After liberation, Hu Lian held a high position in Taiwan's military circles and was a pivotal figure. On the mainland, he is also a real "villain".
However, even under the fierce and tense military and ideological confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait at that time, the former commander of the 18th Army in the mainland Yang Botao (when Hu Lian was the commander of the reorganized 11th Division, he was the commander of the reorganized 11th Brigade). Brigadier), Chen Jiazhen, who served as the Chief of the Operations Section of the 18th Army Staff Office just after the end of the Anti-Japanese War, and Yin Zhongyue, who served as the commander of the 54th Regiment of the 11th Division during the Battle of Nanma, all publicly wrote recollections of Hu Lianming in varying degrees, "withstanding the wind" and derogating but praising Hu Lianming.
In her memory article, Chen Jiazhen mentioned Hu Lian's old colleague in Chiang Kai-shek 's attendant room and Liu Zipei, a classmate of Lu University. This Liu Zipei is not a prominent figure in the national military system. It can be said that he is unknown, but he is relatively upright and lives a poor life in the national military system.
When Chen Jiazhen went from Wuhan to Peiping on behalf of the Eighteenth Army to contact Sun Lianzhong, commander of the Eleventh War Zone, to find the army station, he visited Liu Zipei on behalf of Hu Lian and gave him 200,000 yuan in the name of Hu Lian.
Liu Zipei said to Chen Jiazhen, "Hu Boyu has no problem fighting. He deserves the respect Jiang and Chen hold for him. Don't be proud."
After Chen Jiazhen finished her business and returned to the Eighteenth Army, she reported to Hu Lian that because Liu Zipei was in trouble, he gave Liu Zipei an extra 100,000 yuan on behalf of Hu Lian. Hu Lian said, "That's great. How many upright people are there like Liu Zipei?".
In two simple sentences, the sympathy and sympathy between Hu Lian and Liu Zipei can be seen vividly on the page.
As the saying goes, "Birds of a feather flock together, people are divided into groups." Hu Lian could appreciate the upright Liu Zipei so much, and the upright Liu Zipei also recognized Hu Boyu quite a lot and became a close friend.
If we put aside his political differences and his stubbornness to stick to the end of the war because everyone was his own master, and his "reactionary choice" of following the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek throughout his life, Hu Lian's personality should actually be considered good.
Judging from current mainland historical data, especially the general persona created on the Internet, the original commander of the 74th Division Zhang Lingfu can be said to be a typical and extreme "proud, arrogant, reckless, low EQ, arrogant, and even brainless" person. But Wu Qiang, who became famous by writing the novel "Red Sun" in the 1950s, doesn't think so.
Wu Qiang, as the missionary minister of the Sixth Column in Huaye, personally experienced and witnessed the entire process of the Seventy-fourth Division from being proud in Northern Jiangsu to being defeated in Southern Shandong. In the Battle of Lianshui, Wang Bicheng's Sixth Column and Zhang Lingfu's Seventy-fourth Division were mortal enemies.
In 1956, when Wu Qiang wrote "Red Sun", the People's Republic of China had just been founded, and it was just nine years after 1947. When he wrote "Red Sun", his impression of Zhang Lingfu should be a relatively objective impression after sufficient rationality.
In the preface of the book, when he mentioned Zhang Lingfu, the original words he used were "he is arrogant, cold, reserved, hypocritical, and cunning." Not only is there not a single word related to the almost mocking impression of Zhang Lingfu on today’s Internet, he is “retarded, brainless, reckless, and crazy.” On the contrary, he used the words reserved and cunning towards Zhang Lingfu.
Reserved means not showy, cunning means not reckless and full of tricks. In fact, in the minds of ordinary cadres in Huaye at that time, the Seventy-fourth Division was known for its cunning and cunning tactics. It is not at all what many people in today's cyberspace simply believe, relying solely on American firepower to overwhelm everyone, and there is no technical content in the battle.
