Wang Fan: Biden The government's strategy toward China: competitive coexistence and a new balance
Author: Wang Fan, Vice Dean, Professor, and Doctoral Supervisor of the School of Foreign Affairs
Source: "Peace and Development" Issue 4, 2021; Current Affairs National Security Analysis
WeChat platform editor: Zhou Yue
[Abstract] The policy toward China since the Biden administration took office has attracted widespread attention from the outside world. According to comprehensive analysis, the Biden administration's strategy toward China will neither continue the old path of the Trump administration's arbitrary acts nor return to the strategy of "contact and pressure" in the Obama- era, but will form a new strategy with competitive coexistence as the direction and new balance as the purpose. Competitive coexistence is the result of the Biden administration's domestic politics need to balance with international influence. Although it contains the elements of strengthening cooperation with China in some areas, it is still based on competition. Its competitiveness is reflected in ideological struggles and alliance encirclement in the political field, introspection in the economic field, and the destruction and multi-point instigation in the military field. The purpose is to form a new balance with China and establish a new normal opened by the Biden era. The Biden administration will focus on traditional power balance, supplemented by value penetration and international law rules, and try to suppress China's development momentum while minimizing losses of US interests.
[Keywords] Biden administration, strategy toward China, Sino-US relations, competitive coexistence, new balance
Since the Biden administration took office, its foreign policy has also become the focus of attention of the outside world, among which China policy is particularly eye-catching. It is generally believed that the nature of the Biden administration's strategic competitive relationship with China will not change, and will highlight ideological competition more, return to the alliance strategic tradition and continue to carry out economic and technological competition. However, the specific strategies of the Biden administration's competition with China will change, including the principles of the use of various competitive means, the intensity of competition in the game, the scope of military containment, the space for both sides to compromise, etc. So, what kind of U.S.-China relationship does the Biden administration expect to shape? What kind of strategy toward China will be implemented? These are the focus of this article.
1. Overview of the US policy toward China from a grand strategic perspective
Academic and think tank circles have roughly the following three views on the judgment of the US policy toward China and the direction of Sino-US relations under the new situation.
The first category of views believes that Sino-US relations will tend to ease. Judging from the aspects of promoting economic recovery, responding to climate change, strengthening epidemic cooperation and controlling Sino-US competition, the United States has a real need to ease Sino-US relations. Ryan Hass, a senior researcher at the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Program, believes that although China has performed strongly on many issues, it has not completely changed the nature of "competitive interdependence" between the two countries. He pointed out that the American politics has paid too much attention and exaggerated China's advantages in recent years and has fallen into what former US Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger called "gigophobia", which often creates biased and distorted views. "Joseph S.Nye, Jr. believes that there is no need to be suspicious. The United States should avoid exaggerating fear of China and leading to overreaction. Michael Swen, director of the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute D.Swaine) said that there is not much practical evidence to support the view that China is a serious threat. As a military power, China does not have the ability to "destroy the United States without destroying itself"; China's economic influence is difficult to rise to the extent that it poses an existential threat to American values; China's threat to the ideology of the United States has also been exaggerated. In fact, the Chinese government is not very interested in exporting its governance system, and there is no evidence to show that the Chinese are forcing or actively persuading countries to follow their experience.
The second type of view believes that the U.S. policy toward China will be tougher. This type of view believes that the easing of Sino-US relations is temporary, and the irreconcilable structural contradictions between the two sides will lead the two countries to fall into the "Thucydides Trap" or a Cold War-style strategic confrontation.Aaron Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University, pointed out that the foundation and prospects of cooperation in U.S.-China relations are rapidly disappearing, while Zack Cooper and Hal Brands believe that the United States cannot truly change China according to its own ideas, nor can it change China's intention to "seek regional advantages" and "dominate the Asian order."
The third category of views believes that the Biden administration’s China policy has not yet taken shape. Faced with Sino-US relations that fell to the bottom during the Trump era, the Biden administration is still exploring and waiting, and the Chinese government is also testing and bottoming out, so it is too early to draw conclusions on the Biden administration's China policy. Kurt M. Campbell believes that the era of "contact" between the United States and China has passed, but the future situation is not clear. US-China relations are not a bipolar competition with clear winners and losses. China far surpasses the Soviet Union in terms of economic vitality, technological innovation and global ties. The United States should avoid adopting the Cold War approach to China. He pointed out that there are important differences between the U.S.-China tensions and the U.S.-Soviet tensions after the war: The interdependence between the U.S. and China is more complex, and the two countries have to cooperate when dealing with transnational challenges; the U.S.-China competition is unlikely to end with one side’s collapse. Therefore, regardless of whether the Cold War repeats itself, both countries should formulate trust-building measures to prevent conflict from intensifying. Chris Doran, professor of political science and global issues studies at Lebanon Valley College in the United States, stressed that Biden must admit that the international system structure has changed since the Obama era, and the US-China confrontation seems to be making the current world pattern towards the differentiation of the Cold War 2.0 version, which means that Biden cannot simply fight against the US opponent. Especially when facing China, the only competitor that is evenly matched with the United States, competition and cooperation are needed.
