Snake Island
Because the Black Sea region where Russia and Ukraine are located is one of the three largest grain producing areas in the world. In the entire region, Russia and Ukraine alone account for one-third of the world's exports of wheat, barley, and rapeseed oil, and the two countries' rapeseed oil exports account for about 68% of the global total!
Russia’s blockade on Ukraine first caused Ukraine’s grain exports to drop sharply to zero. Secondly, Europe’s subsequent sanctions on Russia have brought Russia’s grain exports to Europe to close to 0!
When the two are superimposed, Europe will lose this important source of food imports in the Black Sea region.
At the same time, the sharp decline in grain exports from Russia and Ukraine is not just for Europe. The reduction in the total grain exports of the two countries has caused the outbreak of local food crises around the world. The resulting impacts include restrictions on the purchase of flour in supermarkets in Egypt, restrictions on the purchase of cooking oil in British supermarkets, an intensification of famine in Somalia, an increase in the price of Indian pancakes and an increase in the price of Weilong spicy strips.
Russia, wheat harvest
The local food crisis around the world has given Russia further leverage in the international community. Western countries have used this as an excuse to tighten sanctions on Russian agriculture.
As luck would have it, Russia relies heavily on the international market for pesticides, seeds and other agricultural inputs. If Western agricultural input companies continue to block Russia, Russian agriculture may also face a significant reduction in production in 2023.
Therefore, Russia should appropriately compromise with Western countries’ accusations at this time and open Ukraine’s external channels, which will help ease the pressure on Russia in the international arena. The direct benefit is to reduce the possibility of an imminent Russian food crisis!
Farmland in southern Russia is fertilized, and agricultural aircraft are deployed.
Is the opening of Snake Island just a "tasteless" thing for Ukraine?
can see that the benefits to Russia of withdrawing troops from Snake Island are more potential and future.
Therefore, its benefits to Ukraine are destined not to be too great, and it can even be said to be "tasteless"!
Why do you say that?
First, Ukraine’s agricultural production relies heavily on Russia. If Russia only opens its ports but does not provide agricultural inputs, the fundamental problem of reduced grain production in Ukraine will still not be solved.
Nowadays, due to the reduction in domestic grain production, Ukraine has taken measures to ban and restrict the export of many agricultural products! For example, the export of corn and wheat is restricted, and the export of rye, oats, buckwheat, millet, sugar, edible salt, beef, and meat is prohibited.
Ukraine, Salt Lake
As long as the problem of reduced grain production is not resolved, these types of grains that are restricted and banned from export will not change their status quo!
What consequences will this lead to?
Even if Ukraine wants to export food, it is motivated but unable to do so.
So, for which agricultural inputs does Ukraine depend so much on Russia?
Mainly chemical fertilizers, diesel, etc.
Studies have shown that the lack of chemical fertilizers will reduce grain production by 30% to 50%.
Due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the number of spring sowing seeds in Ukraine has reached 39%, and the number of winter grain seeds has also dropped by 28%.
In the context of the lack of agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizers, there is no doubt that the reduction in grain production will enter the range of 30% to 50%!
On April 27, Russian President Putin ordered the extension of restrictions on fertilizer exports to August 31.
The second reason why Snake Island is of little significance to Ukraine is that the conditions of Snake Island as a treaty port are not superior.
From the past, Ukraine’s exports mainly used large domestic ports, such as Mariupol , Odessa , etc.
These ports rely on the development of large cities and are often large-scale and have convenient transportation.
And Snake Island is just a small island 662 meters long and 440 meters wide! One lap is about 2204m, the place is too small! There is also no port on the island, only a small village of about 100 residents and some village and town infrastructure.
It is impossible for a large cargo ship to stop in a place like this! Therefore, just looking at the withdrawal of Russian troops from this place actually has no practical value for Ukraine!
its true value is at sea.
Ukraine, Port of Odessa
Since the Russian army has withdrawn from the island, there will be no Russian fleet to blockade it within a certain range around the island. Through the sea gap, the Ukrainian fleet can enter the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea through the Black Sea Strait, and eventually resume trade with the world.
But how big can it be?
According to international law convention, the territorial waters of Ukraine’s Snake Island are 12 nautical miles outward from the sea line.
The fact that the Russian military has withdrawn from the 12 nautical miles does not mean that it will not appear outside the 12 nautical miles.
Even if the current attitude of Turkey changes to NATO and Russia's control over the Black Sea Strait weakens, this possibility cannot be completely ruled out.
Moreover, Ukraine’s future grain exports via Snake Island will rely heavily on its severely damaged railways, inland rivers and other transportation, which will greatly restrict Ukraine’s grain export capabilities.
From this point of view, whether it is from the hard power of "grain production" or the soft conditions of "grain transportation", the opening of Snake Island will not have a big boost to Ukraine's grain exports!
So if this isn’t “tasteless”, what is it?
Ukrainian agricultural products that are difficult to transport are blocked on the road
References
[1] Luo Guoping, Sun Yanran. Food security warning. Caixin Weekly, 2022(17):42-53.
