The Internet has experienced ups and downs in the past two decades, and countless business models have emerged and intertwined during this period. Some have long since left the market sadly, while others have gone through hardships and are still new with every passing moment.

I, Preface

The Internet has experienced ups and downs in the past two decades, and countless business models have emerged and intertwined during this period. Some have long since left the market sadly, while others have gone through hardships and are still new with every passing moment. The

e-commerce track is undoubtedly one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Internet. Under the spotlight, there were , Amazon, , which achieved 200 times in 10 years, and new players such as Pinduoduo, Shopify, Fiverr, SEA, etc. that achieved 10 times and 20 times in 3 years. legend. Even in more hidden corners, there are talk of vertical players such as Chewy (pet e-commerce) doubling 2-3 times in 2 years, and Etsy (handmade goods e-commerce) 5-6 times in 3 years.

Today, the second half of e-commerce has arrived. The boundaries of the battlefield are becoming more and more expanded and blurred, and the battle is becoming more tense and fierce. Who can have the last laugh in this world? Are the old giants going from strength to strength and continuing to dominate, or are the new forces successfully counterattacking and writing a glorious chapter of their own era?

This series of articles will provide an interpretation from the author’s personal perspective, while providing an overview of the current landscape of more than 20 major players while also taking a forward-looking view. As for the forward-looking battlefield, the author believes that the focus is mainly on five directions: cloud computing and industrial Internet, sinking market, vertical boutique (new retail), live broadcast/video channels, supply chain and finance (small loans).

So, let’s get started.

II, starting from the three giants of China’s e-commerce

(1) Overview

Alibaba Group was founded in 1999 by Jack Ma and other 18 Arhats, located in Hangzhou. After more than 20 years of development, a strong ecological closed loop has been formed in the e-commerce field. The core products include Taobao , Tmall , Ant Financial , Alibaba Cloud, 1688, AliExpress, Cainiao Network , etc. With a current market value of around US$620 billion, China’s e-commerce giant has a solid position. Revenue in FY20 was US$72 billion, GMV exceeded US$1 trillion, and monthly active users were approximately 850 million. Keywords for current development trends: supporting merchants (lowering thresholds, reducing costs, traffic support, etc.), cloud computing, live broadcast, intra-city retail, Cainiao Network, etc. Recent major issues involved include antitrust and financial supervision.

Jingdong Group was founded in 1998 by Liu Qiangdong and is located in Beijing. After Hillhouse Capital entered the market in 2010, it reshaped its strategic positioning and built its own logistics company to do heavy-asset . Later, with the help of Hillhouse , it entered into a marriage with Tencent . It developed rapidly and had a solid foundation, firmly occupying the Chinese market. E-commerce T1 level. Core products include Jingdong mall, Jingxi , Jingdong logistics , Jingdong technology ( Jingdong digital technology ), etc., with a current market value of about US$120 billion. Revenue in 2020 was US$114 billion, GMV was US$401.5 billion, and MAU was approximately 390 million. Keywords for current development trends: Jingxi’s sinking, in-depth exploration of the membership system, intra-city e-commerce and community retail (grocery shopping), supply chain (SaaS), etc. The major events recently involved are the listing of JD Health and JD Logistics.

Pinduoduo was founded in 15 years and is located in Shanghai. Compared with the other two giants, it is very young. However, it has developed rapidly since its establishment. It started with the group-building model (fruit), and then soared with the help of Tencent (WeChat). The current market value is about US$160 billion, with revenue of US$9 billion in 2020, GMV of US$256 billion, and MAU of about 730 million. Keywords for current development trends: group purchasing of agricultural products and communities, normalization of subsidies, brand upgrading, etc.

