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Most people believe that since the Zunyi Conference has been held, a new leadership group has been formed, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has achieved "independence and autonomy", and of course it will no longer be affected by Communist International .
people even believe that if there is any impact on the Communist International at this time, it must be a wrong or right-leaning surrender-style influence. Therefore, at this time, the relationship between the Communist International and the Chinese revolution must be the relationship between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China headed by Mao Zedong and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China boycotting and opposing its wrong influence, and it cannot be any other relationship.
However, with the disclosure of telegram archives about China in recent years, it seems that the facts are far from that simple. The publication of these telegram instructions clearly shows that during the period from 1935 to 1937, the Communist Party of China was still deeply influenced by the Communist International policies. Not only is the well-known policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" formulated under the influence of the Communist International, it was the formation and establishment of the so-called "forcing Chiang to resist Japan" in 1936, that is, the "union of Chiang to resist Japan", which was actually deeply influenced by the Communist International.
1. From anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang to allying Chiang, different document facts
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has gone through a very complicated process from anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang to forcing Chiang and allying Chiang to resisting Japan. Strictly speaking, in the first half of 1936, it had more or less realized that it had a considerable contradiction in the promotion of anti-Japanese war and anti-Chiang, and the implementation of civil war and national war.
For this reason, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has also tried to make some changes in propaganda techniques. However, the change in the fundamental policy was still between August and September 1936. One of the key reasons why implemented this major strategic adjustment at this time was that it received the political instructions of the Communist International on August 15, 1936.
"Compilation of Information on the Communist International and China's Revolution" published this telegram. Pay attention to the series of instructions and resolutions issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to change its strategies and policies. It can be clearly seen that the Communist International has indeed played an important role in urging the Central Committee to abandon its anti-Japanese policy and establishing its policy of forcing and allying Chiang and the joint efforts of Chiang and Chiang to resist Japan.
In this regard, as long as the content of the instructions of the Communist International on August 15 is compared with the contents of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on August 25, the Central Committee’s Instructions on Forcing Chiang to Resist Japan on September 1, and the Central Committee’s New Situation on the Anti-Japanese and National Rescue Movement and the Resolution of the Democratic Republic and other documents, we can know that the basic content of the latter is based on the instructions of the former. Some important words of the latter are even drawn directly from the former in large sections.
This shows that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China drafted and formulated a series of important documents on forcing Chiang and the alliance with Chiang to fight against Japan after receiving the instructions of the Communist International on August 15. We can get some other further proofs for this.
On August 20, 1936, after receiving instructions from the Communist International on August 15, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China called the main leaders of the Red Army in other places, saying:
In the future, "to Chiang Kai-shek and his Nanjing government should change the slogan of anti-Japanese resistance and to express their hope and welcome to Chiang and the Nanjing government to participate in and lead the War of Resistance Against Japan, and demand that the civil war be stopped and the freedom to resist Japan should be implemented."
Immediately afterwards, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China explained the main spirit of the Communist International's instructions and the intention of the Central Committee to fundamentally change the previous policy in accordance with international instructions.
From September 15 to 17, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held an expanded Politburo meeting to comprehensively review the work of the united front in the past in accordance with international instructions, confirming the correctness of the Communist International's instructions, and acknowledging that it had serious shortcomings in its previous understanding of the joint Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Japanese issue.After the meeting, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a self-criticism notice on September 22 regarding the previous anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang slogans and the errors in handling the problem in the Southwest Incident of .
To sum up, it is not difficult to see that the Communist International’s instructions on August 15th had an important influence and role in establishing a new united front strategy and policy on the Communist Party of China.
This includes:
(1) Abstaining from the "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" policy, clearly promoting the Nanjing Kuomintang government and its army to participate in the Anti-Japanese War, and establishing the anti-Japanese national united front across the country ;
(2) Proposes to establish a national unified democracy The Republic convened a national parliament on the basis of universal suffrage and established a national defense government, making it a true representative body and power organ of all parties and organizations participating in the anti-Japanese national united front, and a new idea of unified command of the War of Resistance Against Japan and coordinated party relations;
(3) highlights the principles and specific methods of maintaining the political and organizational independence and purity of the Communist Party of China, its regime and the army, and preventing its own unity and unity from being damaged.
