Economic Observer Reporter Wang Yajie Li Ming 's mortgage was deducted.
From the beginning to the present, as the manager of a secondary enterprise in a central enterprise, he has been working hard for this matter. At the beginning of
html, he signed a relevant agreement on the business target responsibility letter and risk deposit .According to the agreement, Li Ming, who has an annual salary of 450,000 yuan, needs to take out 50,000 yuan as a risk deposit. If the indicator is completed at the end of the year, he can return it three times and get 150,000 yuan. If the main indicator is met and some indicators are not met, 100,000 yuan will be returned. If the main indicator is not met, the risk deposit will be seized.
Due to the impact of the epidemic, he did not complete the established assessment tasks. According to the latest reform measures promoted by enterprises at this level, the board of directors of the newly improved subsidiary companies decided to deduct Li Ming's mortgage in the above ratio.
This is a rare example among many subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises. How to change the salary of executives in
?
In 2021, the board of directors of Li Ming’s company began to be established and improved. Before the board of directors is established and improved, Li Ming’s salary will be finalized by the relevant functional departments of the group.
A staff member who participated in the discussion on formulating the operation plan for related risk mortgages said: "The main reason is that the heads of the branch companies under our department implement operating performance risk mortgages. When signing the performance responsibility letter, they decompose the strategic indicators related to the task operation performance of the superior group. Part of them combines the requirements of the superior group for us, and part of them combines our own planning. The strategic goals of the superior group are decomposed into each subsidiary. Units with operating performance goals require them to sign the target performance responsibility letter and sign the risk mortgage agreement. At present, this pilot work is still being promoted."
According to a party committee staff member of the company, the latest reform process is that by the end of 2022, the above-mentioned newly formed board of directors will be implemented. 6 key powers: medium- and long-term development decision-making power, management member selection and appointment power, management member performance evaluation power, management member salary management power, employee salary distribution management power, and major financial matter management power.
The salary management rights of the management team members include three aspects: formulating salary management measures, formulating salary distribution plans, and establishing and improving constraint mechanisms. When "establishing and improving the constraint mechanism", the company tried for the first time to establish systems such as salary deduction and reimbursement. This is the most direct reason why Li Ming’s salary was affected.
"This is a certain difficulty." The above-mentioned party committee staff said that the difficulty is reflected in the incomprehension of Li Ming, including Li Ming.
Li Ming said: "The company now means that if the (performance) is not good, it must definitely decline. It cannot just rise and not fall like before."
Li Ming cannot fully accept this result. He believes that the decline in benefits caused by the impact of the epidemic is caused by force majeure factors, not a mistake in his own subjective judgment. Li Ming has reported the above issues to his superiors several times.
Not the majority of state-owned enterprises have such resolutely promoted new reform measures as Li Ming’s company.
There are many difficulties in reforming salary for managers of central enterprises.
For example, how to formulate salary management management methods for managers based on the relevant policies of the country and the company on salary management, refer to the salary prices of comparable personnel in the domestic market, and comprehensively consider factors such as corporate development strategy, business goals and effectiveness, and compensation strategies, and determine the salary structure and level of managers?
How to decide on the salary allocation of management members based on the performance appraisal results, reasonably widen the gap, and explore specific salary allocation plans and salary allocation matters?
For this company, the above explorations are all "crossing the river by feeling the stones". Not to mention that the company itself has not promoted the above reforms before, among the subsidiaries of the same type of central enterprises, there are still very few who truly implement the right to pay management.
A state-owned asset professional added that from the perspective of implementing salary management rights, not all subsidiaries of central enterprises have the conditions to promote this reform, because currently only pilot enterprises that pilot the power of the board of directors promote the above reforms, and enterprises that have not promoted the pilot have not yet been truly promoted.
How do external directors play a role?
The above-mentioned state-owned assets person said that in the past, the total wages of subsidiaries were based on the total wages approved by the SASAC to the group enterprise, and then divided this big cake, and there would basically be no significant fluctuations. He said: "For example, before the reform, the following secondary enterprises originally had a total wage amount of 200 million yuan a year. Now, according to the rules set, if the performance is done well, the total wage can reach 250 million yuan. In the past, even if the performance doubled, the total wage increased very little."
