Zhang Hao has served as a professor of at Ohio State University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and an academician of Academia Sinica. His main research scope is the history of modern Chinese thought and the history of Chinese political thought. He is the author of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907 (1971), Chinese Intellectual in Crisis: Search for rorder and Meaning ( 1987), "Dark Consciousness and Democratic Tradition" (1989, Lian Jing), "Exploration of the Times" (2004, Lian Jing), etc. He has written many monographs in Chinese and English.
If studies the tradition of Confucian social and political thought, it is appropriate to start from the concept of managing the world. Those who manage the world "manage the world". It is the concept of managing the world that distinguishes Confucianism from other major competing ideological trends in Chinese tradition. More importantly, managing the world is also a very complex and ambiguous concept, and its multi-layered meanings penetrate into almost all key dimensions of Confucian social and political thought. This article will explore the three main meanings of the concept of managing the world in the historical context of the Confucian tradition of Song and Ming dynasties, in order to clarify some of the characteristics of this intellectual tradition for the modern world.
1. Managing the world as the Confucian ideal of vocation
At the most fundamental level, managing the world means the Confucian ideal of vocation for the social moral elite, the so-called gentleman group. Behind this ideal of vocation is a moral idealism that gives people and society Confucian characteristics. Nonetheless, while Confucianism assumes that everyone has the inherent moral potential for self-realization, this optimistic belief is also subject to a certain realism, that is, not everyone is able to undergo the necessary conditions for self-moral realization. The arduous process of self-transformation. Based on the assumption that only a few people with excellent moral qualities can rule, these gentlemen exemplify the ethics of the community and perform their duties, which embodies the ideal of vocation that governing the world is the special responsibility of the gentleman group. In the institutional environment of traditional China, this social action-oriented ideal of vocation is often translated into the concept of becoming an official or leading local society. In this way, the moral idealism and social activism implicit in the Confucian philosophy of governing the world have a special political flavor. Of course, the fundamental secular orientation in Confucianism is always at the root of the concept of managing the world. For centuries, Confucian scholars regarded this "worldly" orientation as the key to distinguishing Confucianism from competing intellectual traditions such as Buddhism, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. They are dissatisfied with Buddhism and Taoism's excessive focus on "transcendence" or "the other side", and regard it as harmful and irresponsible, and contrary to the concept of life of human ethics.
Indeed, the idea of realizing human potential in this world is at the heart of Confucian self-understanding. However, Confucianism is not just a secular humanistic tradition as some modern scholars believe, because its secular orientation is rooted in the transcendent belief centered on heaven or the way of heaven. The primary concern of Confucianism may be how to practice and present the nature of principles in this world, but this concern has a strong transcendent spiritual power. Therefore, it cannot be ignored that the transcendent characteristics of world management concepts often lead to some kind of religious tension between Confucian social and political thought and the reality of specific social and political order.
As the Confucian ideal of vocation, managing the world is especially based on the concept of self-cultivation. In short, Confucian self-cultivation is a process of self-moral transformation, which consists of three parts: original human nature, perfect human nature, and the path from the former to the latter. The most central part of this connection is the concept of Tao, which has become a consensus among different branches of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. If we focus on its mainstream, we can distinguish several components: ethics of virtue, intellectualism, ritualism, meditative practices, and asceticism. asceticism).Regardless of the relative position of other components in the Confucian concept of Tao in Song and Ming dynasties, there is no doubt that the spirit of asceticism occupies the most important position.
This ascetic spirit is clearly reflected in the aphorism about character training. Such maxims are abundant in the Confucian classics, especially the Four Books that are the core of the Confucian classics of the Song and Ming dynasties. Over the centuries, these maxims have been elaborately and systematically incorporated into various self-cultivation theories. These Gongfu theories vary in detail, but generally consist of three intrinsically related elements: first, introspection, which is to activate and maintain a single-minded and unwavering ambition toward the Confucian life goal of becoming a gentleman; second, , the practice of sincerity and hardship; finally, the practice of controlling desires and emotions. In many theories of moral work, this last element often occupies a prominent position and receives special attention. It is certain that controlling sexual desires has always been one of the main concerns of Confucianism. But Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties intensified this concern, which led to the emergence of a Manichaean self-image. The self is seen as a battlefield where two opposing forces, reason and desire, engage in an endless life-and-death struggle. It is based on this that Zeng Guofan believes that the effort to domesticate desires and emotions is an arduous struggle like "subduing the dragon and subduing the tiger". [1] As we all know, as a traditional Confucian scholar-official in the 19th century, Zeng Guofan's Gongfu Theory had a wide impact on intellectuals and political leaders of various pedigrees in modern China. The existence of Manichean self-image in the Confucian moral texts of the Song and Ming dynasties also implies that the Confucian social actions symbolized by the concept of managing the world have strong ascetic characteristics. In the process of reading the Confucian classics of the Song and Ming dynasties from this perspective, people are often shocked by the spiritual motivation of trying to completely control the inner world of the self. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that there is a corresponding drive to control external nature and society. But on the other hand, we must be wary of Weberian simplistic generalizations, which rashly regard the Confucian worldview as an adjustment to the modern world.
The presentation of the three-fold scheme of self-moral transformation also indicates another characteristic of "managing the world" as the Confucian ideal of vocation. In this ideal, responsibility to society is balanced by a self-responsibility for individual moral fulfillment. The latter is often seen as a means to achieve the former. However, in the perspective of Confucianism, self-moral perfection is also regarded as a self-sufficient goal. The more orthodox Four Books commentaries of Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties, such as Zhu Zi's commentaries, clearly demonstrate the twin goals of Confucianism: enlightening morality and new people. The two are interdependent and not any one-way derivation relationship. [2]
At the same time, the Confucian concept of self has transcendent roots. Human nature, according to Confucianism, is by no means a biological setting. There are moral and spiritual elements involved that can only be fully delineated by virtue of the sacred beyond. It is precisely because of this transcendent foundation that the individual self cannot only be implemented in specific social relationships, no matter how important this social relationship is to the cultivation and realization of the self. Because Confucianism establishes a link between the transcendent-based self and a socially based sense of responsibility, the ideal of vocation transcends the binary distinction of individualism/collectivism. In this respect, a comparison can be made with Christian individualism, as Theodore de Bary and Yu Yingshi attempted. [3] When looking at this characteristic of the concept of managing the world, we should not only focus on the relationship between Confucian symbolic resources and modernization; we should also explore whether this concept has implications for individuals and society in the post-modern and post-individualist era. The relationship between this topic and the ideological resources of the current dialogue.
