[Military Martial Plane] Author: Lele
Recently, the Shahed-136 suicide drone from Iran became famous. The aircraft first participated in the Russian army's long-range air strike on the hinterland of Ukraine, and gradually became the main force with the consumption of the Russian army's missile . Recently, there has been a big news about Shahed-136 "shooting down" the Ukrainian MiG-29, making this drone with a simple structure, a long range and a powerful range, becoming the international focus. The Ukrainian army also felt very tricky about Shahed-136 and specially released targeted counterattack teaching materials to restrain its intensified use. One of the issues that domestic public opinion is highly concerned about is why there is no similar equipment in China at present?
▲The Shahed-136 suicide drone from Iran has attracted great attention
Shahed-136 suicide drone is a powerful player in the "Shahed" series of Iran's aviation industry and a very distinctive equipment. Its flight route is already fixed after launch and no longer accepts real-time control of the backend. Judging from the battle examples released by the Ukrainian General Staff, when Shahed-136 is electronically disturbed by Ukrainian army, it will directly switch to inertial navigation until it flies out of the affected area of electronic warfare equipment, and then re-restores the positioning and preset routes. Therefore, the example of the Ukrainian army using electronic warfare equipment that successfully interfered with the Russian "Orlan-10" drone and seized completely did not occur on Shahed-136. In fact, this is the result of Iran's careful consideration. After all, the US military has outstanding performance in the field of electronic warfare. Iran cannot be prepared for this for practical reasons, and the final outcome is indeed quite good.
▲Russian military "Orlan-10" drone has poor anti-interference capabilities
Secondly, Shahed-136 uses civilian gasoline engines as power, which is noisy, but also gives it a higher range - about 800 kilometers. This means that the Russian army can flexibly use this equipment within a wide range of maneuverage, while the Ukrainian army can only run away. More importantly, the Ukrainian army has not found effective response measures so far. In the combat manual issued by its General Staff, shooting down Shahed-136 is considered a very difficult combat area. First of all, simple electronic interference is difficult to achieve. In theory, interference can be performed from multiple aspects to disrupt navigation, but it has not been successfully practiced so far. Secondly, it is also very difficult to intercept weapons. In film and television works, large-caliber sniper rifles, often as natural enemies of drones, cannot actually pose a threat to Shahed-136.
▲Shahed-136 will only reduce the flight altitude at the end
Large S-300 and medium "Beech" air defense missile . It is also very difficult to intercept Shahed-136 (the drone is too small), and the cost is too high. Individual automatic weapons are considered to have no interception capabilities. The vehicle-mounted large-caliber machine gun and small-caliber anti-aircraft gun are the most suitable interception weapons at present. Finally, even if the interception is successful, it does not mean that the problem is solved. Since the Shahed-136 route is scheduled, it will still fly forward according to inertia even if it is hit and falls. Therefore, the Ukrainian General Staff does not recommend organizing interception in front of Shahed-136 (this is very likely to be injured by the bomb). Organizing multiple mobile platforms to fire and intercept are considered the most effective way to do it vertically below or slightly ahead of Shahed-136. Of course, given the insufficient lethality of small-caliber weapons, it is best to use tracer bullet (ballistic indication) and armor-piercing incendiary bomb tandem ammunition to guide the target and explode the drone.
▲"beech " is considered unsuitable to intercept Shahed-136
Shahed-136 If it falls due to damage, an explosion will also occur when it hits a building, ground or other target on the ground, which means that there may be incidental civil injury. Even if it lands completely, it cannot be confiscated at the landing site because it is equipped with a timing device inside. In the next few hours, a 20-40 kilogram warhead will explode at any time, and the fragmented killing radius is about 100 meters, which in theory can pose a close threat to light armored units. To sum up, Shahed-136 is a difficult target that can be ignored. Its unique design makes its anti-electronic interference capability good, and soft killing is unsustainable.Hard killing requires a series of problems such as excessive cost, low interception probability, and large collateral damage. In addition, its considerable range, it is no wonder that the Ukrainian army is overwhelmed by it.
▲Like the domestic 25mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun is an ideal interception weapon. However, there is no weapon without shortcomings in this world. As Iran deliberately developed, intending to fight against the mass-produced equipment of the US military, it has indeed achieved considerable achievements in cost-effectiveness, anti-electronic interference and other fields, but its shortcomings are largely covered by the limitations of the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield. Shahed-136 uses a large number of civilian components to reduce costs during design and manufacturing, but it is still equipped with a relatively advanced multi-band anti-interference array antenna, which seriously increases manufacturing costs. This emphasis just reflects its weakness - electronic interference. Ukrainian military practice believes that Shahed-136 has strong electron resistance because it inherited the Soviet military system and has never been good at this field. The abandonment of more than 20 years ago has exacerbated this problem. After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the Ukrainian army, which had been trained in Europe and the United States, strengthened this field and even showed a trend of surpassing the Russian army, but the essential flaws were not solved.
▲The advanced electronic fighter of the J-16D type is a nightmare of Shahed-136
In fact, the size, combat mode and design level of the Shahed-136 make its anti-interference level not too high. In the face of special tactical electronic fighters such as the US-made EA-18G, the Chinese J-16D, or larger strategic electronic fighter, it is basically vulnerable. The Shahed-136 flew hundreds of kilometers at medium and high altitude to attack long-range targets. The reason why it was a great success in the Ukrainian battlefield was that the Ukrainian army's own electronic warfare was the fundamental reason. In fact, both China and the United States are equipped with suicide drones with similar design concepts, but the range is only 30 or even one-40 of the Shahed-136. The reason is that in a high-intensity battlefield, long-range suicide drones will soon be locked by their opponents and then interfered and fall, which will even become a safety hazard on their own front. The ultra-small drone (US "switchblade" suicide drone, China FH-901) carried by individual soldiers has a range of about 20 kilometers. Long-range suicide drones such as Shahed-136 are not used for high-intensity battlefields, and medium- and low-intensity battlefields are not needed, so naturally there is no need for development.
▲Domestic FH-901 individual suicide drone (cruising missile)
Shahed-136 itself is a weapon of the Iranian army. The design concept is that special equipment that cannot be used to deter opponents when it realizes that it is impossible to have air superiority. Its unexpected and outstanding performance on the Ukrainian battlefield proves the success of the design and the limitations of the Ukrainian electronic warfare level. As long as the Ukrainian army cannot solve the technical problems of electronic warfare, Shahed-136 will always be a very headache for it. Under such circumstances, the Ukrainian army dispatched MiG-29 to intercept the target a few days ago. As a result, after searching for the target at close range and knocking it out, fragments hit the MiG-29 and "shooting it down", it is understandable.
