Li Xuewei, a professor at the School of Northeast Asia and the Institute of International Studies at Shandong University, and Wang Lu, a doctoral candidate at the School of Northeast Asia at Shandong University, published "Japan's Cognition and Actions on the U.S. "Freedom of Navigation Operations" in the South China Sea in the 3rd issue of "Journal of Japan" in 2022 Coping with China》 (full text is about 26,000 words) .
Li Xuewei and Wang Lu believe that as an important military ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has supported the United States' South China Sea "Freedom of Navigation Operations", but it has shown the characteristics of being "cautious in words and support", which is reflected in Abe This was particularly evident after Shinzo formed his third cabinet at the end of 2014. Japan's attitude is based on its own strategic considerations.
(1) Japan was cautious in its words and deeds in supporting the U.S.’s “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea
Before 2015, because the confrontation over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea between China and the United States had not yet become prominent, the U.S.’s “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea had not yet risen to the level of strategic containment. At the same level, although Japan has spoken out on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, it mainly maintains a wait-and-see attitude towards the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea. Since 2015, the United States has tried its best to discredit China's construction of islands and reefs in the South China Sea as a "militarized" operation, and has begun to conduct "freedom of navigation operations" within 12 nautical miles of China's islands and reefs in the South China Sea. It has continuously intensified and escalated the frequency and form of provocations against China. China The government has strongly protested and firmly opposed the unreasonable actions of the United States, and the confrontation between China and the United States in the South China Sea has continued to intensify. After Shinzo Abe formed his third cabinet at the end of 2014, Japan made a high-profile statement against the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea, showing that it actively supports and highly caters to the United States in terms of political stance and international law.
After Abe formed the government for the third time, the Japanese government made a high-profile statement on international occasions and expressed active support for the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea. Abe expressed active support for the US military's "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea during the Japan-US summit talks in 2015 and 2017. Since then, the Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida governments have basically followed the Abe administration’s support for the U.S. “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea.
At the same time, the Japanese government stated on international occasions and in public speeches that the so-called "freedom of navigation operations" conducted by the United States in the South China Sea, especially the so-called "freedom of navigation operations" carried out by U.S. warships entering the territorial waters of China's Paracel Islands and the surrounding waters of the Nansha islands and reefs, are consistent with the international law. Japan's move is related to its one-sided interpretation of the " United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ", especially the relevant provisions of Japan's domestic policies and regulations. Japan unilaterally claims that all foreign ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters stipulated in the Convention and believes that the actions of the United States are in compliance with international law. Vessels should comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state regarding innocent passage. Japan's "Law Concerning the Navigation of Foreign Ships in Territorial Seas and Other Areas" and the "Response to the Navigation of Foreign Warships in my country's Territorial Sea and Internal Waters That Do Not Conform to the Innocent Passage of International Law" both confirmed Japan's regulations on the innocent passage of foreign warships in territorial waters. Japan maintains that when foreign warships do not "stay" in Japan's territorial waters or "pass through internal waters," Japan does not emphasize prior notification. This is also an important basis for Japan to support the United States in this regard. In addition, Japan also firmly supports the United States on international law issues such as "whether China has unilaterally changed the status quo in the South China Sea."
Japan not only supports the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea from a political stance, but also makes some solidarity and support actions in practical actions. Even so, Japan's actual participation in the US "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea is still limited and restrained.
First, Japan has revised and promulgated a series of laws and policy documents in response to "grey zone situations" to continuously loosen the constraints of the Self-Defense Forces and facilitate the Self-Defense Forces' deployment to the South China Sea to support U.S. military operations. In the 2014 revision of the Self-Defense Forces Act, Japan added Article 95, paragraph 2, which stipulates specific conditions for the use of weapons by the Self-Defense Forces.In the "Guidelines for the Application of Article 95, Paragraph 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Act" formally adopted in December 2016, Japan stipulates that when the Self-Defense Forces cooperate with the United States to carry out activities to assist in the defense of Japan, provided that no armed attack is involved, Limited use of weapons is permitted. In the Japan-US Defense Cooperation Guidelines revised in 2015, Japan expanded the area of Japan-US military cooperation from its surrounding areas to the world, making it "legal" for the Japan Self-Defense Forces to cooperate with the US military in the South China Sea. The "New Security Law" introduced in 2015 stipulates that the Japan Self-Defense Forces can send troops overseas at any time as needed and provide support to the militaries of other countries.
Second, Japan did not directly participate in the US "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea, but it expressed its support for its "actions" by dispatching ships to carry out regular warship and aircraft patrols in the South China Sea and holding regular bilateral joint military exercises with the United States. Solidarity and support.
Third, Japan has also actively enlisted ASEAN countries, Australia, India and European countries to jointly support and support the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea claimed by the United States, and jointly support the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea and build momentum for it.