2. The political orientation of managing the world as a concern of the Confucian political order
The previous article has briefly invented the political orientation of managing the world as the ideal of the Confucian gentleman's vocation.From a cross-cultural perspective, this emphasis on political orientation is particularly striking because it is rarely found in most other civilizational traditions, such as the Christian concept of vocation or the Hindu concept of worldly spiritual practice. Underlying this political orientation is a Confucian belief, which Dong Zhongshu has the clearest expression: political order is not only a bridge between transcendence and the human world, but also for the realization of the clearest nature of human beings. It is necessary. [4] As a result, the primacy of political order in the human world has become a deeply rooted Confucian concept. In the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, statecraft was one of the few interchangeable concepts that represented the basic concerns of the economic and political order.
This article does not attempt to fully grasp the concept of managing the world. The important town of Confucianism in the Northern Song Dynasty Cheng Yi once distinguished between the basic categories of "governing the body" (or "governing the way") and "governing the law", which exerted a dominant influence on Confucian political thinking in the Song and Ming dynasties. Therefore, if we can examine these two basic categories in detail, it will be beneficial to our preliminary understanding of the fundamental characteristics of the concept of political order in Song and Ming Confucianism. [5]
For Neo-Confucian orthodox thinkers such as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, "Tao Tong" consists in the moral paradigm contained in "The Great Learning". This moral paradigm is reflected in the opening chapter of "The Great Learning":
In ancient times, those who wanted to establish virtue in the world first governed their country; If you want to cultivate your body, you must first rectify your mind; if you want to rectify your mind, you must first be sincere in your intention; if you want to be sincere in your intention, you must first develop your knowledge; to achieve knowledge is to study things. After observing things, one will know, and after knowing one's thoughts, one will be sincere, one's mind will be sincere, then one's heart will be upright, one's heart will be right, then one will cultivate the body, if one cultivates one's body, then the family will be in order, if the family is in order, the country will be governed, and if the country is governed, then the world will be peaceful. From the emperor to the common people, everything is based on self-cultivation. [6]
The moral idealism of this paradigm lies in its regard of the cultivation of virtue as the foundation of statesmanship. Combined with a self-evident assumption in Confucianism that only a few people can withstand the arduous experience of moral cultivation, this moral idealism also implies the orientation of political elitism. How can such moral idealism and political elitism be reconciled with the cosmological kingship, which has always been the ideological foundation of the Confucian political order?
To respond to this question, we must pay attention to the two evolutions in the Confucian tradition of Song and Ming Dynasties that were caused by its moral idealism. One is the possibility of the "dual order" contained in moral idealism, which gives rise to the hope of breaking through the kingship of the universe. This evolution is based on the classical Confucian belief of "the unity of nature and man", because "the unity of nature and man" gives Confucian gentlemen a direct channel to become one with nature through the practice of virtue. [7] By viewing direct connection with heaven as the ultimate source of earthly authority, the Confucian gentleman potentially developed a moral-spiritual center, or, as Eric Voegelin calls it, a "spiritual order." (the order of soul), it can bridge the gap between transcendence and the mundane independent of the existing social and political order. The existing social and political order relies on the kingship of the universe, and its universal authority relies on the monopoly of heaven on the king's power. [8]
This potential became prominent with the rise of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, which tended to form the concept of dual authority through some novel historical interpretations. According to this interpretation, the three generations of , Yao, Shun, and once achieved the unity of virtue and power. However, with the end of this golden age of holy kings, the ideal order of unity sadly split into two major traditions. On the one hand, the line of moral-spiritual truth survives according to Taoism; on the other hand, the dynastic tradition continues through the conferment and acceptance of rule. Mainstream Confucian thinkers of the Song and Ming dynasties, such as Zhu Xi, repeatedly criticized the dynastic order of the three dynasties since and described it as degenerate and decadent compared to the moral and spiritual purity of the three dynasties of Yao and Shun.Therefore, the concept of the separation of Taoism and governance clearly indicates the tendency in Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties to regard the scholar group as the center of competitive significance and authority relative to the country's rulers. [9]
Although the concept of the coexistence of Taoism and governance fostered the Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties to elevate the authority of the "teacher" who was based on Confucianism and guarded Taoism, and even made it comparable to the authority of the "king", on the whole, The concept of dual authority was not stable in the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, and it did not become as big as it was. One of the main reasons for the eventual failure of this trend may be that the Confucian "Tao" represents more of a truncated than a full-scale transcendence that is easily truncated rather than a pure transcendence. As early as pre-Qin Confucianism, there was already a tendency to integrate the transcendent way with the rituals centered on the cosmic kingship and universal patriarchy. In Han Dynasty Confucianism, the cosmic mythology that existed at the core of its worldview took the form of the "Three Cardinal Guides", which made the practical nature of the Confucian "Tao" more prominent. According to this belief, cosmic kingship and universal extended lineage are not only fully integrated into Confucian ethics, but also deeply embedded in the all-encompassing cosmic order. [10]
Since the rise of New Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, perhaps influenced by Mahayana Buddhism and philosophical Taoism, its transcendent impulse based on the belief in the unity of nature and man has become stronger. At the same time, this transcendent impulse was never strong enough to negate the Three Cardinal Creeds. From this, we can realize that in Song and Ming Confucianism, a highly tense relationship developed between the transcendent impulse and the deep-rooted cosmic mythology; [11] Despite this, transcendent realization has never been completely overcome. More importantly, although the binary distinction between Taoism and governance still appears frequently in Confucian texts after the 17th century, the tension contained in it has gradually disappeared. In fact, as reflected in the writings of some orthodox Confucian thinkers in the 18th and 19th centuries, Taoism no longer points to an alternative center of meaning and authority, but has completely degenerated into an ideological support for governance. [12] As a result, the evolution of the concept of dual authority in Confucian thought of the Song and Ming dynasties that tended to break through the cosmic kingship was abandoned.
