In modern warfare, in addition to conducting frontal military operations, whoever occupies the commanding heights of intelligence warfare will have the initiative in the war. On the Korean battlefield, the U.S. used almost all U.S. intelligence agencies and intelligence resources. In addition, the U.S.-led "United Nations Army" intelligence agencies and intelligence personnel also participated in the intelligence collection of the Korean War.
In China, apart from the military reconnaissance unit of the Volunteer Army, the only one that could provide intelligence support at that time was probably only the intelligence department under the direct leadership of Zhou Enlai.
Tough choice
In fact, until July 1950, Mao Zedong had not yet determined whether to place his attack force on Taiwan or North Korea.
But one thing is certain - the challenges, or threats, in both directions of come from the US .
He has made up his mind to fight the Americans who oppose him everywhere.
According to his strategic thinking of concentrating superior forces to fight the war of annihilation, the most urgent task is to make a choice in the north and south directions as soon as possible.
As the US military was involved in the Korean War, Mao Zedong's attention shifted from the south to the north.
On August 11, the Central Military Commission decided to postpone the campaign to liberate Taiwan until after 1951. At the end of September, Mao Zedong even personally instructed: cancel the use of the slogan promising to liberate Taiwan within a time limit in National Day celebrations.
In fact, at the beginning of the Korean War, Mao Zedong had no knowledge of . Because Stalin and Kim Il Sung coincidentally at that time, they blocked the war news and intelligence to him.
Even before the outbreak of the war, all the weapons that the Soviet Union assisted North Korea did not come to North Korea by Chinese railways, but by sea.
Kim Il-sungWhen he is confident and full of ambition, he certainly does not want China to interfere in North Korean affairs.And Stalin has some other scruples about this new ally: Will Mao Zedong object to Moscow's decision beforehand? Will Mao step aside when things get tough and don't follow Moscow's orders?
As " the highest person in charge of the revolutionary cause in East Asia ", Mao Zedong certainly did not want to see a war in a neighboring country that would enable the United States to interfere in Asian affairs, but the reunification of the country had not yet been completed, so he could only repeatedly emphasize to the DPRK, Only after China resolves the Taiwan issue can it provide military assistance.
When learning that Stalin and Kim Il-sung had reached an agreement in May on "taking military measures to resolve the reunification issue of North Korea", Mao Zedong had no choice but to agree to help North Korea resolve the reunification issue first, and expressed his willingness to give the DPRK all kinds of assistance.
Now that the Korean "revolution" is really in big trouble, Mao Zedong naturally has to consider how to fulfill his promises and obligations. Especially after Moscow asked China to intervene in the war, Mao Zedong had no reason to back down.
After the US military entered the war, Stalin immediately thought of letting the Chinese fight with the US.. First, China and the DPRK are neighbors, and the national security of China, an ally, may be threatened again, and we must plan ahead. Second, if China sends troops, it will help the Soviet Union to contain the US military deployment and sphere of influence in Asia.
Mao ZedongIt may not have occurred to him that Stalin wanted to take chestnuts for the Soviet Union by himself, but at that time the new Sino-Soviet alliance had just been established, and China had to rely on the Soviet Union to provide economic recovery and construction assistance. There is no need for China to threaten the Sino-Soviet alliance because of the issue of sending troops. Therefore, Mao Zedong made a quick decision on the choice of the two battlefields in the north and south.
If you only consider from the perspective of "protecting the country and defending the country", then North Korea was not defeated in the military confrontation at that time. China only needed to station troops on the north bank of the Yalu River, and did not need to send troops to North Korea..
But Taking into account the factor of assuming internationalist responsibilities and obligations for the socialist camp, if China stands by when the North Korean regime is threatened, the position of the New China in the socialist camp and the image of the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist party will inevitably change. suffered great damage.
Roshen
On July 4, Zou Dapeng, director of the General Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, was instructed to go to the Soviet embassy in China. Specific assumptions about the provision of tactical support in the South Korean battlefield.
Regarding China's suggestion, Stalin immediately called back to express his support, and urged China to send a representative to North Korea as soon as possible, in order to strengthen contact and solve the problem.
Senior "Old Intelligence Officer"
At this time, the Chinese Ambassador to North KoreaNi Zhiliang was still recovering in Wuhan Union Medical College Hospital. In order to maintain contact with the North Korean side, Zhou Enlai temporarily reassigned as early as June 30 the person who was originally scheduled to work in East Germany. Chai Chengwen In the name of political counselor, he went to North Korea quickly.
Chai Chengwen
Chai Chengwen, formerly known as Chai Junwu, was born in Suiping County, Henan Province in 1915. From 1941 as the staff officer and chief of the intelligence division of the 18th Army Headquarters, to 1949 as the chief of the intelligence division of the Southwest Military Region, he became a senior "old intelligence officer" forged from the furnace of war.
And when the country was just liberated, the unexpected Korean War turned the old intelligence officer into a diplomat.
On June 25, 1950, when Kim Il-sung's army of 80,000 crossed the "38th parallel" and attacked the south, Chai Chengwen was ordered to leave Chongqing, where the Southwest Military Region is located, and rushed to Beijing to report.
Due to the timeliness of intelligence, his mission is closely linked to this sudden war. .
On June 30, Truman ordered the US military to intervene in the Korean War.
