[U.S. policy toward China]
Sun Taiyi Assistant Professor of Political Science Department of Newport University in Christopher, United States
18 Scholars commented on "Taiwan Policy Law" and the Game between China and the United States" series. Chapter 9
Editor's Press
Zhao Quansheng [Looking at the world overseas] Editor-in-chief:
The "Taiwan Policy Act" that the US Congress is planning to pass will undoubtedly trigger another round of crisis in Sino-US relations and the Taiwan Strait. This time, we invited 18 scholars from the United States, China, Japan and Singapore to participate in the quick review under the title [Taiwan Policy Law] and the Game between China and the United States].
Scholars and units participating in this quick review:
Pu Xiaoyu University of Nevada
Xiong Dayun University of Yamanashi College
Zhao Quansheng American University
Ch Nianchi Shanghai East Asia Institute
Yin Yanjun Kanto University of Japan
Wang Zai Bang Taihe think tank
Hang hongwei Japan Legal University
Hang
Hang Tsinghua University
Hang hongwei University
Hang hongwei University
Hang hongwei University
Hang hongwei University http://www.sy.com/1hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh Shanghai East Asia Institute
Wu Guo Allegheny College
Qi Dongtao National University of Singapore
Wu Xuanxuan Odogming University
Lin Hongyu Huaqiao University
Cheng Ning University Northeast Normal University
Han Rongbin University of Georgia
[Horizontal challenge to China policy]
Sun Taiyi Assistant Professor of the Department of Political Science at Newport University of Christopher Newport University in the United States
18Scholars commented on "Taiwan Policy Law" and the Game between China and the United States" series 9th
The United States has a tradition of turning a blind eye to China's warnings. In October 1950, just one year after the founding of New China, Premier Zhou Enlai conveyed a clear message to the US through the Indian ambassador: "If the US military on the Korean Peninsula passes through the 38th parallel , China will send troops to help North Korea." At that time, because McCarthyism had basically eliminated officials and experts who understand China within the US government, the US did not take China's warning seriously. believes that Beijing would not dare to do this, but was just bluffing. Moreover, the United States believes that China is just a little communist brother controlled by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union is not ready to launch a World War I for North Korea. Therefore, the US believes that neither China nor the Soviet Union will interfere in the situation on the peninsula by military force. Everyone knows the story behind it.
72 years later, regardless of Beijing's clear opposition, on the afternoon of September 14, local time in Washington, D.C., the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed the revised Taiwan Policy Act 2022 with 17 votes in favor of 5 people, officially putting this bill on the agenda. And a week later, because the Senate version was too moderate, the House Foreign Committee passed a tougher version than the Senate. China has warned the US about the seriousness of the consequences of this bill once passed, especially it may trigger the "fifth Taiwan Strait crisis", but the US seems to have turned a blind eye to such a warning once again. This may largely stem from the US’s challenges in both horizontal and vertical aspects - the horizontal challenge lies in the lack of a mechanism for effectively coordinating China’s policies between the government and the court, and the vertical challenge lies in the timeline that the US always cannot settle on a stable China strategy as the scene and internal and external factors change.
U.S. Congress, pictures are from the Internet.
