After the outbreak of the full-scale anti-Japanese war, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China took into account the weakness of our anti-Japanese forces and led the military and civilians to creatively create a variety of combat methods, such as guerrilla warfare , tunnel warfare , landmine warfare, sparrow warfare , etc.
Among them, guerrilla warfare was the main anti-Japanese war practiced by the Eighth Route Army in the early stage of the War of Resistance. The mobile and flexible combat deployment and unexpected offensive strategies greatly restrained and consumed the Japanese army's forces, and captured our army's active offensive stage in the second half of the war. The foundation is.
However, this is a method that is very consistent with the military situation of our army at that time. At the beginning, it was opposed by many people. Chairman Mao and Lin Biao negotiated many times about this, and finally even attracted the Chairman's anger.
So, what kind of tortuous process has the establishment of the guerrilla warfare policy gone through?
Pingxingguan victory
On August 15, 1937, the vigorous national unified war of resistance officially started. The Red Army team led by the Communist Party of China was adapted into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army and included in the second theater of Yanxishan, Northeast China.
At that time, the Japanese invaders continued to approach the Taiyuan area and successively occupied many surrounding areas.
On September 21, 1937, the 21st Japanese brigade went to the area of Pingxingguan , trying to break through the Pingxingguan defense line, joining with the Japanese army north of Yanmen Pass, and then achieving the siege against Taiyuan.
The defenders of the Second War Zone of the Kuomintang Army resisted tenaciously, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. Seeing that they could not capture them for a long time, the 21st Brigade of the Japanese Army asked for help from the 5th Division of the .
In order to defend the defense line, Yan Xishan sent two brigades of troops to reinforce the Pingxingguan area and called Commander-in-Chief Zhu De, asking the Eighth Route Army to cooperate in combat.
According to the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, led by Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen and others, went to Pingxingguan, and the inspiring Pingxingguan battle began.
On September 14, 15 Division arrived at Yuanping Station and entered the battlefield.
In order to win the first battle of the Eighth Route Army, Lin Biao came to Pingxingguan front three times to inspect the battlefield.
For the first time, he came to Pingxingguan Pass and observed the mountain terrain in the eastern part of Pingxingguan on the map. Then he surveyed the landforms on both sides of the road at the foot of the mountain;
For the second time, Lin Biao focused on the Laoye Temple and the south side of Qiaogou. The terrain and a complete ambush plan formed in my mind; during the last inspection, Lin Biao brought brigade and regiment cadres to convey the combat deployment and ambush plan to everyone.
Everything is ready, just wait for the combat order to be issued.
On the evening of September 24, the 115th Division received a combat order and the troops set off toward the planned ambush position.
After a night of storm, the soldiers all entered the pre-rest positions before dawn on the 25th, and hid in the valley, quietly waiting for the arrival of the enemy.
0:00 at around 7 a.m. on the 25th, the 21st Brigade of the Fifth Division of the Japanese Army, totaling more than 100 military vehicles, and more than 200 trucks loaded with supplies entered the Qiaogou area where our army set up.
When all the enemy troops advanced into the circle, with the commanders and soldiers, the three regiments of the 115th Division, which had already been ambushed, launched an attack on the Japanese army at the same time.
For a moment, artillery fire poured in, and the Japanese army was caught off guard.
Under the siege of the Eighth Route Army, the 21st Brigade of the Japanese Army was soon separated by our army, and the two sides launched hand-to-hand combat .
to around 3 pm, the third main regiment of the Eighth Route Army attacked at the same time, and the 21st Brigade of the Japanese Army finally became a turtle in the jar.
In this battle, the Eighth Route Army annihilated thousands of enemies and seized a large number of vehicles and military supplies, firing the first shot of victory for the Eighth Route Army in the War of Resistance. The victory of the Pingxingguan battle inspired the leaders of the North China Military Branch. During the exchange, everyone generally believed that: "The Japanese army is not invincible. If the Eighth Route Army has equipment like the Kuomintang and cooperate with the Kuomintang and local people to fight, Shanxi can defend it. Come down. ”
However, the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China have different opinions.
Liu Shaoqi believes that the North China region cannot last long in front of the Japanese army, and it is still necessary to develop guerrillas as soon as possible and establish people's regime.
This view was recognized by Chairman Mao.
Pingxingguan did win a great victory, but the problems behind it also have to be taken seriously. Although the
115th Division annihilated thousands of enemy troops, more than 800 casualties were also killed and killed by our soldiers. Many of them were veterans who experienced the Long March .
In addition, the Kuomintang army did not cooperate with our army's battle. The Kuomintang army deployed north of Pingxingguan remained motionless and even let some of the enemy go.