Based on the views of the American think tank community, it can be summarized into the following points: First of all, the United States has an exaggerated threat from China. In this regard, some American elites advocate the need to accurately and effectively evaluate China's strategy to avoid over-exposure and risk costs of the United States while exaggerating China's threat; a degree of confidence in the toughness of China needs to be grasped. Secondly, competing with China will cost the United States a huge cost, so tough on China requires changing strategies. Although China is posing greater challenges to the United States, the United States is also facing more domestic difficulties. Therefore, the United States should adopt more contraction and focus policies and put the finger on China, rather than making enemies on all sides. The United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan and its easing of relations with Iran are all based on this consideration. At the same time, the United States should also unite its allies to deal with China. Third, the US strategy toward China will be long-term. The Biden administration should be based on the long-term and weaken China through phased and long-term competition; and maintaining, utilizing and leveraging the United States' only technological advantages and strictly controlling China's development at the technical level will become the focus of the United States' short- and medium-term.
These views reflect the more refined thinking of the United States’ strategy toward China, and are likely to have an impact on its strategic evaluation, so it deserves great attention. On the other hand, this also shows that the United States has lower cost limits and strategic boundaries in its toughness against China. In other words, the Biden administration emphasizes both the protracted war and long cycle of its strategy against China, and also emphasizes the coexistence under fierce competition. Therefore, on the one hand, the United States will start confrontational competition, but also consider costs and risks. As US Secretary of State Blinken said, the United States will not use "brute force" to deal with China, but will implement a more conscientious and selective economic decoupling plan. The United States' strategic concept will return from "winning by fighting" during the Trump era to "win without fighting", that is, to shift Trump's "finding his contributions to one battle" to a phased and cycled medium- and long-term strategy implementation. In the first stage, we focus on improving our own strength and formulate a strategy toward China based on this goal, and suppressing and weakening China by uniting allies as the main line. On the one hand, the Biden administration holds high the ideological banner, strengthens alliance strategy and diplomatic isolation and encirclement, and promotes institutional model competition and military containment; on the other hand, it controls Sino-US relations to a state of "competition but not breaking" through cooperation in local areas.Compared with the Trump administration, the Biden administration's China policy will be more comprehensive and comprehensive, focusing on grasping the scale and measure, maintaining the necessary flexibility and flexibility, and trying to use three tools of confrontation, competition and cooperation at the same time or alternately according to the situation.
2. The Biden administration's policy direction towards China: competitive coexistence
Faced with the internal situation in the United States and the political and public opinion atmosphere in China, the Biden administration tried to "promote change with pressure", but was unwilling to "destroy itself", so it will form a new strategy that combines competition and coexistence.
(I) The motivation for the Biden administration to choose a competitive coexistence strategy
Based on the Biden administration's adjustment to China strategy, it can be seen that Sino-US relations are undergoing a transformation from competitive interdependence to competitive coexistence, from cooperative pressure to limited decoupling and the Cold War in science and technology, and from the Asia-Pacific strategy to the Indo-Pacific strategy. In the past, China and the United States had competitive interdependence and competitive cooperation, but now it is competitive coexistence, with a slight reversal compared to the past, which puts China-US relations in a state of advancement and retreat.
The Biden administration is building a framework for competitive coexistence in its strategy toward China. Two senior Biden advisers, Kurt Campbell and , Jack Sullivan, wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine that "the era of contact with China has ended abruptly." "Adopting a dual strategy that competes and coexist with China", "Competition is not so much a problem that needs to be solved, but rather a situation that needs control, which can also be interpreted as competitive coexistence. The United States should establish coexistence conditions with China in four key areas of competition - military, economic, political and global governance.
So, why did the Biden administration choose a competitive coexistence strategy in relations with China?n First of all, the U.S. government believes that the competition with China is long-term. The Soviet Union was a three-legged bench, with two of its legs shaking. China is a complete and strong chair. Therefore, the competition with China is different from the Cold War against the Soviet Union. "In any competition, there will be actions and counteractions. Decades ago, an economic rival in the United States asked the United States to make major changes in its thinking. Japan in the 1980s was that competitor. In the 21st century, China has become that competitor and competes with the United States on a more comprehensive basis. In this regard, we should not rule out the opportunity to cooperate in areas that are in common interests in the future. "PI Therefore, the Biden administration's China strategy is based on long-term considerations and weakens China through phased long-term competition.
