However, after the death of this legendary founding marshal, when his old subordinate, Xiao Ke, evaluated Lin Biao's life, he said: Lin Biao's level in war was first-class, but not perfect.

Among the top ten marshals who founded the country, Lin Biao is a legendary figure. In the War of Liberation, as the only general who annihilated hundreds of thousands of national troops besides Su Yu, he made indelible contributions to China's revolutionary cause.

However, after the death of this legendary founding marshal, when his old subordinate, Xiao Ke, evaluated Lin Biao's life, he actually said: Lin Biao's level in war was first-class, but not perfect.

(Lin Biao)

So, why did Xiao Ke, who fought side by side with Lin Biao for half his life, give Lin Biao such an evaluation? In his opinion, what exactly is Lin Biao’s “deficiency in the beauty”?

Today, this episode will tell you about: Lin Biao in Xiao Ke's eyes.

(Xiao Ke)

Xiao Ke and Lin Biao were born in the same year. In 1924, Lin Biao was admitted to the Whampoa Military Academy , while Xiao Ke, who was the same age, entered the Gendarmerie Coaching Office of the Central Military and Political School. After graduating from , the two participated in Northern Expedition together. In 1928, after Lin Biao, Xiao Ke climbed Jinggangshan and became a battalion commander of the 28th Regiment of the Red Fourth Army under the command of Lin Biao. The two worked together in the revolutionary cause since then.

During the War of Resistance Against Japan, Xiao Ke was incorporated into the 120th Division. During the Liberation War from 1946 to 1948, Xiao Ke's Jin-Cha-Hebei Field Army , where he was located, was long affiliated with the North China Military Region. It was not until March 1949 that Xiao Ke was transferred to the Central China Military Region of the Fourth Field Army that he worked again with Lin Biao and followed the main force of the Fourth Field Army, and participated in several major battles such as Crossing the River, Hengbao, Guangdong and Guangxi.

(Photo by Xiao Ke and Peng Dehuai, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping and others)

Looking at Xiao Ke's revolutionary career, although he did not follow Lin Biao throughout the whole process, he fought side by side with Lin Biao during the Red Army period and the late period of the Liberation War for a considerable period of time, and was also familiar with Lin Biao's combat style. As a long-standing warrior and repeatedly made meritorious contributions, he is fully qualified to make evaluations of Lin Biao for future reference.

So, in Xiao Ke’s view, what are the remarkable points in Lin Biao’s combat level? Why do you say that Lin Biao is not “perfect”?

(Lin Biao during the Red Army)

First of all, what Lin Biao admired Xiao Ke was that "training troops well."

Xiao Ke and Lin Biao are both military professionals. One graduated from the Central Military and Political School of the Kuomintang, and the other graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy. They are both prides of heaven cultivated under the regular military education system. Although both of them studied in military rank for only two years, the formal and rigorous military education had a profound impact on the two's combat and leadership style. There is a strong resonance between Xiao Ke and Lin Biao in this regard.

According to Xiao Ke's recollection, during his time as battalion commander of Lin Biao's 28th Regiment of the Red Fourth Army, Lin Biao's usual differences from other Red Army generals was that he loved reading military books. Whether it is " Sun Tzu's Art of War " that records Chinese military thoughts, or "History of World War I", which explains foreign combat concepts, they have all been on Lin Biao's desk.

(Young Lin Biao and Chairman Mao)

However, Lin Biao did not classify these books as only one person's "learning materials". He also excerpted some of the military concepts and materials to the army to promote. As the saying goes, "Soldiers who don't want to be generals are not good soldiers." Under Lin Biao's such a military rule, the soldiers of the 28th Regiment of the Red Fourth Army, whenever they fight, everyone can say one or two of their own ideas before the combat command map. This military rule model not only guarantees the quality of every soldier, but also enhances the grassroots commanders' ability to boldly innovate and adapt to changes. After the Longyan Battle in 1929, Lin Biao's soldiers seized a "Military Practice" issued by the National Army in 1928. After reading it, Lin Biao couldn't help but be amazed. He felt that this method of training was good, so he also promoted it in the army.Later, Lin Biao's move was praised by Chairman Mao. It was precisely because of his emphasis on learning and the cultivation of the qualities of grassroots soldiers and commanders that the 28th Regiment of the Red Fourth Army in the future could become the well-deserved main force of the Central Red Army.