The moral idealism reflected in the Four Books also nurtures another more influential trend. Different from the aforementioned abandoned evolutionary trend, which contains tension with the universe king system, this trend regards the king system as its starting point. The result was a conception of political order based on the cultivation of an elite class surrounding the emperor's institution. The monarch's own moral transformation has therefore become the primary issue of concern for his order. During the development of this trend, Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties accumulated a very rich literature, which presented its moral idealism in the form of "mirror for the Prince". Among such documents, the most influential is a 13th-century commentary - "The Great Learning", which is dedicated to teaching monarchs and their clans the paradigm of moral cultivation in the "Great Learning". In this commentary on the Great Learning, what was originally a universal moral-spiritual classic was transformed into a moral manual for the monarch, thus losing the original critical spirit of the Great Learning. "Explanations of the Great Learning" reflects the typical way in which moral idealism in Confucian political thought of the Song and Ming dynasties was interpreted. [13]
Moral idealism not only marks the formation of the political order that Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties believed in, but also shapes the goals or goals envisioned by this political order. According to the university model, the state is not the ultimate community form of political order. This is why, at least for the mainstream of Song and Ming Confucianism, collective wealth and power were not seen as legitimate goals of the dynastic political order. Ultimately, the state is believed to be just a stage of the political order, which itself needs to be transcended in order to seek the implementation of a higher level of community. The "highest good" mentioned in "The Great Learning", a Confucian highest good, can finally be reflected in this ultimate and more outstanding community.When discussing this ultimate community, first-class thinkers such as Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming often painted a picture of a moral gemeinschaft that included all people in the world. . In this way, the political order deeply believed in by Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties also took on a certain color of utopianism. [14]
Of course, this kind of utopianism existed in the Confucian ideological tradition long before the rise of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. Since its pre-Qin origins, Confucianism has regarded the governance of the three ancient sage kings as a model of ideal order. At the same time, this utopian picture also relies on the assumption that the ideal order of the three generations can be re-realized in the evolution of later generations. Therefore, Confucian utopianism is not just indulging in the memory of the rule of Yao and Shun; it is also accompanied by expectations for the future. However, this expectation is not the desperate desire of religious believers, because what interacts with it is a pessimistic awareness of the fate of the historical process of the universe in three generations. In fact, as Thomas Metzger said, Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties had an inherent sense of embarrassment. Taking into account its frustration and disappointment stemming from historical consciousness, Confucian moral idealism adheres to a hope full of despair. [54]
The utopian picture did not give the Confucian political thought of the Song and Ming dynasties any trace of radical change. As I pointed out before, the transcendence contained in the concept of heaven in Song and Ming Confucianism was realized by the penetration of cosmic mythology. Because from the perspective of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, the realization of its transcendent ideals is often considered to be an intrinsic feature of the reappearance of the prosperous age. Therefore, transcendent realization also means that the ideal order reappearing in the future is by no means a reflection of the current institutional order. of the present). Therefore, in Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties, future-oriented utopianism was not necessarily incompatible with political conservatism.
As we have seen, a distinctive feature of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties is the priority given to moral cultivation in the process of cultivating statecraft skills. Accordingly, mainstream Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties often mentioned the primacy of an exemplary center in the evolution of political order. Orthodox thinkers from Zhu Xi to Zeng Guofan have always insisted that a social picture of honest customs can only be realized as a result of moral-spiritual influence, and this moral-spiritual influence originates from the exemplary role of the elite headed by the monarch. Personality (the exemplary character). Although the emphasis on paradigmatic centrality does not imply a lack of recognition of the importance of institutions, it does imply a preference for light government. Pre-Qin Confucianism, as explained in The Analects, already presupposes a political center of "inaction", which means that it relies more on top-down moral-spiritual transformation to cultivate political order rather than Rely on institutional pressure and manipulation. In the Western Han Dynasty, Confucian scholars eagerly demonstrated and defended this low-profile form of political governance to oppose the interventionist policies of the Salt and Iron Government proposed by the Legalist-style administrative bureaucrats. [16] This attitude, which Benjamin Schwartz called "optimum noninterference", was revived at the beginning of the rise of Song Dynasty as the common denominator of most Confucian scholar-officials at that time. The argument is to oppose the famous Wang Anshi's reform in the 11th century. The essence of the latter was to try to solve the major social and political problems that emerged at that time through strong government intervention. The failure of Wang Anshi's reform somewhat resolved this controversy. At least for the mainstream Confucian thinkers of the Song and Ming dynasties, they generally preferred the principle of small government governed by vertical arches. From then on, until China came under the impact of Western culture in the late 19th century, there was no widespread institutional change in its political center. This fact is by no means an accident of history.
Despite this, the concept of vertical governance in Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties was also accompanied by the recognition of the importance of institutional order. As Cheng Yi said, a sound governance process involves the joint consideration of the importance of both governance and law.[17] Therefore, in the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, there are two commentaries on "The Great Learning" that occupy a very central and prominent position. The 13th-century thinker Zhen Dexiu used "Extensions of the Great Learning" to clarify the moral philosophy based on the model center contained in "The Great Learning". Later, the 15th-century thinker Qiu Jun felt the need to create another annotation to elaborate on Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties. His thoughts on institutional arrangements and government functions are his " University Extensions Supplementary ". [18] In the modern Confucian ideological tradition, these two books are generally respected as complementary classics on governance and law. From the perspective of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, governing the Tao takes precedence over governing the law, and therefore receives primary attention. However, the importance of institutional order is always the intended meaning of the title, and this fact cannot be ignored.
