html In November, Mihajlo Zabrodsky published the article "Patriotic War. Land Military Prospects". This is a continuation of Mikhaylo Zabrodsky's analysis of how we can defeat the enemy in the air.
Shocking events in recent months regarding resistance to Russian aggression have evoked a range of different emotions. Naturally, they have a strong sense of national pride and a firm belief in the bravery of Ukrainian soldiers and the courage of our commanders.
To the north and northeast, north of the Siverskyi Donets River, the situation on the front line had stabilized. Fierce fighting is taking place around Bakhmut, with the enemy constantly trying to carry out a double tactical siege of this important administrative center in the Donetsk region. The enemy left the right bank of the Dnieper River in the Kherson area. This significant change in the delineation of the line of contact, first and foremost on the southern strategic flank, continues to require new approaches to assess the overall situation and predict future events in military confrontation in more detail.
Previously, we considered possible options for new or re-emerging threats and challenges to the nation's land defenses. Now our task is to discuss the prospects for the next sequential, but not important, area of combat - air combat. There is no doubt that airspace remains an integral part of the armed struggle against the Russian Federation and is key to successfully repelling a full-scale armed aggression. Despite the multiple advantages of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in terms of combat potential, it could not be implemented for several reasons. At the same time, the Ukrainian Air Force is still unable to seize the initiative due to a serious imbalance in capabilities. The balanced and rapid establishment of air "shields" and "swords" should become one of the key priorities for the development of Ukraine's armed forces.
A brief history of this topic
In order to better understand the current situation and the topics discussed, it is necessary to mention the events that took place on the front lines at the end of February and in the spring of this year.
The enemy's powerful air and missile attack formations are concentrated near the borders of our country, becoming the trump card of the Russian Federation's invasion forces, ensuring absolute superiority in the air and on the ground, and forming a certain degree of balance of power on land.
Despite the well-known uncertainties surrounding planning for any large-scale operation, it seems likely that the air component of the Special Military Operations program against Ukraine should not specifically involve the Russian command. In fact, all objective indicators, from numerical superiority to the positioning and capabilities of the enemy's air strike means and Ukrainian air defense means, accurately indicate this. After all, all objective indicators of "military mathematics" point to the undeniable superiority of the Russian Air Force in the ratio of quantity and quality of airspace in all main directions of combat, as well as in other "multiplicative" components, such as the ability of the aggressor to ensure strategic encirclement of the theater and provide various carriers with a powerful and universally modern arsenal of long-range missiles. If you add some strategic and operational surprise, coupled with the technical characteristics of missiles and aircraft, as well as extensive experience in preparing and launching missiles and air strikes, then the outcome of a large-scale "air invasion" seems to be beyond doubt.
People in front and behind all remember those poor March and April. From the first day of a large-scale invasion, up to 100 enemy aircraft and helicopters can be present in Ukrainian skies and surrounding areas at the same time. Taking into account the large-scale launch of missiles, the number of air targets on the screens and boards showing the air situation of the aviation and air defense command center reached hundreds. The number of cruise missiles used against Ukraine alone in the first three days quickly caught up with their total consumption in operations in Syria. Priority targets are civilian and military targets in the rear. Terrifying acquaintance - "Iskander", and not so much - "caliber", Ukrainians of all professions and age groups quickly learned these words. Russian ground attack and rotary-wing aircraft carried out devastating collective strikes against the entire line of contact from the Kherson area to Policia. Bombing from an altitude of 6,000-7,000 meters made it impossible to provide direct air defense cover to units, even against single platoon strongholds.Dozens of Su-24M (Fencer-D) and Su-34 (Fullback) frontline bombers circled over Mariupol . Sirens continued to sound over Kiev, Kharkov, Dnipro, Odessa and other cities. Yes, all this and more will never be forgotten.
According to the enemy's plan, during the first to three days of strategic air offensive operations, Ukrainian air defense units should disappear, and in another week there will be remnants of combat aviation. It's likely that's exactly what happened. However, not in reality, but in reports of victory, Russian generals were allegedly sent to Moscow in the first weeks of a massive invasion. In fact, Ukrainian air defense forces persisted and desperately continued to resist. The enemy underestimated its survivability, as well as the stability, courage and tenacity of our pilots and air defense units, and thus completely negated this from calculations. The enemy decided that he had the upper hand in the air and began to complete his main task - air support of ground groups. This catastrophic miscalculation on the part of the enemy gave our air defense forces a much-needed rest and regrouping time.
Therefore, the number of interceptions of air targets turned out to be unexpectedly high for the enemy, although at that time it was disappointing for us in absolute terms. It turned out that the "most advanced" Russian fullbacks and Su-35 (flanker-video+), modern MiGs, various indices of Xiaomi and Ka, "Iskander" (SS-26 Stone), SS-N-27 Sizzler (SS-N-27 Sizzler) and Kha-shkis (Kha-shkis), these three weapons are "unique" in Putin 's opinion, they are perfectly defined, thrown into battle, and then burned to ashes. The experience of Russia's decorated aces, gained by bombing defenseless Syrian towns, turned out to be completely useless for the war in Ukraine, and the number of Russian pilots "those who did not return from combat missions" rapidly increased.