Huaye's battle materials said that the 74th Division was very good at feinting frontal attacks and detouring from the side. They often put some steel helmets on the edge of the trench to confuse Huaye, and then sent powerful troops to Huaye's side to surround and attack, which was very cunning.
World War II Lianshui, the reason why the Seventy-fourth Division attacked Lianshui City was because they learned the passwords of the Communist Army through prisoners, sent a battalion disguised as the People's Liberation Army, and falsely opened the city gate to complete the breakthrough.
Having fought bloody battles with the Japanese for 8 years, the reorganized 74th Division has many veterans and is very cunning when fighting.This is Zhang Lingfu. Among the generals of the same level in the national army, who has the best relationship with him? Hu Lian, commander of the 18th Army, is also one of the five main forces of the national army.
According to Wu Qiang, Zhang Lingfu is arrogant, cunning, and reserved, which shows that this person is actually wise, judgmental, and thoughtful, but at the same time he is arrogant, aloof, and looks down upon ordinary people.
According to current historical data, Zhang Lingfu only showed more respect for his old boss Wang Yaowu . For example, before the Menglianggu Battle , Zhang Lingfu and the main cadres of the 74th Division were optimistic about Shandong's military.
The telegram sent by Zhang Lingfu to Wang Yaowu contained the sentence "I can't help but admire Taidai in the north". He also said that when the Jiaoji Road is opened and he meets Duke Zuo in Jinan, he can have a good drink.
Apart from this, I saw almost no other figures from the national army who were pinched by him with his eyes. But Hu Lian is Zhang Lingfu's rare good friend.
Although there is a relationship between fellow Shaanxi fellows and the commanders of the five main elite Central Military Forces, mutual recognition of their abilities, conduct, and taste in life is probably the most important thing.
said that Zhang Lingfu was proud and looked down upon many people. Why not Hu Lian? Huang Baitao was almost the regional director with the best performance in the National Army system during the Liberation War. During the entire Liberation War, the main force rarely received the Medal of the Blue Sky and White Sun based on military exploits, but Huang Baitao got it. But Hu Lian still called Huang Baitao "Huang Hunyong" and Xuzhou Liu Zhi "Liu Hunyong".
And the reason why Hu Lian and Zhang Lingfu have good relations is. Obviously there is mutual recognition of each other's abilities. So you say Hu Lian’s level is low? From the perspective of the national military system, he is a very strong general.
The most brilliant performance of the 11th Reorganized Division in the War of Liberation was the Battle of Nanma. Hu Lian's command was determined, well thought out, well laid out, resolute and ruthless, which was well reflected.
At that time, Huaye divided its troops, and the four columns of the inner corps 2/6/7/9 and the special column planned to follow Meng Lianggu's example and eat up the 11th Division in one bite. Chiang Kai-shek took advantage of his plan and fished in Nanma. Let Hu Lian's troops be used as bait to go deep into Nanma, the core area of the liberated area, to attract Huaye to attack, and then mobilize the Fifth Army , 25th Division, 64th Division, and the entire 9th Division to counter-encirclement. Let Meng Lianggu's unrealized battle plan be re-executed in Nanma.
In the Battle of Nanma, the 7 infantry regiments of the 11th Division withstood the siege of Huaye's four main columns for seven days and nights, causing great damage to Huaye. As a result, Huaye entered a very "dark" low ebb period.
In the post-war summary of the 11th Division, Hu Lian was praised to the sky by everyone. Even President Chiang who was far away in Nanjing praised him as a victorious general.
The soldiers of the 18th Army believed that Hu Lian's formation, the fortress he built, and the agility and ruthlessness of his emergency command, especially the pre-stored drinking water for more than a week in each independent stronghold, including the temporary toilets, kitchens, and stored grain and ammunition dug in the independent strongholds, all played a vital role in the 11th Division's ability to withstand the "heavy hammer" of Huaye.
Around Nanma, under Hu Lian's personal supervision, thousands of sub-forts were dug and built. Each of them can operate independently and can quickly form fire support for each other, causing great trouble to Huaye. Huaye often used the strength of a regiment and suffered heavy casualties, barely managing to capture a company and platoon-level stronghold of the 11th Division. The exchange ratio is very uneconomical.