Secondly, competition with China will cost a huge cost. The United States needs to view competition and coexistence with China from the perspectives of cost and risk. Sam Sax (Samm) Sucks's theory of "high walls in small courtyards" is based on the Trump-era attack and point cooperation. Because no matter how the United States squeezes China, the benefits squeezed out will be difficult to flow back to the United States, but to other emerging countries. The price of squeeze is mainly paid by American consumers, and American companies are damaged in the competition. As for those profitable countries, they may not be better dealt with than China. Therefore, there is a lot of room for continued cooperation between China and the United States. For the United States, consuming its own energy and repelling one country in exchange for the rise of another or other countries is obviously not the best choice. Therefore, based on cost considerations, Saxophone advocates that the United States only needs to choose to lock in several technological points that are crucial to national security (小官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官网官� ) and actively protect (high walls), which can achieve new China-US relations that are most in line with the interests of the United States and appropriately meet China's needs. She proposed that for a long time in the future, China's threat to the U.S. high-tech field will be far less damaging than some media and countries exaggerate. "Therefore, it is expected that the Biden administration will implement a more conscientious and selective economic decoupling plan rather than a comprehensive and thorough decoupling. On the technology side, the United States is developing an industrial policy to strengthen its competitiveness in semiconductors, 5G and other emerging technologies Biden wants to develop.Against the backdrop of China's further increasing efforts to reform and opening up and opening up market access (mainly financial and automobile markets), the Biden administration is likely to seek to resume negotiations on bilateral investment agreements. nThird, since China and the United States are a controllable competition, they can coexist. The Biden administration believes that China's GDP (GDP) will surpass the United States, but in the foreseeable future, per capita GDP will still lag far behind the United States. This will mean that it is more important for Chinese leaders to focus on domestic demand. Internationally, there is no doubt that China's striking global leadership in trade, investment and infrastructure development has provided it with greater opportunity impact, but it will take many years before China becomes a maker, not a recipient of international financial, capital markets and monetary rules. Viewing China as an enemy and exaggerating confrontation will hinder the necessary and necessary cooperation between China and the United States.
However, the premise of a competitive coexistence strategy is competition. Evan S. Medeiros, former senior director of Asian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, believes that "the new China policy should be based on 'risk management' and no longer seek to weaken competition for cooperation." "On this basis, we need to grasp three directions: First, clarify which relations with China belong to the competition category and which ones do not belong to the competition category. US-China relations will depend on whether we can find the balance point; second, readjustment of the outcome of Sino-US cooperation; third, reconstruction of the decision-making process of China's policy." "Competition in US-China relations does not mean that military conflicts or confrontations are inevitable. The competition between the U.S. and China is not only a hostile zero-sum game, but also can promote both sides to do more and better. : It may be to provide development assistance or invest in global projects.
competition can only coexist after competition. In order to prevent the further deterioration of US-China relations, the United States will emphasize coexistence. Competition does not affect coexistence. Coexistence serves competition, and coexistence is the bottom line of competition; competition has boundaries, coexistence is a last resort, otherwise it will only be a coexistence. For the United States, on the one hand, China will become a Thucydides-style opponent, threatening the United States' status in political spectrum ; on the other hand, n and China are destined to coexist because the only choice left is to destroy at the same time. China and the United States are facing practical problems, and no party can solve these difficulties alone. Allison (Graham Allison believes that "first, (between China and the United States) is a Thucydides-style rival relationship on the one hand, and an inescapable, conjoined baby-like symbiotic relationship bound by technology and nuclear weapon . Second, live peacefully in the environment and nature, if we want to avoid common destruction. "PI, of course, coexistence does not mean restrictions on competition. The United States may put pressure on China in three aspects; one is the institutional level, one is the ideological level, and the other is the alliance level. These are more hidden, targeted and destructive.
(II) The idea of the Biden administration to implement a competitive coexistence strategy
Competitive coexistence is reflected in the coexistence of competition and cooperation. US Secretary of State Blinken admitted at a press conference: "U.S.-China relations can be said to be the most important relationship in the world. It will have an impact on all aspects of the future life of the United States, and this relationship is becoming more and more confrontational. It has both competition and cooperation. Campbell and Sullivan both advocate a policy of challenging China without angering China.
The United States will focus on the dispute over rule rights for how to achieve competitive coexistence. Biden said his administration is ready for "extremely fierce competition" between the United States and China, but he emphasized in an interview with CBS , "I will not focus on international rules like Trump." P As for actions in diplomatic and security policies, Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the American Society of Foreign Relations, advocates the adoption of a policy of restraint. The United States is withdrawing from the era of "launching a 'selective war' abroad". Biden's supporters believe that the United States' armed forces are not prepared to fight a battle with enemies whose firepower and technical equipment are comparable to their own.While Americans believe that their country should represent their values externally, they are also worried about the costs of international confrontation and the unnecessary side effects it brings, as well as possible political overexpansion. "Americans hope that their administration will use power carefully and selectively seek the best opportunities to facilitate positive n-change." They believe that the most important thing is to avoid direct threats from the United States, and everything else, including geostrategic competition with China and Russia, is secondary.
Therefore, the Biden administration's competitive coexistence strategy will use multiple compounding methods rather than simple economic sanctions or military pressure. Specifically, the following points will be included:
1. Ideological attacks in the political field and alliance encirclement
The Biden administration will regain the concept of political warfare and deal with the rising China in combination with changes in environmental conditions. It is clearly positioned as an opponent in ideological and institutional models, and integrate and unite groups and parties from different camps in the country with "democracy, freedom and human rights", and mobilize and organize international ideological alliances. Biden declared that he should use "democratic values" to fight more "authoritarianism" and "the United States should lead with the power of role models, not the role models of power." 1n The Biden administration will label the Chinese government as "authoritarian" and attack China's socialist system and governance concepts; smear China's export of ideology and institutional models to the outside world, shape " China model threat theory"; distort China's foreign policy, spread "China threat theory" and intimidate countries; promote pan-ideological policies, not only organize "area of democratic countries", but also organize or support ideological alliances in non-political fields such as economy, science and technology, culture, and society, formulate rules and regulations containing ideological colors to exclude, exclude, and restrict China; provoke and exploit China's internal social problems and group cognitive differences, and disrupt China. In the era of Democratic Party rule, the United States' use of ideological weapons will undoubtedly be more strengthened.
should be clearly aware that the US ideological war against China is only a means, and curbing China's rise is its real goal. The same was true during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nixon once admitted: "If he (Gorbachev) succeeds in the great reforms at home, then we will face a more prosperous and prosperous Soviet Union in the 21st century, when it will become a more difficult opponent than today." What is extremely dangerous is that if the United States regards the ideological war against China as an important means to quell its domestic conflicts, it will cause long-term harm to China-US relations.