(2) Comparison of key data indicators

(unless otherwise noted, all are 20-year data. In addition, Alibaba fiscal year is three quarters different from the natural year. The data here is its fiscal year data, and its GMV and other data It is only in China, so considering that it is still growing, it is generally underestimated in comparative analysis)

1. Revenue growth rate: Pinduoduo’s revenue CAGR from 2017 to 2020 is undoubtedly the best, reaching as high as 230%. , followed by Alibaba 44%, JD.com 28%. However, if you zoom in further, you will find that Pinduoduo’s growth rate has slowed down. The high CAGR is mainly due to the explosive growth of 660% in 2018, and the growth of 136% and 100% in 2019 and 2020 respectively. In addition, the cost of rapid revenue growth is also very significant. Pinduoduo’s operating loss growth rate has reached a CAGR of 151% in three years. Fortunately, the growth rate of revenue is significantly faster than the growth rate of operating losses, which is also an important source for investors to continue to consolidate their confidence (there is the possibility of achieving large-scale profits).

2. GMV: In 2020, Alibaba accounted for 61% of the three companies, JD accounted for 24%, and Pinduoduo accounted for 15%. In 2017, Alibaba accounted for 73%, JD.com accounted for 24%, and Pinduoduo accounted for 3%. Consistent with the intuitive feeling, Pinduoduo’s GMV share is constantly increasing (developing more rapidly), mainly eating into Alibaba’s share. In addition, the total GMV of the three giants also maintains a high growth rate, with a CAGR of 27% from 2017 to 2020 (note: the analysis in this article excludes influencing factors such as fraudulent orders)

3. GMV realization rate = revenue/GMV: Due to JD.com Self-operated accounts for a large proportion (similar to Amazon), so this indicator only considers Alibaba and Pinduoduo.

As can be seen from the above table, the GMV realization rates of Alibaba and Pinduoduo have increased, by 2.1 and 2.3 percentage points respectively within 3 years. This reflects the overall improvement of the platform's operating level (it also means that the cost burden of merchants is rising. ). If

is further broken down, the platform’s revenue mainly comes from two parts: commission and advertising. There is not much difference in advertising monetization rates between Alibaba and Pinduoduo, 2.7% and 2.5% respectively. Therefore, the main difference between the two is in commission, which is about 0.8 percentage points, and this gap is mainly concentrated in Tmall. commission (Taobao merchants do not charge transaction commissions). The remaining gap between the two is Alibaba's other self-operated businesses in China, including Hema Fresh, Tmall Supermarket, etc.

Therefore, judging from this indicator, there is still a big gap between Pinduoduo and Alibaba. First, in terms of size, Pinduoduo’s GMV in 20 years is only about 1/4 of Ali’s; secondly, in terms of high-end merchants (Tmall) – it can be seen This is also Pinduoduo’s motivation for wanting to upgrade its brand.

4. AAU (annual active users)

17-20 years, the AAU growth of Alibaba, JD.com, and Pinduoduo are all at a rapid level, among which Pinduoduo is the fastest, with CAGRs of 17%, 17%, and 48% respectively. In 2020, the three reached 726 million, 472 million, and 788 million respectively (Pinduoduo is higher than Alibaba).

In addition, Alibaba also has data on mobile MAU (monthly active users). The CAGR from 17 to 2020 was 19%, reaching 846 million in fiscal year 20, which is 120 million higher than AAU.

5. ARPU (average revenue contribution per user), per capita GMV: It can be seen that Alibaba has a clear lead in these two indicators. Note: The analysis excludes the impact of one person having multiple accounts.

html In 2020 (Alibaba data is the fiscal year), each active user contributed US$1,396 in GMV to Ali, which was significantly higher than Pinduoduo’s US$354. ARPU reached US$76, more than 6 times that of Pinduoduo. The reason why JD.com’s per capita GMV is high is mainly due to its low MAU, which is less than half of Ali’s; ARPU reaches 295 US dollars, which seems to be several orders of magnitude higher than Ali’s. This is mainly because its business model focuses on self-operation, so the industries it sells Most of the products and services are included in their own revenue, unlike platform malls such as Alibaba and Pinduoduo, whose revenue comes from "intermediary services".

