About the author (in order of speech)
Li Wei
, researcher at the National Institute of Development and Strategy, Renmin University of China, professor at the School of International Relations, doctoral supervisor, executive director of the American Research Center, and serves as the "Foreign Affairs Review" ” Editorial board member of the journals "International Political Science" and " International Perspectives on ". Main research fields: international political economics , American studies , and economic diplomacy. He has served as a visiting scholar at the Asia-Pacific Security Research Center in the United States, Cornell University, and the Asian Economic Research Institute in Japan. Author of "The War of Systems: Sino-US Relations in the Era of Strategic Competition" (2017), "Checking the Dollar: Political Leadership and the Rise of Currency" (2015), " Institutional Changes and US International Economic Policy " (2010) etc., and has published many papers in major domestic and foreign academic journals such as Chinese Social Sciences and Chinese Journal of International Politics.
Abstract
Starting from the Trump administration, the United States has established China as its main strategic competitor. Among them, the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" is the most important strategic tool for the United States to compete with China to maintain its global hegemony. After the Biden administration came to power, in order to compete with China more effectively, it has fully inherited and significantly upgraded this new international strategy. The core upgrade is reflected in its focus on economic diplomacy and its efforts in industrial chains, high-end technologies, Aspects such as infrastructure and digital trade have injected economic cooperation momentum into the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", and finally the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" will be officially launched in May 2022. The United States is trying to consolidate the economic foundation of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and build an exclusive regional economic alliance to achieve its goal of balancing China in both geoeconomic and geopolitical aspects. The Biden administration's economic diplomacy efforts in the above four aspects will likely put more severe strategic pressure on China's geoeconomic environment. Our country needs to study it in depth and deal with it prudently.
After Joe Biden (Joe Biden) took office as the President of the United States, he clearly stated that the United States is engaged in fierce competition with China (stiff competition), and the United States' perception of China has also risen from a "pressing challenge" (pacing challenge) to "pacing threats". To this end, the Biden administration has vigorously carried out economic diplomacy over the past year or so, trying to build a united front against China's economy in the Indo-Pacific region, consolidate the economic foundation of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy", and then build it into a joint venture with China. A weapon for comprehensive and lasting competition to intensify competition with China in geo-economic terms. Specifically, the United States is actively building an economic alliance that excludes China through economic diplomacy in four aspects: supply chain security, cutting-edge technology, infrastructure construction, and digital trade, and competes with China for economic leadership in the Indo-Pacific region. The so-called The "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" (IPEF) is the culmination of the U.S. government's Indo-Pacific economic diplomacy.
1. Industrial Diplomacy: Building a Supply Chain Alliance
Industrial diplomacy is the core content of the U.S. Indo-Pacific economic diplomacy. The purpose of U.S. industrial diplomacy is not only to facilitate the reshoring of industries, ensure the safety of its own industries, and resolve the fragility of the industrial chain exposed by the COVID-19 epidemic. More importantly, it is to build a supply chain alliance that excludes China and weaken China's industry-wide advantages. , locking in China’s industrial upgrading space and level, making China unable to challenge U.S. economic hegemony. In its industrial diplomacy, the United States focuses on "security" and "democracy" and deploys and implements it in three steps.
First, the United States links the supply chain with economic security. On February 24, 2021, Biden signed Executive Order No. 14017, requiring a comprehensive assessment of supply chain risks in key products and industries, and released the "100-Day Review Report on the U.S. Supply Chain" on June 8. The report believes that the primary risk to the supply chain is that China uses low costs to engage in "unfair competition" and adopts "market-distorting" industrial policies to encourage production to gain a higher market share.In addition, the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee released the "Report of the Defense Critical Supply Chain Working Group", recommending that the Department of Defense regard supply chain security as a priority direction of the U.S. defense security strategy and reduce reliance on Chinese resources and manufacturing capabilities. Through the above measures, the United States has defined China as the core source of risks that threatens the security of its supply chain, laying the foundation for the subsequent construction of a global supply chain alliance with the United States as the core but excluding China through diplomatic means.