Alliance strategy is one of the two major actions that emphasize both domestic governance in the Biden administration's China policy. The focus of the first round of intensive diplomatic activities after Biden took office includes concentrating on persuading some countries to jointly respond to China. He is different from Trump who believes in "America first" - on the one hand, blackmailing allies, and on the other hand, he requires countries to follow the United States' limits on pressure on China. In the Biden team's view, Trump's methods are neither professional nor short-sighted. Biden stressed that "the United States is back. The United States' alliance is our greatest asset." As George Kennan pointed out in the famous long telegram back then: "Whether the Soviets could reverse their disadvantages depends on the degree of unity, firmness and courage shown by the Western world." Biden declared that he would "work with the United States' allies and partners to update the role of the United States in international mechanisms, regain the lost credit and moral authority, and the United States will compete from a stronger position." At the beginning of Biden's tenure, he quickly launched multilateral diplomatic actions with the Western world as the core, and coordinated his position and policies with them on China issues. Recently, issues such as South China Sea and Diaoyu Islands have fluctuated to varying degrees. "abnormal phenomena" such as Sino-UK relations, China-EU relations, and Sino-Japanese relations have all been related to the diplomatic actions of the Biden administration.
Based on the consideration of alliance strategy, whenever the US introduces major measures to China in the future, it will coordinate more positions with Western allies and stakeholders in China, and strive for a "unified voice."In "International United Front", the US will use China's so-called "ideological output", "territorial expansion", "wolf warrior diplomacy" and "economic aggression" as a starting point to exaggerate the "China threat", consolidate the traditional Western alliance, unite relevant countries in the world's geopolitical sector affected by the revival of China, provoke trouble for countries with disputes with China, and create a joint response to China; on the grounds of responding to China, continue the alliance mechanism left over from the Cold War, and organize, expand or strengthen targeted political, military and scientific and technological alliances. The Indo-Pacific strategic system, the Quad Security Dialogue Mechanism (Quad), the Australian-New Zealand-US alliance, the US-Philippines alliance, the US-Thailand alliance, the US-Japan-South Korea mechanism, the " Five Eyes Alliance ", NATO , etc. will be intensified or adjusted to varying degrees. Biden has begun to spare no effort to win over Japan, South Korea and other countries on sensitive issues concerning China's core interests, thereby further winning over US allies to cut off strategic ties with China.
Kurt Campbell believes that "the United States' "engagement" policy on China in the past few decades has not achieved the policy formulation premise that makes China more 'free', and China has even embarked on the opposite path to expectations." "The strategic consensus of the United States and Europe to China is far greater than the differences. The US-Europe relations should be repaired as soon as possible and a new China policy should be established. Among them, it is particularly urgent to regulate the transatlantic dialogue mechanism about China, especially to make the "first track" (intergovernmental) interaction more institutionalized. For example, strengthen dialogue between the US and European political elites in different areas such as China's investment, technological competition, and China's influence." pI However, the Biden administration's alliance strategy has not yet formed the "anti-China chorus" it expects. Biden's proposals such as the Revitalization Alliance and the "Affiliated Democratic Countries" promoted by the G7 meeting and the Munich Security Conference platform have few responded. Host German Chancellor Merkel emphasized at a press conference after the meeting that in order to rebuild world economic system , G7 hopes to strengthen cooperation with G20 , especially with China. Erik Bratterberg, director of the European Program at the Carnegie International Peace Foundation in the United States, commented that " Washington is frustrated with the hesitation of Europe." "Therefore, on the one hand, the United States has oversees the real interests of other countries and kidnapped other countries to follow up; on the other hand, other countries are oriented towards real interests and seeking to maximize their own interests. This contrast will make the United States' strategy unsuccessful.
2. Conflict restrictions in the economic field and its own strength enhancement
The important sign of China's rise is to surpass the United States in economic terms, which not only includes quantity and scale, but also economic quality. At present, China GDP is unstoppable and is just around the corner, but it will take some time to surpass it in quality. Therefore, the current goal of the US economic strategy toward China is to restrict China's economic development within the world economic system dominated by the United States. If the constraints are invalid, China will be excluded from the world economic system in extreme cases.
Since taking office, the Biden administration has adopted a relatively vague handling of China-US economic and trade issues, affirming the necessity of Trump's economic and technological war against China, but also expressing its scope, method and rhythm to go forward. The Biden team regards China's economic development, intellectual property and global governance as a "major threat" to the United States, and must "fight against China's economic behavior". The United States will make arrangements in curbing China's economic competitiveness, slowing down China's economic development speed, and hedging against China's economic and world influence.
