The factory director's words led to a complete collapse of the company's products, huge debts, ratings plummeting one after another, and asset freezes in turn. . . As the former son of CITIC Group and the old employer of Beijing Guoan, CITIC Guoan has struggled for thirty years,

,

's products were in total decline, burdened with huge debts, ratings plummeted one after another, and assets were frozen in turn. . . As the former son of CITIC Group and the old employer of Beijing Guoan , CITIC Guoan has been fighting for thirty years, but they only strive for the title of "Lao Lai". Now it seems that the massive mixed-ownership reform has indeed become a piece of cake, and its rapidly advancing business model has also suffered backlash and has been transmitted to a number of investment institutions (people). In fact, this is not the sunset of the CITIC Guoan family, but also the dusk of an old era. The consequences of leveraging must be sorted out one by one and cannot be spared.

A "Lao Lai" with hundreds of billions of assets

"There is nothing better than being richer than CITIC!"

Eight years ago, Luo Ning, the boss of Beijing Guoan, once made such a half-truth and half-false "rant."

Eight years later, CITIC is still sitting firmly on Diaoyutai, but "Guoan" is in a turbulent twilight.

According to public information from Tianyancha, this established group with assets worth RMB 200 billion has been labeled as a "dishonest person subject to execution" due to two failure to perform its obligations:

Following the April "15 CITIC Guoan After MTN001" and "15 CITIC Guoan MTN002", the medium-term note "15 CITIC Guoan MTN003" issued by the company has also recently constituted a substantial default.

In this regard, CITIC Guoan explained that it is "liquidity is tight", and the company is working hard to raise the interest of this bond through various channels, strengthen its own operations, and pay the interest of this medium-term note to investors as soon as possible.

In fact, CITIC Guoan has long become the “King of Product Defaults” this year. For example, in March this year, it announced that a 2.5 billion insurance debt investment plan was overdue, and it also implicated the guarantor's Beijing Bank to take the blame.

Unexpected disasters fell from the sky. The Bank of Beijing could only lament that it did not recognize the people and admit its failure. However, it was not the only unlucky person like this.

In fact, as of the end of 2018, more than 40 financial institutions were involved in CITIC Guoan’s debt quagmire, ranging from banks, trusts, asset management to private equity, and the total amount involved As high as 48.195 billion:

If you include the debts of other companies, the total debt on the surface is as much as 156.8 billion - let's put it this way, the interest part of the public bonds and loans alone is enough to reach 1 billion. So many!

In order to recover debts, the resulting legal proceedings and equity freezes have also been staged this year. . . As for Guoan's repayment prospects, the rating agency Lianhe Credit has given the answer C.

Having said that, it only took a month for CITIC Guoan's credibility to collapse from AA- in good condition to a C that was "unable to repay debts". Now that it can't get the old ones or the new ones, it can only resort to "off-the-shelf tactics" - according to media disclosures, CITIC Guoan issued a "Letter of Request" to the regulators in March this year, "Begging on your knees" "Relevant departments are coordinating to resolve relevant issues in the restructuring process of CITIC Guoan, that is, we hope that all the heroes who are collecting debts will take advantage of the supervision and not push too hard."

How could CITIC Guoan, which once had no shortage of money, fall into such a humble and pretentious situation?

You must know that CITIC Group is by no means comparable to the tycoons of ordinary private enterprises. It has its own "father" with trillions of assets in charge. The National Security Bureau should not be in such a mess. The director of

would like to remind everyone that today’s national security is no longer the world of CITIC.

The source of all this probably started with the “China’s First Reform” five years ago.

A mixed-use reform of chicken feathers

CITIC Guoan was founded in 1987. Its original identity was a "Guoan Mansion" that attracted foreign guests.

In 1989, it was transformed into Beijing Guoan Industrial Development Corporation, and later renamed CITIC Guoan Corporation - the well-known Chinese Super League giant Beijing Guoan, which was established together with the Beijing Municipal Sports Commission in 1992.