As a typical Confucian text about the institutional facilities of political order, "The Great Learning" is almost entirely devoted to the institutional structure of a bureaucratic regime. [19] Although bureaucracy is certainly at the core of the Confucian institutional order in the Song and Ming dynasties, this is not without controversy. In fact, there is a considerable degree of contradiction within the Confucian political thought of the Song and Ming dynasties regarding the status of bureaucracy in the country. For many Confucian scholars, bureaucracy as a mechanism for meritocratic rule was undermined by the imperial examination system, which tempted scholars to pursue fame and fortune, thus eroding the moral enthusiasm that Confucian officials should possess. In addition, the bureaucracy is also considered to be a system filled with a large number of subordinate staff. Because these subordinate staff lack a suitable Confucian educational background, their behavior is often dominated by greed or other immoral motives. [20]
As for the rule of law, what is more significant is the ongoing debate in the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties about the advantages of the county system as opposed to the feudal system. Through this debate, it reflects that the majority Confucian scholars were reluctant to accept the county system, but they actually preferred the feudal system. [21] The rich thinking behind this preference for ancient feudalism is difficult to explore one by one here, but it can be determined that it is closely related to the Confucian picture of the political community as a moral and polite society. . Of course, Confucianism must have a practical character that enables it to recognize the functions of coercion and management in the process of government governance. But at the same time, Confucianism also has a fundamental tendency to regard the family as the prototype of the human community. As a result, the hierarchical and authoritative structures that Confucians regard as inherent in the political order must be integrated into an organic and cohesive nature of the family. From this point of view, it is not surprising that feudalism, which is inseparable from the patriarchal system in Chinese historical memory, has a strong attraction for the Confucian mind; at the same time, bureaucracy, its Legalist origins, and ruthless Formalism often proves to be alienating, if not hostile, to Confucian expectations of a moral, civilized society.
This expectation can explain why the Confucian institutional order also includes non-bureaucratic institutional facilities such as schools, ancestral halls, local self-government organizations, and clans. From a Confucian perspective, these "soft", non-bureaucratic institutional facilities are equally important in the evolution of political order as those "hard", bureaucratic institutions. Since these hard and soft institutional facilities together form an institutional structure, and this institutional structure is embodied in Confucian etiquette, considering etiquette will help us further clarify the concept of Confucian political order. .
According to the orthodox Confucian conception of political order in the Song and Ming dynasties, the paradigmatic center cannot exist independently of the rites that are the provisions of the Confucian normative order. It is ritual that places the emperor at the center of all things. Nevertheless, as a comprehensive normative order, ritual, as Benjamin Schwartz said, does not operate automatically. [22] It must treat others, that is, it needs a moral elite to launch and operate it. If we focus only on the rigid institutional facilities of etiquette, such as law and bureaucracy, then the preferences of big government will emerge.But if we consider the soft institutional infrastructure, we find a center that focuses on the moral-ritual influence of the monarch through a comprehensive normative order. This center does not rely on coercion, but more on influence and cooperation. From this point of view, the paradigmatic center in the Confucian sense reflects a unique political order that is difficult to describe in terms of “big” or “small” in modern Western concepts of state.
3. As a Confucian concept of governance
In the process of discussing Confucian political thought, the previous article has always emphasized its preference for moral idealism. At the same time, this preference does not obscure the realism inherent in Confucianism from the beginning. After all, the moral picture contained in the Confucian classics also supports concern for people's suffering and corresponding efforts to improve people's livelihood. It also recognizes the legitimacy of the practical needs and expediency of human life at the individual and social levels. Furthermore, in imperial China, Confucianism was not only a moral-spiritual belief but also a highly effective ideology for the ruling elite. Inevitably, a series of thoughts were formed dedicated to solving and responding to practical needs and practical matters that the country may face. In the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, the practical aspect of considering real politics in Confucianism was gradually connected with the concept of managing the world. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, works embodying this aspect of Confucianism were often compiled on a large scale in the name of managing the world. In the 19th century, Confucian scholars mentioned managing the world as the exclusive category of the new Confucian academic branch "the study of managing the world", which was dedicated to solving practical problems faced by the country and society. of. [23] It is in the sense of this exclusive category that the word "managing the world" is very close to the English "statecraft" (the art of governing the country). This article will also attempt to turn to a brief examination of this concept of governing the world as a concept of governance.
The evolutions in the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties that ultimately nurtured and gave birth to the 19th-century school of world management should be seen as a reaction against the larger background of moral idealism that dominated the orthodox concept of political order. According to orthodoxy, there is no need for a specialized discipline called statecraft, since ideas and values concerning the goals and organization of the political order can be derived directly from the moral picture of self and society, which is self-sufficient. Contained in the Confucian moral philosophy of self-realization, that is, the study of righteousness. [24] Despite this, almost from the beginning of the Confucian tradition in the Song and Ming dynasties, some Confucian scholars have avoided the above-mentioned concepts and devoted themselves to demonstrating that the idea of governance is independent at least in a relative sense. Different from the orthodox position, statecraft scholars conceive of the political order by focusing on the reality of national governance, and are less focused on the moral perfection of self and society as the ultimate goal of the political order. The focus of the merit school is neither on the prosperous age of the "Three Dynasties" nor its possible reappearance in history, but on examining the opportunities for the rise and fall of chaos contained in the actual historical evolution from Zhou to Qin.
Of course, although these Confucian scholars share this practical aspect of the idea of governing the world, their assessment of the degree of independence of the idea of governing the world is different. For some of these scholars, its independence is tentative and vague. For other scholars, it is profound and clear. Among the latter, there is even a clear tendency to try to demonstrate that this pragmatic order is a legitimate value appeal inherent in Confucianism. It can be clearly observed in the Northern Song Dynasty thinkers Li Gou, Wang Anshi , the Southern Song merit school, the " practical learning thinkers" Yan Yuan , Li Kuang , and other thinkers in the early Qing Dynasty. An active defense of the moral legitimacy of wealth and power. For them and those with similar minds, the idea of meritorious service is not inconsistent with the Confucian vision of moral community. In fact, the former is an essential component of the latter. [25]
The political realism of the statecraft school is rooted in a special ethics.In order to define this special ethics, we can use an ethics of absolute ends as the frame of reference. The latter is summed up brilliantly by Dong Zhongshu: "Justify the righteousness without seeking its benefits, and understand the way without counting the merits." [26] Of course, absolute purpose ethics only has extreme influence among Neo-Confucianists. It is worth mentioning that there is no primitive and pure utilitarianism thought in Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties that completely went to the other extreme. [27] Beyond the orthodox ethics of Neo-Confucianism, what is presented is more of a restricted absolute purpose ethics, that is, restricted by the tendency to compromise with the reality of life and the world. This trend of compromise continues to develop, and eventually develops a certain ethical orientation with social consequences. Compared with the diametrically divided ethics and the unconditional moral obligations of absolute purpose ethics, the ethical orientation of social consequences is morally contradictory and ambiguous.
