In many previous articles, Watch Aviation has included the development of Japan's aviation manufacturing industry since the beginning of the 20th century. In a recent article, we focused on sorting out the intimate connection between the automobile industry, which is the pillar o

Japanese Airways Self-Defense Force F-86

As a result, license production orders for various aircraft such as T-34, T-33A, F-86F, P2V-7, etc. in the Japan Airways Self-Defense Force are coming one after another. However, these "full" license orders do not seem to have set off a competitive frenzy among major companies, but are silently arranged:

Fuji Heavy Industry was responsible for the license production of T-34 junior trainer aircraft and L-19 contact aircraft;

Kawasaki Heavy Industry obtained the license order of T-33A jet trainer aircraft and P2V patrol aircraft;

The largest order in the early days of the establishment of the Aviation Self-Defense Force, and the license production of F-86F was carried out by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industry's F-86

has such a "division of labor" because these companies have previously repaired this type of US military aircraft, or their components suppliers. For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was once the repair supplier of the US F-86, and Kawasaki Heavy Industries was once the component supplier of the US T-33A trainer aircraft...

Although such a division of labor seemed reasonable at the time, from 1954 to today, Japan's military aircraft production division model has never undergone major changes. To this day, Fuji Heavy Industry is still responsible for the production of primary trainers and helicopters; Kawasaki Heavy Industry is responsible for the production of marine patrol aircraft, advanced trainers and large aircraft; Mitsubishi Heavy Industry is responsible for the production of fighter ; Shin Akiha Industrial is responsible for the production of amphibious aircraft . A division of labor and production model like

is more like a behavior under the coordination of the government. As mentioned in the Japan Aviation Manufacturing Act, which officially came into effect in 1954: "Give a certain order to the production field and industrial chain", the government will take the lead in feeding the aviation industry in accordance with the "rowing and eating fruits" model.

Under the permission of Japan's Aviation Manufacturing Law, the respective business distribution of major aviation manufacturing enterprises. Of course, there is a certain reason for the division of labor such as

because the government is considering balance. For example, in the mid-1950s, in the first batch of military aircraft orders of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, Shinming and Industry did not get any production share, and the orders for repairs of US military aircraft that it originally owned began to decrease. But since then, in order to "spend" Shinami Heavy Industry's aviation manufacturing business, the Japanese government took the lead and allocated 20% of the workload (front fuselage, flat tail, vertical tail, rudder, elevator ) of Kawasaki Heavy Industry's P2V-7 patrol aircraft production tasks to Shinami Heavy Industry.

However, although the first batch of orders of the Self-Defense Forces were to produce US military aircraft under license, Japan's aviation manufacturing industry did not give up independent research and development of military aircraft. During this period after World War II, the most typical cases were Fuji Heavy Industries' T-1 senior trainer aircraft and Shin Akiwa's anti-submarine aircraft.

Fuji Heavy Industry T-1 trainer

Among them, the T-1 advanced trainer developed by Fuji Heavy Industry has the greatest impact on the development and production system of Japan's self-developed aircraft since then:

This is the first time that Japan competes with a plan, and it is also bid for all aviation manufacturers in the industry (although some models adopted a competitive trial model before the war, it is limited to 2 to 3 companies).

Fuji Heavy Industry finally stood out from the competition with Shin Akiwa Industrial and Kawasaki Heavy Industry, and won the first order for Japan to independently develop military models after the war. More importantly, some derivative models of T-1 also use Japan's first generation of domestic jet engines after the war.

This involves the adjustment of Japan's aviation engine industry.

The failed attempt to fly-fast separation

Before the end of World War II, large aircraft manufacturers in Japan's aviation manufacturing industry generally had aircraft and engine production capabilities at the same time. For example, Kawasaki Heavy Industry, Fuji Heavy Industry and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry all had independent engine design and manufacturing capabilities.

. In the seven years since Japan surrendered to , the global aero engine technology has progressed rapidly. It is no longer realistic to develop and produce aircraft engines separately by various Japanese aviation manufacturing companies based solely on their original technical capabilities and scientific research foundation.

