[Text/Jennifer Kavanaghi Translated/Observer Network by Guanqun]
In the recently released " National Security Strategy Report ", "openness" is a prominent slogan. In this report, the White House calls for the establishment of an "open international order" that guarantees "fair and open trade and international economic systems," "free and open next-generation digital infrastructure," and unrestricted access to the global public domain.
In practice, however, many of the Biden administration’s key initiatives are doing just the opposite—they are establishing a controlled world that limits foreign access to U.S. security, economics, and technology. Export controls , investment screening, and the weaponization of the dollar have all helped to create the controllable economic and technological networks that have become a key feature of President Joe Biden's foreign policy. The government also vigorously creates controllable security alliances such as the "Trilateral Security Alliance of the United States, Britain, and Australia" and the "Quad". These security partnerships provide information, resources, and decision-making capabilities to certain partners, but exclude other countries.
The Biden Administration discusses the National Security Strategy Report
There are good reasons for moving firmly towards a controllable world: Facing the increasingly obvious trend of multipolarity, a controllable world is more in line with the interests of the United States.
In fact, treating the "open international order" as the core foreign policy of the United States may ultimately be self-defeating. First, it would undermine U.S. credibility and make allies and potential partners suspicious of the United States. More importantly, it will divert the attention of policymakers from how the world order is changing, thereby hindering the United States from taking coordinated strategic actions to shape a future controllable world that is in line with U.S. interests.
Saying and Doing
Building an open international order has been a core U.S. foreign policy since at least the end of World War II . The rationale is that open markets and capital flows can bring economic benefits, and countries will become safer in a world not divided by spheres of influence. However, under current conditions, insisting on an open order may damage the long-term competitiveness of the United States.
First of all, the open order has advantages and disadvantages, and as international competition intensifies, the disadvantages are becoming more and more serious. Despite these gains in efficiency, globalized trade networks are easily disrupted and lead to unequal dependencies between countries. In today's world, this asymmetric interdependence raises security, economic and technological issues. Reflecting a growing awareness of the risks inherent in open networks, countries and companies are beginning to establish controlled supply chains of advanced technologies and critical minerals within their regions or “friends.”
Secondly, if an open order is to bring economic and security benefits, countries need to commit to abiding by the same set of rules. However, in the face of worsening international competition, this commitment has been rapidly eroded. Once individual countries begin to build their own controllable networks, other countries that adhere to the open order will be under greater pressure - intellectual property theft, economic exploitation and military aggression.
The transition to a controlled world has already occurred, putting those countries that still insist on open trade and secure networks at a competitive disadvantage. Global economic markets are increasingly being replaced by regional trade agreements . The economic access standards of EU are becoming increasingly strict and cover areas such as data processing and storage. Controllable regional economic groups are blooming everywhere, including Asia's " Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement " (RCEP) and the proposed " African Continental Free Trade Area". In the information space, South Korea and India are establishing controllable digital governance systems. U.S. competitors are also moving toward controlled partnership systems.
A controlled but not closed world order
Controlled networks with barriers or costs to entry and exit are becoming more common because in today's competitive world, controlled networks are better than open networks in creating and leveraging long-term competitive advantages. In a multipolar international system, control capabilities (the ability to manage access to and from the network and formulate rules within the network) have become an important source of power.Having the ability to control enables a country to protect and expand its economic, military, and technological resources and advantages, and to accumulate and direct cyber power to achieve its important goals. Because partners may share commitments, standards, and interests, controlled networks are more efficient than open networks and may also be more cohesive, resilient, and patient.
However, a controllable world is not a closed world. A controlled world need not consist of exclusive economic or security blocs. This distinction is very important. Controllable networks have barriers or costs to entry, but these networks are not exclusively closed and their members can move among multiple networks. Participation in controlled networks like the US-UK-Australia Trilateral Security Alliance and the Quad does not prevent its members from engaging with China or Russia on other security issues (albeit with some restrictions). In contrast, U.S. semiconductor export controls establish strict borders that appear to be designed to create a completely closed network, forcing potential partners to choose between the United States and China. Controllable networks can build and exploit valuable cyber power, but closed networks can alienate partners, limit U.S. influence, and lead to escalation of conflict.
The new order in the Indo-Pacific gives us a glimpse of what a closed world might look like. The region is layered with networks between states, militaries, government agencies and companies. Some networks are led by China, some by the United States, and still others by the Pan-Asian Alliance. Many networks have entry and exit requirements (standards, commitments, and costs), but most countries in the region participate in all three networks, and the main issues in these networks are often similar. For example, many RCEP member states are also members of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, and "mini-bilateral relations" (which focus on economic issues and do not involve China and the United States). Cross-cutting networks of influence and power, rather than blocs clearly led by the United States and China, have emerged alongside this controlled order.
Planning a controllable world
Therefore, there is nothing wrong with Biden building a controllable network. But the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy continues to promote a vision of a radically open world. This has two disadvantages.
First, it could damage U.S. credibility, damage U.S. relationships with allies, and weaken Washington 's ability to attract new partners. The United States has been criticized as "hypocritical" by the outside world because it fails to match its words with deeds in promoting democracy and respecting sovereignty. Calling for an open world while building a controlled world could further erode other countries' trust in the United States.
Secondly, the United States should have first shaped the emerging controllable world order to promote the interests of the United States and its allies, but this report caused the United States to lose such a fleeting opportunity. That’s because the discussion and planning needed to achieve this goal are unlikely to occur without U.S. foreign policy explicitly focusing on controllable networks.
So far, although U.S. policymakers frequently refer to controllable networks, there is little evidence that they have a clear strategy for exploiting controllable networks. Some of the controllable networks created by the Biden administration, such as technology export control measures and the "trilateral security alliance" between the United States, Britain and Australia, appear to be of little help. Other efforts, like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework or the Global Infrastructure Investment Alliance, appear to be too open to be effective.
The United States, Britain and Australia hold an online summit
Decision makers need to admit that the open international order has changed, and this order is no longer the order that best serves the interests of the United States. U.S. policymakers should start making a concerted effort to plan for a controlled order. Three points should be considered when developing this plan.
First of all, what issues should we build a controllable network around? The most effective controllable networks should be based on the common real needs of countries and companies. For example, many countries in the Indo-Pacific region are interested in building their own defense industrial base and creating secure technology supply chains. These issues may become the core issues of a controllable regional network that attracts the participation of various countries.
Second, policymakers need to consider membership requirements and specific network entry and exit criteria.Too strict networks may lead to a world of group separatist forces, but being too open may cause the network to be damaged by opponents or opportunistic countries. The key is to find the right balance and attract the right partners to achieve network goals.
Third, decision makers need to examine the overall architecture, namely, coordinate various controllable networks (whether led by the United States or friends and enemies) to shape and maintain this controllable world order. Without such coordination, the closed networks may destroy each other or form an international system that is too divided and cannot produce competitive advantages.
Shaping and activating this emerging controllable world should be the central goal of US foreign policy. Initiating this new international order may be thankless, but building it may be crucial for the United States to remain competitive in the long term.
( Observer.com is translated by Guanqun from the US "National Interest" website)
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