Fourth, Japan has exercised restraint and restraint in supporting the United States’ “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea. Although Japan has verbally supported the "freedom of navigation operations" in which U.S. warships entered the territorial waters of China's Paracel Islands and the waters surrounding the Nansha Islands and Reefs, it has never sent its Maritime Self-Defense Force to participate; Japan's patrol activities and joint training in the South China Sea have also been maintained Japan is cautious and restrained; Japan also avoids controversial actions that may lead to the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations.
(2) Japan’s strategic considerations
The Japanese government attaches great importance to the important role of the situation in the South China Sea in promoting its concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”. As a country outside the region, following the United States in safeguarding "freedom of navigation" in the South China Sea is not only one of Japan's core goals in implementing the "Indo-Pacific Concept", but also an important measure for it to respond to geopolitical changes in the Indo-Pacific. Since Abe formed his third cabinet, the reason why Japan has shown such a "cautious" attitude towards supporting the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea has its own strategic considerations behind it.
Japan’s active support of the United States’ “freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea has its strategic considerations. First, from a fundamental perspective, Japan has significant strategic interests in the South China Sea. As an island country surrounded by sea, Japan is highly dependent on sea route transportation, and the route through the South China Sea is its maritime "lifeline". Ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is extremely important for Japan's import and export trade through the South China Sea, especially energy imports. The South China Sea is an important channel connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, and is an important hub for Japan to implement its concept of a "free and open Indo-Pacific". By supporting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, Japan can gain greater strategic benefits.
Second, with the successive implementation of the United States' "Return to the Asia-Pacific", "Asia-Pacific Rebalancing" strategies and "Indo-Pacific Strategy", the Japan-US alliance has been rapidly strengthened and upgraded. In the South China Sea, the most important military activity of the United States is to conduct "freedom of navigation operations." In order to fulfill its alliance obligations, Japan will definitely express its positive stance and take actions to express solidarity and support for the United States.
Third, Japan is eager to expand the responsibilities and operational scope of the Maritime Self-Defense Force. By supporting the United States' "operations" to conduct military training and military reconnaissance in the South China Sea, Japan can also understand and "monitor" the construction status and development trends of the Chinese Navy. Japan maintains a united front with the United States and jointly puts pressure on China on the South China Sea issue to contain China's rise.
Fourth, Japan uses the United States to put pressure on China on the South China Sea issue, which can not only increase China's investment in strategic resources on the South China Sea issue and distract the East China Sea, but also relieve Japan's pressure in dealing with the Diaoyu Islands dispute. . Moreover, by supporting the United States' "Freedom of Navigation Operations" in the South China Sea, Japan also hopes to obtain support from the United States in its response to the Diaoyu Islands issue.
At the same time, Japan has limited operational support for the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea. This stems from certain differences between Japan and the United States in the status of the parties to the Convention and Japan's maintenance of its relations with China and neighboring countries in the South China Sea. strategic considerations of relationships.
First, even though Japan supports the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea from the perspective of international law, the differences between the two countries in terms of their status as parties to the Convention require Japan to maintain a restrained and cautious attitude. The United States insists on the innocent passage of military vessels through the territorial sea, but it does not abide by the Convention's proposition of "complying with the laws and regulations of the coastal state regarding the innocent passage of the territorial sea." Unlike the United States, Japan, as a party to the Convention, is supposed to abide by the provisions of the Convention on "innocent passage of the territorial sea" and abide by the laws and regulations on innocent passage of the territorial sea formulated by China in accordance with the Convention. For this reason, Japan is concerned that the "Law of the People's Republic of China on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone" stipulates that foreign military ships must obtain approval from the Chinese government when entering territorial waters.
Second, as neighbors separated by a narrow strip of water, Japan and China have very close economic, trade and cultural exchanges. The two sides also have many common interests in the non-traditional security field. Japan also strives to maintain stable relations between Japan and China. Although Japan supports the United States' "freedom of navigation operations" in the South China Sea, as a country outside the South China Sea, it does not want to confront China over the South China Sea issue and undermine the normalization of relations between the two countries. Therefore, in response to the "action" of the United States, Japan has maintained a certain degree of caution and restraint in its actual actions.
Third, except for China, the countries surrounding the South China Sea are all Southeast Asian countries. Japan has long attached great importance to developing friendly diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries, and has regarded Southeast Asian countries as the diplomatic focus of its "Indo-Pacific Concept" and "Go South" strategy. The countries surrounding the South China Sea are very sensitive to the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea. Therefore, although Japan insists on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, it must also consider the sovereignty claims of these Southeast Asian countries. Japan is especially cautious about such sensitive behavior as "military ships entering 12 nautical miles of territorial waters." At the same time, due to the existence of the ASEAN mechanism in Southeast Asia, if Japan's "innocent passage" of a country's territorial waters causes dissatisfaction and resistance from that country, it will inevitably arouse opposition from ASEAN and other member states, which will further affect Japan's relationship with The normalization of relations between Southeast Asian countries is also one of the important reasons why Japan has maintained relative restraint in its actual actions in the South China Sea.
(Feature article of "Journal of Japan" of the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, only represents the author's personal views. If you need to reprint, please indicate the author's name and source. The picture comes from the Internet. Compiled by intern editor Sun Lijuan)