Secondly, the Biden administration uses democratic values as its ideological weapon and joins forces with important industrial countries in the Indo-Pacific to build the so-called "Democratic Supply Chain Alliance." The Biden administration's "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance" clearly states that the United States will work with democratic allies and partners to reshape the supply chain to ensure its security, thereby helping the United States gain strategic and competitive advantages against China. To this end, Biden convened the first "Global Supply Chain Resilience Summit" in Rome, , together with key Indo-Pacific countries and "democratic partners", proposing that in order to ensure the security of the supply chain, a "transparent" and "sustainable" supply chain should be established , labeling Chinese industries as "non-democratic" and "non-market". The United States uses ideology to transform the industrial competition between the two sides into a battle between "justice" and "unjustness" to conceal its essence of safeguarding U.S. economic hegemony and self-interest.
Finally, a number of senior U.S. cabinet officials have frequently visited key Indo-Pacific countries such as India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore , Indonesia , etc. in the past year or so, seeking to help these countries reshape global supply to the United States. chain support, and establish close ties with key companies in the country’s supply chain to maximize control over the supply chain layout. On the one hand, the United States uses values to demarcate a "small circle" to persuade target countries and companies to support the U.S. position on supply chain security issues, supplemented by interest inducements; on the other hand, it uses its existing power advantages to carry out threats and intimidation, forcing Target countries and companies must turn to the United States to form a stronger dependence on the United States, thereby consolidating industrial alliances.
The United States has actively built its industrial alliance in the "Economic Indo-Pacific" through three steps: defining risks, establishing alliances, and locking in "small circles." It also provides double guarantees for the alliance with common ideology and dependence on the United States, and strives to enhance Industrial advantages over China.
2. Technology Diplomacy: Building a Semiconductor Alliance
Different from the Trump period, which mainly focused on "technological control" against China, Biden has adopted a two-pronged strategy of "technological control" against China and the establishment of a "technical alliance" . The "100-Day Review of the U.S. Supply Chain Report" believes that the proportion of the U.S. semiconductor manufacturing industry in the world has dropped from 37% to 12%. The U.S.'s declining position in the global semiconductor industry threatens the U.S.'s long-term economic competitiveness. The government needs to Take defensive measures to protect U.S. technological advantages. Therefore, the House and Senate of the U.S. Congress have successively proposed the "American Innovation and Competition Act of 2021" and the "American Competition Act of 2022" to increase investment in semiconductor production, innovation, R&D investment and technology protection in the form of legislation. In addition, the United States has also formed a "semiconductor alliance" with specific countries or actors to compete with China for technology "fortresses" or the right to formulate technical standards. As the cornerstone of the information and digital economy , semiconductors have become the main battlefield in strategic competition between China and the United States. The Biden administration will deploy the semiconductor technology alliance in three stages.
In the first stage, the United States securitized technical issues and built security and military alliances on the grounds of national defense. In mid-March 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin went to Tokyo and Seoul successively to hold "2+2" talks with Japan and South Korea. , providing a foundation of security and trust for building a semiconductor alliance in both diplomacy and military terms.In early April, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Japan's National Security Agency Director Shigeru Kitamura, and South Korea's National Security Office Director Xu Xun held a meeting at the U.S. Naval Academy in Maryland. During the talks, the three parties confirmed the importance of ensuring the security of the semiconductor supply chain, discussed the security threats posed by China, and believed that the three countries hold most of the key factors in future semiconductor manufacturing technology and have the ability to establish a semiconductor supply chain that is independent of China.
In the second phase, the Biden administration began to implement it at the corporate level to restrict cooperation between relevant companies and China in the semiconductor field. On April 12, 2021, the United States invited Samsung , TSMC and other key semiconductor company CEOs to participate in a semiconductor video conference hosted by Biden at the White House to discuss not only the security of the semiconductor supply chain. , and even issued clear orders to specific companies. For example: The Biden administration specifically requested Samsung to move its semiconductor production base from China to the United States. On May 11, 2021, 64 companies from the United States, Europe, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan established the Semiconductor Alliance of America (SIAC). Member companies have almost achieved full coverage of the semiconductor supply chain, but no mainland Chinese company has participate.
