author: [US] Robert · M Qi Dinuo (Robert M. Citino)
Translator: Between the two world wars between military innovation
little Iceman
two world wars (1919-1938 years) , The German army found a solution. They managed to develop a "doctrine" applicable to warfare and completely smashed the deadlock in the trenches. The core of this doctrine is the close coordination of highly mobile armored corps and fighters. It is now a well-known fact that the Germans themselves did not coin the new term "blitzkrieg" (blitzkrieg). In fact, they are more likely to use the term "mobile warfare" (Bewegungskrieg). However, the use of the word blitz to describe the German military's extremely successful combat doctrine in the early days of World War II is indeed very vivid.
campaign in Poland: the white plan
Poland campaign provides evidence of military innovation. The combat plan formulated for the "White Plan" is characterized by two very far apart army groups (a total of 5 army groups) from Pomerania and East Prussia to the north, Silesia and Occupied Slovakia to the south. Carry out a centripetal assault. The main forces invested by the German Wehrmacht are the "Northern" Army Group (General Fedor von Bock) and the "Southern" Army Group (General Gerd von Lundstedt). Their combat operations will form two huge iron tongs: the 4th Army advancing from Pomerania and the 8th and 10th Army from Silesia forming one iron tongs; the 3rd Army attacking from East Prussia Formed another pair of iron tongs with the 14th Army that launched an offensive from Slovakia.
German forces trapped the main force of the Polish army in a huge encirclement, resulting in 65,000 Polish deaths, 144,000 wounded and 587,000 captured. The advancing speed of the German army was astonishingly fast, and its armored force reached the outskirts of Warsaw on September 8. As of September 19, only the Polish capital was still holding. After being encircled and subjected to continuous bombing, Warsaw fell on September 27. Although, like any large-scale combat operation, the "White Plan" has also made some mistakes, in general, this mobile warfare driven by radio command and armored combat vehicles has been carried out almost perfectly. The
radio guarantees the stability of the command, enabling the German army to wedge, break through, and rush out of the Polish defensive positions in the border area. The Poles’ decision to stick to every inch of their land on the long border helped the Germans a lot—this decision was based more on political objectives than combat reasons. Nevertheless, the achievements of the German army are still impressive.
Compared with almost every battle since the Napoleonic era, the German assault momentum has not weakened. In fact, this momentum has even strengthened after the first week of the battle. The factors that caused the stagnation of past battles, such as the fortifications like Modlin outside Warsaw, are now completely eliminated by air strikes. It turns out that the dive bomber (Stuka) is particularly effective. 160 dive bombers formed a "melee division", destroying the Modlin position in one fell swoop, shattering obstacles that are nothing more than hard walnuts for ground troops. The army no longer has to wait for the arrival of the siege artillery as in previous battles.
(above) The Stuka dive bomber
, preparing to take off for combat, is proceeding very quickly. The army has not stopped advancing, and the method of issuing orders has to keep up with this speed. The past two decades have been committed The effort to concise commands finally came to fruition. On the evening of September 1, 1939, Captain Hans von Luke ordered his company to go into action to attack the first Polish defensive position they encountered. This verbal order was very concise: "The first and second platoons attack , The third platoon served as the reserve team, and the heavy weapons platoon provided fire cover.” But he soon found that he had to add: “Everyone follow me.”
Although a large number of books on this battle almost completely ignored the Polish army, But the Poles played well and were brave. From September 9th to September 12th, they even launched a large-scale counterattack along the Buzula River west of Warsaw. The Polish "Poznan" Group Army (14th, 17th, 25th Infantry Divisions and Podolska, Wilkopolsk Cavalry Brigade) under the command of General Tadeusz Kutcheba, the forces within the jurisdiction hit the GermansThe overstretched 24th and 30th Infantry Divisions along the Buzula River, where they were providing cover for the advancement of the German 8th Army (General Johannes Blaskowitz) .
Only, although the attack was completely sudden and made excellent progress at the beginning, only the 30th Infantry Division of the German Army was captured with 1,500 men (this situation must have caused deep anxiety for the German Army and Group Command) , But the outstanding operational mobility of some German troops has dramatically reversed the situation.
German reinforcements came quickly, including a large number of armored units of the 8th Army. They immediately divided their troops on the way to Warsaw and turned around 180 degrees almost effortlessly. This example illustrates the advantage of radio in command. At the same time, the Polish army’s inadequate radio communication network forced their offensive troops to fight alone without the support of other troops. There is no doubt that troops in other parts of Poland were already in trouble. In the face of centripetal attacks from all directions, the Polish army that carried out counter-attacks quickly fell into a small encirclement on the Buzula River. Also surrounded was the remnants of the "Pomeranian" Army Group, which was violently in the German "Northern" Army Group. Withdraw from the northwest under the blow.
Polish troops have been continuously attacked by the Luftwaffe. German mobile artillery has caused them a large number of casualties. In addition, the strategic posture has become desperate. As of September 21, more than 100,000 Polish soldiers have surrendered. The German 8th Army rushed to Warsaw again.
This article is excerpted from "From Blitz to Desert Storm: The Hierarchical History of War Campaign"