2. Why did the Communist International make such instructions?
. It should be recognized that the basic spirit and basic content of the Communist International’s instructions on August 15 have positive significance to the Communist Party of China, and it is reasonable for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to criticize itself for this. This is because the problem is indeed as Dimitrov said in a speech at a meeting:
"In China's mission is not to expand the Soviet area and develop the Red Army, but to find opportunities, find ways and appropriate slogans and methods to enable the vast majority of Chinese people to unite to fight against Japan."
Working in accordance with the "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" policy, it cannot quickly achieve the goal of uniting more than 90% of the country's population into the anti-Japanese national united front. insisting on "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" means "to treat Japanese imperialism equally with Chiang Kai-shek", which means that Chiang Kai-shek and his army under his command are also regarded as lackeys of Japanese imperialism, which means that civil war and national war must be carried out at the same time. The Communist Party of China must first focus on expanding the Soviet area and developing the Red Army, and to form a local united front with various anti-Chiang factions, such as the strategic policy of the Northwest National Defense Government, which is of course not conducive to the situation of "stop civil war and uniting in resisting Japan" as soon as possible across the country.
However, Dimitrov ignored these two basic facts here.
First, at that time, in the northern Shaanxi and Gansu region, the Central Red Army , facing the siege and attack of hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops, the first thing they had to solve was not the problem of how to resist Japan but how to survive. When Chiang Kai-shek wanted to kill the Red Army, the Chinese Communists must put survival issues first, expanding the Soviet area and developing the Red Army. Only by truly having sufficient living conditions and development conditions to show sufficient military and political strength can Chiang Kai-shek come to the negotiating table and have the possibility of uniting against Japan;
Secondly, it is precisely the Communist International and Dimitrov himself who stipulated the "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" united front strategy for the CCP and the basic tasks of expanding the Soviet area and developing the Red Army. The resolution of the Wayaobao Conference, which was regarded as an important mistake by the Communist International, was made in accordance with the spirit of the August 1st Declaration conveyed by Zhang Hao and the instructions of the Communist International. The Communist International, the "Seventh Congress" documents and Dimitrov's report obtained by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in early 1936 also show that the Communist International still adheres to the policy of the Soviet revolution.
Obviously, the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on "anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang" and the decision of "combining civil war with national war", as well as the practice of expanding Soviet areas, developing the Red Army and jointly anti-Chiang forces were all in line with the requirements of the Communist International at that time. In fact, neither the Communist Party of China's delegation to the Communist International nor the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did not want to establish a certain form of united front with Nanjing. However, on the one hand, the Communist Party of China cannot decide on itself, and on the other hand, it must adhere to the Soviet revolution, its regime and military forms, and even try to focus on Soviet , Chiang Kai-shek would never agree.
Therefore, although both the Communist Party of China delegation and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had secretly had political contacts with representatives of the Kuomintang, the results were disappointing. Their proposals of "national defense government", "anti-Japanese coalition", "anti-Japanese national salvation conference" and "anti-Japanese people's front" have become fantasies.
When it comes to establishing a united front, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is actually much more practical than the Communist International and the Communist Party delegation. They clearly understand their own strength and expertise. They do not deliberately pursue something in a form. Therefore, at the beginning of the organization of the Northwest Alliance and the Northwest Defense Government plan, they clearly advocated the election of Zhang Xueliang as the commander-in-chief of the future Northwest Anti-Japanese Allied Forces in accordance with the principle of strength. After receiving instructions from the Communist International that it must establish a united front with the Nanjing government, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China immediately "expressed its hope and welcome to Chiang and the Nanjing government to participate in and lead the War of Resistance Against Japan."
However, if the weak Communist Party wants to reach a real agreement with the powerful Kuomintang, they must make more concessions. In this regard, the instructions of Dimitrov and the Communist International once again show a disagreement. They blindly believe that as long as "correctly reverse the CCP's political policy of treating Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang", specifically stipulate the political and military principles of the united front organization, and put forward a more feasible slogan of the democratic republic, so that the Chinese Communists "appear as advocates, initiators and organizers of the comprehensive anti-Japanese front", it is enough to "mobilize national public opinion" and make all patriots refuse to "suppress the Communist Party" civil war, thus forcing Chiang Kai-shek to agree to establish the anti-Japanese united front .