1
Horizontal Challenge between the government and the House
On the issue of the Taiwan Policy Law, BidenThe White House and the two parties in Congress have big differences. As early as this spring when the bill was still brewing, the White House had already shown vigilance. In August this year, especially after Pelosi visited Taiwan on , , the White House directly intervened to stop or delay the bill. In addition to not wanting to let the Democratic government, which was already in dire straits (at that time, Biden's polls hit a record low), be forced to distract from new major challenges and escalate Sino-US frictions, the Biden team also hopes to focus on advancing several unfinished domestic bills to prepare for roadshows and momentum in the midterm elections. open and high-profile opposition to the bill will undoubtedly be a political suicide for the Biden administration, because will obviously seize it in a critical period before the midterm elections, hyping the Democratic Party’s weakness towards China. Therefore, the Biden administration took a step back and actively lobbying officials from both parties in private. Lobbying like
directly led to the proposal being shelved in August and was put into the process of reopening discussions in September. The White House National Security Committee, headed by Sullivan , directly interferes in the discussions of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and hopes that even after the bill is passed by the Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate majority leader Schumer can continue to delay the Senate's vote. Biden's White House is not friendly to China, but his team still has diverse voices on topics that concern the global situation and potentially harm the US's own interests. Even if the Sullivan team, which is regarded as a hawkish against China, has classified the contents of the bill into two categories. , the symbolic one, will only anger Beijing without any substantial role in Taiwan's defense, and will not be in line with the actual interests of the United States; the other is, it can actually strengthen Taiwan's defense, especially its asymmetric strength to deal with the mainland. The goal of Sullivan’s team is to allow the first type of content to be finally removed or at least diluted, and to package the second type of content into National Defense Authorization Act , which not only ensures that this part of the clause can be finally passed, but also creates a motivation to no longer promote the Taiwan Policy Act, so that the rest of the clauses cannot or do not need to be passed in the end.
Blinken (left) and Sullivan (right), pictures are from Yonhap News Agency.
Of course, as I mentioned in the "Haikan Quick Comment" article "China-US friction may originate from the institutional defects of the United States", members of Congress do not have as many concerns as the White House. After all, they are not the implementing party of the policy. Once there is a problem, they can always put the blame on the White House, believing that it is caused by "ineffective execution." So, Although the Senate (and its Foreign Committee) is controlled by the Democrats themselves, Sullivan's team only exchanged for a revised "alternative amendment." Foreign Committee Chairman Menendez believes that major concessions have been made to Sullivan's team. For example, the appointment of the director of the Taipei Office of the "American Association in Taiwan" no longer requires approval by the Senate like the US ambassador to foreign countries to avoid being interpreted by the mainland as an upgrade of the diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan; the Taipei Meridian Office has also changed from a mandatory "request" to a suggestive "congress opinion", so that the White House has no actual constraints and must be renamed; the bill has adjusted the sanctions clauses against the mainland, which has less compulsory and greater flexibility to the US government. also read the Senate version of the Senate version. The House Foreign Affairs Committee felt that the Senate had made too much concessions, so it specially passed a tougher version itself as a bargaining chip for mediation and modification of the content in the future. But no matter which version is used or the version is modified, the adjustment of , which changes the soup and not the medicine, will eventually make the Senate and House members who need to vote next believe that the US has made certain concessions, and that China should not behave any more, ignoring the warning and the seriousness of the situation.
2
vertical challenge on the timeline
In history, the United States' strategy for Asia and China has been ups and downs and close, and its actions often cannot keep up with ideas, and its strategies are often restrained by the environment and emergencies. At the end of the 19th century, the United States hoped to strengthen diplomatic and military input to explore Asia, especially its desire to prevent both hegemony from rising in Asia and maintain trade with China was interrupted with the arrival of the Great Depression. Even after the "Pearl Harbor Incident", the United States still believes that its focus is on Europe and that it must first resolve Nazi Germany and then deal with Asian issues. The outbreak of the Korean War made the United States pay attention to Asia again. In addition to sending troops to interfere in the peninsula, the United States also directly intervened in the Taiwan Strait and provided public support and logistical support to Taiwan. When the first Taiwan Strait crisis (1954-55), Essenhower's Secretary of State Dulles also stated that the United States was considering using nuclear weapon to resolve the crisis; after the second Taiwan Strait crisis (1958), the United States further transported weapons to Taiwan to strengthen its military presence near Taiwan. Afterwards, the U.S. military further increased its investment in areas around China until Nixon returned to the logic of "balance of power" and adopted a more pragmatic foreign policy, and the U.S. pressure on China was slightly weakened. After the end of Cold War, U.S. senior officials re-seek the rising China as a threat, hoping to curb China through cooperation with Asian allies, until 9/11 and turned their attention to Middle East . Since the Obama administration, the United States has begun to "return to the Asia-Pacific" and continues to play Taiwan cards, trying to put pressure on China again.
