During the self-defense counterattack and border defense operations against Vietnam in 1979, the Vietnamese army's operational guiding ideology or strategic policy was "active defense." Due to its small land area and shallow strategic depth, the Vietnamese army's explanation of its "active defense" strategic policy is: "oppose luring the enemy to penetrate deeper", "stick to the front line" and "win on the front line". According to the terrain characteristics of Vietnam northern part, the Vietnamese army clearly proposed to implement "regional defense" and required all troops to engage in "regional defense war." The first line mentioned by the Vietnamese army refers to the shallow, near and deep areas in northern Vietnam within 50 kilometers from the border.
The northern border area of Vietnam is a high mountainous area, which is the continuation of my country's Yunnan Mountains to Indochina Peninsula . The terrain gradually slopes from northwest to southeast. Most of them are earth mountains or rock mountains sandwiched between soil, and some are stone mountains. The slope of the soil slope is gentle, mostly between 20 and 45 degrees. The rocky hillside has a steep slope. After years of erosion by rain, it has formed a steep karst landform. There are many stone crevices and caves on the mountain, which are convenient for hiding people and materials.
This area has a hot climate, abundant rainfall, and luxuriant plant growth. Regardless of whether it is a mountain of earth or a rocky mountain, most of the area is covered by dense jungle and tall grass, forming a natural camouflage layer. This kind of terrain makes it more difficult for the army to maneuver, observe and shoot, but for the defending side, it is a very favorable condition because of the good natural barriers and a large number of shelters.
The so-called "regional defense" of the Vietnamese army means that according to operational needs, the main force is deployed in a certain area (province, county, township, commune), combined with the local local troops and civilian armies, to jointly defend and fight " "Regional Defense War". The Vietnamese army proposed that the armed forces of a county should be able to hold back a division of the attacking party. The Vietnamese People's Army is quite large in number. The Hanoi authorities stipulate that the number of people participating in the People's Army in schools and industrial and mining enterprises must reach more than 60% of the total number, and the number of people participating in the People's Army in rural areas must reach 10% of the total number. By 20, almost every household had a gun.
The weapons and equipment of the Vietnam People's Army include, in addition to submachine guns and light and heavy machine guns, 40 rocket launchers and recoilless rifles. The civilian army not only differentiates defense areas and designates defensive positions, but also dispatches public security personnel to direct (supervise) them during war, stipulating their shooting positions and timing. If they violate the regulations and avoid fighting, they will have their rations deducted or even be arrested and imprisoned. Under such pressure and under the influence of anti-China deceptive propaganda, the Vietnamese people also have a certain degree of tenacity.
The Vietnamese army's "regional defense" positions, which are occupied by the main force and local troops, are usually chosen to be on roads that are convenient for the movement of the opponent and on the highlands on both sides of the valley to form a relatively solid support point; In terms of terrain, it is defended by some local troops or civilian troops. The construction of fortifications takes advantage of natural conditions and is built at the foot and mountainside of the highlands on both sides of roads and valleys. Sometimes fortifications are also built near the top of the mountain to control the commanding heights and form multi-layered positions at the foot of the mountain, the mountainside and the top of the mountain.
On the positions at the foot of the mountain, short-range weapons such as submachine guns, light machine guns, recoilless rifles, and rocket launchers are deployed; on the positions on the mountainside and top of the mountain, the longer-range heavy machine guns , anti-aircraft machine guns , and mortars are deployed Cannon , even 85 cannon. Sometimes, large areas of field fortifications connected by trenches and communication trenches are built on relatively low and gentle hills. Although the goal is obvious, there are not many troops deployed. Its main troops and firearms are still dispersed and deployed in hidden positions on both sides, and even deployed in nearby hills, jungles, bamboo bushes, caves, etc., to control the position with side fire, oblique fire, reverse fire, and cross fire.
In front of the position, in addition to the main force or local troops sent to guard the position, there are also civilian troops. This "regional defense" is deployed uniformly by three forces: the main force, local troops, and the civilian army. It basically forms a position system with the main force's defensive support points as the backbone, occupying and controlling considerable frontal and depth positions. The Vietnamese army's "regional defense" combat methods can basically be summarized as: top, hide, disperse, and attack.
When our army attacks, the Vietnamese army first relies on the established positions and fights according to the established combat plan. When it cannot withstand the firepower attack of our army's superior force, it uses the natural concealment conditions to hide and suddenly opens fire when our army approaches. , or after the first echelon of our army passes, use sudden firepower to kill the follow-up troops. If the terrain is not conducive to hiding on the spot, break them into pieces, disperse and hide, and wait for the first echelon of our army to pass before coming out to attack the follow-up troops. The Vietnamese army is good at using the cover of favorable terrain to carry out close combat and guerrilla raids in a concealed manner.