However, as early as the Red Army period, Lin Biao exposed his flaws to a certain extent. As the saying goes, "Victory and defeat are common affairs of military affairs." In early 1929, the Kuomintang warlords in Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces carried out the third "suppression" of the Jinggangshan base area, and the Red Army fought a fierce battle with it. At this time, Lin Biao was pessimistic about the future prospects of the revolution. In a letter to Chairman Mao, he raised the question of "How long can the Red Army fight?" . Chairman Mao replied to the letter in early 1930. This is the famous article by Chairman Mao later, "A Spark of Fire Can Start a Prairie".

From these two things, we can see that although Lin Biao could be called a young and promising general at that time, after experiencing setbacks and failures, he would fall into hesitation and pessimism, which would affect his judgment . His personality defects and confidence in the revolution were also reflected in the Battle of Siping and the Battle of Jinzhou under Lin Biao's later command.

(Lin Biao during the Anti-Japanese Period)

may also be due to personality reasons. Lin Biao's command psychology and combat style are usually summarized by later generations in the word "careful". But in Xiao Ke's view, although Lin Biao has always acted cautiously, after determining the possibility of winning on the battlefield, he will execute it regardless of the cost until he wins . This allowed Lin Biao to win several fierce battles that could determine the fate of the revolutionary army.

For example, in the battle of Luding Bridge commanded by Lin Biao in 1935, it can be regarded as a model for turning the fate of the revolutionary army with a fierce battle. In May of that year, after the Central Red Army led by Chairman Mao arrived at Dadu River, the Sichuan Army tried to use Dadu River as a natural danger to block our army's northward route, while the national army behind him was chasing him reluctantly. If our army cannot cross the river in time and make the enemy attack our army forward and backward, the revolutionary cause will be in danger of overturning.

At the time of crisis, Lin Biao commanded the Red Fourth Regiment to march for forcibly, rushing to the side of Luding Bridge day and night, and quickly deploying the downward attack plan. After two hours of fierce battle, the Fourth Red Regiment seized the iron chain bridge that covered the natural danger, opening up a way for the Red Army troops behind him. Afterwards, Chairman Mao highly praised the battle and called it a turning point that "determines the fate of the Red Army and affects the victory of the Long March of ."

In the Tashan Blocking War during the Liberation War, Lin Biao's decisiveness during the command of the war was also fully demonstrated. In order to concentrate superior forces and conquer Jinzhou as soon as possible, Lin Biao only left the 4th column, 11th column and two independent divisions of Rehe for the Tashan defense line, in order to resist the superior forces of the 11th division of the Kuomintang and the attack of naval guns . Although Lin Biao learned about the tragic situation on the Tashan front line in Cheng Zihua's telegram, in order to achieve the strategic goal of seizing Jinzhou, he still retained the first column as a general preparation, allowing Wu Kehua on the front line and the soldiers on the Tashan defense line to complete this seemingly impossible defensive task under the condition of "putting it to death and then resurrecting".

(Lin Biao who practices guns)

Although Lin Biao was decisive in the decision to seize major battles such as the Luding Bridge and Tashan blocking battles, Lin Biao's "decisiveness" on the battlefield was based on his belief that this battle was sure to win. In decisions related to the overall strategic situation, Lin Biao's judgment was far less decisive and firm than in tactical tactics. caused Chairman Mao to "problem" Lin Biao in several decisions related to the national situation.

For example, in the Four Crossings of Chishui Campaign from January to March 1935, Lin Biao had a disagreement with the Chairman's combat decisions - the overall layout of this battle was personally deployed by Chairman Mao, with the purpose of commanding the Central Red Army to get rid of the encirclement of the Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan warlords and the pursuit of Xue Yue, the direct unit behind him. Lin Biao at that time did not understand. If Chairman Mao wanted to go north as soon as possible, why didn’t he walk on the “bow back” of the Chishui River, but he had to cross the river four times with a "hard work".