Hu Lian's military exploits in the First Battle of Nanma were aided by the sudden strengthening of the national army's determination to coordinate and cooperate and the courage to rescue and rescue after the Meng Lianggu War, but Hu Lian's well-organized command, subtle layout, and quick responses still played the most important role.
If Hu Lian had not predicted the enemy in advance, fully estimated the difficulties, and dug out so many living facilities and reserves of food, ammunition and water inside the independent stronghold, the 11th Division would never have been able to withstand the attack of the four main columns of Huaye.
Hu Lian actually loves to joke. It's not the saying that someone made up on the Internet. The widely circulated claim is that the chairman said about him, "Cunning as a fox and as fierce as a tiger."It seems that he is a very dark and cunning person, very withdrawn and very cruel, but in fact he is not.
Judging from the recollections of more relevant personnel in the national military system, Hu Lian is generally a relatively gentle, humorous, optimistic, even talkative, and joking person.
During the Battle of Longfeng, the reorganized 11th Division was cut and besieged by the superior forces of Liu Bocheng in the middle field. The battle was fierce.
But even so, Hu Lian took a rare break in the headquarters and joked with his staff after dinner. He used an anecdote about when Yang Hucheng was besieged and asked friendly forces to rescue him to liven up the atmosphere.
In fact, at that time, he and the Fifth Army Qiu Qingquan were very unhappy because the Fifth Army refused to work hard to rescue the siege when they called for reinforcements. But he still made fun of Yang Hucheng's experience when he sent electricity to ask for help but was rejected by friendly forces.
He told his staff, "In the past, when Yang Hucheng was defending Xi'an and was under siege, he sent electricity to the friendly forces to urge relief, but the friendly forces could not go back. Yang Hucheng was furious and personally responded to the call with only sixteen words: "If the enemy comes to attack me, you don't care. If I die, you will inevitably die too. "Everyone burst into laughter after hearing this.
Unfazed in the face of battle, optimistic and cautious, resolute and flexible, Hu Lian is actually a very capable general on the battlefield.
Moreover, Hu Lian is actually very emotional. He is not the made-up "as cunning as a fox and as fierce as a tiger" at all. As the six-character comment said, it seemed very lonely, dark, and violent.
During the Battle of Menglianggu, the 11th Division was ordered from Xintai to break the siege of Menglianggu. Before they could defeat it, the 74th Division was over. Halfway through, Hu Lian encountered the defeated troops of the 74th Division running north. After briefly understanding the battle situation, Hu Lian sighed sadly: "Why do you all go to such a barren mountain when you are so good? "
During the Battle of Suqian, Hu Lian failed to save Dai Zhiqi . Dai Zhiqi actually kept talking to Hu Lian until the last minute. Until the People's Liberation Army rushed into Dai Zhiqi's command post, Dai shot himself. Hu Lian was so desperate that he couldn't stop crying.
In the Battle of East Henan , Kaifeng fell, and rescuing troops was like putting out a fire. In order to speed up the march and save Henan Provincial Chairman Liu Mao'en, Hu Lian volunteered with Zhang Zhen and asked to go into battle lightly and abandon their baggage. He personally led all nine infantry regiments of the 18th Army to advance quickly through gaps, which demonstrated the fierceness and vigor rarely seen in the national army system and rescued sieges. determination.
Double accumulation of encirclement, Hu Lian was already in Nanjing and was able to escape. However, in order to assist Huang Wei in setting up defense and waiting for rescue, he still took a small plane and jumped into the encirclement alone. This courage, responsibility and spirit of sacrifice are actually very rare in the national military system.
Putting aside the filters of political opinion and camp, Hu Lian rushed from the safety of the rear into the double-stacked iron barrel-like encirclement alone. This move can be regarded as a fearless comment.
