Deng Hua also said: "Boss, didn't you let us give us a view? That's how we see it. Whether to adopt it or not is decided by the boss. We will firmly implement what the boss has decided."
President Peng did not make any statement. Deng Hua and I explained our opinions and reasons again. Mr. Peng got up and left, and went to draft the telegram, but he drafted it according to his playing style south of Jinhua and Tieyuan.
At this time, it's time to have lunch. Deng Hua finished his meal and left. I was the only one left to have dinner with the boss. I took this opportunity and said, "Boss, I have the right to suggest three times. I have made suggestions to you twice. Now they are all gone. I will give you the last suggestion, and it will be up to you in the end." Then I explained my thoughts in detail again.
After hearing this, Mr. Peng pondered for a long time and sighed, "Your opinion also makes sense. I just consider that the Korean battlefield is narrow, and it is difficult to put the enemy's tank in it!"
I said, "It is difficult to drive the enemy tank in, but it is even more difficult to fight when we fight. When we move forward, the enemy has to retreat. We rely on two legs. The enemy is running in a car. Our people are tired and the terrain is not familiar with, so we can't catch up with the enemy's cars! In addition, how can we supply it when we fight far away? The supply line cannot be connected!"
Mr. Peng kept silent, so I didn't say anything else.
Later, I heard from Mr. Peng that the reason why he did not adopt our opinion was because he was worried that the time would be delayed and the enemy would be in danger of landing from my side. Mr. Peng’s concerns are also very reasonable. At that time, the troops we drove in were all deployed in frontal attacks. The enemy wanted to land from my side and destroy my frontal attack. Once this happens, we have to adjust the deployment again. The troops are all equipped on the front, with hundreds of thousands of troops, so it is difficult to turn around. So Mr. Peng wanted to launch the attempt to smash the enemy before the enemy landed.
On April 6, General Peng held the fifth enlarged meeting of the Volunteer Army Party Committee in the gold mine cave in Jinhua and arranged the fifth battle. Those who attended the meeting were General Peng, Deng Hua, Park Yiyu, I, Han Xianchu, , Jie Peiran, Du Ping, Song Shilun, commander and political commissar of the 9th Corps, commander of the 19th Corps, Yang Dezhi, political commissar of the 19th Corps, Li Zhimin, deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, and deputy political commissar Du Yide.
General Peng summarized the basic experience of the first four battles at the meeting. He pointed out that there are two main lessons learned in the fourth battle: in military terms, it is difficult for me to stick to the defense against the enemies of modern equipment, and actively moving defense is necessary; in politics, it shows that the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea was a long-term one, and it was a fantasy to break through 38th parallel and obtain Seoul, and it is a fantasy. General Peng also conveyed the general policy of the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao on "war preparations for a long time and try to strive for the short term." He said: Under this general policy, our country's military is preparing to replenish 600,000 people this year, and the country will focus on national defense construction, and economic construction should be carried out around national defense construction. Our army implements rotational operations, improves the equipment of the Volunteer Army, strengthens logistics institutions, and strives to prepare the air force and armored troops to participate in the war, and strives to end the war in a short period of time.
Mr. Peng focused on analyzing the battlefield situation and said: The war is still in a difficult and tense stage. All aspects of the situation and various signs show that after occupying the 38th parallel in the fourth battle, the enemy not only had to continue to advance northward, but also had a high possibility of landing from our side to cooperate with the frontal attack. The purpose was to occupy the 39th line, namely the Anzhou and Yuanshan front line. If the enemy's conspiracy succeeds, our army's main supply line will be cut off, which will pose a great threat to me. Therefore, we must make full estimates and make full preparations for the enemy's attempt to land.
In order to smash the enemy's plot to land from the side and cooperate with the frontal attack, we will avoid falling into an unfavorable situation of fighting on both sides; our army must launch an attack first. Mr. Peng said that at this time the fourth battle was fought, the enemy was very tired, the casualties and consumption had not been supplemented, and the reserve forces had not yet arrived. It was most advantageous for our army to organize a counterattack immediately.However, the assembly of our army's strategic reserve team has not been completed at this time, so we have to wait for a while to put the enemy on the front lines of Jinhua, Wendengli and Gancheng before counterattacking. If the enemy is progressing fast, I will start counterattacking on April 20. If the enemy is progressing slowly, I will start counterattacking in early May. General Peng said to all the commanders of the corps present: "How to fight this battle, everyone can express their opinions.
At this time, the commanders of the corps had just entered the battlefield and wanted to show their skills. They were very excited and expressed their opinions one after another. The venue was very active. Everyone expressed their agreement with General Peng's opinion.
General Peng further clarified that in order to change the situation of the Korean War, five or six enemy divisions need to be eliminated. In the fifth battle, we must strive to eliminate more of the enemy's vitality in an established place, smash the enemy's plans, and regain the initiative. The areas where the counterattacks were mainly carried out are the West Front Wenshan to Chunchuan . This area includes the 1st Division of South Korea, the 29th Brigade of the United States, the 3rd Division, the 25th Division, the 24th Division, the Turkish Brigade and the Southern Dynasty The 6th Division of Xian.
According to the characteristics of the enemy's battle arrangement, its reinforcements mainly come from horizontal directions, it decided that our army will implement the policy of combining battle division with combat (artistic) division in combat guidance, and combining battle encirclement and tactical encirclement and detour. In terms of military force layout, it is planned to first use a force to level the line from Jinhua and Jiao, and use the mountainous areas in this area to split a gap and cut the enemy from the east and west.