Let’s take a closer look at the growth rate of ARPU. The CAGRs of Alibaba, JD.com, and Pinduoduo from 17 to 20 are 26%, 17%, and 129% respectively. There are three points worthy of attention: First, the AAU and ARPU of the three giants have maintained a high compound annual growth rate, which reflects the continuous rapid improvement of China's economic growth and consumption power, as well as the booming development of e-commerce (online shopping penetration rate improvement, etc.); secondly, Alibaba’s ARPU growth rate is 9 percentage points higher than AAU growth rate; thirdly, Pinduoduo’s ARPU growth rate is very high, mainly due to its relatively weak foundation. Its value in 2017 was only US$1, but considering The rapid growth of AAU also indirectly reflects the increasing recognition and stickiness of users to the platform.

6. Profit level and cost control

Due to different business models, Alibaba and Pinduoduo mainly consider gross profit margin, while JD.com mainly considers operating profit margin.

Let’s first look at JD.com. Due to its heavy-asset business model (similar to Amazon), the operating profit margin is very low. It turned from negative to positive in 19 years, reaching 1.5%, and slightly increased to 1.7% in 20 years. Then the important task of increasing profit margins in the future lies with JD Technology (Mathematics) and PLUS members. (Continued in the following article)

Comparing the other two, we can find that Alibaba has been significantly impacted by Houlang Pinduoduo in recent years. Alibaba's gross profit margin was 60% in 2017, but this figure was only 45% in 2020.Of course, taking into account the direct costs of and (cost of revenue), including inventory and logistics, data center operations and maintenance, customer service, costs related to cooperation with third parties/merchants, payment-related costs, etc., Alibaba’s gross profit margin has also declined due to scale expansion. Impact, and the possibility of tilting certain resources to Ant Financial.

But overall, the gross profit margin of 45% is a relatively good level for such a large scale.

Looking further, Alibaba's cost control remains at an excellent level. marketing costs and account for about 10% of revenue. R&D and comprehensive management costs account for a slight decline in revenue. In 2020, they dropped by 2.4% compared to 2017. and 2.1 percentage points (reflection of scale effect).

Pinduoduo has maintained a relatively high gross profit level and has grown - 59% in 2017, 67% in 2020, and as high as 80% in 2019. However, it should be noted that the possibility of maintaining such a gross profit level is not high, mainly because it has invested heavily in heavy assets such as the supply chain (agricultural products) and warehousing and logistics, and its scale is still very small compared to Alibaba (20 years of operation) The price is only 1/8).

In addition, the market is widely concerned about Pinduoduo’s losses, which are mainly concentrated in marketing costs. This cost accounted for 130% of revenue in 2017, and has since dropped to 69% in 2020. The decline is very obvious, but in terms of the absolute number of and , 69% is still a very high level (Alibaba is about 10%). Combined with Pinduoduo’s latest strategic layout, the possibility of achieving profitability in the foreseeable future is still very small.

(3) Long-term competitiveness - winners and losers and winning prospects

Next, let’s talk about the three moats, mainly from the three dimensions of merchants, users, and the platform’s own internal control. Let’s discuss them separately first.

. JD.com

Speaking of JD.com, we can compare it to Amazon. The business models of both companies focus on self-operation—heavy assets, large scale, and low profit margins. Amazon's market share in North America is about 40%, JD.com only has about 20%, and its GMV is 1/3 of Alibaba. What's the difference?

The author analyzes that the main reason lies in the particularity of my country's economic development. Since the United States already has a well-established industrial system, and the manufacturing head concentration effect is very strong, this means that the supply side is mainly characterized by large-scale, standardized products. China's economic boom began in the 1980s, with a relatively weak foundation and a large number of small and medium-sized private factories. Such conditions are actually more conducive to the development of the C2C Taobao model or the C2M Pinduoduo model.

