Why is it said that was able to rise on the way to ? What are the three major contributions of Zhou Enlai?
Zhou Enlai during the Long March
At the end of September 1933, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 1 million troops and more than 200 aircraft, adopted the policy of "three points of military and seven points of politics" to launch the fifth "encirclement and suppression" to the revolutionary base areas. This was the largest "encirclement and suppression" that Chiang Kai-shek spent a lot of money on the revolutionary base areas, and he was determined to win.
At this time, the central leadership had been seized by Wang Ming. Under his remote control, a group of people led by Bogu resolutely implemented Wang Ming's "left" mistakes. spared no effort to suppress and exclude Mao Zedong's correct propositions, deprived Mao of the command of the front-line Red Army, and instead the German Li De commanded the Red Army to carry out the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" war, and the bad luck of the Red Army came.
Li De was completely blindly commanding. He had no idea about the actual situation of the Chinese revolution at all. He copied all the experience of the Soviet Red Army in combat, completely deviated from the reality of the front line, locked himself in the room and relied on the map to command the battle. What's even more terrible is that he refused to accept all the suggestions from Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others, and led to the Red Army's defeat again and again.
As early as the spring of 1934, Li De, who knew that he could not withstand the Kuomintang's attack, told Bo Gu that he should prepare for a major strategic shift. Especially after Guangchang fell on April 28, 1934, the Kuomintang army entered the hinterland of the Central Soviet Area in large numbers. This means that the defeat of the Central Red Army in was decided and he was unable to make up for the situation.
In May, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee decided to evacuate the main force of the Red Army from the Central Soviet Area and asked for instructions on this decision to Communist International . In June and July, the Communist International replied that the Central Red Army would withdraw from the Soviet area and implement a major strategic shift, which is the Long March. Bo Gu and others did not intend to go too far to this strategic transfer of the Central Red Army, but were just preparing to go to western Hunan and Hubei to join the Red Second and Sixth Corps, and then create a new revolutionary base.
In order to prepare for this strategic shift, a three-person group composed of Bo Gu, Li De and Zhou Enlai was established: Bo Gu had the final say in politics and Li De had the final say in military affairs, and Zhou Enlai could only specifically supervise the implementation of the military preparation plan and could not participate in the decision-making of all major events. This means that the so-called " three-person group " is actually just a "two-person group" controlled by Bo Gu and Li De!
On October 10, 1934, the situation was critical. If the Central Red Army did not evacuate, they would all be "made dumplings" by the Kuomintang army. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army Headquarters then led the main force of the Central Red Army and the rear organs, a total of more than 86,000 people, and started the Long March in a mighty manner with many luggage such as jars and jars.
Oil painting "Zunyi Conference"
The Red Army suffered a crushing defeat when breaking through the fourth line of defense for heavy defense of the Kuomintang army. This is the great defeat of Xiangjiang Battle . Although the Red Army broke through the enemy's siege, it paid the price of sacrifice of more than 50,000 people, and the Central Red Army only had more than 30,000 people left. But the Red Army was still in extreme danger at this time, and Bo Gu and Li De still insisted on going to western Hunan and Hubei to join the Red Second and Sixth Corps as planned, which was equivalent to throwing themselves into the pockets laid by the enemy in advance.
The suggestions made to Bo Gu and others were rejected many times before, but this time was a life-and-death moment. Mao Zedong once again suggested that he firmly advocated giving up the original plan and instead march towards Guizhou, where the enemy's weak strength. After the disastrous defeat in the Xiangjiang Battle, the command of the troops had actually been transferred from Bo Gu and Li De to Zhou Enlai's shoulders. From then on, Zhou Enlai firmly agreed with Mao Zedong's proposal.
At the Politburo meeting held by Channel and Liping , Zhou Enlai firmly advocated the adoption of Mao Zedong's opinions. At this time, Zhou Enlai's weight had reached a decisive role, so the final decision was formed entirely based on Mao Zedong's opinions, that is, abandoning the original plan and marching towards Guizhou. It was precisely because of the adoption of Mao Zedong's opinions that the Central Red Army had escaped from the passive situation for the first time since the Long March.
