11 On January 4, 1941, Ye Ting led the New Fourth Army headquarters and troops to move northward in the rain. As a result, he was surrounded by more than 80,000 troops in the Maolin area by more than 80,000 troops on the way, and the retreat was cut off.
htmlOn November 10, the First Bureau of the Military Commission in Yan'an received a telegram from Ye Ting from southern Anhui, saying:
Our entire army was surrounded by Jingxian , south of Maolin, and fought fiercely with five or six times greater than us for five days and nights, breaking through the difficulties of the encirclement. Now the soldiers are overly tired, but their morale is still high, so they have to defend until the last one shot. However, the food and ammunition are not enough, and they may not be able to defend. Ting should be fully responsible. Please negotiate with Jiang and Gu in the name of blocking the slag and Enlai... The Second Detachment should immediately take active action to Suan and Anhui , so that northern Jiangsu can operate at the same time and support it is better. If there is no turning point, the entire army will be wiped out.
htmlOn the 111th, Ye Ting sent another telegram saying: The food and ammunition are not good enough and cannot last.
At this critical moment, in the early morning of the 12th, Mao Zedong, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang came to the First Bureau of the Military Commission. Director Guo Huaruo told Mao Zedong: It was too late to rush to help, and southern Anhui was in danger.
Mao Zedong and Zhu De and others thought there was no hope in southern Anhui. Mao Zedong pondered for a while and said, "Come on the store to ensure quality. I'll send a telegram to Ye Ting."
Then, Mao Zedong personally picked up a pen on the table and wrote:
"Ye, Rao:
Are you allowed to break through? If possible, I plan to break through and go east or north in batches to go east or north (Specify the target, divide it into several detachments to advance in different ways, without limiting time, with the principle of preserving strength and achieving tasks) In order to benefit, we hope to consider the decision. Because negotiations in Chongqing may not be reliable. At the same time, we should pay attention to negotiations with the head of the encirclement troops and hope to inform the situation.
Mao, Zhu, Wang
The morning of January 12th. "
The head of the encirclement troops mentioned by Mao Zedong, that is, Gu Zhutong, commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone of the Kuomintang. He and Ye Ting are classmates in the same class as Baoding Military Academy .
A staff officer Yang Di, who worked in the first bureau, later recalled:
"After Chairman Mao finished writing, he handed it over to Comrade Zhu De, Wang Jiaxiang and Wang Ruofei for viewing. After they agreed, they handed it over to Director Guo for viewing, and the confidential secretary personally sent it to the confidential department to translate it (the confidential department is very close, just at the foot of the mountain opposite the war room).
Mao Zedong stood up and said heavily: 'Based on what we learned and Ye Ting's call and listened to your report, I think the situation in southern Anhui is irreversible. As long as we can perform a scattered breakthrough, some comrades can be rescued.'"
However, Ye Ting was unwilling to execute it after receiving the telegram. Yang Di recalled:
"On January 12, Commander Ye Ting received a telegram from the Party Central Committee, Mao, Zhu and Wang... The Central Committee proposed two methods in the telegram: one is the method of breaking through and advancing eastward or northward in batches, and the other is to pay attention to the method of negotiating with the head of the encirclement.
Commander Ye Ting thought and struggled in thought for how to implement these two methods. It was not until the night of January 12 that he made up his mind to break through. Commander Ye Ting made up this decision after a very painful struggle, because in his lifelong military career, he had never set a "point" '' determination and order to break through. But this time it was the order of Comrade Mao Zedong, Zhu De and Wang Jiaxiang, the highest-level party of the Party Central Committee. Comrade Ye Ting has strong organizational discipline. He obeyed the telegram from the Party Central Committee and ordered the troops to break through.
He sent the telegram to the Party Central Committee and Central Plains Bureau , and even ordered the password to be burned and the radio station was smashed. The Central Committee of the Party asked him to negotiate with the Kuomintang, because of his resolute and unyielding nature, he would never negotiate, and he would never break through himself. He was determined to die for his life, and would rather be broken than to be completely broken.