Now, everything that happened and is happening in the Russian air battle was not determined by design, but entirely by reaction to the development of events. The transition to missile terror tactics, the increase in the share of missile strikes by the "not new" Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) and Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt) air-launched cruise missiles, the use of S-300 (SA-10) air defense systems against ground targets, the humiliating purchase of kamikaze drones from Iran, and the widespread use of civilian infrastructure by the "superpowers" are far from a complete list of the Russian Federation's desperate attempts to change the situation and intercept the strategic air initiative. The decision of the Russian command on the use of air strikes, depending on the direction of the experts, can be called "flexible", "adaptive" or "creative". However, in essence, and this is most important, they are situational. A planned Russian strategic air offensive that was supposed to clear the way for the invasion force's ground combat teams and quickly force the Ukrainian population to cease resistance failed.
At the same time, the relative balance with the enemy in the air, which was achieved at a heavy cost, is precarious, and the situation in the fight against missile terrorism in the Russian Federation is, regrettably, far from being under control. Enemy air strikes on energy supply facilities have had devastating consequences for millions of our fellow citizens and the national economy. Civilians continue to die from airstrikes, and Ukrainian armed forces suffer losses. Enemy swarm bombings and air strikes are becoming a thing of the past, but the use of cruise missiles and attack drones still pose mortal dangers. At the same time, we must understand that what is happening now is very different from what the Russian command planned and what should have happened even more than six months ago.
Looking for possible reasons
Let us consider the objective possible reasons for the failure of the Russian air raid. Rather, this question can be narrowed down to a more technical question: What prevents the enemy from realizing its combat potential and quantitative and qualitative advantages in the means of airspace warfare? Strengths can be thought of as a dual category - objective physical (the abilities available at a certain moment) and subjective psychological (the ability to use/implement them with maximum efficiency).
It is necessary to start with the well-known quantitative and qualitative components of the Russian Federation Air Force, which apparently turned out to be somewhat overestimated. The number of Russian fighters in the invading air force group, as shown by estimates over the past few years, has traditionally impressed all experts in the triple digits and led to catastrophic calculations of ratios for Ukraine [ Numerical indicators of the initial quantitative and qualitative ratios of the forces of the parties are still a subject of debate. Depending on the "age" and "nationality" of the calculation method used, the enemy ratio ranges from 1:7 to 1:30 or more. .]
According to experts, the Russian Federation was and in principle remains one of the few countries in the world with offensive capabilities in the airspace. Only the aviation force along our borders, established on the eve of the invasion, consisted of nearly 50,000 fighters and several hundred helicopters. If we take these data as a basis, it is likely to be completely sufficient. List of numbers for airplanes and helicopters. It should be added that as of February this year, the number of combat aircraft of the aforementioned powerful fleet of the Russian Federation Air Force alone exceeded the aviation fleet of the Ukrainian Armed Forces by approximately four times.
At the same time, the basis of the Russian formation is precisely modern models of aviation equipment, such as Frankel-ε+, "Full Back", Su-30 (Frankel-C), Ka-52 (Hokhem B), Mi-28 (Havoc) and other early modified aircraft and helicopters that were not used until later, causing irreparable losses in modern models. At the same time, the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is equipped with physically and morally obsolete samples of Soviet-produced aviation equipment and anti-aircraft missile systems that have long exhausted their intended resources and have not undergone any major modernization.
However, the course of the first few days of the invasion showed that the "mathematical equation" of war has too many unknown factors that can fundamentally change the outcome. Such "known unknowns" include the following: the low degree of professionalization of the Russian Federation's air fleet, which was not influenced by Soviet practices; the unsatisfactory organization of the overall support of aviation operations; the technical imperfection of key terminology of aviation means of engagement; gaps in the operational, ethical and psychological training of air crews; and unsatisfactory levels of operational command and control.
The imperfections of Russian aviation equipment and weapons require an explanation. Until the last few years of the last century, the Soviet and Russian military aircraft manufacturing schools held leading positions in the world. The emergence of MiG-29 (fulcrum) and Su-27 (Flanker-B) fighter jets and their innovative technical solutions have aroused deep concern among NATO countries. However, the ten years of stagnation of Russian industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rapid development of the Western aviation industry caused the situation to quickly change in the opposite direction. The West follows the path of creating multifunctional aviation platforms, while the Russian Air Force continues to preserve the tradition of the general aviation sector. Even their most modern aircraft, sadly called "multi-purpose" aircraft, are divided into primary and secondary functions. In military language, they are called primary and secondary missions. Therefore, the "Defender" is still a frontline bomber with limited air combat capabilities, while the "Forward"-C is still mainly a fighter.