The ethical orientation of social consequences still recognizes the primacy of the moral ideal pursued by absolute purpose ethics, but the recognition here is also balanced by a certain specific understanding. According to this specific understanding, just as the rule of the three generations of holy kings is difficult to reproduce in the historical situation since the Qin and Han Dynasties, Confucian moral ideals are by no means always feasible in this real world where luck has faded. Therefore, social consequential ethics involves a moral standard based on the actual consequences and social efficacy of human behavior. In a relative sense, it also treats non-moral factors such as wealth, heroism, and real-world achievements as worthy ends in life.
In the Confucian ideological tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, it is this ethical orientation of social consequences that lies behind the idea of meritorious service. The strict judgment between morality and reality that orthodox Neo-Confucianists have always emphasized has become very vague in the meritocracy school. Their rhetoric still adheres to orthodox moral discourse, and they are familiar with dichotomous categories such as "king" and "hegemony", "public" and "private", "righteousness" and "profit", and "dao" and "gong". ; But in the minds of Song Dynasty merit thinkers such as Chen Liang (1143-1194), these dichotomous categories no longer mean irreconcilable opposition. Chen Liang firmly believes that these seemingly opposing categories can be reconciled in his political philosophy based on the principle of "using both king and hegemony, and pursuing justice and benefit". [28]
The special ambiguity of social consequential ethics is strengthened by the moral metaphysics that emerged in the 15th century - gas monism. Qi monism emerged from the beginning as a heresy and reaction to the dualistic worldview that was the mainstream of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. Different from the latter, which regards reason and qi as the fundamental components of the universe, qi monism emphasizes that the root of the universe ultimately lies in qi. As a result of a monistic worldview, this orientation also opposes the orthodox view that sees moral-cosmic principles in absolute conflict with human desires. Confucian scholars of the Song and Ming dynasties who agreed with this orientation believed that moral-cosmic principles and human desires are closely integrated. Human desires are not only not absolutely evil, but can also be completely good. This view inevitably provokes realism and blurs the inherent distinction between the opposing categories emphasized by the orthodoxy of dichotomous categories mentioned above. Because of this, Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), an outstanding thinker who was influenced by Qi monism, was able to absolutely defend the way of etiquette and at the same time demonstrate that people's selfishness is not necessarily evil, and that under certain circumstances, it can be transformed into promoting Confucian public virtue. The positive power of implementation. [29]
In the process of implementing political order by the merit school, the most relevant thing to its realist political ethics is the so-called institutional approach. As mentioned earlier, the concept of political order in Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties can be roughly divided into two categories: governance, which emphasizes the moral and spiritual influence of human nature; governance, which focuses on the institutional forces that form political order. In the orthodox view, although both are necessary for the maintenance of political order, governance has clear priority over governance. For those scholars who understand the management of the world in the sense of governance, the focus of their efforts is on governance. Although they did not necessarily reject the idea of governing the Tao, they made it either fade into the background or become questionable.Over the long centuries, the institutional path contained in the idea of emphasizing the rule of law has formed a series of different assumptions about institutional arrangements. What we will do below is to try hard to see whether we can present a universal solution. describe.
When deducing their legal thoughts, merit scholars tend to regard the monarchy as a basic system. Of course, there is no shortage of anti-authoritarian statements in medical thinking. However, they are often limited to the behavior and policies of individual monarchs or bureaucrats, and rarely break through the pattern of dynastic politics, so they cannot challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy. Looking at the twists and turns of governance thought in the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, Huang Zongxi may be the only exception. His thinking on the institutional arrangement of political order has made a breakthrough in denying imperial power as an institution. [30]
If the meritorious school of thought lacks innovation here, it is at least worth mentioning that some of its thinkers have rejected the common tendency in the Confucian tradition to demonstrate the origin and authority of imperial power through the order of the universe. Practical thinkers such as Ye Shi (1150-1223) of the Southern Song Dynasty, Gu Yanwu and Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) of the late Ming Dynasty, all consciously followed Xunzi (298-238 BC) and Liu Zongyuan (773-819) and tried to use "secularity" to explain the rise and legitimacy of monarchy in a functional and functional way. In their view, the emergence of monarchy is mainly due to the practical needs of social integration of human groups, and the so-called destiny comes secondarily. [31] This kind of thinking at least provides the flexibility of thought that the cosmic monarchy cannot allow. If some thinkers, such as Gu Yanwu, can examine the legitimacy of monarchy from the perspective of the need for self-integration of social groups, then at least it is possible for others to challenge the dysfunctional monarchy on the same grounds, as in Huang Zongxi's thought as indicated.
As for the thoughts of merit scholars on the institutional order based on monarchy, I can only provide some preliminary observations here. What is clear is that bureaucracy is at the center of its concerns. But their recognition of bureaucracy was always plagued by recurring doubts that lasted until the seventeenth century. This doubt can be properly explained only by taking into account the general background of the aforementioned debate between feudalism and the county system. It should be noted that merit scholars did not entirely support the county system in this debate. Naturally, they did not share the moral enthusiasm that orthodox Neo-Confucianists had for "feudal utopia." However, within their scope, this debate still involves a practical issue that they are very concerned about, that is, the issue of centralization and decentralization.
