruited reserve troops and civilians from the people to join the army to make up for the soldiers' losses.
From a more detailed perspective, the Ukrainian army's supplement method is very similar to the original national army. Whether it is the Ukrainian army or the national army, if the main force is injured, reserve officers and soldiers will be drawn to supplement it. Moreover, the Ukrainian army and the National Army have the same characteristics that there are many veterans. In actual combat, veterans often go to the second-line front, allowing new soldiers to go directly to the front-line front to fight. If the recruits go directly to be cannon fodder, the recruits will naturally suffer very extreme casualties.
So what consequences will this kind of combat cause? Even if the Ukrainian army retreated after failure, this army that preserved the backbone of veterans could always maintain a certain combat effectiveness. Unless the Russian army annihilates all the infantry brigades of the Ukrainian army from commanders to lower-level soldiers, the Ukrainian army's division and brigade-level combat units can repeatedly preserve their combat effectiveness by replenishing new recruits as cannon fodder.
Moreover, after repeated replenishment of soldiers, many new recruits of the Ukrainian army will suffer losses. But the new recruits who survived the battlefield for a lifetime are veterans. As the number of surviving veterans in various divisions and brigades of the Ukrainian army increases, the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian brigades will be enhanced as the war continues.
was deployed in actual combat and found that a considerable number of troops in the Ukrainian army used the method of preserving the cannon fodder of veterans and recruits to preserve the combat effectiveness of the troops.
For example, the 17th Tank Brigade of the Ukrainian Army in Khlsong and Kharkov counterattack direction is a team that has repeatedly replenished new recruits, but many veterans have many backbone combat forces.
The 24th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, the 57th Infantry Brigade and a mountain brigade that participated in the battle in the direction of Khlsson were also fighting bloody battles in the North Donetsk battlefield. The Russian army was indeed a large number of new recruits to the Ukrainian combat brigades, but they failed to eliminate the combat backbone and command structure of the Ukrainian veterans, resulting in the combat effectiveness of these Ukrainian combat brigades, which has maintained the combat effectiveness of these Ukrainian combat brigades, which has stabilized the combat effectiveness of the Ukrainian army for more than 200 days. As long as the veteran backbone is not completely wiped out, the Ukrainian army will be able to recover its combat effectiveness quickly.
Therefore, the serious consequences of the Russian army's unwillingness to fight a siege and annihilation war have been highlighted.
What is an annihilation war? Annihilation war is a type of offensive war. Its purpose is not to capture cities and territories, but to eliminate the enemy's built-up and production wars, causing irreparable losses to the enemy.
So, what does the annihilation war mean to the Russian army?
If the Russian army annihilates a division of the Ukrainian army, assume that the number is the 1st Division of the Ukrainian Army. If the Ukrainian army wants to rebuild the 1st Division, they have to re-transfer officers from other troops and military academies to form a command structure, and then recruit new recruits for training. In the long process of this newly formed 1st Division from its establishment to its formation of combat power, the manpower, material resources and financial resources consumed can be imagined.
So, many times, it is better to annihilate one enemy division than to defeat 10 enemy divisions.
And the Russian army should also fight an annihilation war, and annihilate a division or army of the Ukrainian army in an integral manner. The Russian army's early defeat war can indeed eliminate many Ukrainian troops, but the defeat war can only attack the middle and lower-level recruits and grassroots officers of the Ukrainian army, while the veteran backbone cannot be eliminated in large quantities, resulting in the Ukrainian army being able to continuously form troops and supplement the strength of various combat brigades. In this way, the Ukrainian army can launch a full-scale counterattack more than 200 days after the war begins, defeating the Russian army's large forces in Chongliman and other places in one fell swoop, and almost wiped out five Russian regiments.
Why didn’t the Russian army fight annihilation? This may be related to the idea that the Russian army controlled the scale of the war, but the idea that the Russian army did not fight an annihilation war did cause great trouble to the Russian army's operations. The painful lessons of the Russian army not fighting an annihilation war are worth learning from by military strategists from all countries.
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