Under the strategic planning of the Ministry of International Trade in Japan, in June 1955, with the joint investment of four companies, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Fuji Heavy Industry, Fuji Precision, and Ishikawa Shiromo Heavy Industry (the only jet engine manufacturer in Japan before the war), the Japan Jet Engine Company (NJE) was established, trying to "concentrate efforts to accomplish major tasks" and quickly break through the bottleneck of the research and development and production of jet engines.

But things did not go as smoothly as expected.

NJE's engine design originated from Fuji Heavy Industry's JO-1 engine solution in the past. The overall progress of R&D was relatively smooth. Four years after its establishment, NJE completed the early mass-produced model YJ3-3 of the first engine. However, because the installed capacity is too small (only a part of the T-1B trainer machine is assembled, the total order volume does not exceed 60 units), and the business prospects are extremely limited, the final production cost exceeds control.

J3 engine equipped with T-1

Finally, in 1960, NJE sold the engine production rights to Ishikawashima Kaoro Heavy Industry, and then entered the long river of history... This can be regarded as the initial case of the company's huge operating problems due to the high cost in the history of Japanese equipment research and development.

After the failure, Kawasaki Heavy Industry, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry and Ishikawa Shiroma did not completely give up engine manufacturing, but continued to develop in the field of license-based production. In the end, the situation in which these three companies control the Japanese aero engine field has been formed, and it has continued to this day.

civil aircraft has become a huge debt

In the field of civil aircraft, Japan has also made attempts early, and the most typical case is the YS-11 passenger aircraft.

In 1956, the Ministry of Public Transportation and Industry of Japan proposed the first plan for the development of civil passenger aircraft led by Japan. Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Shin Akiha Industrial, Kawasaki Heavy Industry and other companies naturally support it.

In 1957, the Japanese government began to provide budget for this project in the name of industrial technology subsidies. At the same time, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and University of Tokyo took the lead in establishing the Japan Transportation Aircraft Design Association.

In 1959, the Japan Transport Aircraft Design Association was reorganized into the Japanese Aviation Aircraft Manufacturing Company (NAMC), a half-official and half-civilian.

During this period, Japan's civil passenger aircraft project gathered almost all of Japan's aviation scientific research and production forces before and after World War II, involving entities including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Fuji (Nakashima) Heavy Industries, Shin Akiha (Western Sichuan) Industry, Showa Flight Planes, as well as equipment manufacturers such as Sumitomo Metal , Shimazu Production, Japan Electric, Toshiba , Mitsubishi Electric , Tokyo Aviation and Electrical Appliances.

This means that a large number of aviation talents have also been mobilized on a large scale to this project: Horikoshi Jiro , , who designed the "Type I" fighter jets, Minoro Ota who designed the "Purple Electric Reform" and "Type II Big Boat", Takeo Doi who designed the "Type Three Flying Swallow", Hidemasa Kimura who was once responsible for the development of record-breaking aviation research and development...

These Japanese fighter chief engineers who had become famous in Japan gathered in the design of the first Japanese civil passenger aircraft. They had only one purpose: to create a passenger aircraft that could pass the FAA certification.

Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force equipped YS-11

, but the road of YS-11 is not as optimistic as the Japanese government expected: although it successfully passed the FAA certification, its sales and operation problems have not been truly solved:

was discontinued until 1973, and a total of 182 YS-11s were produced. In addition to domestic use, there were 76 exported to 13 countries. Although this number has exceeded the planned 150 aircraft, Japan did not make any money, but left behind a huge debt of more than 36 billion yen.

In January 2020, the first batch of production YS-11 was dismantled and transferred to a park for exhibition. The plane had been parked in a hangar at Tokyo Haneda Airport for 20 years.

These debts have caused endless disputes between the Japanese government and aviation manufacturing companies. In the end, the Japan Aviation Aircraft Manufacturing Company, which created the YS-11, was officially dissolved in 1982. Its assets and talents were basically inherited by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. In the original plan, the larger jet passenger aircraft YX became a silence.