Until 2014, CITIC Guoan was still a wholly-owned subsidiary of Genzheng Miaohong Group; and after the "Auction of the Century" that shocked China's capital circle in 2014, the nature of CITIC Guoan suddenly changed, and it transformed from a state-owned enterprise into a state-owned enterprise. , "public enterprises" that are mixed with the people.

Specifically, five major private enterprises entered the market at that time, namely Heilongjiang Dingshang Decoration Engineering Co., Ltd., Guangdong Zhongding Group , Henan Senyuan Group , Beijing Qianrong Investment and Tianjin Wanshun Real Estate. According to statistics, the total capital injection of these five private enterprises reached 8 billion yuan, and their shares accounted for 79.06%. CITIC Group's shares shrank to 20.54%, downgrading from the biological father to the largest non-controlling shareholder.

Times have changed and the situation has changed. In the next five years, "the city has changed its flag". Private enterprises back then seemed to be just passers-by who were keen on speculation. Today, only Heilongjiang Dingshang and Tianjin Wanshun are the five major shareholders. Real estate, and CITIC Group still holds the largest share with a holding ratio of 20.94%, but it does not actually have control of the company.

As for who the actual controller is, it seems that there is no one, or it is unknown. Now there are some baseless theories in the media, which still involve Wang Xuebing, who was dismissed. . . However, judging from the inextricable relationship between existing shareholders, it is not impossible that CITIC Guoan is operating behind the scenes. The director of

checked the backgrounds of the five major private enterprise shareholders: Heshengyuan's major shareholder is CITIC Guoan Fund; Ruiyu's controller is China-Africa CNCBank, which is actually controlled by CITIC Guoan; the remaining three private enterprises have pledged their shares to Shanghai Juhe, which is actually controlled by China-Africa CITIC Bank. From this point of view, on the surface, CITIC and Guoan are "separated", but tracing back to the source, it seems that they are still connected.

Of course, no matter what the truth is about the actual controller, one message is always clear - through the mixed reform, CITIC Guoan has obtained a certain amount of asset expansion, and has since started its buying spree of not rejecting anyone who comes and running blindfolded. .

Up to now, its existing main business includes 12 major categories and 25 sub-categories such as energy, communications, real estate, culture, tourism, and sports. In addition, it has aggressively entered the securities market and overseas projects. In 2018, its total assets soared from 110 billion five years ago to 210 billion!

But as its size increases, the debt it carries continues to accumulate. According to Guotai Junan's research data, Guoan's asset-liability ratio has always remained at 80%, and its proportion of interest-bearing liabilities is also increasing year by year.

In contrast, CITIC Guoan's hematopoietic function is not ideal, because most of these investments are still in the "cultivation period". Not only are there uncertainties in future returns, but they also cannot be quickly realized in statements.

would like to further explain this issue. The factory director also has a "classic case" here.

As early as 2010, CITIC Guoan had acquired and developed a "high-quality project" - the high-end residential "Guoan Mansion" in the prime location of Xuanwumen, Beijing. At that time, the project investment was as high as 20 billion, and the pre-sale amount reached 30 billion. .

However, in 2017, the group was found by the court to be a "malicious breach of contract" due to a land transfer dispute. Not only was there no hope of recovering the funds, but it also found itself in the tragic situation of "demolishing the building and returning the land." . . But in this way, not only have 20 billion funds and seven years of hard work been wasted, but there are also hundreds of lawsuits waiting for Guoan against paying owners.

In addition to the unsatisfactory investment returns, the group's own business is also difficult to improve. In fact, more than 50% of the group's revenue contribution comes from nonferrous metal trading, but the gross profit margin of this business has hovered in single digits all year round. Judging from the annual reports of the past few years, CITIC Guoan’s net profit has always been suppressed below 1 billion yuan. From 2018 to the first quarter of this year, CITIC Guoan has suffered continuous losses:

In short, the debt expansion pursued by the group The strategy failed to generate revenue, and the company suffered. As for the policy changes after 17 years, it was just the last straw that broke this giant. How to solve the endgame of

?

The building is about to collapse, and the trunk can especially be "rescued", but the details cannot be taken care of, and it becomes an abandoned child that fends for itself.