In the third stage, the United States pledged to consolidate the results of technological diplomacy with its leaders, and Biden reached a consensus on semiconductor technology cooperation with the top leaders of Japan and South Korea. On April 16, 2021, Yoshihide Suga, then Prime Minister of Japan, visited the United States. The two sides further clarified their willingness to cooperate in building a supply chain for important components including semiconductors, especially emphasizing the importance of establishing a "decentralized supply network" sex, aiming to reduce dependence on semiconductors from China and Taiwan. On May 21, 2021, then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in visited the United States. The heads of both sides committed to strengthening mutual investment in the supply of semiconductor-related materials, components and equipment to improve the production capacity of key products and develop cutting-edge technologies. cooperation on export control. The United States, Japan and South Korea have politically established the above results through summit consensus. On the evening of May 20, 2022, Biden arrived in South Korea. He only talked with South Korea's new President Yin Xiyue for 90 minutes, and then he and Yin Xiyue went straight to the Samsung Electronics semiconductor factory for a visit. The message he released is self-evident.
The United States has adopted domestic legislation to protect technology and established alliances to monopolize technology, forming a comprehensive containment of China's technological development and international technological cooperation. It has used national defense to build trust, companies to take action, and leaders to provide endorsement of . United allies to strengthen technological competition with China and try to build technological alliances into a key pillar in the "Economic Indo-Pacific".
3. Infrastructure Diplomacy: "Building a Better World"
Infrastructure has become an important battlefield in the strategic competition between major powers. In order to counter China's increasingly expanding "One Belt, One Road" initiative, the United States has begun to pay attention to investment in the field of infrastructure construction. Although the Trump administration proposed the "Blue Dot Network" plan in 2019 with the intention of uniting allies to build a US-led infrastructure and network, it ultimately came to nothing. After taking office, Biden further increased investment in infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region, announced the launch of the "Build Back a Better World" (B3W) initiative, and focused on comprehensively leveraging the United States' advantages in partnerships, rules, and technology, and regarded infrastructure diplomacy as a U.S. The key content of building the Indo-Pacific economic order.
First of all, Biden uses "climate change" and "democracy" as dual value weapons to shape infrastructure rules. At the G7 summit in June 2021, Biden and the leaders of the six countries launched the B3W partnership and launched tit-for-tat infrastructure actions with the "One Belt, One Road" initiative. By showing off its own infrastructure plans, the United States labeled China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative as “opaque,” “undemocratic,” and “low standards,” while constructing its own yet-to-be-implemented plan as “a joint effort led by major democracies.” Values-led, high standards and transparent” infrastructure partnerships. At the same time, the United States vigorously hypes up the debt crisis in relevant countries caused by China's promotion of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative in order to suppress and delay the advancement of China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative.
At the fourth summit of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, the four countries also proposed to provide approximately US$50 billion in infrastructure assistance and investment to the "Indo-Pacific region" in the next five years. Prior to this, although the United States has always claimed that it attaches great importance to overseas infrastructure, its financial investment has been relatively limited. This "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue" means that the four countries of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia have taken a key step in infrastructure construction. For China, overseas infrastructure construction is a strategic advantage area of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative. This time, the United States joined forces with Japan, India and Australia to increase overseas infrastructure construction, and regarded infrastructure construction as an important part of the subsequently launched "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework". Emerging economies are equipped with high-standard infrastructure, thereby accelerating the closing of the infrastructure gap in the Indo-Pacific.
Secondly, Biden uses his rules and technological advantages to focus on building "green infrastructure" and "digital infrastructure" to build an important starting point for China and the United States to compete in the global infrastructure field for energy reform and industrial transformation. The United States has now passed a US$1.2 trillion domestic infrastructure bill, which includes investment in “low-carbon” infrastructure such as new energy charging piles or digital infrastructure such as networks and base stations. This can not only cause a dimensionality reduction blow to the traditional labor-intensive industry in terms of development model, but also compete for high ground on the track of future emerging industries. In addition, the global infrastructure field will be extremely broad in the future, and "green infrastructure" or "digital infrastructure" will become another economic growth point, injecting economic impetus into its domestic economy.
Finally, Biden’s infrastructure diplomacy also focuses on building bridges between the Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic, and building an infrastructure alliance that excludes China on a larger scale at a lower cost. During the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), Biden participated in a meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and British Prime Minister Johnson. This "B3W" global infrastructure initiative meeting aims to negotiate the integration of the "Global Gateway" proposed by the EU and the "Clean Green Initiatives" proposed by the UK. This means that the United States, Europe and the UK will The jointly formed "B3W" global initiative is kicking off the infrastructure competition between China and the United States and becoming another key measure for the United States to build an "economic Indo-Pacific".