Based on this concern, merit scholars have made efforts to reconcile the two, and thus formed the concept of a "mixed system" of government. Judging from the background of the times, this concept was in response to the political trend of excessive centralization in the Song and Ming dynasties. Proponents of hybrid systems argue that concentrating power at the center exposes the political order to two major threats. First, it will inevitably lead to insufficient local military strength, thereby weakening its ability to resist external invasion. And more importantly, centralization of power can easily breed authoritarianism. The best way to contain these two threats is to combine centralized bureaucracy with some decentralized system similar to feudalism. [32]
The concept of this mixed system was first proposed by meritorious scholars of the Southern Song Dynasty represented by Chen Liang and Ye Shi. [33] However, it has a stronger historical echo in the political thought of the 17th century. For example, Huang Zongxi once suggested drawing on the historical experience of the late Tang Dynasty to establish a vassal and town system in the form of a "general governorship" along the border areas. [34] Gu Yanwu even went further. He argued that local chief executives should be given autonomy and hereditary rights, so that they could perform functions similar to feudal princes to a certain extent. This is the essence of Gu Yanwu's so-called principle of "embedding feudalism in counties and counties". [35]
The concept of hybrid system is also reflected in the idea of trying to use large-scale clan organizations to supplement the bureaucracy.Of course, regarding clan as one of the foundations of social and political order is a very ancient Chinese concept, and this concept has also been integrated into the Chinese concept of feudalism. In China, the connotation of feudalism was established based on the most mature feudal practice in the Western Zhou Dynasty, and the patriarchal system was structurally integrated into the feudal system of the Zhou Dynasty. Therefore, from very early on, patriarchalism and feudalism have become more or less the same ideal, and together they symbolize an ideal society with order and moral unity. Of course, in the political tradition, the ideal of patriarchal rule is not as prominent as its position in the orthodox concept of political order in Neo-Confucianism. But it is still very dynamic and is reflected in the political thoughts of famous figures such as Fan Zhongyan (989-1052), Gu Yanwu, Gong Zizhen (1792-1841), Feng Guifen (1809-1874) and Chen Qiu (1851-1903). . [36] According to the views of these scholars, the patriarchal system can be used as a tool of social control and combined with bureaucratic organizations to jointly achieve social order and stability. Nonetheless, for Gu Yanwu, the patriarchal system could serve a more important function: he viewed it as a social organization that could integrate scholar-bureaucrats into one body. As Gu Yanwu said, its purpose was to "embed feudalism among the scholar-bureaucrats", that is, to cultivate the collective consciousness of the scholar-bureaucrats as a group and make them a social force that balances the centralization of monarchical power. [37]
The trend on which the hybrid system concept of the meritocracy scholars ultimately relies is shared with Neo-Confucianism orthodoxy. This is one of the many ways in which they all believe that bureaucracy is merely an economic and political order. Therefore, bureaucracy must be combined with institutional facilities other than bureaucracy. After the 17th century, early merit scholars' strong interest in mixed systems may have gradually waned among later generations, but the concept that bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic institutional facilities complement each other to nurture and cultivate political order continued until the 19th century. century, the most obvious manifestation is the various efforts during this period to combine bureaucracy with clan organizations or local self-government organizations such as "township covenants" to promote peace and stability. In this regard, there is no huge difference between meritorious scholars and Neo-Confucianism orthodoxy. The only difference is that compared to the latter, the former's plan is slightly less moralistic and more realistically oriented.
Although the above-mentioned thinking about hybrid systems and institutional facilities other than bureaucracy was at the center of its ideological focus at certain stages in the evolution of the meritorious school of thought, these considerations are important in terms of the overall concerns of the meritorious school. Sex should not be overestimated either. Overall, from a long-term perspective, the institutional structure and the operation of the bureaucracy are still the primary concerns of merit scholars. This was especially true in the final stages of the evolution of medical thought after the seventeenth century. The collection of literature on governance that emerged from the Ming to the Qing dynasties marks the evolution of a long and growing interest in bureaucratic organizations. The "Huang Ming Jing Shi Wen Bian" compiled in the late 16th century was cataloged according to the author of the article. However, when the "Huang Qing Jing Shi Wen Bian" was compiled, its style was systematically arranged according to the division of labor among the six central departments. If this change has any meaning, it can only be said that the institutional considerations of meritologists are increasingly taking the form of bureaucracy. [38]
Over the course of centuries, the healing tradition as a whole has rarely shown a general tendency toward change within the framework of a bureaucracy. Indeed, Confucianism in the early stages of the Song and Ming dynasties had a strong impulse to attempt to reconstruct the bureaucracy on a large scale, which was clearly reflected in the reform plans of Fan Zhongyan and Wang Anshi, the pioneers of the meritorious school. However, this reform impulse almost completely faded in later generations. Bao Shichen in the early nineteenth century was perhaps the only figure since the early stages of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties who still envisioned widespread changes in bureaucracy. [39] A more typical political vision is reflected in the "Huang Qing Jing Shi Wen Bian", which generally contains the orientation of fine-tuning the bureaucratic organization.In response to this political vision, the concept of sporadic reforms emerged in the Ming and Qing dynasties, which was reflected in political practices such as the famous one-whip tax law reform and extensive technical changes related to salt administration and public works matters.
Such piecemeal reforms are often not guided by long-term political goals such as the pursuit of a rich country and a strong military or a universal moral community. Rather, it shows a short-term goal-oriented thinking pattern, characterized by: (1) a clear understanding of a limited technical or organizational problem that a bureaucratic country may face; (2) based on the relevant Empirical investigation of the problem and estimating its costs and benefits. Such organizational considerations are very different from those under the hybrid system concept. The latter is often accompanied by varying degrees of clear or vague critical awareness of the existing bureaucratic order; at the same time, the former, which is oriented toward fine-tuning within the bureaucracy, usually lacks this critical vision. Compared with the former which is driven by a considerable degree of instrumental rationality, the latter presents the characteristics of a perspective that considers national security and public solidarity. Nonetheless, both have a place in the institutional considerations of the merit school, and this should always be kept in mind.
The previous article has conducted a comprehensive exploration of the concepts and values contained in the three-layered meaning of the traditional Confucian philosophy of Song and Ming dynasties. These concepts and values provide a basis for evaluating the social and political ideological legacy of Song and Ming Confucianism from various perspectives. A comprehensive assessment is beyond the scope of this article. As a final summary, this article simply attempts to provide some thoughts from a modernization perspective.
As mentioned above, the Confucian ideal of destiny shows a considerable degree of inner-worldly asceticism. Inevitably, a Weberian question arises here: What tensions does this ideal of calling create? It is not easy to answer this question. On the one hand, as pointed out above, this ascetic spirit is already presupposed in the Confucian concept of self-realization, which creates tension in the endless struggle for self-conquest of the inner world. On the other hand, the Confucian worldview does not show the drive to conquer the external world of nature and society. The tension of this orientation is first limited by the special moral idealism contained in the core Confucian concept of "benevolence". In the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties, this is the so-called world view of "the unity of nature and man". This forms a vision that values the harmony of the universe and society, and accordingly alleviates people's external tension when facing nature and society. In other words, the endless drive to purify one's inner world in the Confucian concept of self-realization has not been translated into its perspective in dealing with natural and social affairs.