At the same time, the 3rd Corps attacked from the front, the 9th Corps and the 19th Corps attacked from the east and west wings respectively and carried out the battle detour, and each divided and annihilated the enemy, and then developed in depth. The Jinxiong Group of the People's Army on the East and West Front and the 1st Corps of the People's Army on the East Front attacked the enemy in the face, actively cooperated with cooperation.
General Peng specifically solicited opinions on the time of the battle. He asked: Is it OK around the 20th? Is it time for the troops to assemble and arrive at the attack starting point and impact position? Several commanders said that there is no problem and it is guaranteed to start at that time.
In order to ensure victory of the battle, General Peng also made the following arrangements: First, seize the time to conduct political mobilization and tactical education immediately; Second, organize the first batch of cadres of the participating troops to introduce combat experience to the newly participating troops, and send consultants to assist the new participating troops in command; Third, strictly organize combat reconnaissance and tactical reconnaissance according to the combat area; Fourth, speed up the collection of grain and material, and when the battle starts, each participating department will lead its own 5 days of dry food, each branch will prepare 5 days of dry food and follow the troops. At the same time, all efforts must be made to overcome the difficulties of the 300-mile grain-free area when we advanced south, so that the troops can continuously obtain food and ammunition supplies; Fifth, the health department is required to prepare to contain 40,000 to 50,000 wounded people; Sixth, Engineer troops immediately starts to repair the highway from Xichuan through Dexian Liningbian, Monsan to Yangde, and prepare to serve as the main transportation line once the enemy lands from the side and the traffic on our western line is cut off.
General Peng finally emphasized: The logistics work is repeated again and again, and we must pay special attention to the food supply of the five armies on the Eastern Front. If there is no food for a day or two, the best (combat) plan will be completed. If you win this time, half of the credit of all the officers and soldiers will be calculated and half of the logistics.
On the 10th, General Peng sent Chairman Mao to his ideas and deployment. On the 13th, Chairman Mao replied that he fully agreed and pointed out that "in order to prevent the enemy from landing from Yuanshan, it seems that the main force of the 42nd Army must be located in and near Yuanshan City to ensure Yuanshan."
htmlOn 11 and 18, the Volunteer Army Command issued instructions on combat guidance and tactical thinking to its subordinate troops, emphasizing that as long as our army can closely grasp the principle of concentrating superior forces and destroying the enemy in each case, divide the enemy from both sides in the battle, and use sufficient force to cut the advancing enemies into several large pieces, and concentrate absolutely superior forces and firepower to quickly annihilate them separately, we will definitely win. Whether this battle can annihilate the enemy in large quantities depends on whether the entire army can persist in fighting during the day.Du Ping, director of the Political Department, discussed and drafted the political mobilization order for the fifth battle, and issued it to the entire army on the 19th.The mobilization order pointed out that this battle is the key to whether our army has taken the initiative and the key to shortening or delaying the Korean War. We call on the entire army to mobilize, carry forward the spirit of hard struggle, and eliminate the enemy in an institutional way with incomparable courage and wisdom, and strive to win every battle.
During this period, the 19th Corps, the 3rd Corps, and the 9th Corps, which I had been resting some time ago, have gathered in the pre-determined areas respectively. The newly entered North Korea's 2nd Artillery Division, the 1st Artillery Division, the 31st Anti-Tank Destroyer Artillery Division and the 61st Anti-aircraft Artillery Division have all been assigned to the armies. In order to ensure the smooth flow of railways and highways, the Military Commission transferred the 3rd Division of the Railway Corps and 4 engineer regiments into North Korea, and appointed the 18th Public Security Division to serve as air defense posts along the railways and highways, responsible for air surveillance. A forward service command was also established, which commanded 6 branches to be responsible for the logistics support work of the three corpses.
At this time, the Volunteer Army had 14 troops, 6 artillery divisions, 4 artillery divisions, and a certain number of railway soldiers, engineers, public security, logistics and other troops in North Korea. Among them, except for the 38th and 42nd armies and the newly-entered 47th Army in the rear and were responsible for the task of coastal defense and emergency repair of airports, the troops responsible for front-line combat have reached 3 corpses, 11 armies, 3 artillery divisions and 1 anti-aircraft artillery division.
On the day the 5th enlarged meeting of the Volunteer Army Party Committee was held, the enemy of the North had advanced to Shangganling , which was only a few dozen kilometers away from Shangganling , the Jinhua area of Zhisi stationed. For the safety of General Peng and Zhisi, as soon as the meeting was finished, we moved to Kongsi Cave, which is more than 100 kilometers northwest of Shangganling.
In order to prevent accidental sacrifices at the same time, the leaders of our headquarters were divided into three batches when they were transferred. Peng always left the first batch, I left the second batch, and Deng Hua left the third batch. The day after Mr. Peng left, after dark, I rode on the road in a jeep and arrived at Kongsidong in the middle of the night.
This place in North Korea has a characteristic, there are gold mines everywhere and some gold mine caves everywhere. Our headquarters lived in gold mines after entering North Korea. Dayu Cave is a gold mine, Junzi is a gold mine, Jinhua is a gold mine, and Kongsi Cave is a gold mine. The Kongsi Cave we are here now is a gold mine, and finally transferred to Huicang is also a gold mine. The reason is that there are holes in the gold mine, which is good for air defense.
There are also many caves in Kongsi Cave, which are on the top of the mountain and under the mountain. However, the difference here is that water is often dripping in the mine, which is very wet. Mr. Peng just didn't want to live in the cave. In addition to thinking that the cave was wet and stuffy, he also thought that the cave was dark and had to light candles during the day. Just in time, there are several houses at the foot of the mountain, which have not been bombed by enemy planes. The comrades from the management office arranged for him to live in, and dug a small air-raid shelter for him at the door of his house.