They even still want to abolish the central position of the Kuomintang government in Nanjing, convene a new "National Parliament" through universal suffrage, and continue the basic policy of the agrarian revolution through such a National Assembly that broadly represents democratic forces, "solve the land problem", and establish a new "national defense government" that truly represents various parties and organizations, and then implement a democratic system different from the dictatorship of the Kuomintang across the country.
They also clearly demanded that the Communist Party of China "continue to consolidate the Soviet Union", saying that "the Soviet Union is now the only democratic organ in the country and the most reliable pillar of the Chinese people's struggle against Japanese imperialism", and advocated that "the issue of establishing the Soviet Union as a democratic institution of the Republic of China can be raised accordingly to strengthen its status and encourage the masses to "organized struggle for the establishment of the Soviet Union."
3. Political considerations behind the huge compromise
Communist International instructed on August 15 to change the strategic policy of the Communist Party of China against Chiang Kai-shek, but it cannot change the basic conditions for Chiang Kai-shek to resolve the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in political terms." .
This is:
must unify the military and politics of the country with the Nanjing government as the center. The Communist Party must give up its Soviet revolutionary proposition, the regime and the army must be reorganized and adapted, and accept the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government.
It is not difficult to see that the conditions of the Kuomintang are very different from the wishes of the Communist International and the Communist Party of China, and what needs to be changed is mainly the understanding of the problems of the Communist Party. According to the initial document issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China after receiving the political instructions of the Communist International, the Chinese Communists obviously acted strictly in accordance with the instructions of the Communist International.
They are convinced that the slogan of the Democratic Republic proposed by the Communist International is "the best way to unite all anti-Japanese forces to safeguard China's territorial integrity and prevent the Chinese people from suffering the tragic disaster of national destruction and extermination", in order to mobilize national public opinion, it will be possible to "convene the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Congress elected by the people of the whole country and the armed forces willing to resist Japan", deny National Government and its so-called "National Congress" and "National Defense Conference", and achieve the purpose of "continue to consolidate the Soviet Union" and "election of the national defense government and organization of anti-Japanese coalition forces that unify the country."
In the above file, the only difference between it and the Communist International is that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China recognizes the extreme difficulty of achieving the above tasks.
For this reason, they had to emphasize the Communist International's instructions on creating a movement that forced Chiang Kai-shek to agree with the side of the united front of the anti-Japanese war, put forward the strategic idea of "forcing Chiang to resist Japan", and prepared to continue to adhere to the critical attitude of the Nanjing government's policies, while maintaining an anti-Japanese alliance with various anti-Chiang local forces, trying to use this as an important bargaining chip to consolidate their own strength and encourage Nanjing to make compromises. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly knows that if they really want to reach an agreement with the National Government, they must face up to the conditions put forward by the Kuomintang and take more practical steps.
From late September to early October, 1936, in order to conduct a relatively practical negotiation with the Kuomintang, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China drafted the " Draft Agreement on the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China ". In this draft, although the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China continued to advocate "convening the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Congress based on the elections of all parties, factions, all walks of life and military forces across the country", "deciding all anti-Japanese and national policies and plans", and then organizing the "Democratic Congress" and "democratic government and establishing a "democratic republic", the "Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Congress" based on the compromise clearly stated that it could be replaced by the "National Defense Conference" existing by the National Government.
, and in terms of specific military and political organizations, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has clearly begun to make major concessions from its original position. The draft publicly stated that the CCP is willing to stop the remarks and actions of overthrowing the National Government by force, and the Red Army is prepared to Under the conditions of "unchanging the organization and leadership of Communists in the Red Army", together with the army across the country, the Red Army representatives are willing to participate in the "unified national military command organ " with the Kuomintang "occupies the main leadership position".
This attitude shows that although the Central Committee of the Communist International still has hope for the establishment of a "national defense government" and "anti-Japanese coalition" required by the Communist International instructions, and even believes that it may promote the emergence of "democratic parliament" and "democratic government", the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has begun to realize that the united front established based on the current strength comparison, It is absolutely impossible to be equal.
For the Communist Party, the key to the problem is only:
"Seeking to establish a united front between the two sides under the basic conditions of implementing the anti-Japanese war and preserving the Red Army in the Soviet area" Everything else is secondary.