The current US attitude and tools towards China are similar to those in the high-pressure period in history. For example, during this period between the Korean War and the Vietnam War , military, the United States strengthened its intervention in the region and maintained the military base practice in Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Taiwan. It is quite similar to today's frequent "freedom of navigation operations", strengthened cooperation with the Philippines, and prevented China's influence in South Pacific island countries. Economically, the United States used its market advantages to promote the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATTh) to weaken China's economic attractiveness, and promoted the in previous years. 1TPP (TPP) has been stranded and has changed to the current use of "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework " (IPEF) to try to raise the threshold for trade between China and neighboring countries, and exclude China from the door to formulating economic and trade rules in the 21st century. The operation of is similar; diplomatic, the United States developed the "hub spoke" architecture with Japan, Australia, New Zealand , South Korea and Thailand, and today's promotion of Australia-UKUS Three-Party Alliance (AUKUS), Quad-Side Security Dialogue Mechanism (QUAD), and Five Eye Alliance (Five Eyes), G7 (G7) and other small groups have come to encircle China with different paths.
But even in such a "high pressure" period, The United States' actions towards Asia are still undecisive, confusing and often restrained by various temporary factors. The Korean War gave the United States the inspiration that it is either not to participate in the war. To participate in the war, you must do your best, otherwise chaotic and unorganized high-pressure intervention will only be doomed to fail. In the Vietnam War, the United States did its best, but it encountered a complete failure. This not only made the United States understand the boundaries of its own strength, but also made it impossible for the United States to draw conclusions on how to intervene and whether to interfere around mainland China. Many people wonder why Biden repeatedly said that once the mainland unifies the military reunification of the United States will assist in defense of Taiwan, the White House team repeatedly denied the rumors that the United States' "one-China policy" has not changed. In fact, the White House should still not think about how to intervene and how to interfere with the situation in the Taiwan Strait. After all, if you can only choose among the results of the Korean War and the Vietnam War, there will be no good choice for the United States.The US can only hope that conflicts will not escalate and wars will not happen. However, the general background of "ups and downs, close and distant" policy to Asia will inevitably make the United States unable to settle on a stable China policy.
3
The bill is a possible result
The U.S. challenge in both horizontal and vertical aspects has caused great resistance to its formulation and implementation of a stable and effective policy toward China, But on the specific issue of the Taiwan Policy Law, this challenge may become an obstacle to the smooth passage of the bill. Because the midterm election is approaching, the window for the US Congress to pass bills before the midterm elections is mainly in September. Once October comes, lawmakers will go to the constituency to vote separately, and it is almost impossible to pass a new bill. After the midterm elections come back, in addition to the National Defense Authorization Act that has begun in the fiscal year as soon as possible and the new fiscal year budget, there are three other important bills being advanced. In addition to the Taiwan Policy Act, there are also the "energy reform project licensing procedures" that Manchin wanted to promote and originally wanted to join the Inflation Reduction Act but was eventually removed, as well as the bill involving same-sex marriage protection. Both bills are currently facing some resistance, and the Democrats are willing to spend more time discussing and mediating because of the importance of these two bills. , coupled with the Biden administration's further obstruction of the Taiwan Policy Act, the bill is likely to be shelved in the future, and we will consider whether to re-open it until the new member of Congress arrives in January 2023. In this process, the Sullivan team may continue to lobby all parties to package the security assistance content to Taiwan in the Taiwan Policy Act into the National Defense Authorization Act, making it unmotivated to continue to advance the remaining content in the bill.
At the same time, because of the existing existing on the vertical axis of time, as well as possible emerging emergencies and major issues to be resolved - such as Inflation , inequality, women's rights, racial relations, gun control, immigration and other topics, It is difficult for the United States to focus on the Taiwan Strait at present, and it does not have the energy and resources to deal with the challenges after the potential crisis. Therefore, the vertical challenge of the US policy toward China makes it difficult for China-US relations to quickly get out of the current shadow, but it can also prevent further deterioration of China-US relations to a certain extent.
This article was exclusively first published by Overseas World Platform, and the text only represents the author's views