At present, the Sino-US economic and trade war, science and technology war, intellectual property war, and struggle in the financial field will continue. However, since the current new crown epidemic has not yet ended. The national economy lacks confidence. The situation will be more complicated. The competition between the two sides in the mid- and low-end industries may ease significantly, and competition in the high-end industries will intensify, and there will even be selective "decoupling".Biden has signed an executive order to review the supply chain status of key commodities such as drugs, rare earths, semiconductors, and large-capacity batteries in the United States, and will conduct a one-year deeper assessment, focusing on six major areas of defense, health, information, energy, transportation, and food, and demanding suggestions to improve supply chain resilience and security. "Although the executive order does not mention China, Biden's move intends to reduce the dependence of key products on China in the context of competition between the United States and China. It is a practical measure to promote the "decoupling" of some sensitive areas to China. economic war has always been a "double-edged sword". The Biden administration will accept the lessons of the Trump administration when dealing with economic and trade issues with China, and emphasizes strategies and face reality rather than attacking from all sides.
After Biden took office, an important policy trend is to readjust its relationship with the international economic system and unite countries with similar ideologies to promote economic integration. Biden may continue the checks and balances and transformation strategies of the Obama era, promote the establishment of exclusive economic integration organizations (such as TPP), formulate "international rules" to suppress China, promote the "decoupling" of cutting-edge technology, and return to the United States to the United States, etc., and engage in economic competition with China. ;On the other hand, an anti-Chinese mechanism is set up to block China with clauses containing political system thresholds, excluding China, and promoting change by suppressing it, but it also leaves room for the so-called "transformation in place". In other words, forcibly adding politically related clauses to China within the multilateral economic organization mechanism may become a normalized means for the Biden administration to curb China economically. The American Chamber of Commerce published a research report saying that although the "decoupling" of the Chinese and US economies is huge, it is "not unacceptable". Once Sino-US relations deteriorate, in extreme cases, the United States will not rule out that it will promote the establishment of another international economic system that excludes the Chinese economy.
3. Deepening of containment in the military field and multi-point provocation
Military, technology, finance and talent are the most advantageous areas in the United States. The core of the US military strategy toward China is to form a military alliance, maintain its military advantage over China, use military containment to cooperate with the US policy toward China, and at the same time prepare for possible conflicts when Sino-US relations break down, especially in the direction of the Taiwan Strait. The Biden administration will continue to promote the deepening of the Indo-Pacific strategic system, consolidate the US-Japan-South Korea alliance, develop a four-party security dialogue mechanism, transform the original alliance mechanisms such as the Australian-New Zealand-US alliance, the US-Philippines alliance, and the US-Thailand alliance, expand the functions of the "Five Eyes Alliance" and NATO, and establish a comprehensive military blockade circle with China. The Biden administration and the Trump administration have changed a lot in China's policy, but the military strategic containment of China will continue.
The high-tech war against China is the goal of building combat capabilities of the US military. This process has begun in the Obama era, accelerated during the Trump era, and continued the Biden administration. Biden has instructed Secretary of Defense Austin to assess the global situation of the U.S. military. Secretary of State Blinken declared in an exclusive interview with CNN that it would ensure that the US military could deter China's "aggression". It can be confirmed that the US military strategy towards China focuses on containment and preventing China from changing the "status status" through military power, but it may not be practical. Because "war has its own power, it will deviate you from all thoughtful plans." P Once a war breaks out between the two nuclear powers of China and the United States, it will not only be a disaster for the world, but neither of them will be able to survive. This is exactly what competitive coexistence emphasizes.
In the current COVID-19 pandemic, it is dangerous for the Biden administration to rashly intervene when the task of rebuilding domestic order and reshaping the international image has not yet been completed. On February 4, 2021, after the Biden administration came to power, it implemented the first Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea ship cruise operations. The "McCain" missile destroyer passed through the Taiwan Strait on the same day and broke into China's Xisha territorial waters on February 5. On the same day, China's Ministry of National Defense announced that China conducted a land-based mid-stage anti-missile interception technology test in its territory, and the test achieved the expected purpose. Although from a technical perspective, the target of the mid-segment anti-missile is the ballistic missile , this may be interpreted as a response to the US military's military operation.n Since the Biden administration came to power, some American think tanks and media have been constantly hyping that China and the United States will fight in the Taiwan Strait, believing that China may resolve the Taiwan issue in advance in the near future, and the United States may intervene in military intervention. This aroused the alert from all parties. American Cato Institute's senior researcher Brandon Valeriano and Eric Gomez warned: "The least thing the United States needs now is to conduct more military intervention abroad or expand its commitment to defense. Confusing leadership with the use of force is a dangerous pathological situation in Washington, which is difficult to avoid, but must also be avoided." Obviously, although the United States will continue to adopt a military pressure approach, this approach is part of its comprehensive pressure. The United States' suppression and containment of China includes military pressure and alliance encirclement, as well as comprehensive means such as economic warfare, technological warfare, public opinion warfare and other comprehensive means.