In addition, the economic structure of the United States is characterized by relatively cheap land prices (warehouse rent), relatively expensive labor, and relatively even population distribution. This structure is suitable for Amazon's self-built warehousing logistics - the cost is appropriate, and it can effectively improve transportation timeliness. In contrast, in my country, low land transportation costs and low labor costs (the average single ticket revenue of four links and one expressway are only more than 1 yuan) make self-operated warehousing and logistics not very cost-effective.

However, JD.com still has its own irreplaceable advantages in developing in my country.

Core advantage 1: Quality

When mentioning JD.com, the first impression that comes to mind is most likely “quality”. JD.com is basically not associated with the word “fake”. In terms of user portraits, compared to the other two companies, JD.com is dominated by men and mid-to-high-end consumers.

As shown above (JD.com financial report), JD.com, which started with 3C digital and home appliances, still accounts for 53.8% of revenue in this category in 20 years. In fact, this is also the reason why JD.com built its own logistics - the early logistics did not have complete performance guarantees for handling valuable items, which seriously affected the consumer experience.

Core advantage 2: Logistics experience

Needless to say, since Hillhouse entered the game, JD.com’s consistent strategy has been to focus on assets and improve its self-operated business closed loop. The short delivery time and delivery services have greatly improved the user experience and continued to accumulate more goodwill for JD.com - especially for JD.com's self-operated products, "next-day delivery" has basically become standard.

To this day, JD.com is still making breakthroughs in terms of delivery time, and its core battlefield has extended to intra-city e-commerce - delivery within half an hour to one hour. This battlefield is the bridgehead that the major Internet giants are currently competing for. JD.com will compete with powerful opponents such as , Meituan, , Tmall Supermarket, , Suning, and .

is highly related to the local e-commerce community group buying/grocery shopping. This local track is also in a melee stage. Liu Qiangdong also said that he will personally lead the team to buy groceries. We can wait and see who will win in the end.

In the field of intra-city e-commerce and community group buying, JD.com still has a relatively large chance of winning - its experience in warehousing logistics and supply chain operations, especially after the acquisition of "Dada" to provide stronger transportation capacity for intra-city transportation.

(Note: A separate explanation will be attached for intra-city e-commerce and community group buying/grocery shopping)

strategic direction: Jingxi’s sinking, in-depth exploration of the membership system, intra-city e-commerce and community retail (grocery shopping), supply chain (SaaS) )wait.

2. Pinduoduo

The development of this young Houlang company in recent years cannot help but awe-inspiring. Both are empowered by Tencent, but Pinduoduo uses social networking better than JD.com - "Help me chop a knife", "Fight in a small circle" and other gameplay methods are really exciting.

But the author believes that its core competitive advantage still lies in low price, which is also the key to the sinking market.

Of course, it is precisely because of this that many dumbfounding things have happened in recent years - Kang Shuaifu, Qi Pihen, Lei Bi... As a result, some netizens ridiculed Pinduoduo as "Pin Xixi" "However, Pinduoduo is still growing wildly amid doubts.

Let us go back and rationally analyze the reasons behind it. The author believes that there are three keys.

First, there is overcapacity. After the reform and opening up of and , China's economy continued to grow at a high rate, during which a large number of small factories and mom-and-pop shops were created. Seeing that those who went into the sea first got a lot of meat, more and more people actively participated in it. In addition, the Chinese nation is known for being hard-working and can tolerate a large time cost in exchange for low cost-effective benefits. Over time, overcapacity will inevitably occur (after all, only a handful can upgrade to high-end manufacturing). In popular terms nowadays, it is rolled into .

Under this circumstance, Pinduoduo’s C2M model was born, and small merchants still flocked to it despite the meager profits-fly meat is also meat, which is better than nothing.

Secondly, it is human nature to be greedy for petty gains and "enjoyment alone is not as good as the enjoyment of everyone" - why not join a group together and get some discounts? At the same time, social ties are deepened, which is especially important in sinking markets.

Third, the quality is acceptable - although there were many "Kang Shuaifu" incidents in the early days, when everyone gradually discovered that the quality of things bought at low prices was not bad, it was inevitable that they would say "really fragrant" sighed. After all, the people's eyes are sharp.