Why is this important? Everything is simple. Despite all the dynamics of air combat, it is linear in the execution of combat missions. First, compete for superiority in the air, destroy command and control, reconnaissance airspace, establish air defense systems , and attack enemy aviation. Then - carry out airborne missions, isolate these areas from the air and provide air support directly to the troops. Finally, launch missile bombs at strategic depths to disrupt military and economic mobilization.
In actual operation, if the "narrow" specialization of aviation equipment is retained, while fighters are engaged in a fierce battle for air superiority, ground attack aircraft and bombers will idle on the airfield, waiting for opportunities, and vice versa. At the same time, if you field truly multi-purpose equipment, you can provide the same capability with a much smaller force and just change the configuration of the air weapons based on the mission of the mission.In other words, despite the significant numerical indicators of the Russian intrusion aviation group, Ukrainian air defense forces had to deal with only about one-third of their number at the same time.
Likewise, the idea of technical solutions embedded in Russian aviation engagement assets has had a negative impact on the Russian Air Force’s air operations process. For example, the anti-radiation missile is the main means of air defense suppression. Anti-radiation missile (English: Anti-radiation missile, ARM) is a missile designed to detect and target enemy radio emission sources. It has been used extensively since the 1960s, especially against self-propelled missiles .]
The Russian army's X-58 (as -11km) type (and others) have quite sophisticated tactical use. To successfully guide the missile to the target, the pilot must duel with the air defense missile system operator and conduct a "frontal attack" on the SA missile launch site in a "kamikaze" manner for a long period of time. To increase their chances, the enemy made a clear functional division of the entire "Hunter Aircraft" force in the "Flock". But all of this requires pilots to be highly professional, organized, willing to take risks and self-sacrifice. Russian pilots lack everything so little, and judging from the effective suppression of our Ukrainian missiles, Russian pilots prefer to kill civilians in our cities. Meanwhile, the AGM-88 damage weapon successfully adapted by Ukrainian aviation (and other modern world aviation weapons) has a completely different philosophy. An airplane is usually just a delivery platform. Although the pilot can independently select and attack targets, his main task is simply to bring the missile to the launch point. The missile can independently search for targets within a defined area or can be targeted by another aircraft or a combat control point. As a result, much of the modern or rather "new" Russian aviation equipment and means of engagement adhered to outdated air combat concepts and proved unable to defeat the handful of technically obsolete but spiritually innovative Ukrainian air defense and aviation supported by Western partners.
Another possible factor in the failure of Russian aviation is the weak level of overall support for aviation combat operations. Russia has conducted many experiments in previous years with regard to the transfer of aviation units to air base systems, and once again moving to regiment and division levels has clearly had a negative impact on overall combat readiness levels and the ability to conduct long-term combat operations away from home air bases. This shows that at 5 to 7 major air bases and a dozen operational airfields located near the borders of Ukraine and the territories of Crimea and the Republic of Belarus, which the Russian Air Force has already used in the spring for air strikes, it is difficult to notice the presence of more than 14 or 18 attack aircraft on one airfield. We can also mention the alleged heartbreaking plan of the Russian aviation commander, which was designed to mislead and distract the efforts of the Ukrainian air defense forces and any other higher significance. The explanation of these two properties is very simple. Sounds familiar - technical applicability.
In military practice, the above situation is roughly as follows. On the eve of the invasion, the mixed aviation regiment of the 2nd Mixed Air Force of the 14th Army of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces, stationed in the Chelyabinsk area and equipped with 24 defenders, received a mission to participate in "special military operations" in Ukraine. After overcoming all the accompanying difficulties, in February of this year, 18 fighter jets appeared at Belarusian airports. In this case, the number 18 is magical and indicative. This is not one squadron, nor two squadrons, nor four or five flying size units. This is a reality in terms of technical conditions, to be precise 75% of the total number of bombers in the regiment. This indicator is on the verge of limited operational capabilities. Hostilities had not yet begun and a quarter of the aircraft were already missing. In the estimation of Russian staff, a fully mixed aviation regiment continued to appear. This also applies to the most modern (more precisely, the latest) Russian 4+ generation fighter-bombers, which were adopted only in 2014. The overall picture of technical suitability is unlikely to be better for earlier types and series of aircraft.