Furthermore, the concept of managing the world involves the tendency to limit Confucian life concepts and career pursuits in a narrow sense. As has been demonstrated above, the political orientation emphasized by the Confucian ideal of vocation means that its activist tendency towards this world is limited to the social and political field. The fact that the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming dynasties institutionally endured the imperial examination system further narrowed the political orientation of the Confucian ideal of vocation, limiting it to the level of providing bureaucratic political services to the government system and local society. The non-bureaucratic realm of society and the non-political aspects of life tend to be insulated from this world-oriented activist orientation of the worldly philosophy.
Then, from the motivating resources of the Confucian ideal of vocation, what we can see is a spirit of worldly asceticism that is inherently limited by other factors in the Confucian legacy. This limitation is both ideological and institutional. In modern China, what the legacy of Confucianism encounters is that with the influx of Western influence, the role of these restrictive factors is weakened, and then this ascetic spirit of worldliness is released and directed to other areas of social life. among. From this perspective, we can accurately observe the significance of Confucian recipes for character discipline in a series of social and political action trends in modern China.
The ideological legacy of the philosophy of managing the world should also be evaluated from the level of institutional resources. Confucianism and bureaucracy have had a long-standing symbiotic relationship. But over the long centuries, it has not evolved the ideological impetus that would enable bureaucratic organizations to be universally rationalized. Confucianism exhibits a restricted instrumental rationality in this regard, which is reflected in the drive for sporadic reforms that occur from time to time. The underlying problem lies in the relative lack of vision for a development state. I deliberately use the modifier "relatively" here. From the perspective of the meritocracy school, which regards enriching the country and strengthening the military as a legitimate national goal, we can already see some potential to form a vision of development trends. But this potential is not strong enough to overcome the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy's contempt for this vision based on the ideal of moral community. Therefore, under the dominant influence of orthodox moral goals, the ideal of a rich country and a strong military remained largely on the fringes of Confucian political thought. However, under the modern historical circumstances, as the dominance of orthodox goals has been weakened by the impact of Western influence, the originally marginal concept of a rich country and a strong military has suddenly become the center of ideological focus. More importantly, this concept has become the main intermediary for the digestion of many novel institutional concepts from the West. And these novel institutional concepts, such as nation-states and democratic systems, will become extremely influential in China in the twentieth century. Here we can also observe another explanation of the important role played by the ideological legacy of the concept of world management in modern China: it can also be obtained through the transformation of the internal balance of Confucian heritage, and the two are equally divided.
This article has previously argued that the ideological legacy of Confucian world management concepts does not only involve some kind of motivation for organizational innovation within the framework of a bureaucratic state. It also includes a picture of the institutional order of a non-bureaucratic state, which can be presented as orthodoxy. The feudal utopia of the school or the hybrid system of the merit school. Naturally, it is easy to doubt the transformative potential of these alternative visions of order. After all, they are largely rooted in the ancient institutional model of cosmic kingship and patriarchal-based feudalism, and for the goals of modernity, These can be said to be useless. But at the same time, we cannot ignore the possibility of other institutional images behind the concepts of these alternative orders. Here, it refers not only to the dualistic order concept of Song and Ming Confucianism, which allowed the tradition of moral-spiritual principles to compete with the tradition of real state power; it also refers to the hybrid system concept of the meritorious school, which tried to establish a new system in the bureaucracy. Make adjustments to the decentralization of power internally. In both cases, one can detect the Confucian scholars’ pursuit of organizational autonomy independent of the governing authority of the state. Of course, within the perspective of the Confucian political order of the Song and Ming dynasties, compared with the centrality of institutional models such as the cosmic kingship and the feudal system based on patriarchal law, the above ideas are only auxiliary and their importance is often hidden.
At the same time, as we can see, these two divergent but coexisting ideological clues in the Confucian political thought of the Song and Ming dynasties produced modern ideological transformation from different angles. The Chinese encountered Western liberal modernity that had disenchanted the cosmic monarchy and feudal patriarchal system. At the same time, this historical situation also made modern Chinese intellectuals more sensitive to the long-lost phenomenon of dualistic order and scholar-bureaucrats’ pursuit of organizational autonomy that had long been lost in Confucian heritage. In turn, the modern recovery of this line of thought has also shaped Chinese intellectuals’ understanding and acceptance of Western liberal ideas. This was shared by radical intellectuals like Fei Xiaotong and cultural conservatives like Xiong Shili (1885-1968), Liang Shuming (1893-1988), Mou Zongsan (1909-1995) and Xu Fuguan (1903-1982). This is especially true in the extraordinary moral enthusiasm for democratic ideals. Here again, we can see the subtle ways in which the internal transformation of the balance of Confucian heritage drives China's modern transformation.
Now, with the help of the perspective of modernization, we can see more clearly that the Confucian social and political thought of Song and Ming Dynasties, which was formed around the concept of managing the world, left behind mixed resources including adaptive and non-adaptive concepts and values. . To this day, our understanding of the traditional Confucian picture is still dominated by the non-adaptive factors that fueled the disastrous process of China's modernization. What is needed now is actually a more complex and subtle picture that allows us to recognize the important role played by adaptive factors as the result of the internal transformation of the Confucian tradition in promoting and shaping China's modern transformation process. In-depth exploration along this line of thinking will help us gain a more balanced and prudent vision of both Confucian tradition and modern transformation.
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Note:
[1] Zeng Guofan, "Zeng Disheng's Self-Education" (Chongqing: Commercial Press Library, 1943), pp. 1~2.
[2] Benjamin Schwartz, "Several Poles in Confucian Thought", cited in [US] Nimison and Wright, eds.: The Practice of Confucian Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 54~ 58 pages.
[3] See [US] DeBary, "Learning for Oneself: On the Individual in Confucian Thought of the Song and Ming Dynasties" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 4, 8, 23, 95, 182. Yu Yingshi, "The Modern Significance of Chinese Culture from the Value System" (Taipei: Times Culture Publishing Co., Ltd., 1984), p. 5.
[4] Xiao Gongquan, "History of Chinese Political Thought" (Taipei: Chinese Cultural Publishing Commission, 1961), pp. 297~298.
[5] [Qing Dynasty] Zhang Boxing, "Jin Si Lu Collection" (Taipei: World Publishing House, 1967), Volume 8, page 236.