Moreover, he was not the commander of the 12th Corps at that time. Not happy. But in the face of a formidable enemy, he could put aside his past grudges, fly into the encirclement, and sincerely help Huang Wei deploy his troops and adjust their formation.
Although Huang Wei usurped his position as the commander of the Twelve Corps, he had no objection to Hu Lian. He always believed that "Hu Lian is a rare talent" and urged him to leave the encirclement to save some fire for the party and state.
Generally speaking, after the founding of the People's Republic of China, old people in the former military system inevitably added " Get some negative reviews.
However, it is almost difficult to see "negative evaluation" of Hu Lian in the existing recall articles of old people in the National Army who had interactions with Hu Lian.
You must know that Hu Lian has been confronting the mainland across the sea in Kinmen, Taiwan after liberation, and he is a hot figure in Taiwan's military circles. But even under such circumstances, it is rare to see his former colleagues and subordinates speak ill of him.
uses at most "fierce, vicious, cunning, stubborn", but rarely uses attributive words that can damage people, such as "foolish, timid, reckless, corrupt, selfish, cowardly, afraid of death".
needs to know that writing these memoirs required risks and pressure at the time.
And so many Hu Lian's deployments, colleagues, and people who have interacted with him, even under this pressure and risk, can still describe his "personality charm" and "military quality" as objectively as possible. "Nurture", and even the Chunqiu writing style of expressing explicit and covert praise for Hu Lian through the mouth of others is enough to show that Hu Lian has something worthy of recognition purely from the perspective of his conduct as a person, his military professional level, and even his professional soldier's quality.
Of course, people have different political views, and each has his own master. It is also true that Hu Lian followed the Kuomintang throughout his life and was an enemy of our army. He fought many battles and caused great disasters to the people. He retreated to Taiwan and remained stubborn until death.
Let me say that from the perspective of the national military system, Hu Lian is already one of the few excellent professional soldiers and senior generals who can fight, dare to fight, and is good at fighting.
Hu Lian is bold and careful, calm and collected, has a keen sense of smell, is cunning and changeable, and has a fierce style. In the siege battle, he has the determination and courage to advance lightly, and in the defensive battle, he has careful and meticulous firepower formation matching, as well as fierce and fierce counterattacks. He has extremely high intelligence reading and analysis capabilities, and has very clear thinking and judgment on the battle situation.
He rarely fights foolishly. Even though he often fights in liberated areas due to the incompetence of the national army's overall intelligence system, blind men riding blind horses, passively transferred into the encirclement of our army, but with his good military literacy and command ability, he is rarely defeated by a single blow and suffers heavy losses.
He was good at summarizing, taking advantage of every opportunity, and created his own "core maneuver" to deal with the Communist army's "hundred-mile attack."
Many people said that the 18th Army's attack was simply ineffective and that it could only rely on defense to retreat and seek self-protection. There were many cases of failure in rescuing sieges. This cannot be blamed on the military-level units of the national army.
This is our party’s human wave tactics taking effect. It is easy to fall into the encirclement of the Communist army for reinforcements, but it is unable to use the same tactics against the Communist army once. This is an eternal pain for the National Army.
This is caused by the entire strategy, mobility, intelligence, supply capabilities, and popular mobilization of the national army falling into a disadvantage. It's not something that can be changed by a certain main force that can fight.
offense? Will the Communist Army hide in big cities and wait for you to fight like the National Army? In the battle of Dabie Mountain, the 18th Army chased for half a year but could not catch the tail of the Communist army. How could they attack? Will the communist army be guarding Queshan , waiting for your national army to surround the site and send reinforcements? Can't surround.
Hu Lian devoted himself to studying the history of the Southern Song Dynasty in Taiwan in his later years. When looking back at the "Battle of Xu Bang", he left behind the sentences "Earth and wood are not worth a drop" and "The land cannot be defended, but the army is the only one who protects it". I am afraid that in his eyes, he has long seen through the reasons for the success or failure of the Kuomintang and the Communist armies, the reasons for success or failure, the foundation of success or failure, and the key to success or failure.
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