The missile portion of the airstrike proved quite successful.It seems that the Russian group and the massive missile attacks in the first week should quickly lead to the destruction of Ukrainian military stocks and defense objects. The scale and systematic nature of the missile attack, in addition to causing heavy material losses, caused chaos in daily life, localized panic, and made some of our compatriots feel that disaster was inevitable. The
quantitative indicator once again plays an important role in this regard. In the first two, the most difficult months of the large-scale invasion, enemy missile attacks alone averaged 8-10 times a day, with an average of up to 15 cruise missiles and ballistic missiles per day. Furthermore, on the first days of the invasion, the attrition of SS-26s reached a level that the enemy could not reach later. More than 80 percent of air strikes include Russia's SS-26 and SS-N-27 ground- and sea-based missiles. Even without taking into account Russia's bet on the rapid advance of ground forces, this skillful use of a very limited number of existing weapons and fighter aircraft by the SS-26 and the SS-Ukrainian Armed Forces Air Force, coupled with measures to disperse, camouflage and direct air defense cover objects and troops, did not allow the enemy to achieve his goals. Despite the technical shortcomings and minimal experience of using Ukrainian air defenses before a major invasion began, the actions came as a considerable surprise to Russian theorists who favor missile terror and aerial offensive self-sufficiency. One of the clear confirmations of this is the subsequent transfer of air strikes by the enemy specifically to the infrastructure of Ukraine, with the aim of creating extremely complex economic conditions in the country, especially in the energy sector, with the expectation of lasting damaging effects.
There is no doubt that the human factor is extremely important, if not decisive. We can mention that the Russian Air Force cannot ensure the safety of the use of aviation from combat airfields. The presence of dozens of charred helicopter and plane wreckage at Chornobayivka or Saki airports can only be explained by the reckless disregard of basic safety rules by the officials concerned. We are also talking about the crews of aircraft, ships and missile complexes. We will immediately exclude from consideration categories of persons who do not personally expose themselves to danger when using their weapons systems. This is the crew of the Tu-22M3 (Backfire) long-range bomber, which attacks with impunity from the airspace of the Republic of Belarus or the Russian Federation, the missile carriers of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Fleet, as well as the crew of the SS-26 mobile short-range ballistic missile system, which can be launched from extremely long distances. Fighter, bomber and attack aircraft pilots all require an entirely separate set of professional qualities, not to mention rotorcraft aircrews.
Obviously, the enemy had and still has the biggest problem with this type of personnel. The conditions for performing missions at training airfields and in the skies of Syria or the Caucasus are very different from the actual situation in Ukraine. And where personal training and fighting qualities should be most fully reflected, that's where the difficulty begins. Tight flight times and an unwillingness to risk lives, self-confidence and outstanding home mortgages, ignorance of the battlefield and the true extent of the threat from Ukrainian air defense forces - all of this can be found in the interrogation transcripts of Russian pilots who were lucky enough to be captured.
Assigning combat missions to a small group of the most experienced pilots, selected from reserve pilots or aviation unit command staff, proved to be a temporary solution. However, the ratio of one "trained" to twenty-thirty "inexperienced" is obviously not conducive to solving the problem. At the beginning of a large-scale invasion, various types of pilot "combat groups" from aviation units and formations, averaging up to 30% of the flight crews, were often dispatched to perform "special military operations" missions. Regardless of their name, these pilots were essentially appointed "from among all able men." Additionally, pilot training takes years, not weeks.
This cannot be considered absolutely typical. The enemy continues to have enough qualified and well-trained airmen to study with us in this war and gain combat experience. The level of professional training of its individual "experts" is far higher than we could hope for.However, we are talking about the realization of potential, regarding qualitative and quantitative indicators, and in this sense the situation with enemy pilots can hardly be called satisfactory.
In addition, judging from the development of the situation, the "human factor" was most fully reflected in the work of the C2 unit of the aggressor air force. The act of establishing an air group on the eve of an invasion would not in itself help ensure controllability. The "collective hodgepodge" of aviation units and units from different military districts, their location on dozens of airfields, unresolved problems of interaction and coordination - all this increases the problems of organizing combat use. The most important thing is that strategic misjudgments in the planning stage, lack of understanding of the enemy and the development of the situation, and the inability to quickly adapt to these changes led to the failure of the Russian strategic air offensive operations.
"The Mathematics of War" still suggests that we should lose the battle over our airspace. In fact, the only reason, other than the courage and heroism of our soldiers, that we have successfully withstood past air strikes that eliminated this advantage is that our C2 bodies work absolutely better than the enemy.
An objective account of what has long been known as
A review would be incomplete without pointing out the factors that significantly contributed and continue to contribute to the performance of enemy air combat missions. They can be conditionally divided into two categories: situational and ongoing operations.
The absolute similarity and good familiarity have a significant negative impact on the enemy fleet and the air defense means of the domestic air force. The long-term use and use of practically identical models provides the opportunity to conduct in-depth studies of the "weak points" of all the characteristics and technical characteristics of their operational use. In this way, the enemy can use its own air strikes to exploit the well-known weaknesses of our air defense systems and, if possible, neutralize powerful air defense systems. This is manifested in the construction of air defenses for air and missile strikes, selected routes and trajectories of various parts of the flight profile to increase the possibility of breakthrough. This, in turn, forces our air defense and combat aviation to constantly maneuver, change the way they work and make extensive use of remaining air defense system resources.
