TSMC accounts for more than 50% of the chip foundry market, with revenue reaching US$45.505 billion last year. TSMC released its third-quarter 2021 financial report data. TSMC's revenue in this quarter was US$14.88 billion (approximately RMB 95.8 billion), an increase of US$2.74 billion from the third quarter of last year, a year-on-year increase of 22.6%. Its net profit in the third quarter exceeded 5 billion and reached US$5.614 billion (about 36.1 billion yuan), a year-on-year increase of 20%. In terms of profit margin, the financial report shows that TSMC's gross profit margin in the third quarter was 51.3%, operating profit margin of 41.2%, and net profit margin of 37.7%. The reason why the reputation of the
" Lenovo " brand has been damaged is fundamentally due to the general background of Sino-US technology competition, especially the background of chip blockade and chip sanctions on core enterprises in my country. The Chinese people's "angry and inconvenience" emotions towards some so-called "high-tech enterprises" with a long history.
But we don’t ask: Taiwan, China, can produce a “TSMC”, why haven’t we cultivated similar companies?
Especially from the timeline of the establishment of a company, TSMC was established in 1987, Lenovo was established in 1984, Sitong was established in 1984, Great Wall Computer was established in 1987, and was established in 1988...
Is it because our country does not have enough support for these companies?
中文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文文� The Chinese market is big and has many opportunities. You can make a difference in the terminal market, gradually accumulate strength, improve your technical level and capabilities in all aspects, and then develop upstream, make accessories little by little, make changes in the accessories field, and then develop upstream to materials, etc.
But I personally think that this "reason" is not enough to fully illustrate the inevitability of our lag behind Taiwan in the chip industry. Or in my opinion, our lag behind Taiwan in the chip industry is the result of a combination of accidental and inevitability.
Perhaps most netizens are not clear about it. In fact, the earliest Taiwan entry into the "chip industry" was not "TSMC", but "Taiwan Unit Electronics", the predecessor of " MediaTek ". At that time, it was called " UMC ", and was established in 1980. is the first semiconductor company in Taiwan and the real founder.
"UMC" was established 70% earlier than "TSMC". Also in Taiwan, it also has a certain so-called "government background" and has not become the leader of the industry. Therefore, we must admit the accidentality of the success of "TSMC".
The conclusion I came to in the comprehensive information is as follows:
people's factors
Zhang Zhongmou, a senior talent who understands technology and has been engaged in technology enterprise management for a long time, we did not have it at that time.
TSMC founder Zhang Zhongmou resume:
1949, 18-year-old Zhang Zhongmou entered Harvard University in the United States, 1950, Zhang Zhongmou transferred to MIT , specializing in mechanical engineering. In 1954, he received a master's degree in from the Department of Mechanical Engineering of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1955, 24-year-old Zhang Zhongmou worked in an engineer in the semiconductor department of a electrical appliance company near Boston, and entered the semiconductor industry.
1958, 27-year-old Zhang Zhongmou came to Texas and entered Texas Instruments , becoming the first Chinese employee of Texas Instruments. At that time, Texas Instruments' annual turnover was less than US$100 million. In 1964, he received the 27-year-old Sexas Instruments 1.5 Texas Instruments' annual turnover was less than US$100 million. He has a Ph.D. in the Department of Electrical Engineering at Tanford University and returned to Texas Instruments. In 1965, he was promoted to the general manager of the integrated circuit department. In 1972, he successively served as vice president and senior vice president of Texas Instruments. He is the third person in Texas Instruments, second only to the chairman and president. In 1985, he resigned from his high-paying position in the United States and returned to Taiwan, China. He was invited by Taiwan to serve as the dean of the Taiwan Institute of Industrial Technology, and made outstanding contributions to the rise and industrial upgrading of Taiwan's semiconductor industry. In 1987, Zhang Zhongmou established the world's first professional OEM company - Taiwan Integral Circuit Manufacturing Company (TSMC), in the Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan, and quickly developed into the leader of Taiwan's semiconductor industry.
Take the Academician Ni Guangnan and Liu Chuanzhi who are now discussing it. Academician Ni Guangnan understands technology, but does not understand management and industrialization of technology; Mr. Liu Chuanzhi's management may still be constantly exploring and growing in the development of the enterprise. Similar situations were also obvious in other so-called high-tech companies in China during the same period.
But here I also have a question: in , the one who really engages in semiconductors in , the one who engages in chip research and development should be the "Microelectronics Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences"? It is not the Institute of Computer Science, right? I don't know why Mr. Ni Guangnan is devoted to "chips" and why he entered the Institute of Computer Science.
industry understanding is insufficient, and the industrialization policy is inconsistent. In the 1970s, Taiwan determined a policy with the technology industry as the core and supported many technology companies. VIA Electronics , UMC, and Foxconn were all established during this period.
, and in our country, 1980-2000 During the year, the State Council's " electronic computer and large-scale integrated circuit leading group", 908 engineering, 909 engineering and other policies were established. During this period, the establishment of the domestic wafer production line was mainly started. However, the overall understanding of chips was still insufficient.