In the early stages of the self-defense counterattack, our army suffered some losses due to a lack of experience in fighting the Vietnamese army in tropical mountainous jungles and insufficient understanding of the characteristics of the Vietnamese army's "regional defense" operations, and its progress was slow. The troops suffered heavy casualties, mainly reflected in "three unexpected things".
According to the general rules of combat, places with a large number of trenches and communication trenches must be positions where the enemy has more troops and firearms. Therefore, our army's artillery fire will focus on these places. In fact, the Vietnamese army was dispersed and concealed on both sides of the position or in a position in depth that our army could not observe, which greatly reduced the efficiency of artillery fire. Under the fierce artillery fire attack of our army, the enemy hides and does not fire. Our army often thinks that the enemy has escaped or been eliminated, so it becomes careless and attacks in dense formation to attack and occupy the position.
As a result, when our army approached the enemy's position and artillery fire was unable to support it, the Vietnamese army used sudden firepower to kill the attacking infantry and tanks. After capturing the enemy's position, you can't see the enemy or hear the gunshots, and you think that the enemy has escaped or been eliminated. In fact, the enemy is hiding in caves, stone crevices, grass, and trees a few meters or tens of meters away. They often take advantage of my unpreparedness, appear suddenly, and carry out attacks. The 125th Division of the
42 Army originally planned to use one day to annihilate the Vietnamese army in the Fuhe area, quickly open up the transportation line to Gaoping , and then launch an attack on Guangyuan, threaten Gaoping from the east, and cooperate with the main force to encircle and annihilate the enemies of Gaoping. But in fact the fight was not going well, and it took three days to basically annihilate the enemies of Reunion. One of the important reasons was that they did not understand the tactical characteristics of the Vietnamese army's dispersed concealment and sudden fire.
There are many caves, rock crevices, tunnels and sugar cane fields in the Fuhe area. At first, the troops only focused on capturing the high ground, but did not pay attention to the hidden enemies. Often, when they conquered the high ground and advanced in depth, they were attacked by the firepower of the Vietnamese army behind them. I suffered a lot. By summarizing experience and learning lessons, in view of the characteristics of the enemy's dispersed drilling of holes and large blind spots at the entrance, we adopted small group multi-channel tactics, organized firepower to block the entrance of the hole, and attacked the enemies in the stone caves and tunnels one by one, thus reducing casualties and speeding up the pace.
According to general terrain combat experience, if the main peak (top of the mountain) of a highland is occupied, the enemy on the mountainside and foot of the highland will waver or even flee. However, in the complex terrain of northern Vietnam, sometimes when he occupied the top of a mountain, he could not see the enemy positions on the mountainside and foot of the mountain, which could not directly threaten him, so he continued to stay there. Our army followed the general routine and occupied the top of the mountain and controlled the commanding heights. Without being able to see the enemy positions below, they thought they had completely occupied the high ground. As a result, the follow-up troops were suddenly shot by enemies from positions on the mountainside and foot of the mountain, increasing the number of troops. Huge casualties. On the evening of February 19, the 372nd Regiment of the 124th Division captured Boshan, the southeastern barrier of Gaoping City, and the main peak of Highland 17. Since there was no search at the foot of the mountain close to the road, the 3rd Battalion of the Army Tank Regiment advanced to Highland 17 to cooperate. During the infantry operation, they were suddenly blocked by Vietnamese anti-tank firepower from Boshan, No. 17 Highland, and No. 526 Highland near the road, hidden behind the bamboo forest, banana forest and houses at the foot of the mountain. Three vehicles were destroyed immediately and two vehicles were injured. ; When the 1st Battalion went down the mountain from Hill 17 and approached the road, it was also fired upon by the Vietnamese army. The organization was disrupted and the entire regiment was unable to move forward.
According to common combat knowledge, if a high ground is occupied, then there will be no enemies in the valleys and hills on both sides; if the front troops are defeated, it means that the enemies have been eliminated or escaped.At this time, the follow-up troops often pay little attention to reconnaissance and search during the advance, and as a result, they are attacked by enemy fire that suddenly strikes and then stops. When encountering this situation, some troops, especially the logistics units, did not pay attention to it at first, thinking that it was just a few remnants of the enemy attacking, and continued to advance with a little cover. As a result, they suffered successive losses. When the
121 Division was conducting deep battles to the west of Gaoping, it did not understand the combat characteristics of the Vietnamese army and believed that as long as the front troops were defeated, the rear would be safe. Under the guidance of this idea, the logistics of divisions and regiments were arranged to follow up behind the main team. Due to the lack of cover, the front echelon of division logistics and the logistics of each regiment were ambushed and attacked by the Vietnamese army for two days after leaving the country. Almost all supplies were lost and the losses were huge. Because the logistics support could not keep up, the combat effectiveness of the troops was severely weakened.
The author is a master of history and a university lecturer, focusing on the history of the Sino-Vietnam War.
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