After entering October, the battlefield between Russia and Ukraine was still fierce, and even reached a new stage.
This stage was led by the Ukrainian army's temporary initiative in the battlefield. Due to its rapid breakthrough in Kharkov -Khenliman and the Russian army's big retreat, almost the entire northern battlefield disappeared. At present, the war is spreading towards Lugansk . The Russian army only retains a corner in the eastern part of Kharkov and the northern part of Donetsk .
Although the collapse of the northern battlefield was too embarrassing and the reaction in Russia was very strong, the Russian army has not stabilized the situation yet. There is no good plan to curb the attack of the Ukrainian army.
's several rounds of victory on the northern line greatly boosted the morale of the Ukrainian army. In particular, the Ukrainian army, which suffered repeated blows in , , faced pressure, and their morale and confidence that they were defeated can always be restored.
The Ukrainian army, which strengthened heavy equipment, recently moved south from the northern part of Khlsong along the Dnieper River, and made considerable progress. The war is still in progress, and its overall threat to the Russian army in Khlsong is a reality.
The basic situation on the battlefield of Russia and Ukraine is that the Ukrainian army is rushing to seize the Russian contract soldiers troops have not yet recovered their combat power or are unwilling to use it easily, and the mobilized troops cannot be used immediately. The limited time window for the cold winter has not yet arrived, and the cost-effective attack is carried out.
is in the direction of Kharkov, and you have seen the results now. In the direction of Khlsong, after fighting hard for a month, the Russian army basically defended its position and faced an assault from the Ukrainian heavy reserve team after being encouraged. The pressure can be imagined.
Here we need to note that the Ukrainian army's attack in the direction of Khelson focused about 10 brigades of active regular troops, and in the direction of Kharkov-Chunliman, there were also about 10 brigades (the Ukrainian army had 29 active combat brigades before the war). Here we do not yet consider the troops activated by the reserve, the National Guard and the Territorial Guard.
If we pay attention to the specific war, we will find that these brigades of the Ukrainian army can always fight on the battlefield. Are these active brigades all iron-clad and unable to be killed?
This is certainly impossible.
The way the Ukrainian army maintains combat power is somewhat similar to the national army back then.
When its main force is injured, it will immediately replenish it with huge reserve manpower. Moreover, whether it is the National Army or the Ukrainian Army, the same combat characteristic is that veterans have a lot of gas, and they often push new soldiers to the front line in actual combat, allowing them to bear the greatest pressure while also bearing the greatest casualties.
Then even if it is defeated and retreated, this kind of army can save a considerable number of veterans. If it is repeated, its combat power can always be restored after being supplemented. Moreover, this process has been repeated several times. Although a large number of new recruits have suffered multiple casualties, the accumulated veterans will also increase, and their actual combat power will sometimes be stronger.
As for the Ukrainian counterattack operations in Khlsong and Kharkov-Khenliman directions, the 17th Tank Brigade, which participated in the battle in both directions, emerged from the Beidon battlefield in June.
The 24th Aircraft Brigade, the 57th Motorcycle, and the 128th Mountain Brigade invested in the direction of Hersson were also withdrawn from the Beidon battlefield.
The 14th Aircraft Inspector Brigade, the 79th Aircraft Infrastructure Brigade (Part 1), and the 80th Aircraft Infrastructure Brigade were invested in the direction of Kharkov-Kungliman; the 4th Aircraft Brigade, the 15th Regiment and the 27th Brigade of the National Guard also retreated from the Beidun battlefield.
These troops suffered heavy casualties in the Beidon battlefield, but the biggest part was the mobilization troops that were added. As long as their backbone forces are not completely wiped out, they can restore their basic combat power in the future.
So the current passive situation of the Russian army on the battlefield is to some extent the Beidun Battle did not overcome the difficulties and ate the determination of the main force of the Ukrainian army in one fell swoop, and let it evacuate the sequelae of the vitality of the Beidun Twin Cities.
I remember when we were about to talk about several solutions.
Or the Russian army will strengthen its attacks on these Ukrainian evacuation channels and kill as many of its living forces as possible. Of course, since this passage is actually not long, if the Ukrainian army passes quickly, the Russian army will have no choice.
If the Russian army is really unwilling to fight an annihilation war, then don’t be busy occupying the territory quickly, but should directly attack Atmsk with the new force.
Ah Cheng did not have many defenders at that time, and the city defense fortifications were not very sound. The retreating troops of the Ukrainian army were still spread on the front of Beidun dozens of kilometers, and they could not take care of Ah Cheng at all.
result The Russian army finally chose to force the main force of the Ukrainian army to easily take over the Twin Cities and did not follow up attacks on Atmsk. Since then, he has turned to rest.
