After the founding of the People's Republic of China, some personnel from the local authorities in Tibet, with the support of foreign imperialism, refused to negotiate with the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army on the peaceful liberation of Tibet, attempti

marched into Tibet

After the founding of the People's Republic of China, some personnel from the local authorities in Tibet, with the support of foreign imperialism, refused to negotiate with the Communist Party of China and the People's Liberation Army on the peaceful liberation of Tibet in , in an attempt to fight against our People's Liberation Army in order to bring Tibet back to the embrace of the motherland. In accordance with the instructions of Jinyang and the Central Military Commission, our Southwest Military Region formed a Westward Advance Corps with the 18th Army as the main force shortly after the end of the Southwest Battle, and prepared to march into Tibet with the cooperation of some troops in the Northwest Military Region.

In order to successfully complete the arduous task of entering Tibet and guarding the border, the military region paid great attention to solving the support for personnel, equipment, transportation and material supply of the 18th Army. Commander He Long has listened to and studied logistics supply work many times, and repeatedly explained that the troops entering Tibet should be given the best equipment and the best mules and horses. What the troops entering Tibet need, and what they can do must meet their requirements. As early as the Second Field Army Chief Liu and Deng issued the "Instructions on Mobilizing the Whole Army to Support the 18th Army in Tibet", it said that our 18th Army is now receiving the glorious mission of occupying Tibet. We decided to mobilize all possible forces of the entire field army to support the army in all aspects of equipment and transportation. Therefore, it was decided that each army would draw excellent horses, organize a transport force of one thousand horses, and equip a unit, breeders and saddles.

and instructed each of the 10th, 11th and 12th armies to draw 3,000 (total 9,000) of strong soldiers from provinces outside Sichuan Province to the 18th Army from the Liberation Warriors... In this instruction, it was also decided to draw twelve Type 92 infantry artillery, 700 carbines, 400 Tom-style submachine guns, and a base of ammunition to the 18th Army. At the same time, in order to implement the support for Tibet, the Southwest Military Region also decided to establish a Tibet Support Command, appointing the deputy commander of the 18th Army, Chang Binggui as the commander, and Lu Nanqiao, deputy director of the Logistics and Practice Department of the Second Field Army, was responsible for supporting Tibet work as the political commissar. The Western Sichuan Military Region also dispatched some troops to enrich the reduction of personnel in the 18th Army due to bandit suppression operations.

and from the cars seized in Chengdu, four or five hundred were selected to form the car transport force , and a large amount of gasoline, alcohol and other fuel were collected for use by the troops entering Tibet. Because the leaders attach importance to multi-party support, the troops entering Tibet have sufficient and strong personnel, excellent weapons and equipment, and other supplies are also provided. After emergency repairs and new developments, the road can basically ensure the transportation needs of cars or mules and horses. This puts the policy of "supply more than combat" into practice, which better ensures that the troops entering Tibet launch the Chamdo Battle and march towards Lhasa in a timely manner.

In accordance with the instructions of the Party Central Committee, the Party Committee of the Southwest Military Region proposed the policy of entering Tibet based on the possible problems and actual situations encountered in entering Tibet: "Politics is more important than military" and "supply is more important than combat". The troops who were responsible for the mission to march into Tibet, while carrying out material and road preparations, seized the time to provide ideological education and political mobilization for commanders and fighters. In response to some bad thoughts and emotions in the army at that time, we actively carried out education on the situation and tasks. Through the evaluation, complaints and oath meeting, we inspire the class awareness and fighting enthusiasm of the vast number of commanders and fighters, consciously respond to the call of the Party Central Committee, and bravely march towards Tibet to complete the glorious task of liberating the last piece of territory in the southwestern part of mainland China.

In order to timely grasp the ideological trends of the troops entering Tibet and do a good job in ideological mobilization, the Political Department of the Southwest Military Region sent a working group to the 18th Army to help with the work. In March 1951, with the cooperation and support of brother troops, they began to march towards Tibet. After more than 20 battles of all sizes along the way, they reached the periphery of , Chamdo , but the enemy still occupied Chamdo. From October 6th to 24th, our army launched the Battle of Chamdo and captured Chamdo in one fell swoop. Annihilate the enemy's Chamdo Border Command, the six generations (equivalent to the regiment) including the Third, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Zhenbla, and one of the other three generations. The ninth generation of the original uprising had a total of more than 6,000 people.The victory of the Battle of Chamdo allowed our army to control the political, economic and transportation centers in eastern Tibet, gave Tibet a serious blow and deterrent, promoted the internal wavering and differentiation of the Tibetan ruling group, and created good conditions for the peaceful liberation of Tibet in the future. The local authorities in Tibet saw that Chamdo was lost and our army was unstoppable to enter Tibet, so they sent representatives to Beijing for negotiations in April 1951.

May 22. The Central People's Government and representatives of the Tibet local government signed the "Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" in Beijing. According to the agreement, several troops that we marched into Tibet, set out from Xikang , Yunnan, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and advanced towards Lhasa and other places in July and August. Our troops entering Tibet defeated the important difficulties of ice and snow, difficult roads, insufficient material supply and lack of oxygen in the mountains during the march. In December of that year, he arrived in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet and other regions, and finally completed the arduous task of peacefully liberating Tibet.

After the Battle of Chamdo, I went to Chamdo to learn about the situation of the troops entering Tibet, inspected and guided the work. The self-sacrifice spirit of overcoming all difficulties and obstacles and moving forward bravely and heroic deeds of the commanders and fighters in the Tibet army deeply moved me.