Since banks and insurance have no way to recover, then individual investors, who are at the bottom of the investment structure, may not be immune. The director of

takes some private equity products as an example. According to relevant media reports, more than a hundred individual investors went to CITIC Guoan’s headquarters to ask for money in the first half of this year because the private equity products they invested in were not paid when due.

It is understood that CITIC Guoan has issued more than ten private equity products through Golon Capital, with a total scale of 1.7 billion and more than 1,300 investors involved.

According to information from the China Foundation Association, Gollon Capital was established in November 2014 and registered in April 2015. Its registered capital is 58.82 million, and its institutional type belongs to other private equity categories.

learned from the official website that Gollen Capital focuses on "basic industry investment", "diversified real estate development" and "alternative asset investment", among which the investment scale of basic industries has exceeded 10 billion. It has established a strategic cooperative relationship with CITIC Guoan Group . Among the 20 products currently registered, the "Anying Series" is the main force invested in Guoan projects.

Specifically, it is divided into two major categories. One is short-term liquidity loans actually invested in CITIC Guoan, mainly three-month and six-month accounts receivable items, with a yield of 7%-8%. . The portion that has expired has not yet been paid.

In addition, his Dongba project is also "very problematic."

According to reports from investors, Gollon Capital raised funds for Guoan through private equity products No. 7, 8, 9, 10, and 21 of the "Anying Series", all of which were used to acquire the income rights of Dongba land-related regional projects. .

But in May of this year, according to the "Reply to Letters and Calls Matters" issued by the Chaoyang Branch of the Beijing Municipal Planning and Resources Commission, "the income rights transfer contract was signed by Beijing Guoan Holdings Co., Ltd. and Gelun Capital Management (Beijing) Co., Ltd., and we The Bureau Land Reserve Chaoyang Branch is not a party to the contract and cannot transfer relevant funds to the private equity investment fund custody account in accordance with the contract."

In other words, Chaoyang Land Reserve Center may not have even received the notice of equity transfer, Guoan Holdings has breached its contractual obligations, and as the manager, Gollon Capital is also suspected of "failure to report knowledge" and failure to fulfill its responsibilities (even problems larger).

It is worth mentioning that the fund sales companies for the above products are all Prudential Funds, and Prudential Funds is also a member of the CITIC Department of Nottingham University.

Speaking of "CITIC Dad", this should be a life-saving straw in the darkest moments of national security.

In fact, CITIC Group had already started the asset restructuring of CITIC Guoan earlier, and had just received a 3.5 billion entrusted loan in the third quarter of last year. . . However, judging from the successive defaults of CITIC Guoan, CITIC's assistance is only a drop in the bucket and fails to change the essence of the group's current situation.

In fact, in the opinion of the factory director, this is no longer a question of whether it can be saved, but a question of whether it is worth saving.

You must know that CITIC Guoan's "dead end" does not lie in the amount of debt, but in its unreasonable business structure and inefficient profitability. To put it bluntly, the rescue cost is too high but the return is too little, and it is inconsistent with CITIC's own financial situation. The layout doesn't match either.

Besides, today's Guoan has long been an adopted and abandoned son. For CITIC Group, which has "many heirs", making gestures is already a sign of respect and benevolence.

Looking back now, we can see that it didn’t happen overnight. In fact, the foreshadowing of these crises has already been laid. In recent years, as banks have raised the threshold for lending, some companies have turned to financing channels such as P2P, financial exchanges, trusts, and private equity to transfer risks. From this perspective, investors who purchased a large number of private equity and trust fixed-income products in the past few years, especially in 2016, are the most dangerous group of people. The director of

would like to remind everyone that for investors, the endorsement of the major shareholder of the financier should not be superstitious. The "repayment source" of the financier is the most important - especially those debt-driven companies should be avoided. And when companies experience large-scale product redemptions, it is best not to get involved, so as not to be taken advantage of by borrowing new products to repay old ones. . . By the way, this wave of "lag risk" has not yet finished fermenting, and the centralized payment period of various real estate companies, bonds, and credits will continue until next year.