The Russian army's choice has its own reasons. After all, this way, it can take up a large area of territory without too many casualties, and its results are already very good.
However, the battle between Russia and Ukraine cannot play a decisive role by the war in Beidun, and it also depends on the next step.
Whether it is a closed encirclement, it has suffered considerable casualties to completely eat up the main force of the Ukrainian army; or directly attacking the empty Atmsk regardless of fatigue. These are all difficult deployments at the moment, but they are conducive to future operations. It is obvious that you want to bleed less now and you will have to bleed more in the future.
As a result, the main force of the Ukrainian army basically withdrew after suffering a certain amount of casualties. Then one part strengthened the Atmsk defense line and the other part retreated and supplemented.
Since till now, the Russian army has not broken the Seversk-Atmsk defense line; at the same time, the main force that the Ukrainian army has rested and recuperated has undertaken the current counterattack task of Khlsong and Kharkov. Isn’t it ironic?
To be honest, when we talk about the situation, we are usually unwilling to turn over old accounts. It is meaningless to turn over old accounts and make predictions. However, to explain the current passiveness of the Russian army, Beidun's old accounts had to be reviewed.
Of course, this article is an essay after getting up early (the earthquake happened to be in the middle of the night and I didn’t sleep well). I shouldn’t have worked during the National Day holiday. Don’t be too serious about wherever I think.
This is another issue, the issue of fighting annihilation war.
A few days ago, we posted an old article about why our army likes to fight annihilation wars. Some readers said, who doesn’t want to fight the annihilation war? Do you need to emphasize it?
To be honest, the thinking and thinking of war among us Chinese are actually very complicated. When talking about tactical issues, we are much better than those foreigners.
Of course, we are not talking about the author, but our ancestors and those real military strategists.
Chairman Mao once said: The defeat is not something that basically determines the outcome of a strong enemy. Annihilation war immediately had a significant impact on any enemy. For a person, it is better to cut one finger than to hurt one finger; for an enemy, it is better to annihilate one of his troops than to defeat one of his troops than to defeat one of his troops.
Judging from the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, except for Mariupol , it is a real annihilation war, there are almost all wars of attrition and defeat wars on other battlefields.
As for the Ukrainian army, it may not necessarily not want to annihilate the Russian army's established troops, but the Russian army can withdraw even in the unfavorable situation. After all, it is just a shortage of troops, and the advantage of air cannon still exists objectively, although it is not as everyone imagined.
And if the Russian army does not want to fight an annihilation war, the main reason why it does not want to fight a war is that it lacks troops and is afraid of excessive casualties.
So is it interesting to fight attrition?
The Russian army wanted to consume the Ukrainian army's vitality through firepower consumption until it could not hold on. The plan found by the Ukrainian army was to fill the front with a large number of mobilized troops and release the main force for attack.
In essence, this is still the tactic of Tianlinggui against maces, but in the case of insufficient Russian troops, it may not be invalid. Wars with the purpose of specific territory ownership require a large number of infantry. Therefore, part of the Russian army's mobilization is also solving this problem.
But Ukraine is also a country with a population of tens of millions, and its potential mobilization number under the overall mobilization mechanism is still a large number. If the Russian army does not change its overall strategic thinking and cannot wipe out some of the Ukrainian troops, the war of attrition will still exist after it is mobilized.
The casualties caused by long-term consumption may not be smaller than the annihilation war that is fought at a certain price.
In fact, the annihilation war with concentrated forces usually suffers greater casualties in the early stages, but once the opponent is defeated and eaten, the total calculated battle loss ratio is still the one that is the better, and this can solve the opponent's combat-capable troops.
In addition, it should be noted that the scale of annihilation war does not necessarily have to be big, and small annihilation wars can also be accumulated. During the positional war between our army in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, many battles were only battalion companies, but so what? If you really stutter, you will still have a headache if you eat too many companies at the opposing battalion.
It is better to break one finger than to hurt one finger. Who can withstand ten fingers?
So when it comes to the annihilation war, don’t emphasize how difficult it is. Is it difficult when the Nakano-yeon surrounded Huang Wei's Corps? Even with the support of Huaye, is the overall balance of power really very large? Difficulties need to be overcome. They don’t just run away when they see difficulties and retreat when they are in danger. So what else are you fighting?
The above are not only talking about the war situation in Russia and Ukraine, but also talking about general wars, especially combining the way of thinking of us Chinese people. Simply put, these things are what we chat about, and we think about them from our perspective. As for how the real Russian-Ukraine war develops and fights, they must have their ideas. We will not substitute them too much. These are two different things.
Research battle situation is the research battle situation, chatting and talking about the mountains is the chatting and talking about the mountains, this article belongs to the latter.