(Four Crossings of Chishui)

However, what Lin Biao and the generals of the Kuomintang did not expect was that Chairman Mao took advantage of the contradictions between the three warlords of Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan, and interspersed around their respective territory boundaries, causing the warlords to "work but not work hard", while Xue Yue's direct warlords were exhausted all the way. During the four crossings of Chishui, the Red Army not only broke away from the encirclement of the millions of troops behind them, pointed out the direction to the north, but also made the Kuomintang pay the price of 30,000 casualties. When the Red Army was approaching Guiyang, Chiang Kai-shek, who was in charge of the battle, was almost captured alive by our army. In May 1960, when Chairman Mao met with Marshal of Montgomery, the second World War II, he said, "The four crossings of Chishui were my proud strokes."

, and Lin Biao's flaws in strategic vision were also reflected in the differences in decision-making between the Jinzhou Battle and the Chairman. In mid-1948, the chairman who watched the situation in the Northeast was keenly discovered that "whoever seized Jinzhou would grasp the portal of Liaoshen Campaign and could form a closed door and fight dogs against the Kuomintang army outside the pass." However, Lin Biao, who was worried about being attacked from both sides, once insisted on capturing the big city of Changchun first. was always worried about the enemy in Changchun City. It was not until the enemy increased its troops and that he made up his mind to accept the chairman's suggestion and directly attack Jinzhou - this is a place that later military scientists have always criticized for evaluating Lin Biao's combat style.

(Jinzhou Battle)

Although from the perspective of strategic decision-making, Lin Biao's judgment of grasping the current situation was slightly insufficient, in terms of the details of deploying troops and conducting personnel deployment, Xiao Ke in his later years praised him for his "extraordinary talent" and used a "small computer" to call Lin Biao's mind when conducting military deployment.

949 Hengbao Battle was a military cooperation between Xiao Ke and Lin Biao after many years of separation. In this battle, Lin Biao faced the Bai Chongxi , known as the "Little Zhuge of the National Army". As a scheming general and a warlord who dominates the side, after Bai Chongxi fought with our army, kept his main force, the Seventh Army of the Guangxi clique, and continued to move between Nanling , and delayed exposing the main position of , and raided our army all the way, making our army feel that this is indeed a difficult opponent.

(Bai Chongxi)

Faced with the cunning and suspicious Bai Chongxi, Lin Biao ordered the 49th Army to go deep into the mountains of Nanling, hoping to use the 49th Army as bait to attract Bai Chongxi to take the bait. However, Bai Chongxi, who had always been suspicious, did not move his troops in the face of the temptation of an army. Under the supervision of multiple power generations from Li Zongren , Bai Chongxi concluded that the 49th Army went deep into the ground and was exhausted and led the main force to pursue it.

After Bai Chongxi exposed the main position of the Guangxi warlords, Lin Biao made decisive arrangements and ordered the 3rd, 4th and 15th corpses to divide the troops into the east and west routes, cut off the return route of the Guangxi warlords to Guizhou and Yunnan, and dispatched 5 armies to encircle the main force of the Guangxi warlords. During the deployment and decisive battle for more than a month, the Fourth Field Army under Lin Biao wiped out more than 47,000 troops of the Guangxi warlords. The Gui army, which had been entrenched in Guangdong and Guangxi for more than 20 years, was destroyed after this battle.

(Lin Biao and others held a meeting)

As a participant in the Hengbao Battle, Xiao Ke witnessed Lin Biao's process from combat deployment to a decisive battle with the Gui army, which made him sincerely admire Lin Biao's command ability.

However, at the end of the Hengbao Battle, our army reported casualties. Lin Biao received two battle reports of one more casualties and one less, and finally Lin Biao chose to report the one with fewer battle reports to the central government. Although it was later found that the war damage reported by the Fourth Field Army in this battle was incorrect, Lin Biao still did not make any modifications to the battle report and refused to admit his mistake, which was one of his undeniable flaws.

Looking at Lin Biao's life, he is indeed a well-deserved genius general in the history of the Republic. However, his omissions in military command also need to be recognized and recognized by us. As the saying goes, "No gold is pure, no one is perfect." Only by looking at and judging historical figures from a dialectical perspective can we not lose our objective and real vision. Because everyone has his advantages in history and his undeniable flaws, only those who stand in time seem so vivid after a hundred years.