Most of the air defense equipment, especially the air defense systems, were developed 50-60 years ago. They are obviously technically obsolete and cannot effectively attack certain types of air targets. First, this applies to small objects, ballistic targets and hypersonic air-launched missiles. But it's not just the SS-26 and SS-N-27 that are undeniable threats. X-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) or P-800 "Onyx" (SS-N-26 Strobile) missiles are also targets that are difficult to intercept by our air defense forces. Theoretically, the SA-10 air defense missile system can deal with them, but Ukraine does not have anti-missiles suitable for them.
For example, for our tactical aviation aircraft, the lack of an effective jamming station is fatal, and this jamming station should act on the main component of modern radar - the monopulse direction finder. In addition, the aircraft of our tactical aviation do not have an effective on-board electronic warfare complex capable of protecting them from enemy SA/AA missiles. In addition, due to the enemy's use of the Pantsir S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) mobile air defense system, the execution of combat flight missions in the area of the contact line is always accompanied by significant dangers, since the radar activity of this air defense system cannot be detected by conventional airborne radiation warning stations.
Technical wear and tear, losses, damage and the resulting unsatisfactory level of technical combat readiness of air defense equipment and aircraft are not the last factor.
There is also a set of factors that are constantly at play. The most important of these is the numerical superiority of the means of air attack, beyond which even the tactical and technical characteristics of the model no longer play a decisive role. In other words, it was lackluster air defense systems and insufficient numbers of fighter jets that were effective. This is particularly critical when repelling enemy missile swarms and large-scale attacks. Let us not forget that the inventory of SA missiles available to the old campus air defense systems was generally limited.
For long-term planning, it is important to understand the current imbalance between the number of covered objects and the number of air defense assets and take losses into account. Previous calculation methods no longer provide the possibility to estimate air coverage indicators.The reasons for this lie in the different levels of development of military technology, as well as the degree of branching of the infrastructure that ensures the functioning of the country and the well-being of its citizens. Based on the experience of this war, the selectivity and pertinence of the enemy's use of air strike forces was revised, and the existing number of anti-aircraft weapons and SA missile stocks were calculated.
The existing numerical composition of troops and air defense means actually does not allow the establishment of an echelon of air defense on the national territory. Currently, our ability to effectively intercept ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and attack drones is limited. For a while, the architecture of our air defense systems was primarily built during the Soviet era and was designed to combat low- and high-altitude aircraft. and successfully completed this task. But most cruise missiles and attack drones fly at very low altitudes of 50-150 meters. At this high echelon, existing SA missile systems can cover a small part of the country's territory. That is why when we note the interception of 70...90% of the enemy's missiles, this should be attributed solely to the skills of our air force personnel.
Factors constantly at play were also mentioned in the delimitation of the state borders with the Russian Federation and Belarus, including the strategic southern flank of our territory and coastal areas. The use of Black Sea waters, airspace and the territory of the Republic of Belarus has increased the enemy's total front line of possible air attack directions by nearly three times. Since this summer, Russia has "emphasized" the use of air- and sea-based cruise missiles. In addition to being an objective indicator of its weapons reserves, it also has considerable operational significance.
It cannot be denied that the enemy skillfully used these two familiar, but difficult to predict in the pre-war period, elements of military confrontation in air combat.
One of them is the use of the Beriev A-50 (Mainstay) airborne early warning and control aircraft and its modifications. This enables the enemy to control the air situation hundreds of kilometers deep into our territory along the line of contact. This is especially important for monitoring the movements of our fighter and bomber aircraft. We have noticed individual cases of intercepting Korean aircraft deep inside our territory with AA-type long-range missiles aimed at the "mainstay". At the same time, the detection range of domestic air defense means is actually determined by the propagation characteristics of meter waves and centimeter waves.
Another reason is that due to the poor protection of our air defense systems from the enemy, the enemy makes extensive use of radio-electronic suppression of air defense weapons. It is worth noting that the performance of these tasks, the means are not the participation of the latest Russian models, the reason for their effectiveness lies entirely in the technical flaws of domestic air defense equipment.
Why is it Air again?
Under the pressure of sanctions, Russia’s endless production possibilities of the SS-26 series of cruise missiles are by no means endless, forcing the Russians to find other cheaper means of destruction to complete their mission. The first step is the transition to widespread use of the Shahed family's attack drones. The next step, which has been observed, is to shift most of the strike mission to airborne cruise missiles. At the same time, given the limited inventory of SS-26 cruise missiles, their use will become more selective in the medium term and is expected to target HVTs.