In view of this, the Chinese Communists have begun to consider how to recognize the current "most powerful" Kuomintang's strong leadership position in the future united front organization, and based on this, a series of major issues of changes in the name of the Red Army, the form of the Soviet area's regime, the confiscation of landlord land and related revolutionary policies. However, since then The sudden deterioration of the military situation and Chiang Kai-shek's will, things changed drastically.
In late October 1936, about 80,000 people from the three main forces of the Red Army met in northern Gansu, but the " Ningxia Battle " organized to open up the international line and receive military aid failed due to various reasons. Faced with Chiang Kai-shek's heavy army "encirclement and suppression" and serious difficulties in food, winter clothes and military supplies, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had to further make up its mind to make concessions to the Kuomintang, and at the same time prepare to switch to the mainland whenever he had no choice, in order to obtain material conditions for survival and development. To this end, at the Politburo meeting held on November 13, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China began to consider no longer taking the "Anti-Japanese National Salvation Congress", "National Defense Government" and "Anti-Japanese Allied Forces" as conditions before the negotiation agreement, and prepared to accept the Kuomintang's approach to focusing on military unification, and recognize the adaptation of the Red Army under the command of Chiang Kai-shek to eliminate the disaster of war and preserve its strength.
The latest conditions for the Kuomintang that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China learned at this time were 4 items summarized by Zhang Zihua himself after meeting with the Kuomintang representative Zeng Yangfu in mid-October. means:
(1) The party can openly operate;: (2) The government continues to exist; (3) Participate in the parliament; (4) The Red Army is reorganized under Chiang’s command, and is organized and treated according to the National Revolutionary Army.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believes that an agreement can be reached with the Kuomintang under this condition, and the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has been sent to Shanghai, asking him to negotiate with the Kuomintang leader immediately on this condition. is also prepared to send Zhou Enlai to Nanjing if necessary in order to speed up this process.
The Communist International obviously lacks sufficient ideological preparation for this major concession by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Faced with such a serious military situation, they cannot come up with any practical solutions to the problem. In the telegram on November 20, they frankly expressed their disagreement with sending Zhou Enlai to Chiang Kai-shek, and believed that under the conditions of Chiang Kai-shek's firm anti-communist opposition, the negotiations of the Kuomintang were either a spy or would have no practical significance.
It is obvious that at this time, the Communist Party of China has only three ways to go:
First, "on the basis of protecting all the organizational forces of the Red Army and demarcating the anti-Japanese defense line" and uniting with Chiang; second, using the secret alliance with Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng to instigate the Northeast Army, , the Northwest Army and the Red Army to jointly create an independent situation in the northwest, and strive for the sympathy of the two departments of Yan Xishan and Fu Zuoyi; third, break through in different ways, transfer to the mainland, and carry out a long-term guerrilla war, , to preserve the main force of the Red Army.
But the first road was blocked by Chiang Kai-shek, and the second road, the Communist International did not agree with it, but the result was that only the third road was feasible. But in fact, once the Red Army invaded the mainland, not only will the military situation be more steep and the future be unpredictable, but it will be even more difficult to quickly realize the national anti-Japanese national united front and compromise with the Kuomintang.
4. Chiang Kai-shek's influence on the changes in the CCP's strategy and policy and the Soviet Union
Nanjing National Government cut off diplomacy with the Soviet Union in 1928. After "918 ", knowledgeable people in China condemned Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Soviet behavior, believing that the Japanese invasion was a result of the breakup of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union, and calls for the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union to rise. Those who advocate the restoration of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations include not only progressive intellectuals, social groups and public opinion circles, but also some upper-class people within the Kuomintang. After the joint appeal of the government and opposition, starting from April 1932, the National Government sent representatives to discuss the issue of resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet government representatives. In order to avoid Japan's destruction from it, the negotiations took strict confidentiality measures. The representatives of both sides attending the international military shrinking meeting (China is Yan Huiqing, and the Soviet side is Diplomatic People's Commissar Livinov) were held at Geneva . From December 12, the two sides negotiated an agreement to announce the formal resumption of diplomatic relations.
1935, Chiang Kai-shek accelerated the pace of the Soviet Union, which is related to the following situation.