So how long can Pinduoduo’s low-price model last? Or how deep is the moat? In the author's opinion,

's moat is not deep. In comparison, its main advantage lies in the user stickiness brought by the first-mover advantage. Under the constant impact of "Taobao Special Edition", "Juhuasuan", "Tuanhaohao" (Meituan), "Jingxi", etc., its advantages will continue to weaken (for example, the MAU of Taobao Special Edition has reached 130 million, and Jingxi There are also about 100 million MAU).

But the dilemma is that Pinduoduo still cannot remove subsidies in the foreseeable future, and may even increase them.

Pinduoduo’s strategic direction: group purchasing of agricultural products and communities, normalization of subsidies, brand promotion, etc. In general, Pinduoduo has a certain chance of winning in the agricultural products and community group buying arena, but the road to normalization of subsidies and brand upgrading is long and difficult. And even if Pinduoduo can break through in the agricultural products and community group buying tracks, it will be difficult for it to be the best - it is more possible for a group of heroes to coexist - this track essentially tests the supply chain capabilities, which is not the case before. Pinduoduo rose to prominence through differentiation through social networking and low prices.

This means that even if Pinduoduo achieves scale profitability in the future, its profit margin indicators will still be difficult to reach Alibaba’s level.

3. Alibaba

is big but not old. It should be able to describe Alibaba more vividly. Single-handedly accounting for half of China's e-commerce market, and still able to achieve double-digit revenue and profit growth, it is indeed powerful. As the big brother, Alibaba has mostly faced challenges in recent years. The relatively leading and cutting-edge layout lies in cloud computing , which has been honed for ten years, and Ant Financial, which already has a very deep moat.On the basic e-commerce platform,

mainly includes "Juhuasuan" and "Taote" (Taobao special edition, the latest data MAU has exceeded 100 million) to challenge the sinking market. The effect is quite satisfactory, and again - low price It is the life gate of the sinking market. There is no shortage of time in this market, and consumers can spend more energy searching for products that are low-priced and meet cost-effectiveness requirements. Then there are "Tmall", " Tmall International ", "88 Members", etc. to consolidate the mid-to-high-end market. In 19, they acquired STO and further integrated the rookie distribution system to challenge JD.com.

In addition, there are new retail and intra-city e-commerce fields, including "Tmall Supermarket", "Suning", " Taoxianda " (Daily Fresh, Hema Fresh , etc.), and the acquisition of " Ele.me" ", invest in " Shihuituan " to compete with the heroes in this category including Meituan, JD.com, Pinduoduo, Didi , etc. Of course, Alibaba is at the forefront in the field of video and live streaming, but it also needs to engage in close combat with new forces such as , Douyin, , Kuaishou, and potential B station .

From this point of view, the war situation in recent years can be said to be very tense and lively. However, overall, Alibaba's e-commerce fundamentals are still very solid, and it seems to be able to cope with challenges everywhere. Coupled with the early deployment of cloud computing (China), Alibaba's leading position will be difficult to shake in the foreseeable future. However, since the end of last year, it has been deeply involved in antitrust and financial supervision. Coupled with the environment of competition between major powers, the stock price performance has been unsatisfactory.

Therefore, for Alibaba, it is currently in the incubation period of the giant beast. It is consolidating and increasing its multi-line strategy. When its adjustment is successful, it will surely shock the mountains and forests again. Perhaps many people will be amazed at that time. It turns out that Ali, who has returned to the spotlight, is still the proud king he once was.

Next, let’s compare the three giants together. Let’s look at the client first – I believe that for Internet companies, the core is the user, or the behavioral data behind the user, which will provide the core production materials for their development. . (Of course, getting familiar with big data is also an issue that needs to be thought about and discussed urgently. Since it is not the focus of this series, we will not talk about it for now)

The three client interfaces, from left to right, are Alibaba, JD.com and Pinduoduo.