However, no matter how China-US relations change, the US government has never given up on the practice of provoking China's nerves on hot and sensitive issues related to China. The Biden administration will use hot and sensitive issues as a means to isolate, contain, encircle and "transform" China. Its method of using hot and sensitive issues will be more cunning and deceitful, focusing on collaboration with allies and the media, rather than doing whatever they want and fighting alone. However, hot and sensitive issues related to China often concern China's core interests and national dignity, and affect the national feelings of 1.4 billion Chinese people, "it is untouchable." P US former ambassador to China Rui Xiaojian (J. Stapleton Roy) once warned: "When dealing with the Taiwan issue, American policy makers must consider the risk factors of the outbreak of military conflicts between the United States and China due to the Taiwan issue and escalating into nuclear war." P US Rand Company published a research report pointing out that in order to protect themselves, the United States may be forced to reduce intervention in global affairs in the future, including taking the Taiwan issue cautiously and ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait. "All signs indicate that the Biden administration's policy toward Taiwan may be very strong, but it will also control possible potential risks.nIn short, although the Biden administration's competitive coexistence strategy is more difficult to deal with than the fierce confrontation of the Trump administration, it is relatively clear and more predictable. Its goal is different from the previous administration's "extreme pressure" on China in the economic and trade fields, but rather to form a new balance against China.
3. Biden administration's strategic goals toward China: New balance
In the US's China strategy, there is a concept called "new balance". As we all know, the United States had the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy during the Obama period, so what is the meaning of the Biden administration? How should the United States achieve a new balance?
(I) The new balance of the Biden administration
"New balance" was determined after clarifying the strategic positioning of "China-US competition". Former US Senior Director of Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, Mai Wen, believes. "The United States is now turning to a framework based on risk management n, which means that it is necessary to predict and tolerate possible frictions and tensions, and even prudently use it: accept certain risks and costs brought by the US measures, balance multiple conflicting interests, acknowledge that certain differences cannot be resolved, and use dialogue and cooperation if necessary. But dialogue and cooperation must not be regarded as the purpose. This strategic shift aims to develop policies that reflect the core of the competition between the U.S. and China, but also establish a lasting relationship that can withstand the irreconcilable conflict of interests between the two countries. "American current affairs critic Fareed Zakaria believes that at present, the world is turning from a unipolar system dominated by the United States to a bipolar world, and for the first time a competitor is truly on par with the United States. According to Henry Kissinger, it is the path that the United States can do to accept the reality of China's rise and carry out strategic competition. The United States and China have entered the stage of "competitive coexistence", but competition must be carried out with a vigilance and humility, rather than expecting to change China." One view represents the holistic change in the view of Democratic elites on China, and is called the "New Washington Consensus". Under this premise of strategic competition, the United States will implement a new balance strategy.
The Indo-Pacific Affairs Coordinator of the US National Security Council, Campbell believes that "the real goal of the United States in Asia is to maintain a balance of power with China, maintain its influence in order to prevent China from dominance, and make Asian countries believe that the actions and purposes of the United States are legitimate." "The new balance is also a strategic consideration to ensure competitive coexistence. The new strategy must include a dynamic combination of power balance, and it must tie China into new or existing institutions to promote diplomatic dialogue and contact." He stressed that "the modern version of the typical balance of power cannot only use military deterrence. The domestic and defense dimensions must be taken into account. In addition, the balance of power also involves the United States' assessment and determination of its own economic and military strength." McEven, former senior director of Asian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, believes that "the bundled constraint strategy can work in balancing China's influence. The strategy pulls China into existing and newly established institutions and will weaken China's ability to modify rules and standards. Although China has begun to stick to its claims internationally, the bundled constraint strategy can still work, just needing to update standards involving issues such as Arctic, cybersecurity, drones and automatic weapons to continue to play a role." μn In short, the "new balance" of the Biden administration is a comprehensive strategy. It recognizes the reality that the Sino-US conflict is intensified under the new situation, clarifies China's position as a competitor of the United States, abandons the "engagement" policy with China that the Obama administration has always implemented before, and is not afraid of Sino-US frictions, conflicts and even confrontations. If necessary, it can actively use frictions to achieve its goals. The "new balance" combines traditional military deterrence, coupled with enhanced its "legality" in the Asia-Pacific region, and is complemented by efforts to set standards and agendas in international organizations and institutions. The fundamental goal is to limit China's rising influence to protect US hegemony.
(II) How does the Biden administration achieve a new balance
So, what aspects does the balance the United States wants to seek include?
First of all, we must find a balance between value diplomacy and the pursuit of commercial interests. Shortly after Biden took office, the United States' overall strategy is still underway. However, its current focus is to vigorously invest in and develop advanced technologies at home and recruit democratic allies to build an anti-China "unified front". The so-called "Ten Democratic States" is the embodiment of this concept. The US G10 Democratic G2 is to add Australia, India and South Korea to the G7, and at the same time link human rights and other value factors with the US high-tech competition to prevent China from using Internet artificial intelligence for "social control" and get rid of its dependence on China in the field of 5G.