In the future, considering the effectiveness of missile weapon systems that use ballistic or ballistic descent in the final part of the trajectory, it is most likely to expand the scope of their use. In this context, Iran's advanced imitation Soviet-Chinese Fateh-110 ballistic missiles and their improved Zolfaghar versions - the possibility of supplying such missiles to the Russian Federation was noted just two months ago - pose a deadly threat to installations throughout our territory. Characteristics of range and accuracy, as well as the natural technical complexity of intercepting ballistic missile targets, as well as Ukraine's limitations in the necessary means, encourage adversaries to consider such an option.
For a number of reasons, the situation in the operational organization of aviation equipment of the Russian Armed Forces is unlikely to improve, but due to its impressive numbers, the enemy can still maintain and expand the aviation group. Russia continues to divert aviation equipment from its "rear" military zones to replenish losses and still has sufficient resources to fight in the airspace at its current intensity for years to come.However, the number of aviation groups around Ukraine has remained almost unchanged since the beginning of the invasion, and the quality of its composition has greatly deteriorated, as the Russian side has been forced to replace modern lost aircraft and helicopters with obsolete modifications, sometimes even taken out of stock.
The situation of strategic aviation, especially the counterproductive fleet and Tu-95MS (Bear-H) missile-carrying bombers, does not seem to worry the Russian command, since there were no air losses among these aircraft. At the same time, the main type of Russian Air Force strike aircraft takes into account the extreme importance of the use of air strikes, and the command of the Russian Armed Forces seems ready to adopt such measures, sometimes even yielding to the need to maintain a balanced air presence in other areas.
Russia's inventory of air-launched cruise missiles, especially modern missiles, like any military inventory, is not unlimited. However, there is no reason for optimism. Under the current circumstances, just waiting and hoping that the air strikes will stop because the enemy lacks weapons is the worst thing you can do. There is an equally simple answer to a simple question: when this might happen - never. It’s safe to say that the Russian leadership has been busy looking for a way out of this situation for more than a month. Some solutions are already being implemented. One of these is based on the relative availability of air and missile weapons for external supply. Monetary fees or obligations to partners could eliminate problems for the Russian Federation related to continued design or increased production of air strike weapons. In a way, the situation is a bit like the situation in Ukraine, where we have no specific choice but must accept the help our partners offer or are able to offer.
Winter has increased the difficulty of air defense troops rapid maneuvering to a certain extent. Note that in situations where the numerical superiority of air strikes exceeds that of air defenses, such maneuvers are the key to a successful confrontation.
The weakening of ground force operations will likely lead to relative stability along the entire contact line. Under the condition of effective use of reconnaissance means, due to the reduction of target maneuverability, the possibility of discovering and hitting the target increases. The location and configuration of air defense systems are becoming more fixed and predictable. This opens certain opportunities for enemy plans to successfully overcome area air defense along the line of contact, which means it is possible to resume the widespread use of attack aircraft against targets in the operational rear and deep in the country's territory.
By focusing on air strikes, it is possible not to reduce the intensity of hostilities not only on the front, but also throughout the country, regardless of possible redeployments of ground troops. For civil infrastructure, first and foremost energy facilities, failure during the colder times of the year is even more painful and requires an unparalleled effort to restore. Needless to say, the country’s energy system is teetering on the edge. Furthermore, our country's critical infrastructure is not entirely constrained by energy facilities.
The purely military purpose of the continuous and escalating air strikes against our country’s rear targets may be to disrupt planned troop training, restore combat capabilities, and supply new weapons and military equipment. This means that air strikes can once again target military training areas, supply bases, storage sites and defense industry facilities.
The focus on airstrikes therefore leaves open the possibility of exploiting the reality of a regional energy disaster for speculation and political pressure on the country's leaders and the international community. To some in the Russian Federation’s leadership, the above appears to be the key to successfully completing the “special military operation” and defeating Ukraine. Such a plan was not only another reason to assert its reckless nature and lack of prospects, but also underlined the seriousness of the enemy's further intentions.
will have a continuation of
It should be pointed out again that the enemy is also further looking for ways to realize the potential of air superiority. Some of the problematic issues mentioned, and even the broader list of issues, concern the Russian command as much as they do us. It is only logical that we should expect to improve existing ones or introduce new steps and evaluate innovative approaches to air combat.Today we see at least three such possibilities.
Enemy drone attacks, primarily on infrastructure, will continue. If we base our observations from September to November on, the stocks available and announced for delivery under Iranian contracts are probably enough to last another two to three months. It is possible to establish Russian production and expand the range of drones that will be used. During this period, with an effective air strike program, it can wreak havoc on our civilian facilities and industry. Furthermore, the goal of large-scale drone attacks will remain to exhaust air defense systems and force excessive use of SA missiles. Despite the high proportion of interceptions, considering the cost of SA missiles and the moral and economic consequences of strikes, drones will remain one of the main types of air combat weapons. Soon, creative options for the involvement of complex UAV and cruise missile strikes or replicating HVTs will begin to emerge.