At the same time, Lin Biao initially wanted to capture prisoners and march, and thus improve the morale of our army, but the Japanese army did not achieve its goal. At the last moment of fighting, he did not leave a living for our army.
Afterwards, even Lin Biao himself reflected: the method of concentrating the main force of the Eighth Route Army to conduct mobile warfare is not feasible. Under the current circumstances of our army, it should still focus on sneak attacks and invasions behind enemy lines.
's view coincides with the guerrilla warfare ideas proposed by Chairman Mao Zedong at the Luochuan meeting some time ago.
Unfortunately, Lin Biao did not support this combat plan at that time and insisted on concentrating his troops to launch a mobile warfare. The Chairman was furious about this. What was going on?
Lin Biao tried his best to oppose guerrilla warfare
After the full-scale war of resistance began, the Kuomintang army retreated in the face of the Japanese invaders' attack, and a large area of land fell into the enemy.
The Kuomintang army, whose troops and weapons are far better than those of the Eighth Route Army, are like this. How should more than 40,000 Eighth Route Army fight this battle?
Chairman Mao fell into deep thought.
For a long time, Chairman Mao has locked himself in the house, studying various war books and cases in ancient and modern times, and hopes to point out a clear way for the Eighth Route Army to fight on the battlefield of the Anti-Japanese War.
Finally, Chairman Mao proposed a strategic plan of "mobilizing the masses and carrying out guerrilla warfare" based on the current national conditions of our country.
In early August 1937, when Chairman Mao passed this combat principle to various troops, it attracted many generals' confusion.
Seeing that the Eighth Route Army was about to fight, Chairman Mao Zedong was extremely anxious. He quickly rushed from Yan'an to the Luochuan area, and summoned the generals from the front line to gather in Luochuan to personally explain the combat strategies to everyone.
In late August, in a dilapidated private school on the outskirts of Luochuan City, 22 military and political leaders of the CPC Central Committee, including Chairman Mao, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, etc., were all present.
Starting from the 22nd, everyone had a heated discussion on the strategy of the war of resistance to be implemented.
Chairman Mao first revealed his views on guerrilla warfare, and many comrades expressed different opinions.
They believe that this is no longer the guerrilla warfare era during the Red Army period, and should focus on fighting mobile warfare, and Lin Biao is one of them.
This part of comrades said: We should cooperate with the Kuomintang army to fight more major wars, and the troops should be concentrated and all of them should be driven out.
Chairman Mao firmly opposed this view: "We cannot underestimate the Japanese army, and the combat methods cannot be bound by the old tricks of the Kuomintang. It is absolutely impossible to fight hard. Our supply of weapons and equipment is a big problem. All my family was completely covered up at once.”
Chairman Mao’s words were on the point, which attracted many comrades’ approval.
Mr. Zhu took the lead in expressing his agreement, but also raised concerns: "If you don't fight a big war, what will the Kuomintang react? Will the people have any opinions?"
This is indeed a very worthy of consideration. It is also the reason why the Chairman cannot make up his mind to issue a combat strategy directly. The purpose of the Luochuan Conference was to establish the combat principles of our army in the War of Resistance. Unfortunately, until the meeting ended and the troops were departing, the Party Central Committee still had differences.
Even Mr. Peng wrote in his later memoirs: "Many comrades in the organization did not realize the strategic significance of guerrilla warfare at the beginning, and we did not have a clear understanding of the policies put forward by Chairman Mao."
At the end of August, Chairman Mao returned to Yan'an, and the Eighth Route Army troops also entered the battlefield one after another.
Chairman Mao was always worried, very worried that the commanders and fighters on the front line could not implement the guerrilla warfare policy, so the Chairman sent five telegrams in September to remind all departments. Soldiers.
According to the instructions of the chairman, the two bosses Zhu and Peng made clear that each unit: "mobilize the masses and carry out extensive guerrilla warfare. "
Chairman Mao was very pleased when he heard the news, but some generals did not follow the instructions of the chairman.
In September, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen led the 115th Division to the Pingxingguan area. After Lin Biao inspected the battlefield, he made a combat plan and conducted a battle plan at the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army. Report: When the "344th Brigade and the division concentration camp were preparing to attack the friendly positions of Pingxingguan, our army took the opportunity to attack the enemy's left side and annihilate one of the enemy. "
Lin Biao's combat plan was also passed to Chairman Mao in Yan'an. The chairman knew that Lin Biao had always wanted to fight big wars and mobile wars.
So he said in a reply to Lin Biao: "Our army should adhere to the guerrilla warfare policy and cooperate with friendly forces in the battle. "
After the telegram was sent, the chairman was worried and sent a telegram to Lin Biao: "Our team cannot play a strategic decisive role now and should not shake the original established policy. "
However, these two telegrams still cannot convince Lin Biao to give up the decision to abandon the large-scale mobile warfare.