Even today, we still have enterprises like "Lenovo" as "semiconductor companies". It is believed that Lenovo did not create "chips" by itself, which is the original sin of the Lenovo management team.
to check the history. The earliest "semiconductor company" in China should be "Shanghai Beiling Company" in September 1988, which was reorganized and listed in September 1998. It is the first listed company in China's microelectronics industry. It is a large backbone enterprise in my country's microelectronics industry that produces large-scale integrated circuits. The purpose of its establishment was to provide large-scale integrated circuits for communications to "Shanghai Bell Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Co., Ltd.".
The earliest IC manufacturing veteran in China, Mr. Zhu Yiwei, once recalled painlessly:
"China's IC started late. At the end of 1965, 13 domestic first identified DTL-type bipolar integrated circuit , which is only 7 years away from the invention of ICs in the world." Zhu Yiwei said, "But after more than 30 years of development, China's IC industry has a gap of about 15 years from the world's scientific research and technology level, and a gap of more than 20 years in industrial production."
"my country's five-year plan has repeatedly reached the goal of reaching 30%, and even 50% of the ICs have never been achieved. Why?" Zhu Yiwei asked in his twenty questions. "The government has failed to consistently formulate and implement preferential policies for the IC industry. The state-owned IC enterprises generated under the planned economy are difficult to adapt to the rapid development unique to the high-risk, high investment and high competition of the IC industry." This is one of the reasons why China's IC industry has gone from "grandfathers" to "grandsons".
does not have advanced enterprise mechanisms and management concepts, blindly launching projects, wasting a lot of resources and time
From the perspective of national strategy and investment, in fact, our country has never lagged behind in the semiconductor and chip fields, and the problem lies more at the execution level.
From 1984 to 1990, local governments, state-owned enterprises and universities in China introduced wafer production lines from abroad, with a total of 33. According to the estimated US$3-6 million per plant, the total cost was about US$150 million. However, for various reasons, most of these 33 wafer production lines have no commercial value at all.
From 1988 to 1995, with policy support, China had five large-scale state-owned semiconductor companies: Jiangsu Wuxi Huajing Electronics (formerly Wuxi 742 factory merged with Yongchuan Semiconductor Research Institute), Zhejiang Shaoxing Huayue Microelectronics (China's first 4-inch wafer factory was established in 1988), Shanghai Beiling Microelectronics, Shanghai Philips Semiconductor (China's first 5-inch wafer factory was established in 1991), and Beijing Shougang NEC (China's first 6-inch wafer factory was established in 1995).
September 1990 Ministry of Electronics Industry decided to start the "908 Project", hoping to make a breakthrough in ultra-large-scale integrated circuits, with the goal of building a 6-inch 0.8~1.2 micron chip production line. The project is undertaken by Wuxi Huajing.
In 1995, the Ministry of Electronics Industry proposed to implement the "909 Project", with an investment of 10 billion yuan, undertaken by Shanghai Huahong, and cooperated with NEC, and Minister of Electronics Industry Hu Qili took charge of the leadership. Under the gaze of the public, the largest electronics industry project since the founding of the People's Republic of China was launched in 1996. The six companies involved in the
531 strategy, the 908 project, and the 909 project have almost become all the capital invested in China in the chip industry before 2000. However, their respective endings were very different.
The most tragic ending is undoubtedly Shougang NEC, which entered chip manufacturing in 1991. Benefiting from Shougang's steel business, Shougang has inherent financial advantages, so he has been proud to shout the slogan "Shougang will not be a steel in the future", cross-border chips, and established a joint venture with Japan's NEC. All the technology comes from NEC, and the factory "production of Japanese drawings".
Although the technology provided by NEC is not advanced, it was one of the top ten companies in the world in the chip field at that time. It has unique features in management and operation, and coincides with the industry's prosperity. In 1995, sales reached more than 900 million. Inspired by this, Shougang continued to work hard.
In December 2000, Shougang found an American company, AOS (Wanguo Semiconductor), and jointly established "Huaxia Semiconductor", investing 1.3 billion US dollars to make 8-inch chips, and the technology comes from AOS. However, when times come, the world is lonely, and luck heroes are not free.
The IT bubble in 2001 caused the global chip industry to fall into a trough, AOS drew its investment, Huaxia Semiconductor lost its source of technology, and soon died, and its joint venture with NEC also fell into losses. In 2004, Shougang basically withdrew from the chip industry.
After that, coupled with the impact of "Hanxin scam" and "Ark defeat", China's "chip industry" was in a mess before 2010!
The tragedy of China's chip industry is numerous. There are also many articles analyzed online. The majority of netizens should still look at some practical problems rationally.
includes Huawei ’s success today. Is it a sustainable success? Is it a replicable success? This was a very in-depth discussion many years ago.
We cannot ask every company to become the "hero" we want! What we need is rational knowledge of shame and courage!