At first glance, the three are very similar in layout - top search bar, two-line sub-category navigation bar (Alibaba does not have a pure text category navigation bar), "core highlight bar" (such as Alibaba's Juhuasuan , Taobao Live, Pinduoduo’s Duoduo grocery shopping and tens of billions of subsidies), followed by intelligent recommendations (finding people for goods), which are basically listed one by one. The bottom bar has 5 functions, and the three are slightly different. different.

To expand further, Alibaba and JD.com also have some thoughtful layouts on the top search bar, such as Alibaba’s “subscription” to facilitate users to find favorite stores; JD.com’s “promotion” stimulates the mentality of being greedy for petty gains. There is not much to say about the

search bar. Under it, both JD.com and Pinduoduo have a list of text-only recommended categories (displayed differently by different users, depending on personal purchasing habits). For example, in the screenshot, Pinduoduo shows men's clothing, department stores, etc. , food, etc.), while Ali needs to find it in "Categories", which is one more click step, but it doesn't hurt.

On the two-column graphic navigation bar, JD.com and Pinduoduo have made careful thoughts respectively: JD.com is a large poster banner, and Pinduoduo is a "small circle" with its unique social color.

The next two columns of navigation bars are designed to reflect their respective characteristics and strategic directions. Alibaba uses Tmall's new products, today's hot products (Juhuasuan), Ele.me, etc. as its symbols; JD.com focuses on supermarkets, electrical appliances and intra-city retail (fruit), etc.; Pinduoduo highlights its consistent low prices, flash sales, clearance, free, 9.9 sale and more.

The next column is what I call the "core highlight column" (from a visual perspective, you will most likely pay attention here first when you open the software), such as Alibaba's Juhuasuan and Taobao Live, JD.com's special flash sales and live broadcast, Pinduoduo The grocery shopping and tens of billions of subsidies basically reflect the three companies’ special skills or strategic bridgehead.

’s subsequent smart recommendations are similar to the bottom bar. It is worth mentioning that Pinduoduo’s bottom bar does not have a shopping cart, but has a live broadcast link, which poses certain challenges to consumers’ habits (requiring a certain amount of learning costs to adapt). In addition, in terms of intelligent recommendations, there is generally not much difference in terms of user experience. Existing AI technology can basically "understand you" (consumption habits, price range, etc.) - sometimes it is a bit scary to think about it, but there is nothing you can do about it.

Generally speaking, in terms of user-side design and experience, the three giants have clearly demonstrated their own advantages and also reflected the strategic direction behind them. On the one hand, Alibaba and JD.com have consolidated their mid-to-high-end basics, and on the other hand, they have also launched a fierce offensive into Pinduoduo’s hinterland (low-price). Pinduoduo focuses on the ecology of agricultural products and hopes to gradually include more high-end brands through tens of billions of subsidies. Its ecology while gradually reshaping users’ minds. There is not much difference between Alibaba and Pinduoduo in terms of delivery and timeliness. JD.com has a better fulfillment experience in its core categories due to its self-operated warehousing and logistics.

Next, let’s look at the merchant side and its own internal controls.

JD.com:

Due to its business model that emphasizes self-operation and mobile phones and home appliances, it has not been too concerned about incorporating small merchants into the ecosystem. After the official launch of Jingxi in 2019, it changed its previous attitude and began to work hard to sink the market and attract a large number of small and medium-sized sellers. There are also more discounts in terms of deposit payment and transaction deductions, such as deductions of only 0.6%.

’s own internal control of JD.com has been doing well, but due to its business model, the net profit margin is unlikely to increase. It is not easy to reach 2%-3%, mainly relying on scale effects.