In a reply to the chairman, Lin Biao said: "Under the current battlefield situation, our vanguard should regard large-scale annihilation of the enemy as its main task , fighting big wars and captives can improve the confidence of the military and civilians in the war of resistance and enhance the prestige of our army. "
Chairman Mao received a telegram from Lin Biao and was furious on the spot. He slapped the table and shouted: "Lin Biao is still insisting on large-scale mobile warfare, and he still wants to show himself and be a hero of the War of Resistance! "
The tea that had just been poured on the table was also overturned by the Chairman's palm.
Finally, Chairman Mao gave a compromise instruction on Lin Biao's combat plan, ordering him to dispatch only one brigade of troops to fight mobile warfare.
Chairman once again emphasized : "In the current war situation, our army does not play a decisive role! Guerrilla warfare is our specialty. "
Although Lin Biao and the 115th Division achieved a great victory in Pingxingguan, even Lin Biao himself saw the interests clearly, so he wrote the helpless words in his diary that "it is not appropriate to engage in large-scale mobile warfare".
The establishment of the guerrilla warfare policy
Pingxingguan victory greatly inspired many comrades, so that the North China Military Branch made some overconfident remarks.
But the subsequent war situation quickly made the North China Military Branch realize the mistake.
The subsequent rectification movement During the movement, the North China Military Branch stated: "The estimate of the Kuomintang is too high, and the measurement of our strength is not accurate, and the mistake of underestimating the enemy is made. "
With the loss of Taiyuan, the Kuomintang army lost all the battlefield in North China. Chairman Mao issued an instruction: "The frontal war in North China has basically ended, and the guerrilla warfare stage has begun. I hope that all ministries will implement their policies and policies. "
However, when the Eighth Route Army was preparing to fully transfer to the guerrilla war behind enemy lines in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions, Wang Ming , the head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China's delegation to the Communist International, returned to the country.
In the combat meeting at the end of 1937, Wang Ming urged Chairman Mao’s guerrilla warfare policy was criticized, believing that guerrilla warfare could not cause any damage to the Japanese army, and strongly advocated that the Eighth Route Army adopt mobile combat methods.
Wang Ming’s words were somewhat Communist International 's voice has shaken many comrades in the party again.
At the Politburo meeting at the end of February 1938, Wang Ming continued to stick to his proposal and proposed that the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and other anti-Japanese troops be widely implemented Mobile warfare.
Wang Ming's views were not based on our army's current military situation at all. He just blindly copied the experience and cases of the Communist International. Such an approach was naturally opposed by Chairman Mao.
In fact, as far as the situation on the anti-Japanese battlefield in North China was concerned, Wang Ming's instructions did not have much impact, because the troops had already begun to go deep into the enemy's back and launch guerrilla operations against the Japanese army.
In the spring of 1938, our army had opened up anti-Japanese bases such as northwest Shanxi , southwest Shanxi , southwest Shanxi , and Jinchaji . Mobilizing the masses and carrying out guerrilla warfare has become a strategic policy unanimously recognized by our army.
In order to enable the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army to thoroughly understand the guerrilla warfare strategies behind enemy lines, Chairman Mao published "Strategic Issues of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Warfare" and " on Protracted Warfare " in 1938, giving an in-depth and easy-to-understand explanation of guerrilla warfare related issues.
With Chairman Mao’s instructions, the development of in the anti-Japanese base area behind enemy lines was in full swing.
Even the Communist International recognized Chairman Mao’s combat plan. In the summer of 1938, Wang Jiaxiang, the representative of the Communist International, re-transmitted the instructions:
affirmed Chairman Mao’s guerrilla warfare line, and expressed his support for Chairman Mao to become the leader of the Communist Party of China. .
Soon, the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held in Yan'an. Chairman Mao's leadership position within the party was finally established, and his military line was also unanimously recognized and supported.
At this point, the combat policy of guerrilla warfare was established legitimately and became the main combat strategy that our army adhered to in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japan.
Conclusion
As our army won one victory after another on the battlefield, as the scale of the anti-Japanese base behind enemy lines became larger and larger, as more and more people joined the anti-Japanese war team, our army was fighting against Japan The passive situation on the battlefield was getting better and better day by day, and slowly turned passive into initiative, launching a counterattack against the Japanese army until the Japanese invaders were defeated.
Facts have proved that Chairman Mao’s guerrilla policy is extremely correct.
is the so-called "practice leads to true knowledge".
Chairman Mao’s policy has been proven by practice, withstood the test of practice, and has also pointed out the correct direction for the soldiers of our army in the early stage of the War of Resistance.