Immediately afterwards, at the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong analyzed and criticized the wrong military line since the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" in his long speech, elaborated on the strategic issues of China's revolutionary war, and pointed out the future direction. Zhou Enlai once again firmly supported Mao Zedong's correct proposition. Mao Zedong's ability to rise on the Long March is inseparable from Zhou Enlai's firm support for Mao Zedong's correct proposition. This is Zhou Enlai's greatest contribution.
For Zhou En, firmly supporting Mao Zedong's correct proposition is not enough. His second greatest contribution is to take advantage of all opportunities to force Mao Zedong to the top. At this Zunyi meeting, Zhou Enlai fully recommended Mao Zedong to lead the future actions of the Red Army. Zhou Enlai enjoyed lofty prestige and influence in the Red Army, and his proposal immediately received the support of most people. Mao Zedong himself later believed that "Comrade Enlai played an important role."
Four Crossings of Chishui (oil painting)
In this extraordinary period, Zhou Enlai's attitude actually played a very critical role in Mao Zedong's rise during the Long March. Therefore, Mao Zedong was elected as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee at the Zunyi Conference. Moreover, after the meeting, the Central Standing Committee held a meeting to determine the division of labor, and decided that Mao Zedong would be the helper of Zhou Enlai in military command. Obviously, this means that Mao Zedong's correct proposition can determine the actions of the Red Army.
Although Zhou Enlai was very clear in his heart that only Mao Zedong could save the Red Army and lead everyone out of difficulties and win, because Mao Zedong was previously suppressed and excluded by "left" erroneously, if he wants to rise in the Red Army and the Party, he must go through a process of slowly subjugating the people, so he can only first let him play a role as Zhou Enlai's identity as a helper in military command.
Once there is a stage, Mao Zedong's military genius will be fully demonstrated. At that time, the Central Red Army relied on the strategic guidelines and routes set by Mao Zedong. In this regard, Mao Zedong was unmatched and could not be replaced. However, Zhou Enlai's specific command was Zhou Enlai's third greatest contribution to the arrangement of each battle and the victory of the war. In fact, this is often easily overlooked.
Mao Zedong set a major strategic policy and line, and Zhou Enlai was responsible for the specific implementation and implementation. From then on, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai began this seamless cooperative relationship. Since then, this seamless cooperative relationship has continued until the construction of New China after the founding of the People's Republic of China, until their deaths.
In terms of the arrangement of specific battles and the victory of the war, Zhou Enlai had outstanding talents that no one could compare to him: He not only knew which of the Kuomintang troops was Chiang Kai-shek's direct troops, which was a miscellaneous army, and what specific combat capabilities were; he knew better which division of the Red Army had strong combat power and which division had weak combat power. Therefore, his command can maximize his strengths and restrain the enemy's weaknesses.
Moreover, Zhou Enlai's understanding of the troops was unmatched: How many people, guns, and bullets are there in each army, and how many casualties and replenishments are there after each battle. Zhou Enlai knew very well. Therefore, in order not to be asked by Zhou Enlai, the military commanders of the troops must grasp the situation of the troops in more detail. Therefore, Zhou Enlai enjoyed a high prestige in the army, and his character made everyone very willing to get close to him. Even everyone likes to call him "beard" (Zhou Enlai during the Long March had a beautiful beard).
Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu during the Long March (first right)
After that, with Zhou Enlai's strong help, under Mao Zedong's command of using troops as a god, the Central Red Army "crossed the Chishui River four times" and cleverly interspersed among the enemy's heavy army groups. Finally, it was able to get rid of the encirclement and blockade of hundreds of thousands of heavy troops of the Kuomintang army, crushed Chiang Kai-shek's plan to annihilate the Red Army during the Long March, and achieved a decisive victory in the Long March. Since then, Mao Zedong has risen rapidly in the Red Army and the Party.
It is obvious that Mao Zedong's rapid rise during the Long March is inseparable from the three major contributions made by Zhou Enlai behind it.
References:
"Biography of Zhou Enlai": Jin Chongji's author Central Documents Publishing House
"Biography of Mao Zedong": Jin Chongji's author Central Documents Publishing House