Pinduoduo:

The deposit requirements for merchants have always been very low. Most categories of personal stores only require a deposit of 2,000 yuan, and the same ID card can open multiple stores (with the opportunity to obtain more natural traffic). The transaction deduction is also 0.6%. However, it was previously mentioned that Pinduoduo’s monetization rate is basically the same as Alibaba’s, which means that merchants’ marketing costs are not low. The author personally visited several Pinduoduo sellers (who also have stores on Taobao) and confirmed the above conclusion - the marketing cost of some Pinduoduo stores is as high as 10%-15%. In the case of low prices, the profits are meager. Know.

In addition, Pinduoduo is significantly different from Alibaba and JD.com in that it focuses on single product hits (many stores have only one hit product, or even only 1-2 SKUs), while the latter focuses on the overall store (brand) building. It feels like you have thousands of swords, but I only have one sword. It’s a joke. It’s hard to say whether the two completely different models are good or bad. I can only say that they are adapted to each other’s business models and markets they specialize in. In terms of

's own internal control, it's hard to say whether Pinduoduo is good or bad - the meaning behind expansion is to burn money, and burn a lot of money until it burns out. Nowadays, Pinduoduo has basically prospered, with more than 700 million AAU, which is on par with Alibaba. However, although the loss has reduced, it is still losing money, and according to its strategic plan, it still needs to burn more money in agricultural products. Money, this is a big test for itself and the determination of investors. We will wait and see what the final success or failure will be. The author personally believes that it still has a chance of winning, but even if it achieves large-scale profits, the profit margin level may not be as good as Alibaba.

Alibaba:

Due to the rapid rise of Pinduoduo, Alibaba is feeling even more pressure - this young boy has no martial ethics and has endangered my core position within a few years. Is this okay?

On the merchant side, Alibaba has finally made a big investment - reducing fees, reducing burdens, and reducing fees! Including but not limited to reducing merchant annual fees, software usage fees, etc. For example, Tmall has added new trial operations (lowering the threshold for entry), simplified price rules for marketing platforms (through trains, diamond exhibitions, Juhuasuan, etc.), reduced merchant freight insurance (expected to help merchants save 25% of return costs), and business consultants is free for multiple categories, and the marketing package tool (three treasures and one coupon) is free...

(Note: The business consultant is the internal data station of the Alibaba platform, which provides data of various categories, such as competitive store analysis, consumer portraits, etc., basically for merchants Essential)

provides considerable support to merchants, let’s see what the final effect is.The author personally believes that although these measures will reduce Alibaba's profit level, they will undoubtedly shape long-term competitiveness and a deeper moat, and it is a worthwhile move.

Alibaba has always done very well in terms of its own internal control. You can refer to the previous cost analysis.

(4) Looking at

, in general, the differences between the three giants are significant (perhaps this is the reason why Hillhouse Circuit buys all), but as the battle becomes more intense, the three parties are marching towards each other's hinterland, and the differentiation is gradually become smaller.

Alibaba started with C2C, and then vigorously developed Tmall, financial services, cloud computing and other businesses, resulting in strong user stickiness. Although it is currently facing supervision and challenges, its leading position will still be difficult to shake in the foreseeable future.

JD.com specializes in self-operated digital home appliances, its warehousing and logistics model is aligned with the Amazon model, and its moat is also very deep. Nowadays, while consolidating its basic base (such as increasing PLUS membership), it is sinking with one hand and community group buying/in-city e-commerce with the other. Let’s look at its other Stamina geometry.

Pinduoduo has seized on the pain points of my country's economic structure and emerged with its social and low-price model. It has developed rapidly in recent years and is now able to dominate a corner. However, the moat of the low-price model is not very deep. In the past two years, it has faced fierce impact from Taote and Jingxi. Under such circumstances, Pinduoduo seems to be at a loss as to what to do. On the one hand, it continues to provide tens of billions of subsidies in the hope of cultivating the user mentality and consumption habits of "Pinduoduo buys high-end products (such as mobile phones/skin care products) which are also delicious." On the other hand, it increases the investment The agricultural product supply chain strives to create a moat for community group buying. Regardless of ultimate success or failure, this young game-breaker will continue to make big waves.

(to be continued)