In order to prevent the situation of "China wins the Internet", a report from the United States proposed to establish a "T-12" forum composed of the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, South Korea, Finland, Sweden, India, Israel, Australia and other countries to jointly promote the norms and values of scientific and technological development. "Hal Brands, a professor at the Hopkins School of International Studies and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Zack Cooper, a researcher at the Enterprise Institute and director of the Alliance for Ensuring Democracy and Security," published an article in Foreign Affairs, opposing the idea of "separating ideology from geopolitical competition in the U.S.-China competition." They believe that ideology plays an important role in U.S. foreign policy and is an important factor in winning the Cold War; in the face of Chinese competition, it is unrealistic to divest ideology in the face of Chinese competition. However, the ideological diplomacy the United States will promote must be balanced with its economic interests. Daniel, founding partner of Rongding Consulting Company Rosen said that when formulating China policies, the Biden administration needs to consider not only politics or ideology, but also carefully weigh the cost of its policies to the industry. "It is obvious that politics is the first priority at this moment. No leader or aspiring to become a leader wants to fall behind on the issue of toughness towards China, but "we cannot serve the interests of the United States without considering both business interests and national security interests."
Secondly, we must find a balance between non-traditional security and traditional security.One of the Biden administration's key tasks is to deal with climate change and fight the epidemic, but can this become the top priority of its foreign strategy? John Kerry, the U.S. government's special envoy on climate issues, once said that military and economic priorities will not be sacrificed for the sake of climate agreements. In other words, traditional security is still placed above non-traditional security, and the United States will still use traditional security as the core of formulating external strategies, but it has only added new content. For example, the same suppression of China is now focusing on turning to the digital economy and infrastructure related to its supply chain, and joining the United States' allies to build new technological rules for restricting China. The Biden administration believes that cooperation between the U.S. government and U.S. companies will be the key to balancing national security and business interests. The U.S. government will evaluate the current tax laws and licensing procedures under the federal Clean Air Act to attract investment and strengthen U.S. competitiveness in the industry. "Improving the capabilities of American companies, especially manufacturing industries, is also seen as an initiative to enhance the security capabilities of the United States.
Third, we must find a balance between "preventing China" and "cooperating with China". Prevention and suppression of China is an important means for the United States to mobilize the people and unite people. Since the Trump era, the United States has made extensive public opinion mobilization. The Biden administration will not give up this. According to a recent poll by Ipsos Group, 54% of Americans feel that China's rise is the biggest threat to the United States; most Americans are convinced that Trump's unconfirmed statement that China is responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic consequences, and believe that China "eats American lunch." P Russian scholar Bloshin believes that the Biden administration "will not have the same Chinese phobia as Trump was in power", "China is a threat to the Pentagon and the US think tanks. But political elites who maintain relationships with Democrats and Chinese companies will support normalization of relations with China "; "These factors are likely to lead to a new U.S. administration adopting a selective strategy to curb China and maintain dialogue at the same time," specifically, "Washington may be quite strict in restricting Chinese technology companies operating in the United States, and Chinese companies related to the military will also be under pressure. But in those areas where fits are possible, partnerships will be strengthened.
Fourth, maintain a balance between normal trade and high-tech restrictions. The Biden administration stresses that "no cold war." The strategic bottom line of non-decoupling. Biden's team realized that the "new Cold War" and "decoupling" are not in line with the long-term interests of the United States. Elv Ratner, head of the China Working Group of the US Department of Defense, emphasized in the Washington Post that "China-US competition is not a recurrence of the Cold War." First, China is not the "second Soviet Union", and has neither formed an anti-US group nor launched a proxy war. It is different from the Cold War. China-US economic exchanges are close, China has integrated into the international system, and China-US competition is limited and differentiated, rather than a comprehensive confrontation. Military alliances, geopolitical containment or comprehensive economic decoupling are not applicable. Second, the slogan of "full decoupling" will lead to racial discrimination in Chinese, and will also make the United States lose the opportunity to understand and enter China, and will not affect China's middle-class group. Third, "trade decoupling" is equivalent to "self-isolation", and "tariff wars may fall into a new Cold War trap", because of the existence of common people The two countries "can neither go to a Cold War nor be completely decoupled" and can "set conditions before cooperating". At the same time, the United States should reduce its dependence on Chinese goods and regulate China's development model and foreign behavior with multilateralism. Fourth, China and the United States can carry out technological competition and cooperation under the "limited decoupling" model. "n A study by the Peterson Institute of International Economics shows that American consumers may "recover" every job that Trump's "Made in the United States" policy should pay more every year $250,000, which means an extremely high $94 billion spent on purchasing goods and services. Since the Biden administration's slogan "buy American goods" is a protectionist policy similar to the Trump administration, it will obviously bring similar results. Supply chain flexibility in the four major areas of pharmaceutical supplies is evaluated and a report is submitted within 100 days.In the long-term assessment work, the U.S. government departments should form policy recommendations on measures to strengthen the flexibility of the U.S. supply chain, including designing institutional laws and regulations for improving the supply chain, as well as coordinating allies and partner countries to strengthen the supply chain through diplomatic, economic, and trade policies. Biden pointed out that the executive order aims to address supply chain loopholes in key areas of the economy, so that the United States can be prepared to deal with any crisis and rely on itself, "the best way to achieve this goal is to protect and enhance the United States' competitive advantage by investing domestically." Biden said that during the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States has shortage of public health epidemic prevention materials such as masks and protective clothing "should not happen again." When talking about the shortage of semiconductor supply, Biden quoted the proverb that "lost a horseshoe nail, loses a kingdom", emphasizing the importance of supply chain elasticity, and said that semiconductors are "horsehoe nails of the 21st century." In addition to short-term assessment of supply chains in key areas, this executive order also requires the U.S. government departments to conduct long-term assessments of supply chains in six major areas including defense, health, information technology, transportation, energy, and agriculture, and establish a four-year supply chain assessment and review mechanism. Biden stressed that "a resilient, diverse and secure supply chain will help revive U.S. manufacturing while creating high-paying jobs." "So, Paul Triolo, head of global science and technology policy at Eurasia, called the policy "clever decoupling".