[6] "New Translation of Four Books" (Taipei: Sanmin Book Company, 1957), page 1.
[7] Zhang Hao, "Classical Confucianism and the Breakthrough of the Axial Age", quoted from [US] Cohen and Goldman, editors: "Ideas Across Cultures: Essays on Chinese Thought Dedicated to Mr. Schwartz" (Massachusetts) Cambridge: Council for East Asian Studies of Harvard University, 1990), pp. 17-18.
[8] Same as above. Regarding Voegelin’s concept of “order of the mind,” see [US] Eric Voegelin, The New Political Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 52~106.
[9] Zhang Hao, "Transcendence Consciousness and Dark Consciousness", collected in "Dark Consciousness and Democratic Tradition" edited by Zhang Hao (Taipei: Lianjing Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 54~55.
[10] Zhang Hao, "Confucian cosmic mythology and the transcendent spirit of Song and Ming Confucianism", quoted from [US] Smith and Guo, editors: Cosmology, Ontology, and Human Efficacy (Honununu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 11~33.
[11] Same as above.
[12] Zhang Hao, "Transcendent Consciousness and Dark Consciousness", pp. 35~56.
[13] [Song Dynasty] Zhen Dexiu, "The Complete Works of Zhen Wen Zhong Gong" (Taipei: Wenyou Bookstore, 1968), Preface, 2b-3a. Also see [US] DeBary, "Taoism and New Learning" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 79~83.
[14] "University", quoted from "New Translation of Four Books", page 1.
[15] [US] Mo Ziqi, "Getting Out of Dilemma: New Confucianism and the Evolution of Chinese Political Culture" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 49~166.
[16] For a more detailed description of this debate, see Tao Xisheng, "History of Chinese Political Thought" (Taipei: Sichuan Min Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 159~171.
[17] [Qing Dynasty] Zhang Boxing, "Jin Si Lu Ji Jie", Volume 8, page 236.
[18] [Ming Dynasty] Qiu Jun, "The Supplementary Notes of the Great Learning", cited from [Qing Dynasty] Chen Hongmou: "The Supplementary Notes of the Great Learning", source description and general catalog. Also see Zhu Honglin, "Qiu Jun (1421-1495) and the Supplement to Daxue Yanyi: China's Thoughts on Management of the World in the Fifteenth Century" (Ann Arbor: Universities International (UMI), 1990), pp. 1-284.
[19] Same as above.
[20] In traditional China, the word "Li", which refers to low-level bureaucrats, is often confused with its two homophones - "Li" and "利". This fact also implies a very low evaluation of lower-level bureaucrats, because lower-level bureaucrats are seen as always acting in a mean and greedy manner as a priority.
[21] For an overview of this debate, see Yang Liansheng, "Local Administration in the Ming Dynasty", quoted from [US] He Kai, editor-in-chief: "Chinese Government in the Ming Dynasty" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 1~10 Page.
[22] [US] Schwartz, "Several Pole in Confucian Thought", pp. 54~58.
[23] Qian Mu, "China's Academic History in the Past Three Hundred Years" (Taiwan: The Commercial Press, 1964), pp. 317,628.
[24] This is the underlying assumption for both Cheng, Zhu and King Lu. This can be seen from the commentaries of the two schools on the Four Books.
[25] Xiao Gongquan, "History of Chinese Political Thought", pp. 449~469; also see Yang Peizhi, "Yan Xizhai and Li Shugu" (Wuhan: Hubei People's Publishing House, 1956), pp. 63~91.
[26] Zhou Fucheng: "On Dong Zhongshu's Thoughts" (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1962), page 28.
[] These 27 extreme utilitarianisms only appear in Legalist thought, and the Legalist school is generally criticized by all Confucian scholars.
[28] Xiao Gongquan, "History of Chinese Political Thought", pp. 449~469.
[29] Hou Wailu, "General History of Chinese Thought" (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1958), Volume 5, pp. 240~241.
[30] [Ming Dynasty] Huang Zongxi, "Records of Visits to the Ming Yi" (Shanghai: Zhonghua Book Company, 1957), page 2. Also see Gao Zhun, "Research on Huanglizhou's Political Thought" (Taipei: Dahan Publishing House, 1967), pp. 52~85; [US] DeBary, "Chinese Despotism and Confucian Ideals: A Seventeenth-Century Perspective", Quoted from [US] Fairbank, editor: "Chinese Thought and Institutions" (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 163~203; and [US] DeBary, "Ming Dynasty Scholarship and Huang Zongxi's Free Thought", In "China's Liberal Tradition" (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983), pp. 67~90.
[31] Xiao Gongquan, "History of Chinese Political Thought", pages 101~120, 408~409, 466~467, 611~617. For Huang Zongxi’s own thoughts on this, please see [Ming Dynasty] Huang Zongxi, "Ming Yi Waiting for Visits", page 5.
[32] Xiao Gongquan, "History of Chinese Political Thought", pp. 461~481.
[33] Same as above.
[34] Gao Zhun, "Research on Huanglizhou's Political Thought", pp. 83~86.
[35] Lin Cong, "Summary of Tinglin's Thoughts" (Taipei: Lotte Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 109~111.
[36] Xiao Gongquan, "History of Chinese Political Thought", page 615; [Qing Dynasty] Gong Zizhen, "Nongzong", quoted from "Selected Materials on the History of Chinese Philosophy: Modern Part" (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1959), 1 :13-22; [Qing Dynasty] Feng Guifen, "Protests in Xiaobinlu" (Taipei: Wenhai Publishing House, 1967), pp. 111~117; and [Qing Dynasty] Chen Qiu, "Zhi Ping Tong Yi" (Place of publication unknown, 1893) ), pages 1a~4a.
[37] Xiao Gongquan, "History of Chinese Political Thought", page 615.
[38] Zhang Hao, "An Interpretation of Confucian Thought on Managing the World since the Song and Ming Dynasties", quoted from "Proceedings of the Seminar on Modern Chinese Thought on Managing the World" (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1984), pp. 16~19 Page.
[39] For the blueprint for general institutional reform of bureaucracy envisioned by Bao Shichen, see [Qing Dynasty] Bao Shichen, "Shuo Chu" (Shanghai, 1906).
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