The enemy will try to gain maximum benefit from the technical complexity of intercepting ballistic targets. It may increase the means of air strikes and present itself as a ballistic target for our air defenses, such as the Zolfaghar ballistic missile, which has a flight range of up to 700 kilometers, the manufacturer claims. The enemy's further "backstage" use of cruise missiles and even obsolete "Tochka-U" (SS-21 Scarab A) for complex missile strikes and overloading Ukrainian air defense construction cannot be ruled out.
There is no way to rule out the continued selective use of SS-26 and SS-N-27 cruise missiles to attack the most important targets in our rear. The selectivity will depend on the number of missiles, which will remain limited due to difficulties in production and, more precisely, in the supply of components under pressure from international sanctions.
Today's Tasks for a Successful Tomorrow
It's often easier to ask questions than to provide answers. Air combat has always been a devastating combination of measures to shield one's own forces and targets from air attacks while inflicting maximum damage on the enemy. This exquisite dance with aerial "shield and sword" is well known, especially by military professionals, since the war era of the early twentieth century.
When considering Ukraine's air "shield", one must start by solving the problem of acquiring air targets, because "seeing", especially in the case of cruise missiles, attack aircraft, bombers and offensive drones, is often much more difficult than hitting. Today, such tasks are solved by the air force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine through skillful operation of detection means, constantly putting the enemy in front of new configurations of radar fields, for which he once again needs time and resources. However, this method is more typical of covering troop groups rather than rear objects, and it is used in a somewhat forced manner. The ideal option is to establish a continuous radar field covering the entire altitude echelon, including very low altitude echelons. It's not cheap, nor is it fast, but such goals should be set. No funding should hinder the reliable protection of civilian lives on the home front and of military personnel on the battlefield. Not to mention that the economic losses caused by air strikes will exaggerate the specific losses by an order of magnitude.
In addition, the ability to detect air targets and target interceptors can be provided by air situation control systems implementing the NATO information exchange Link-16 standard. The production and improvement of a domestic model of such a system - "Oreanda-PS" - has been ongoing for more than a year. In the meantime, a straightforward solution might be to supply such systems from abroad. Importantly, our partners also understand the need for such a “hot” solution. In particular, US Army General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in October this year that "... whatever systems are ultimately delivered to Ukraine, they will be merged into a joint structure to ensure the exchange of information."
The future is to carry out systematic work jointly with partners to rearm the Ukrainian Armed Forces Air Force with anti-aircraft missile systems. Although the decision also required an immediate decision, with the daily threat of enemy air attacks, it was necessary to consider two basic factors. First, it is the existence of objective opportunities and the political will of our partners.Unfortunately, anti-aircraft missile systems do not belong to the type of weapons that can be stored in arsenals for decades, so their "stockpiles" are very small. Exceptions are made only for early types of air defense systems or reserve air defense systems. This means that any decision to transfer air defense systems to Ukraine is, and will be, taken by any country that would, first of all, harm its own security. In addition, Ukraine cannot yet refuse foreign aid or put forward its own conditions. Secondly, it is crucial to prevent the formation and accumulation of a "zoo" of different foreign-produced air defense systems in the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Of course, we should not forget about the standardization and interoperability of almost all types of similar weapons in NATO countries and outside the alliance. However, we must remember that, unfortunately, the real or potential threat of Russian air strikes will not disappear tomorrow or even after the war is over. The use and operation of heterogeneous systems of high-tech weapons such as air defense systems has been and will remain a serious challenge for a long time. That is why, as far as air defense assets are concerned, the future architecture of the domestic air defense system should have been clearly formed, agreed and implemented by us and our partners.
One of the world-wide classification standards for air defense systems provides for short range - up to 40 kilometers; average range - up to 80 kilometers; long-range complex - up to 150 kilometers and more. ]
Modern calculations show that the demand for air defense systems of a given level is respectively two thirds, less than one third and 8.10%. Started filling this structure with corresponding material parts. For example, the IRIS-T SL air defense system developed under the leadership of German experts, the American MIM-23 Eagle series and the Norwegian-American NASAMS 2 are, in their current configuration, typical representatives of the class of short-range air defense systems that replace the Soviet Buk-M1 (SA-17 Grizzly). The next step should be to fill in the components of the medium-range air defense system to replace the SA-10 air defense system. The Ukrainian Air Force may encounter such a complex in the near future: the French SAMP/T, which has a range of up to 100 kilometers and is capable of intercepting ballistic targets; the Israeli Barak-8, which has a range of up to 90 kilometers. Using the American MIM-104 Patriot in a modified PAC-3 would also provide serious advantages. In the future, as a long-range air defense system, it may be used as long as partners make appropriate decisions, such as the United States' THAAD.