Fifth, we need to find a balance between strategy and tactics. Strategically, Biden plans to strengthen ties with American allies to put pressure on China, but this may be easy to do and may face the difficulties of tactical implementation. The United States and its allies have different aspects such as economic ties with China and threat perception. A few countries are proactively handing out "vote letters" like Australia. Most countries, even the allies of the United States, are unwilling to "select sides" between China and the United States. Scott Kennedy, an expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pointed out that the Biden administration has clear policy goals and a large number of available measures, but has not yet "find out how to combine strategic deployment and tactics." There are still many things to be discussed in terms of competition between the United States and China."
For the Biden administration, putting politics above the economy will not benefit his campaign promise to achieve economic recovery. Biden is in a dilemma on China's political and economic issues: economic and political transformation cannot be done, nor can political and economic transformation; toughness against China will be given political plus points, but will be disastrous for the US economy, and "weakness" against China may stifle the cooperation efforts between the anti-China Congress and the new government. Therefore, the Biden administration decided to adopt a two-handed policy, that is, a policy of political and economic balance or combination. On the one hand, we must crack down on the so-called unfair trade behavior in China, and on the other hand, we must formulate a national strategy to help the United States strengthen its economic status and better fight against China's competition. Dai Qi, the U.S. Trade Representative to China, believes that "China is an opponent and a trading partner, and is also a huge player. We also need to cooperate with them to meet specific global challenges." Dai Qi pointed out, "We must remember how to walk, chess gum, and play chess at the same time." P That is to say, the Biden administration will adopt a three-dimensional, parallel goals and multi-pronged policy towards China.
4. Conclusion
The Biden administration's strategy toward China will be a new combination of competition and cooperation. This combination is dominated by competition and assisted by cooperation. Cooperation with China will also serve the US's advantageous competitive strategy against China. Based on the principle of competitive coexistence, control the intensity of competition in order to reduce costs and risks. Taking the realization of a new balance as a means, we will comprehensively handle the relationship between multiple sets of contradictory factors in order to maximize benefits in the Sino-US relations with limited costs and complex relations. "Competitive coexistence" and "new balance" are the embodiment of the strategic concept's return to "win without fighting" idea. It is based on the medium- and long-term and phased, emphasizing the fierce competition on the invisible front. Join forces with allies to set so-called "international rules" to achieve the goal of "promoting change through pressure".
Obviously, competition will become the main theme of the US strategy toward China.The Biden administration has fallen into the agenda set by Trump in its relations with China. In its competition and cooperation relationship, it emphasizes that competition overwhelms everything and replaces win-win situations with victory. The purpose of competitive coexistence will be to achieve a new balance in China's strategy. The new balance means that the Biden administration can maintain economic ties with China while limiting China's economy to the greatest extent, making it difficult for China to stay at the second-rate position in the world. Compared with the general containment strategy, the new balance is comprehensive, combining traditional power balance, military encirclement, rules disputes, ideological confrontation, public opinion wars and other factors. At the same time, the Biden administration intends to implement cooperative pressure on China in some areas that must be cooperated, so as to jointly solve the problems faced by mankind such as climate change and nuclear proliferation.
Although the Biden administration's competitive coexistence and new balance strategy is skillful in design, it is difficult to work. China is the world's second largest economy and has formed interdependent relationships with many countries around the world. It is also an irreplaceable important role in the international industrial chain and supply chain. Under the new development pattern with the domestic circulation as the main body and the domestic and international circulations mutually promoting each other, it is also difficult for the United States to achieve "regulation" on China. The "encirclement of China" pieced together by the United States seems huge, but in fact it has different demands. The United States' strategy of containing China is destined to fail.
* Statement: This article only represents the author's personal views and does not represent the position of this official account
Digital Economy Think Tank
Forum on Political Science and International Relations
In order to better serve the construction of the digital China, serve the construction of the "Belt and Road", and strengthen theoretical and practical exchanges in the process of digital economy construction. Experts and scholars from China's digital economy and the construction of the "Belt and Road" have established digital economy think tanks to contribute to the construction of digital China. Wei Jianguo, former vice minister of the Ministry of Commerce, served as honorary president, and well-known young scholars Huang Rihan, Chu Yin and others were the leaders. The Forum on Political Science and International Relations is a special platform under the Digital Economy Think Tank.
