Song Dynasty emperor
Northern Song Dynasty The foreign war of the dynasty was a waste of time, and could not defeat the powerful Liao Dynasty , nor could it defeat the Xixia , which was separatist in the northwest. For a long time, the one that is considered to be the sign of the weakness of the Song army is , the Battle of Good Water River . The failure of this war caused Xixia to lose its constraints and truly seek independence. The matches against Xixia are Han Qi and Fan Zhongyan . They are both considered famous officials during the Song Renzong period, but the two fell into a dispute over the war against Xia, which to a certain extent led to the defeat of the Battle of Haoshuichuan. The Battle of Haoshuichuan itself was an unequal war. The Song army was less than half of the number of people in Xixia, and they lost their favorable geographical location. Internal wars and uncertainties all doomed the Song army.
1. War background—— Why did Yuanhao suddenly rebell?
Dangxiang clan where Li Yuanhao is located, has dominated the northwest since the early Northern Song Dynasty. Li Yuanhao's grandfather Li Jiqian and his father Li Deming both pursued actual separatism, but at the same time avoided stimulating the Song Dynasty. Therefore, in the name of surrendering to the Song Dynasty, he dominated the northwest and did not dare to openly compete with the Song Dynasty. By the time of Li Yuanhao, Li Yuanhao had only a land of "two thousand miles" in the eleven northwest states. His military strength and territory were too inferior to those of Song, Liao and even Tubo , but why did Li Yuanhao dare to be emperor? This has to talk about the economic crisis of the Northern Song Dynasty.
xixia
Northern Song Dynasty developed to the late period of Zhenzong and Renzong period, and the disadvantages of three redundant and two accumulations have already emerged. In 1039, Renzong cast " Emperor Song Tongbao " and gave it to "Swordsmen on the Border of Shaanxi". In the early Song Dynasty, money was made every year, and its specifications were standard, with the year number engraved on it, but only the country name was used on the copper coins of 1039, rather than the year number. " Literature Tongkao " also says that only 1039 coins have no year number, and this kind of thing has never happened since then. " Qingli will be given the year number again."
The author believes that it was around 1039 that the Song Dynasty experienced an economic crisis, because money was made in the early Song Dynasty, and at most, more than 1.8 million stags of copper coins a year during the reign of Emperor Taizong. At the beginning of Renzong, he made more than 3 million copper coins a year. The large-scale increase in copper coins reflects two problems: First, the Northern Song Dynasty trade has made great progress, so the amount of money used has increased greatly; the second copper coins may flow out or the private sector has hidden copper. As a strategic material, in history, copper has been used as a tool for civil or ethnic minorities to re-smelter the central dynasty currency. For example, the money of Ming Dynasty " Yongle Tongbao " was outflowed in large quantities. After it flowed overseas, it could make arrows and muskets projectiles. Japanese Oda Nobunaga even used the four words "yongle Tongbao" as military flag. When the amount of copper harvest cannot be increased, the increase in the amount of coins will only reduce the quality of the currency, and then an economic crisis will occur.
Japanese Warring States flag
. In the Song Dynasty, the recruitment system was adopted. The soldiers' efforts required the state to give money. The Song Dynasty sent bad money to the border army . "Wenxian Tongkao" said that after the Northern Song Dynasty's border army got new money, "the old money was not paid, the new money became lighter" and "not used abnormally." The soldiers received insufficient value for money, which hit the enthusiasm of the Song army and the border defense was unstable, which gave Yuan Hao an opportunity to take advantage of. This is also one of the reasons why the Song army was defeated in the Battle of Haoshuichuan.
2. Song Xia started a war
1038, Yuan Hao publicly proclaimed himself emperor and broke through the bottom line of the Song Dynasty. The Song Dynasty finally became tough on Xixia. Before the war began, the mentality of the monarchs and ministers of the Northern Song Dynasty was exactly the same as that of the monarchs and ministers of the Qing Dynasty. " Song History " records: Most court officials believed that " Yuan Hao is a clown, and they were immediately killed ". It is easy to deal with Yuan Hao, so it should be demonstrated with power, strictly guard the border, firmly clear the country, cut off trade with Xixia, and use economic means to stifle the Western Xia. However, the border generals believed that it was better to take the initiative than to defend, so they actively wrote a letter to attack. In this way, the central government and the border army were inconsistent with the strategy, which made the Song Dynasty unable to unify its thoughts and do its best to deal with the Western Xia. This became the second reason for the defeat of Haoshuichuan .
1040, 100,000 people in Xixia attacked Yanzhou, and the Battle of Sanchuankou broke out.This was the first large-scale battle between Emperor Renzong and Song Xia. The Song Dynasty's border troops underestimated the enemy and advanced rashly, and the starry night galloped, and the Song army was defeated. The defeat of the border army in one battle inspired the arrogance of the pro-war faction within the Song Dynasty. The Song Dynasty was determined to avenge the shame, so he ordered Han Qi to be the deputy envoy of Shaanxi to pacify and go to Shaanxi to assist in the war.
