suicide drone cooperates with high-precision missiles to play saturation attack !
From October 10 to 12, Russia carried out more than three-day rounds of intensive air strikes on Ukraine's deep civil infrastructure, causing major casualties in Ukraine. In addition to the caliber, KH101 cruise missile , and Iskander missile , Russia's air strike has added dozens of Shahed-136 suicide drones. The high-precision missiles, combined with dense suicide drones, directly penetrate Ukraine's fragile air defense system. Ukrainian air defense system lost all its attention and could only watch the missile and suicide drone, succeeding again and again, paralyzing Ukrainian infrastructure, causing more than 30 casualties in Ukraine.
It is reported that Iran's Shahed-136 suicide drone warhead weighs up to 50 kilograms, has a range of 2,500 kilometers, and a maximum flight speed of 185 kilometers per hour. It is a small cruise missile with low cost. It is economical to launch attacks on Ukrainian deep targets, which can attract Ukrainian air defense firepower and create attack windows for high-precision missiles. It can also use its own charge to cause considerable damage to Ukrainian deep targets. Putin did not wait for Erdogan in vain, nor did he go to Iran in vain, and he did bring back a big killer from Iran to the Russian army. How to objectively evaluate the performance of Iranian drones To be honest, Iranian drones entered the Ukrainian battlefield, which has indeed helped the Russian army achieve some results and even gained certain advantages in some areas. However, the real combat effectiveness of Iranian drones is not as terrifying as the outside world boasted. Iran's suicide drone has indeed achieved remarkable results, but the performance of the slightly higher-level detection and attack integrated drone is not outstanding. It can even be said that it is very bad, and I was captured as soon as I went to the battlefield. This is also normal! Under European and American sanctions, Iran can only manufacture drones by purchasing second-hand chips. Suicidal drones are disposable drones, without considering take-off and landing mechanisms, high-performance photoelectric probes, and chips can also be used very rubbishly. The technology is low and the manufacturing is simple. Iran's Shahed-136 suicide drone can naturally be produced in large quantities. Relying on large charges and huge output, the Shahed-136 suicide drone carried out saturation attacks on Ukraine and achieved certain results. However, the accuracy of the Shahed-136 suicide unmanned mechanism is indeed average, and it is not small to the world-class level. As for more advanced detection and attacking drones, Iran's own production is very limited, and Russia has not bought too many this time. Moreover, the "Mohajer-6" type reconnaissance and attack integrated drone requires remote communication support, and there are also bugs in the software system. With the help of the United States, it is very likely that Ukraine has cracked its secrets, and it may be easy to capture it. After all, even American drones have precedents of being captured. After actual combat in Ukraine, the real combat power of Iranian drones has been very clear, and there is still a big gap with the world's advanced level. Under the full blockade of the United States, it is indeed very impressive that Iran can bring the drone industry to its current level by relying on the second-hand chips and optoelectronic equipment purchased through various channels.