The total wage refers to the total labor remuneration paid by the enterprise directly to all employees who established labor relations with the enterprise in an accounting year (including wages, bonuses, allowances, subsidies, overtime wages, and wages paid under special circumstances, etc.).
What he said is "set rules", including the formula and model of the total wage determination mechanism for the approval of the total wage. After the formula and model are determined, the board of directors of the subsidiary will then make the total wage budget based on the financial and operating goals. The advancement of the reform of the authorization mechanism of the board of directors to the management has prompted the board of directors of subsidiaries to have more autonomy, including independently deciding the relevant total wages and filing them with superiors.
This is also difficult. After all, the total salary is so large. It’s all about it, either you are more or I am less. Therefore, further market-oriented reform of the total wage determination mechanism is needed in the future.
According to the idea of state-owned enterprise reform, the company's board of directors is determined by the main body of this "rule", but the effective operation of the board of directors is also facing challenges.
Take this company as an example. For the newly established board of directors, external directors account for more than half of them. Internal directors are actually personnel of the internal team. They cannot decide themselves, but more than half of the external directors will discuss and decide. However, the performance guarantees of external directors are not enough at present.
The above-mentioned party committee staff said: "Outsiders come to hold meetings once or twice a year, and they cannot do the salary assessment and distribution at all. Moreover, most of the external directors do this part-time job and have their own jobs. They come here to have a meeting. They are not clear about the results of the business team's performance and the assessment matters at the end of the year."
Based on this, during the discussion, external directors cannot scientifically formulate the salary of the business team, and it is also very difficult. They usually come too little and do not have sufficient information to support their judgment. What they can get is the information that the managers show them.
The above-mentioned party committee staff said: "This is the information given to you by the subject of the assessment. There is almost no information obtained by the external directors before. Basically, it is all good and good. The so-called decentralization of power will certainly be lost." The situation mentioned by the person, an external director of the company agreed: "We don't understand the situation and can't make mistakes. That's too inappropriate."
The above-mentioned party committee staff believes that according to the top-level requirements, the board of directors has certainly been established, but the real decentralization and even implementation of rights will take a long process.
If you want to promote the solution of this problem, the above-mentioned state-owned assets person said that it can be completed by further improving the board of directors salary and assessment committee .
htmlOn April 6, the staff of the Party Committee of the company said that the company is working hard in this direction.In the future, the company plans to establish a director of the salary and assessment committee, with the company's chairman. The term of office of the committee is consistent with the term of office of the same board of directors, and the term of office of the committee is consistent with the term of office of the director.
In terms of power, the committee will be mainly responsible for organizing the formulation of the operating performance assessment methods and salary management methods of the enterprise manager's management; organize the performance assessment of the management's management; propose to the board of directors the management's assessment results and salary cashing proposals; propose to the board of directors the employee salary allocation plan within the total salary budget of the enterprise and other powers granted by the board of directors.
Administrative executive compensation reform context
Reform of the compensation system of state-owned enterprise executives is an important link in the reform of state-owned enterprises and a link of widespread concern in society.
In 2015, the overall high salary level of state-owned enterprise executives caused widespread discussion and triggered a round of salary reform.
At that time, the differentiated salary reforms that were implemented in the salaries of executives of central enterprises began. The salary of the company's head would consist of the past basic annual salary and performance annual salary, and adjusted to three parts: basic annual salary, performance annual salary, and term incentive income.
Since the three-year action plan for state-owned enterprise reform was launched in 2020, the term system and contractual management of management members have been comprehensively promoted, and qualified enterprises have promoted the professional manager system. In terms of salary and benefits, on the one hand, enterprises are encouraged to comprehensively use medium- and long-term incentive methods such as equity incentives, job dividends, and excess profit sharing to continuously enrich and improve the salary structure of managerial members. On the other hand, it emphasizes rigid fulfillment, fails the annual assessment, deducts all annual performance salary, and establishes a salary recovery and deduction system. In this way, incentives and constraints should be given equal importance to the responsibility and action of state-owned enterprise executives.
, general manager of Shanghai Tianqiang Management Consulting Co., Ltd., Zhu Boshan, believes that from the perspective of this round of salary reform of state-owned enterprise executives, there are three characteristics:
, the first is "control level". The overall high salary level of state-owned enterprise executives is the main reason for triggering the salary reform in 2015. The senior executives of state-owned enterprises are essentially state public officials. Although they work in enterprises, their salary should not be too high.
