Hong Kong's China Review News published an editorial written by commentator Lin Shuling, saying that Taiwan's 2020 "general election" is heating up, and the Democratic Progressive Party has been non-stop promoting integration. Recently, it has successfully reached a consensus with a number of small green parties to support Tsai Ing-wen. The Chinese Kuomintang is just the opposite. Chairman Wu Dunyi publicly denounced "one China, one representation" as "evil words" at the regular meeting last week, and canceled his attendance because the new party would propose the "one country, two systems Taiwan plan" on its party anniversary. Former chairman Hong Xiuzhu asked to run for election Tainan's "legislators" were also blocked, arousing dissatisfaction among the blue army's pan-unification forces. What is the KMT Central Committee’s anti-integration strategy?
Both the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party have internal line issues. The Kuomintang is from dark blue to light blue, and the DPP is from dark green to light green. Integration before the "election" is the top priority. Even though the Democratic Progressive Party cannot suppress the formation of the "One Side One Country Action Party" and the "Happy Island Alliance", it has made the "Taiwan Independence" Alliance, Taiwan's "Basic Progressive Party", "Social Democratic Party" and others declare their support for Tsai. The "Sunflower Generation" also integrated smoothly after the leader of the "student movement" joined the Central Party Committee. As for the Blue Army, the Kuomintang has so far not only failed to integrate the unification movement, but has become dissatisfied because of the obvious exclusion and deliberate drawing of boundaries by the Party Central Committee. The case of Hong Xiuzhu's candidacy for Tainan City "legislator" is rumored to be finalized this week. If he is really blocked, it will be another storm.
What proportion of the Blue Army does the United faction have? Zhang Yazhong, a professor at the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University, analyzed to China Review News that the United Alliance, the United Promotion Party, and the New Party add up to about 3 to 5%. If the broad unification faction such as those who advocate unification are added in, the figure should be at least 20%. It is already very difficult for the "opposition" Kuomintang to fight against the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, and every vote counts. However, the Central Committee of the Kuomintang not only keeps a distance from the unionist faction, but even attacks the unionist faction's arguments, making people full of enthusiasm to challenge the difficulties for the Kuomintang. Hong Xiuzhu of the constituency was seriously injured. Hong insisted on asking Miao to run for the election, and it was clear that it depends on how the Party Central Committee handles it. If she is forced to get stuck, the Party Central Committee will be responsible, and her emotions are rising.
Hong Xiuzhu's "One China, One Taiwan" and the "One Country, Two Systems Taiwan Plan" launched by the New Party Party Day are both regarded as scourges by the Kuomintang. This can be viewed in several parts. First, can the Democratic Progressive Party advocate "Taiwan independence", but the Kuomintang cannot advocate reunification? The Kuomintang is actually more vocal than the Democratic Progressive Party, which makes some deep blue disapproval.
Second, the "redwashing" of "One China" is actually the result of the Kuomintang's long-term loss of the right to speak on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Whether it is "one China, each representation", "one China, one representation", or even "one country, two systems", it does not deviate from the so-called "one country, two systems". "Constitution of the Republic of China" is just a different way of expressing it. The key point is whether the Kuomintang can grasp the right to interpret "one China" and "one country"? The Democratic Progressive Party has always accused "one China" of "selling out Taiwan." Even if the Blue Army says that "one China, each represents one country," the Green Camp is still "red." This is the biggest dilemma of the Kuomintang. From being in power to "being in opposition", cross-strait discussions have been retreating steadily. As soon as the DPP "smeared its red", the Kuomintang itself felt red, and then kept retreating, always afraid. "One China, one representation" means "both sides of the Taiwan Straits jointly express one China." How is it different from "one China, each representation"? Why evil? The New Party is right to boldly advocate that the current situation across the Taiwan Strait is "one country, two systems". The Kuomintang dare not say this, but the more afraid it is, the more it will be red-hatted.
The current main focus of the KMT Central Committee's cross-strait discussion is to oppose "Taiwan independence," "one China, each representation," " 1992 Consensus " and oppose "one country, two systems." In addition to being far away from the "Hu Lian's Five Visions" of the KMT and the Communist Party in 2005, it is also different from the 2005 "Hu Lian's Five Visions" There are also gaps in the 2017 version of the KMT’s policy platform. The more important thing is that this will involve the basis of mutual trust between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Professor Zhao Chunshan, who was the promoter of the 2015 "Ma Xi meeting", recently published a new book "Cross-Strait Adversity" and mentioned that Su Zhicheng, Lee Teng-hui's core staff, once said to him that "cross-strait is about mutual trust, not discussion." This sentence can be used to examine Tsai Ing-wen and Ke Wenzhe's handling of cross-strait relations, and it also applies to the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.How can the relationship between the KMT and the CPC get better when voices advocating cross-Strait reunification are suppressed within the KMT?
In particular, Taipei's political circles have also discovered that there seems to be a gap between Han Kuo-yu , who will run in the 2020 election, and the cross-strait discussion of the Party Central Committee. It is rumored that the KMT Central Committee is afraid of the "flood" and the "Korean Wave" combined, and "one China, one country" "Exhibition" drags down South Korea's election, so they tend not to allow Hong Xiuzhu to be elected as a "legislator" in Tainan. However, Han Guoyu did not express opposition, and Ma Ying-jeou also publicly expressed his support for Hong's candidacy. What’s so scary about the combination of “torrent” and “Korean Wave”? It's really puzzling. Positively speaking, Hong can help the Kuomintang consolidate the votes of the deep blue and reunification factions. Regardless of whether it wins the election, it can at least inject a different political discourse into Tainan, which is extremely green. She also has a strong ability to build momentum. Secondly, if Hong Xiuzhu does not run for the election, will Hanguo Yu not be "famed"? This is too naive.
Most of the previous "general elections" of the Kuomintang were conducted by the chairman himself. The Party Central Committee and the campaign headquarters were seamlessly connected, and the candidates were at their fingertips. Not only was this not the case this time, but Han Kuo-yu was also distracted by the Kaohsiung municipal administration, and was surrounded by the party along the way. The internal and external attacks on the party have been to the point of complete destruction, and there is a strange phenomenon in which the party center is strong, the candidates are weak, and the campaign headquarters is even weaker. Including the fact that the Party Central Committee not only failed to integrate, but also suppressed the Deep Blue and United factions. Former Chairman Zhu Lilun went to Washington and told US officials that "the KMT's position has always been pro-American, and it will be so in the past, present and future." Does this mean that it means Han Guoyu’s attitude? Have they gotten along with each other? All are worth pondering.