4. Trade Diplomacy: Building Digital Trade Leadership
In the more than 20 years since China joined the WTO, it has surpassed the United States in 2013 to become the world's largest country in goods trade, and the gap with the United States has continued to widen. Currently, China is the largest trading partner of 128 countries and regions in the world, while only 30 countries or regions have the United States as their largest trading partner. As China’s largest trade market, the Indo-Pacific region accounts for more than 60% of China’s total trade volume. %. Traditional trade in goods has become China's biggest advantage in the world economy, especially in the Indo-Pacific regional economy, while the United States' advantage is constantly being weakened. However, global trade has gradually entered a new stage of digital trade from traditional commodity trade. The United States is a major and powerful country in global digital trade, and is also the ruler and leader of digital trade. Therefore, the United States is particularly focused on using its digital economic advantages to regain Its dominant position in the international trade system . While emerging digital trade is booming, China is also catching up. In 2020, ASEAN 10 countries and 15 Asia-Pacific countries including China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand signed the " Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement RCEP". In 2021, China submitted to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement. Applications for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (CPTPP) and the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement (DEPA). These are regarded by the United States as China's key actions to compete for digital economic rules and voice in the Indo-Pacific.
The United States is the largest digital economy country and pursues the concept of free flow of data.In order to defend its advantages in the emerging digital economy, the United States first took advantage of the current opportunity when international rules such as digital standards and information flow have not yet been formed, and continued to promote the construction of an "American template" in digital trade through trade diplomacy, thereby establishing a global digital economy under the leadership of the United States. Trade rules. In July 2021, the United States considered drafting a digital trade agreement covering major economies in the Indo-Pacific region, but excluded China. The key to this action by the United States is to connect data sovereignty with economic security and use allies to establish its leadership in regional digital governance. The actors planning to participate in this agreement are all allies or strategic partners of the United States and can cooperate with U.S. initiatives to a greater extent and even encourage other countries to join. Therefore, when drafting the agreement, the Biden administration also supplemented its diplomatic efforts with these countries, continuously negotiated on cybersecurity and digital economy issues, and actively relied on the "U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement" and the "U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement", etc. The spillover effect of existing rules seeks to establish the United States’ dominant position in regional digital governance.
At the same time, the United States combines trade issues with technological issues to weaken China’s digital trade advantages. On the one hand, the United States has joined forces with its European allies to establish the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Commission (TTC) to seek multiple technology monopolies in the field of digital trade; on the other hand, the United States has vigorously helped other Indo-Pacific countries develop their digital economies, allowing these countries to form Reliance on U.S. digital economic technology and establishing a regional digital economic framework under U.S. leadership. Digital economic cooperation is one of the most important aspects of U.S. Indo-Pacific economic diplomacy. By uniting allies, establishing new regulations, and suppressing China's digital trade diplomacy, the United States continues to shape its own digital trade rule system and enhance its leadership in digital trade. The status of digital economic governance in the Indo-Pacific region suppresses China’s digital trade development space.
5. The Limits of U.S. Indo-Pacific Economic Diplomacy
Generally speaking, the United States is trying to weaken China’s dominant position in infrastructure, industry and other fields through active economic diplomacy, thereby highlighting the U.S.’s dominant position in technology, digital trade and other fields. The results of economic diplomacy in the above four aspects are ultimately reflected in the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" (IPEF) launched by the United States. In order to make up for the strategic shortcomings caused by Trump's withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP), in 2021, Biden proposed at the East Asia Summit that he would establish a new "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework", and then Secretary of Commerce Ji Gina Raimondo said at the Bloomberg Innovation Economic Forum in Singapore that this new economic framework will be launched in 2022 and made it clear that she will not return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) TPP) or join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" was officially announced when Biden visited Japan on May 23 this year, focusing on areas such as digital economy, supply chain, clean energy, and taxation. This is the 3.0 version of the U.S. economic competition strategy against China after Obama and Trump. Its essence is to use the power of multilateral alliances to reshape the regional institutional system under the leadership of the United States to "compete against China."