First of all, due to the increasing national crisis after the North China Incident , the National Government urgently needs to find foreign aid. Given that the United States and Britain’s demands for Nanjing after the “September 18th” were mostly polite but not in effect, considering that the southeast coast will be blocked by the Japanese Navy after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, it is difficult for China to obtain foreign aid from seas; and the northwest China borders the Soviet Union and is a reliable channel for receiving foreign aid.
Secondly, through the fifth "encirclement and suppression", Chiang forced the main force of the Red Army to withdraw from the Soviet areas such as Fujian, Jiangxi, Hubei, Henan and Anhui, and his strength weakened during the Long March process. In Chiang Kai-shek's view, the Red Army that arrived in Shaanxi and Gansu was at the end of its strength, and if it could not constitute his "confident" Chiang felt at ease to improve relations with the Soviet Union and accelerate the pace of the Soviet Union.
Once again, I learned about the friendly attitude of the Soviet Union and the urgent mood of Lianhua. In the summer vacation of 1934, a liberal scholar who was respected by Chiang Kai-shek and personally met with him, and a professor in the Department of History of Tsinghua University, Jiang Tingfu planned to visit Europe to collect relevant historical information. Chiang Kai-shek summoned him again in Lushan on July 27 and asked him to detect the possibility of cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Chiang Kai-shek informed the Soviet government through diplomatic channels that Jiang Tingfu visited the Soviet Union as his representative and asked the Soviet Union to help. Jiang Tingfu was warmly received in Moscow.
In order to accelerate the alliance with the Soviet Union, Chiang Kai-shek took some practical steps. In April 1935, Chiang sent his confidant Deng Wenyi to Moscow with the rank of army colonel and served as the chief military officer of the embassy in the Soviet Union. , a figure who shoulders a special mission, not only fulfilled his duties as a military officer, also secretly met with the representative of the Communist Party of China to the Communist International under Chiang’s order, Wang Ming , opening the prelude to the secret negotiations on cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in anti-Japanese war. At the end of 2, Chiang Kai-shek sent one of the core figures of the Kuomintang Central Committee, Chen Lifu to the Soviet Union, hoping to form an anti-Japanese military alliance with the Soviet Union. Chen Lifu was accompanied by Zhang Chong.
The main action Chiang Kai-shek accelerated the United Nations and the Soviet Union was to hold talks with Bogmolov, the Soviet ambassador to China, in Nanjing. The Soviet government verbally agreed to Nanjing's request at this time, but was very cautious in its actions.
The main reason is that one is that Chiang Kai-shek is worried that he will compromise with Japan, and especially that Chiang Kai-shek is afraid that Japan will oppose the Soviet Union. Second, the Soviet Union asked Chiang Kai-shek to adjust his policies to the Communist Party of China and change it from "suppressing the Communist Party" to alliance with the Communist Party.
The Soviet government believed that the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was only beneficial to the Japanese invaders. Only by stopping the "suppression of the Communist Party" and forming an anti-Japanese national united front with the Red Army can Chiang effectively resist Japan's invasion. Moscow instructed Bogmolov to show that the Soviet government is very concerned about this issue when negotiating with Chiang Kai-shek. Nanjing's "If the army and the Chinese Red Army do not realize a united front, it will be impossible to fight a serious struggle against Japan's aggression"; at the same time, we must also explain to Chiang: The Soviet Union is not ready to act as a middleman in the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and believe that "Chang Kai-shek himself can negotiate with the CCP without any intermediary."
Chiang Kai-shek knew that in order to seek Soviet aid, he had to make some gestures at home; at the same time, he believed that the Red Army transferred to Shaanxi and Gansu after the fifth "encirclement and suppression" could be solved by incorporation.
January 22, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek directly told Bogmolov:
The Soviet Union "the most important thing that the questions raised to him was the problem of dealing with the Red Army. If an agreement can be reached on this issue, other problems will be solved." He "requested the Soviet government to mediate from it" and "exerted influence on the Red Army" and accepted his inclusion. Chiang said that if this could be done, "it would show the Soviet government's sincerity towards Nanjing, and the Nanjing government could become a loyal ally of the Soviet Union."
Bogmolov solemnly replied to Chiang:
"The Soviet Union does not intend to mediate between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party" because this is "purely China's internal affairs."
Two months later, on March 21, Kong Xiangxi told Baogmolov that Chiang Kai-shek had begun secret negotiations with the Communist Party of China.
(end of the text)
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