han Qi
3. Continuous disputes in strategy
After Han Qi arrived in Shaanxi in February of the first year of Kangding (1040), he advocated active attacks and planned to divide his troops into two groups to fight. Fan Zhongyan, who took office in May, believed that defense should be done at this time. Frontline command is caught in a dispute. In December, the envoy of the Southern Court of Xuanhui and the General Administration of Shaanxi Fourth Routes, and other envoys, and the Supreme Commander of the Song Dynasty's border army, who was fully responsible for the Xia War, wrote two war plans for offense and defense after compiling the opinions of Han and Fan, and sent them to Tokyo for decision-making by Renzong. Renzong tended to attack, but Xia Shu himself tended to defend, so he sent someone to lobby in Tokyo. However, the prime minister Lu Yijian tends to attack, and the deputy envoy of the Privy Council Du Yan also tends to defend. In this way, while the front line and the central government were fighting back and forth, it was the first month of the first year of Qingli (1041). In the end, Renzong decided to take an offensive. But Fan Zhongyan on the front line still wrote a letter to convey his defensive opinions. Finally, the court asked Fuyan Road under Fan Zhongyan to take active defense and could recruit Xixia at the appropriate time, and other Shaanxi three routes were preparing to attack.
fan Zhongyan
In the year-long strategic dispute over Xia, the Song Dynasty had disagreement in command of the front line, and the front line and the central government had strategic differences. The two sides who advocated offense and defense were not giving in to each other, delaying the opportunity for war. Just as the internal struggle of the Song Dynasty, the Xixia side seized the opportunity, concentrated its troops to prepare, and sent people to Jingyuan Road to seek peace, and even sent high-ranking officials to Fan Zhongyan's office in Yanzhou to discuss specific peace agreements to confuse the Song Dynasty.
In February of 1041, Xia Shu keenly noticed the ambitions of Xixia and the crisis of the Song army, so he asked Jingyuan and Fuyan to advance. Xia Shu wrote to Renzong: Due to the different attack orders and Fan Zhongyan's strategy of recruiting and recruiting, Fan Zhongyan refused to send troops, but he had to send someone to discuss with Fan Zhongyan, but Fan Zhongyan "has not willing to go out." It was under this constant dispute over front-line command that the Battle of Haoshuichuan broke out.
Xia Shuai
4. Battle of Haoshuichuan
1041, Xixia attacked Weizhou, and Han Qi sent Zhenrong Army stationed in Guyuan, Ningxia, with as the commander of Fu, and all set out to rescue Weizhou. The Western Xia set up ambush at the mouth of Haoshuichuan. The Song army was ambushed and defeated miserably. Since then, Xixia completely broke away from the constraints of the Song Dynasty. Songxia signed the "Qingli Peace Discussion", and Song recognized Xixia's independence. Regarding this battle, the key factor is the issue of military strength comparison.
"History of the Song Dynasty·Biography of Wang Gui" says: " sent five thousand soldiers to Renfu to station Haoshuichuan. After fighting for three days, all the generals were defeated. " "History of the Song Dynasty·Biography of Renfu" says that the battle of Haoshuichuan was good, and the Song army "more than 6,000 soldiers died." "History of the Song Dynasty: Biography of Xia Guo" says that the Battle of Shuichuan was good, and the number of deaths in the Song army reached 10,300. According to many historical materials, in the Battle of Haoshuichuan, the head general Ren Fu should have 18,000 soldiers, his subordinate Zhu Guan had 5,000 people and 3,000 people in , Wuying ; the reinforcements of Jingzhou governor Wang Gui , , 3,000 people, Weizhou 3,000 people, and Jingyuan Wang Zhongbao also led 10,000 people to provide assistance. The Song army's total strength should be around 43,500 people at the maximum. But because Zhu Guan ran away halfway, Wang Zhongbao did not reach the battlefield, and Ren Fu was surrounded by only a thousand middle troops. Therefore, in the Battle of Shuichuan, Ren Fu could command only about 15,000 Song troops. Under this circumstance, the number of deaths in the Song army was between 6,000 and 13,000, which was a disastrous defeat.
Song Army
Unlike the Song Army, in the Western Xia Dynasty, there were 10,000 troops that lured the Song Army and 100,000 soldiers who were ambushing it, occupying the geographical location of Haoshuichuan. Today, we will investigate the geography of Good Shuichuan. Its river valley is 30 kilometers continuously, with ravines and dense vegetation, which is suitable for hiding soldiers. Even if Yuan Hao had reserved a reserve force, his troops participated in the battle together were far more powerful than those of the Song army. Based on the above factors, no matter what, the Song army will inevitably be defeated in the Battle of Haoshuichuan.
Wenshijun said that
When Yuan Hao was the emperor, the Northern Song Dynasty and Liao Kingdom had entered a state of peace. The Song Dynasty was peaceful in the north and was able to draw a large number of troops to fight against the Western Xia. The Song Dynasty stationed no less than 200,000 troops on the Xixia border, of which 68,000 troops were stationed under the Fuyan Road, 50,000 troops on Huanqing Road, 70,000 on Jingyuan Road, and 427,000 on Qinfeng Road, but the Song Dynasty did not have the advantage in terms of military morale, strategy, or geography. This also destined the Song army to defeat Xixia. However, although Xixia has won many battles, it does not hurt the border defense of the Song Dynasty. In addition, Xixia is a minority regime with a relatively backward system. Years of war against Song have also led to instability in some ethnic relations within them. In desperation, Yuan Hao had to take advantage of the victory and ask for surrender. Fan Zhongyan, who was on the front line of the war against Xia, also saw the poverty and ills of the Song Dynasty through many battles, and then began to reform faithfully, which kicked off the Qingli New Deal.
Reference
Su Zhengxi: "Re-examination of the main battlefield ruins of the Battle of Haoshuichuan in Song and Xia", "Heilongjiang History and Records" Issue 15, 2014.
An Beijiang: "Another exploration of the issue of the Battle of Good Shuichuan in Song and Xia", Journal of Ningxia Normal University, Issue 05, 2016.
(Author: Haoran Literature and History·Ziju)
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