At this time, Rao Shushi said to Comrade Ye Ting as the deputy secretary of the Southeast Branch of the Communist Party of China: 'We should go to negotiate, why not question Shangguan Yunxiang and Gu Zhutong? What shame is there to say about the subordinates going to meet superiors and classmates going to meet classmates? (Note: Ye Ting, Gu Zhutong, commander-in-chief of the Third War Zone of the Kuomintang, and Shangguan Yunxiang, commander-in-chief of the 32nd Army, were both classmates of the sixth class of Baoding Military Academy. At that time, they were all close friends in the struggle against Beiyang warlords.) You are now on your own, and the Party Central Committee has clear instructions. With the deputy secretary of the Southeast Branch of the Communist Party of China, it should not be too difficult to make this decision. ’
Comrade Ye Ting still refused to negotiate the proposal. He said: ‘I am a person who has left the party and has taught enough lessons. Although I am not a party member, I must be like a real Communist Party member. ’
Rao Shushi heard Comrade Ye Ting say this, which touched his inspiration and had the weapon to convince Ye Ting. He immediately said to Ye Ting: ‘The Party Central Committee sent us in a telegram to us on the 12th that negotiations in Chongqing may be unreliable, and at the same time, we should pay attention to negotiations with the head of the encirclementing troops. ’
Rao Shushi further said: ‘Negotiation, this is the instruction of the Party Central Committee… You have also suggested that the Central Committee ask Comrade Enlai to negotiate with the Chongqing authorities. Now the distance water can no longer save the near fire. Rear negotiations are not as effective as you negotiate in front of the enemy. ’
Comrade Ye Ting finally agreed after hearing this, but said sadly: ‘Although negotiations are necessary, they may not be effective. ’
Rao Shushi saw that Ye Ting had agreed to go to the negotiations and said, ‘The effect will definitely be, it’s just a difference between sizes and sizes. ’
Comrade Ye Ting’s pain calmed down a little, and he said, ‘Okay, I will follow the instructions of the Party Central Committee and go to Shangguan Yunxiang and Gu Zhutong for negotiations. ’
htmlOn November 13, Ye Ting went to negotiate with representatives sent by the Kuomintang army, and was detained and detained by his old classmate Gu Zhutong. He was then imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek for more than five years and was not released from prison on March 4, 1946.
It turns out that Ye Ting believes that the negotiations with Gu Zhutong are not effective. Didn’t Mao Zedong understand? In fact, Mao Zedong also knew that Ye Ting had no effect in negotiating with Gu Zhu. But why did he have to negotiate with Ye Ting?
The reason is to save Ye Ting's life. Yang Di recalled that Mao Zedong said something when he sent a telegram to a bureau of the Military Commission on the 11th, revealing the purpose of his approach. Yang Di recalled:
"The chairman paused, took out a cigarette, put it under his nose and smelled it for a while, and said, "I am very worried about the life and death of Comrade Ye Ting. I want him to negotiate with the surrounding troops so that he can save his life. Because Ye Ting is a famous general in the Northern Expedition and is very famous. He has a relationship with Gu Zhutong, Chen Cheng and many other senior Kuomintang generals are old classmates, and the Kuomintang army generals dare not kill him.' Mao Zedong used his good intentions to protect Comrade Ye Ting's life, which moved and admired us."
Because Ye Ting was likely to die in the melee of the chaos. And Mao Zedong used this method to save Ye Ting's life.
This is Mao Zedong's wisdom. The book "The Great River Goes East: Why They Converge Under Mao Zedong's Banner" published by the Communist Party History Press wonderfully describes Mao Zedong's many extraordinary wisdom and his little-known personal relationship with this and that senior leader. The book is the company's annual bestseller and has been listed on the list of many bestsellers.