Although the Biden administration is accelerating the upgrade of the Indo-Pacific strategy through the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework", which seems eye-catching, this framework is also under dual pressure from the United States and the international community, and is being implemented in specific areas. There are also many obstacles. At the domestic level, one of the core goals of Biden’s administration is to respond to the interests and concerns of the middle class. Whether the middle class, the backbone of the United States, will continue to support the Biden administration’s substantial investment in the ambitious “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” currently remains unclear. It's hard to predict.
At the international level, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has had a huge impact on the world order under the leadership of the United States and the West. At present, the United States is in a stage of relative decline in international leadership. It is not yet known whether the United States has the ability to respond to the dual challenges of Europe and Asia at the same time. . Factors such as the diversity of the Indo-Pacific region and the divergent interests among U.S. allies and partners have also placed higher demands on the U.S.'s international coordination capabilities.Not only will U.S. allies and partners not necessarily obey the words of the United States because the cost of following the United States to contain China is too high, but the different actions and positions of Indo-Pacific countries in the Russia-Ukraine conflict have amplified regional diversity and differences, and increased This increases the cost for the United States to bridge differences among its partners and thereby create synergy.
In addition, in terms of specific areas, there are many obstacles for the United States to establish a "small group" that excludes China through economic diplomacy. First of all, its supply chain resilience strategy has difficulties in getting companies to obey the national strategy, because the main body of the supply chain is the company, not the government, and may not fully follow the government's instructions. What substantive measures will Biden take to make these companies serve the United States? Supply chain resilience strategies need to continue to be observed.
Secondly, in terms of infrastructure, the United States' capabilities are relatively limited. It is impossible for the United States to invest heavily in infrastructure overseas like China, and there is a certain gap between its infrastructure capabilities and efficiency and China's. However, these countries have united to provide an alternative to the countries along the “Belt and Road”, thereby increasing the bargaining power of these countries with China and thus raising the cost of China’s construction. They can still have a relatively large impact on the “Belt and Road” initiative. pressure.
Finally, from a diplomatic perspective, the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" is more of a loose cooperation initiative and has no binding force. Although the U.S. Trade Representative and Secretary of Commerce will promote implementation at the ministerial level, there is currently no specific roadmap. If the United States cannot provide substantive benefits to its member states and simply allows Indo-Pacific countries to serve as "cannon fodder" in competition with China, I am afraid that the United States will not be able to get what it wants.
For China, we need to attach great importance to and comprehensively study the Indo-Pacific economic diplomacy of the United States. At the same time, we must give full play to our advantages in talents, infrastructure, markets, industries, etc., and actively build the broadest economic partnership network. to resolve the strategic competitive pressure exerted by the United States.
Source of manuscript: National Development Institute of Renmin University of China
WeChat editor: Ma Xiaoqin
National Development Institute of Renmin University of China is a new university think tank with Chinese characteristics built by Renmin University of China with the efforts of the whole school. The current chairman is Zhang Donggang, Secretary of the Party Committee of the school and President. The chief expert is Principal Liu Wei. In 2015, it was selected into the first batch of pilot units for the construction of "National High-end Think Tanks" in the country, and was selected into the top 100 global think tanks. In early 2018, it ranked first in the "Top 100 Chinese University Think Tanks Ranking". In 2019, it was selected into the first-tier echelon in the comprehensive evaluation of national high-end think tanks, making it the only university think tank selected into the first-tier echelon.
The National Development Research Institute of the National People's Congress actively builds a high-end think tank platform with "new platform, large network, interdisciplinary, emphasis on intersection, promotion of innovation and high output". Focusing on the four major research areas of economic governance and economic development, political governance and rule of law construction, social governance and social innovation, public diplomacy and international relations, the school gathers high-quality resources from first-class disciplines in infrastructure construction, decision-making consulting, public diplomacy, and theoretical innovation. Remarkable results have been achieved in aspects such as public opinion guidance and internal governance. With the goal of being "the leader of new university think tanks with Chinese characteristics", the National Development and Research Institute of the National People's Congress is rooted in China, adheres to national strategies, adheres to the mission of the times, and is committed to building into a "world-class university think tank that best understands China."
