After the large-scale missile attack on October 10, the Russian army's strategic strike continued on the 11th, and many infrastructure within the territory of Ukraine were hit and seriously damaged. During the Russian missile strike, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed

After the large-scale missile attack on October 10, the Russian military's strategic strike continued on the 11th, and many infrastructure within the territory of Ukraine were hit and seriously damaged.

During the Russian missile strike, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, Zaluzine, the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, said that the Russian army fired 75 missiles, while the Ukrainian air defense forces intercepted 41 of them. Many netizens are interested in this interception rate, so let’s talk about it briefly.

First of all, some netizens were surprised that the Ukrainian army was able to intercept missiles, believing that the Ukrainian army now has anti-missile capabilities. In fact, the missiles launched by the Russian army are mainly cruise missile , and intercepting such missiles is not particularly difficult. When the US and British troops attacked Syrian on a large scale, 103 cruise missiles were also claimed to have intercepted 71.

So don’t be scared by the name of anti-missile missiles. The key is to see which type of "missile" is against.

In addition, this kind of interception rate claimed by the defense party is enough to listen to it, and it does not have much reference value. The reason why it can be published during a missile attack is not whether the data is true. Instead, it is to convey a message to the public: Don’t panic, most of the missiles launched by the Russian army can be intercepted.

As for whether this interception rate is true, it is not very critical.

Even in previous wars, there were many statements about such interception rates. Simply adjust some calculation caliber, and the data can float around.

Just for this 75 intercept 41, its reference significance itself is not that great, because the Russian army actually launched more missiles than 75, and the missile attack at that time was still in progress. The meaning of this data from the opposite side is that the Ukrainian army admitted that there were 34 missiles that were not stopped. But judging from the subsequent destructive power of the strike, it is obviously not possible for these 34 missiles that were not stopped.

In addition, why do you need to publish half of the interception rate? Because this data is too low, it is not OK to be too high.

is too low and it is difficult to explain to the public. Everyone will subconsciously think, why are you eating air defense system ? Why can’t most of them stop it? If

is too high, it will be detrimental to follow-up operations, because the Ukrainian army urgently needs the West to support air defense weapons. If you perform too well, why give you the expensive air defense weapon ?

So the data released by the Ukrainian army is half too large, it is easy to explain internally and ask for a price externally.

Of course, this does not mean that the Ukrainian army has not intercepted any missiles at all, but that it does not have the ability to systematically intercept large-scale missile raids. Some of the missiles in

can of course be intercepted, but now the results of the missile strike have also come out, and the protection of key targets is basically ineffective.

In the face of interception rates without much reference significance, the final result is obviously more analytical value.

Some netizens who take the lead certainly believe that the Russian army's missiles are exhausted and their performance is not good. They are either intercepted or missed. But now, according to the damage results announced by Ukraine, is this really true?

So, many things need to be based on the results, not on the process of making up for yourself.

Now Ukraine has been hit by a large-scale missile, and its infrastructure has been severely damaged. The West will inevitably strengthen its support for Ukrainian air defense weapons.

But we put our words here. For the entire Ukraine region, the air defense weapons provided by the West can only be sprinkling water. The construction of the entire system's air defense network requires huge investment, and the demand for relevant technical personnel is also huge. This is not about giving the consumption of several Himas s, but it requires real money.

The West can supply large quantities of Ukrainian front-line troops single-soldier portable air defense missile to pose a threat to the Russian army's fighter jets that carry out front-line support missions, but it is actually powerless to build an air defense network covering the entire Ukrainian territory.

Some of the air defense weapons it supports can only meet the protection of key facilities, and "air defense, nine out of ten air defense", this may not be able to protect it 100%.

However, Ukraine didn’t have to worry too much before, because you open the sunroof with air defense , and the Russian army would not have too strong attack methods. But now a new situation has emerged, that is, the Russian army is using suicide drones to fight in large quantities, which is a headache for the Ukrainian army.

According to Ukrainian terms, as early as August, the Russian army used Iranian drone to launch operations. After September, such attacks became increasingly active, and gradually expanded from targets on the front line of the Ukrainian army to important facilities in the rear of the Ukrainian army. In the Russian military strategic strikes in the past two days, a considerable number of Iranian drones have also been put into operation.

Ukraine initially disagreed with the emergence of such drone rivals. However, when it appeared in large quantities on the battlefield, it felt great pressure. Although the targets of

are not difficult to fight, the premise is that you have to build a complete air defense network. Once there is a loophole, it will be quite exciting to be hit by a 50-kilogram suicide drone in the warhead.

. Even if such targets were successfully shot down through the air defense system, the cost of the latter was only tens of thousands of dollars. Even if they were successfully shot down, the interception cost would be unbearable to the Ukrainian army. After all, the war has lasted for more than half a year, and the Ukrainian army has not had enough air defense ammunition.

Therefore, Ukraine expressed strong dissatisfaction with Iran's provision of weapons to Russia, but Iran has not yet recognized the provision of weapons to Russia.

After all, Russia uses the Geranium-2 drone. What does it have to do with the Witness-136?

So when a large number of cheap but long-range strikes and quite destructive weapons appear on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield, the Ukrainian army is very imposing.

In his foreign speech on October 10, Ukrainian President Zelensky put Russian missiles and Iranian drones side by side. When Zelensky asked G7 for help, he claimed that the Russian army had obtained 2,400 Witnesses-136 suicide drones.

Whether such drones in the hands of the Russian army have this number is difficult to determine, but what can be confirmed now is that it is indeed using such weapons to fight in large quantities. Of course, this cheap long-range strike weapon, not all targets can be damaged, but its significance is that it can consume a large amount of air defense ammunition from the Ukrainian army and increase the cost of the Ukrainian army in air defense operations, while the price it pays is quite slight. Where the Ukrainian air defense system does not cover or plays a role, it can strike multiple types of targets and achieve quite good results.

In addition, due to the large-scale use of such weapons, the Russian army can concentrate limited cruise missiles and tactical missiles for strikes on more important targets, avoiding the situation where the Ukrainian army had previously consumed a high-value ammunition.

This drone + missile tactic is an important trump card for Yemen's Houthi armed forces to counter the Saudi coalition. Although the latter has absolute advantage in air force and air defense forces, everyone has seen the repeated defeats.

The essence of war is consumption. Whoever can consume with relatively high efficiency will have stronger confidence. At the same time, the war is not static and requires phased counterattacks. The Russian army has now developed a high-end version of the Houthi tactics. How should the Ukrainian army deal with it is the issue that needs to be considered now and next.