The second is "one adaptation". The difficulty in measuring the contribution of senior executives of state-owned enterprises is a difficult issue in setting salary for executives. Therefore, a highlight of this round of reform is to achieve the compatibility of corporate executives' salary level and corporate functional properties. Overall, the salary level of executives of business type 1 enterprises is relatively high, while the salary level of executives of business type 2 and public welfare enterprises is relatively low.
is "one match", which matches the choice method. The difficulty in defining the identity of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is another major problem in determining executive salaries. Therefore, this round of reform proposes to determine the salary decision mechanism based on the identity of corporate executives and their selection and appointment mechanism. For example, the total salary level of professional managers in is determined by the board of directors and professional managers in consultation with them according to the principle of "double benchmarking performance and salary".
What is the crux of the salary distribution of state-owned enterprises?
reform is not easy. Zhu Changming, partner of Sunshine Times Law Firm , said that the compensation distribution system of state-owned enterprises is closely related to the vital interests of employees, directly affecting the enthusiasm and loyalty of employees, and ultimately affecting the efficiency and competitiveness of enterprises. With the continuous deepening of my country's market economic system reform, although the reform of the salary distribution system of state-owned enterprises has achieved certain results, there are still many problems in the salary distribution system.
includes that the modern state-owned enterprise system is not yet mature and the autonomy of salary distribution has not been implemented.
He said: "As state-owned enterprises continue to deepen from the reform of company system to strengthening state-owned assets supervision, the complexity and difficulty of state-owned enterprise reform are becoming increasingly apparent. The modern state-owned enterprise system is not yet mature and established, and the state-owned assets supervision system that focuses on managing capital is not yet mature and established, resulting in the ineffectiveness of the corporate governance structure of state-owned enterprises, and the operating rights including salary distribution have not been effectively implemented. In fact, after the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, under the state-owned assets supervision system of 'managing people, affairs and assets', state-owned major shareholders and state-owned assets supervision departments often intervene in the salary distribution of state-owned enterprises through administrative instructions or other means and strengthen control."
"Also, the existing salary distribution system cannot meet the requirements of market economy . The salary distribution system of state-owned enterprises has not yet been fully in line with the market. The barriers between the operating level of state-owned enterprises and market-oriented professional managers, formal workers and labor dispatch workers are clearly distinguished. The phenomenon of different salary of is serious, and it is difficult to establish a market-oriented salary distribution system in a short period of time. In addition, the salary structure of state-owned enterprises is unreasonable, and the performance salary is solidified. It has not truly linked salary distribution to the operating efficiency and benefits of enterprises, which hinders the improvement of state-owned enterprises' operating efficiency. From the perspective of performance appraisal, it is not ruled out that the performance is superficial."
Zhu Changming found that when formulating performance appraisal systems, many state-owned enterprises did not fully consider the job value, performance contribution, labor skills and other factors of employees. Performance appraisal is a formality, and the assessment results are similar. The salary incentives are welfare-oriented and cannot reflect the labor value of employees. Differentiated distribution of performance wages is difficult to truly implement, forming a new big pot of rice, and salary incentives cannot promote the growth of enterprise performance. Therefore, as the most incentive performance wage in the salary distribution structure of state-owned enterprises at this stage, it is impossible to effectively motivate employees because the performance appraisal of state-owned enterprises is a formality.
From the perspective of supporting environment, the reform of the salary distribution system is a part of the " three systems reform ", among which the supporting reforms such as labor and personnel system are the salary distribution system The basis of reform, whether cadres can go up and down, whether personnel can enter and exit, and whether assessments are serious are important factors affecting the effectiveness of salary distribution reform.
Zhu Changming predicts that future reforms will also shift from equal distribution to differentiated distribution. At the same time, it will also shift from "efficiency priority" to "efficiency fairness and equality".
He believes that after the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, especially since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the reform of the distribution system adheres to the orientation of "efficiency and equality". The initial distribution of and redistribution must take into account efficiency and fairness, and ensure that the labor and contribution of all kinds of talents are adapted to their income from a system, so as to fully mobilize the enthusiasm and creativity of the vast number of workers, and ultimately achieve the organic unity of efficiency and fairness of the distribution system.
(Li Ming is a pseudonym in the article)
