Turn the wheel of fortune
During this period, the then Chief of Staff of Group A Army, Lieutenant General Von Manstein, carefully studied the first combat deployment plan made by the army headquarters. He and many other German forces Like senior military officers, they were dissatisfied with the proposed combat operations.
He said: "In our generation, it is impossible to make a better plan. And we have to imitate the plans of the predecessors?"
His conclusion is: "In view of the enemy's uncompromising attitude, the head of state proposed to use feints to induce coalition forces into the pockets, and then the main German force through the Ardennes forest to seek a military decisive battle in Belgium is worth considering. In my opinion, the situation at the time required the formulation of such a combat plan. It can crush the enemy and make the outcome of the war beneficial to Germany."
Therefore Towards the end of October, he submitted a memorandum to the army headquarters, together with a detailed proposal for the implementation of Western Front operations. From then until January 1940, Manstein submitted at least six memos!
Military suggestion
At the end of the first memo, he demanded that the attack must force the enemy to start a decisive battle in Belgium.
This can be done in two steps.
In the first step, Germany should deploy its main force south of Namur in order to break through the Somme defense line and cut off and destroy all the enemy's troops into Belgium. A necessary condition for the implementation of this combat operation is that the south wing must be covered.
In the second step, the German army should turn to the south and win the victory through encirclement. Manstein imagined that the enemy would think that the Germans would adopt the Schlieffen plan again, so they would concentrate their forces eastward as much as possible to deal with the German offensive there, and at the same time tried to launch a counterattack on the German south flank to sweep the entire German front.
Therefore, he suggested that the focus of the attack should be on the army group A from the beginning.
The troops of the A group army group should fight in the following way (this will be called the Manstein plan hereafter): An army group uses an infantry division to attack roughly westward between Dinant and Fume. The goal is to cut off and destroy the enemy forces advancing to Belgium under the coordination of the armored and mechanized forces of the Group B Army.
At the same time, another group army crossed the Maas River. Later, he turned to the southwest on both sides of Sedan in order to defeat the enemy's offensive forces that were likely to be deployed there, thereby creating conditions for the final battle.
Manstein believes that if you want to achieve an initial victory against the enemy forces that are being transferred to southern Belgium, only two mobile armies are too small.
He also agreed with Mao Qi’s point of view that the battle plan should only take into account the first battle with the main enemy force.
Therefore, he suggested that the number of mobile units used in the future should be determined according to the enemy's response. Once the danger of the enemy's attack on the flank is eliminated, all available forces should be turned to the north to assist in destroying the encircling enemy.
However, the Germans must also establish a line of defense in Carrignan on the Maas and Mettlach on the Moselle.
Army headquarters
Army headquarters somewhat hesitantly discussed a series of suggestions put forward by Manstein, but did not really exchange views. This was largely due to the fact that the head of state had made such a military proposal long ago, so the plan was ignored by Brauchich and Halder.
These suggestions regarding the implementation of operations by the Army Group A on the Western Front have only been discussed within the Army, and have not been directly presented to the head of state as Manstein hoped.
It was only because of the "Mecklin Incident" that occurred in January and the two exercises conducted by the Army Group A in February that the Army Headquarters was shaken with its plan, especially It was at this time that he had a clearer understanding of the enemy's intentions.
Now all signs show that once the Germans attack, the Allied forces will really automatically enter the Belgian trap that the head of state expected.
However, the original plan is still not moving.
The meeting of the fate of the two
Fortunately, the head of state eventually learned about Manstein’s memos, but not through normal channels.
At the end of January 1940, the deputy commander of the head of state, Colonel Schmont, visited the headquarters of the A group army. There, he learned from other senior staff that Manstein had previously reported to the army. The headquarters submitted a military proposal with the same idea as the head of state.
After returning to Berlin, Shi Mengte immediately reported the matter to the head of state.
Soon, the Führer summoned Manstein in Berlin in mid-February 1940. During this time, he was promoted by the army headquarters to a commander (name rise and fall), perhaps Bo Rausch's comfort in refusing to adopt his plan.
In this meeting, Manstein elaborated on some of his military suggestions for the decisive battle before the Führer.
The head of state immediately applauded after hearing this! Can't wait to go up and hug his soul friend "Manstein".
During this period, the Austrian corporal, inspired by Manstein, who has received a high military education, mustered up the courage to beat Harder and Brauchich. He made repeated orders to force the army headquarters to approve and adopt this majestic idea.
The sickle came out
On February 18th, this final decision was made at a meeting held between the head of state, Braunsch and Halder.
However, to enable the German army to have a decisive operational deployment for the victory of the battle, in any case, it is also due to the army headquarters.
The new operational deployment plan on February 24, 1940 was re-formulated on the basis of Manstein’s operational recommendations and the Führer’s own vision.
But the tactical plan used by the German army was finally completed by the army headquarters, and it was recorded in military history with the "Scythe" plan.
Summary
Germany's victory on the Western Front in 1940 depends largely on this plan.
The strategic objective of the German offensive is to quickly occupy the Netherlands and prevent the British from using the Dutch territory.
At the same time, the offensive forces passing through Belgium and Luxembourg can also wipe out as many French and British troops as possible, preparing for the final destruction of the Allied military power.
At the commander’s meeting held on March 13, Brauchich emphasized that the main task of the Western Front is to cut off the ties between the British and French forces. Afterwards, the British army was wiped out.
Different from the original combat proposal in 1939, the main offensive force is now placed on the south wing of the offensive forces. The basic combat idea is to destroy the southern wing by exposingDestroy the enemy's line of defense between Liège and Sedan.
To achieve this goal, Army Group A (General Von Lunsted) will use powerful mechanized and armored forces-the first independent battle. The troops of Army Group A attacked from the south, cutting off all the troops that the enemy had put into Belgium, and then cooperated with Army Group B (Von Bock), which was attacking north of Liege, to destroy these troops.
The task of the B group army is to occupy the Netherlands as quickly as possible with the support of the airborne and descending troops, and try to contain the enemy forces in Belgium, the more the better.
By launching an onslaught, this force should keep the enemy from being able to figure out the direction of the main attack for as long as possible, and prevent the enemy from attacking the inner side of the encircled wing.
In fact, all the victories of this bold combat plan depend on this.
At the same time, the Group C army group that sticks to the west wall defense line and the front of the Rhine River also uses feints to contain the enemy forces there.