At the same time, these medium and long-range air defense systems will fill the gap in the country's air defense capabilities against ballistic targets. It should be noted that the traditional continuity and unity of most foreign armament models of the air defense forces, only by changing the equipment and designation of SA missiles can the capabilities of the complex itself be significantly expanded. So, for example, the more advanced NASAMS-3, which depends on the use of certain types of missiles from the AIM-120 line, is already considered a medium-range air defense system. The technical capabilities of the main Soviet medium-range SA-10 against the Ukrainian Air Force have not yet been completely exhausted. So, for example, when using the "long-range" SA missile 9M83M, not the new SA-10 becomes a long-range complex.
Aviation's primary mission is to ensure air superiority and improve air strike capabilities. According to the assessment of domestic experts, objectively speaking, the Ukrainian Air Force has no problem maintaining its current fleet. It’s no secret that our aviation “squeezes” necessary resources from our existing fleet, beyond any regulatory and safety margins. And if this is very possible under conditions of total war, then after the war is over, most of the aviation equipment will likely be decommissioned. In addition, this fact also excludes the possibility of further modernization, which in the vast majority of cases loses its meaning if the aircraft platform physically wears out.
is also required to purchase or provide supplies and technical assistance. But this is a traditional long-term and financially burdensome option. As with anti-aircraft missile systems, the world market for combat aircraft is very limited. Production cycles take months, if not years, and the queue to buy a basic model of a modern multi-role fighter is years long. In addition, the issue of sales of combat aircraft has always been politicized, so it requires a certain consensus between manufacturers and the governments of relevant countries. Even if you look at the used equipment market, it's limited.Just like there are long lines at the manufacturer's factory, there are also many people on the secondary market looking to purchase "used" aircraft. Only a few countries, such as the United States, have stored large reserves of aviation equipment, but given their own ambitions and the increasing risk of global confrontation, they are also unwilling to consider the transfer of this important mobilization resource. In addition, all equipment on the secondary market (whether from inventories or from rearmed military units) needs at least an overhaul and even modernization. And this also requires time and financial costs.
However, this does not mean that work with partners should not be carried out. It is already necessary to negotiate aviation "lease" issues. These could be F-16 Block 50/52 or even Block 40/42 multi-role fighters from storage bases, or decommissioned after military units are rearmed (which is the most likely option in the near future). And even if these are not the latest version, they still surpass the Soviet MiGs in tactical and technical characteristics, they will help to compensate for the losses suffered by our aviation and gain the necessary experience in operating Western aviation equipment. It must be considered that they are likely to become expendable items in our wars, so there is no point in seeking to take the aircraft "off the line" now. In the future, it will be necessary to concentrate on acquiring more modern aircraft types: the same F-16, but already modified in Block 70/72, F/A-18 Super Hornet, F-15EX, Swedish JASGrippen wing 39E/F, or even the F-35. However, as is the case with SA missiles, it is better to maintain maximum consistency in the family of aviation equipment for several reasons.
As with SAM, the decisions made may be decisive for a considerable period of time. Given the critical nature of the situation and limited financial resources, a "trial and error" approach is unlikely to work. In practice, this means that stopping at one option or their combination will determine the prospects for the development and equipment of combat aviation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the coming years and decades.
The air "sword" should be a joint attack on the enemy's fixed targets, starting with the area where Russian attack aircraft bases and ballistic missile and cruise missile launch sites are targeted. This will enable the Ukrainian Air Force and Armed Forces as a whole to move from repelling air strikes to retaliatory strikes as well as preventive targeted strikes. Depending on the actual and possible deployment of such targets, there is an urgent need for destruction means that can hit specific types of targets in enemy-controlled areas at a depth of at least 150 to 250 kilometers. Currently, at least two approaches to this problem are being considered. First, the ability to strike aviation should be expanded due to the use of more advanced aviation and missile weapons. The second measure is to increase the range of the M-142 HIMARS complex equipped with ATACMS missiles. Successful joint strikes at limited depth have entered the practice of combat work of the Air Force and missile units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Currently, they are limited to technical characteristics of certain types of weapons. The possibility of attacking aircraft base airfields and enemy land-based cruise missile starting locations remains ideal. This ability to “equalize range” instantly transformed air combat against the Russians and their satellites from an exciting combat launch adventure into a deadly chore.
In the process of repelling large-scale aggression, a brief overview of the history, current situation and possible prospects of air confrontation allows us to draw several main conclusions.
Betting on the air business has been, is and will be one of the main plans of Russian strategists. This approach allows the enemy to count on gaining significant advantages in all key areas of military conflict, from the military to the political.
Despite some significant obstacles, it is an objective reality to seek new approaches and the enemy's insistence on continuing the air war with all available means. Possible targets of further air strikes will remain civilian infrastructure, above all the energy sector, but also the administrative centers of our country.
The continued protection of airspace and objects in the country’s strategic rear should remain a priority for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Only by taking and implementing a set of systematic measures to improve the air-to-enemy capabilities can we successfully complete this mission.
We understand it, we can do it.