Truman
On the same night, Zhou Enlai met Chai Chengwen at the Xihua Hall in Zhongnanhai. Also present were Zhang Hanfu, then vice minister of foreign affairs, and Liu Zhijian, vice minister of the Intelligence Department of the Military Commission.
This emergency summons made Chai Chengwen change his course, and his life became more prosperous and more legendary .
"I obey the decision of the organization"
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States immediately announced its participation in the war, sent the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, and publicly stated that it would vigorously assist France in the colonial war in Indochina, thus completing the deployment of the next military action in Asia .
In this way, Kim Il-sung's war on the Korean peninsula is closely linked to Taiwan, Vietnam, and the entire Far East issue.
Zhou Enlai told Chai Chengwen that if the central government considers that if it wants to accurately grasp the battlefield dynamics, it must send its own military observers to Pyongyang as soon as possible, "Mr. Nie suggested sending you there, and Comrade Bo Cheng also thinks it is appropriate. What is your opinion?"
At this time, Chai Chengwen, who had already received a notice that he was going to work at the Berlin embassy, never expected to be suddenly reassigned to the war-torn Korean battlefield.
But as a PLA officer, he still answered without hesitation: "Prime Minister, I obey the decision of the organization ."
Zhou Enlai said to him: "The United States has pointed the finger of aggression at us, and we must make corresponding preparations.. Now someone needs to keep in touch with Comrade Kim Il Sung. But Comrade Ni Zhiliang is still recovering in Wuhan, so I will send you to Pyongyang with a few cadres who understand the military.
After a brief pause, Zhou Enlai said again: "The General Counsel's opinion is that you will go to North Korea in the name of the military observation group. I think it is better to use as an embassy staff member to . This matter is so settled, try to start as soon as possible. "
After urgent preparations, he completed the preparations for going to the DPRK in a few days.
Chai Chengwen
In addition to Chai Chengwen, it was finally confirmed that the counselors Ni Weiting, Xue Zonghua, the first secretary Zhang Hengye, the military attache Zhu Guang, the deputy military attache Wang Gang, Liu Xiangwen, and 4 other radio staff. Chai Chengwen served as the political counselor and temporary charge d'affaires of the embassy in North Korea.
In the early morning of July 8, 1950, Zhou Enlai once again met with the upcoming Chai Chengwen working group. He gave specific instructions on the work and tasks.
Zhou En said: "This time you went as a senior military attache and political counselor, and you stayed by Kim Il Sung's side. If something happened, you should report to the Central Committee as soon as possible. Now that the Korean people are on the front line of the struggle, they should express their support to the Korean comrades and see if there is anything we need to do, ask them to come up with it, and we will do our best to do it. The current main task of the embassy is: to maintain contact between the two parties and the two militaries, to understand the war situation in various aspects, and to report the changes in the battlefield situation to the Central Committee in a timely manner. "
The Chinese intelligence officer
Chai Chengwen's team who was "fooled" arrived in Pyongyang on the morning of July 10.
Kim Il Sung met them on the same day, and then arranged them to live in the high-level guest house of the Central Committee of the Labor Party, provided them with good food and lodging, and appointed Xu Hui ("Yan'an faction"), who was then deputy director of the General Political Bureau of the People's Army. , to brief Chai Chengwen on the battlefield every day. He also specifically instructed the relevant departments, installed a special line phone in Chai Chengwen's room.
Kim Il Sung said to him, ", pick up this machine, and the phone in my office will ring. If something happens, just tell me ."
Kim Il Sung
Not only that, Kim Il Sung also ordered the The General Staff of the Army assigned a special person to send the latest battle report to Chai Chengwen's team every night.
In fact, The relationship between China and North Korea at that time was not very coordinated. Because of this, when Chai Chengwen left Beijing, he also brought a handwritten letter from Zhou Enlai to Kim Il Sung. Interestingly, Zhou Enlai solemnly emphasized to Kim Il-sung in his letter that " is a reliable ".
This kind of "special preferential treatment" directly arranged by Kim Il Sung surprised Chai Chengwen.
According to Chai Chengwen's recollection, when he first arrived in Pyongyang, he was very happy, felt that Kim Il Sung treated him well . Picking up the phone was Kim Il-sung's voice, and the other party spoke Chinese so smoothly that there was no need for an interpreter.
Even though other senior cadres met in the cafeteria every day, few people talked to him. When he met Chai Chengwen, he was like a passerby; he took the initiative to say hello, but they didn't respond. , as if he were a leper.
Later, Xu Hui quietly told him that Kim Il Sung had instructed that would not allow everyone to contact him and talk .
Speaking of the battle reports sent to the room every day, Chai Chengwen said that he was very happy at the time. With ready-made information, his work was much easier. Only later did
realize that the battle reports that Kim Il-sung sent to him every day were broadcast drafts the next day. For example, on July 9, he received a battle report and immediately sent it to the country. The next day, I saw the battle report appearing verbatim in the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.
As for the request of the Chinese embassy to send a deputy military attache to the People's Army troops to visit and study, the North Korean side has also been delaying and not answering.
In his contacts with other North Korean personnel, Chai Chengwen clearly felt that military intelligence is basically a restricted area for the Chinese..
Nie Rongzhen
At the same time, the Chinese military's staff group to be sent to North Korea to understand and grasp the dynamics of the battlefield was also declined.
Not long after Chai Chengwen returned to China to report on his duties, when the Central Military Commission held a meeting, Nie Rongzhen reprimanded him in a Sichuan accent: "Chai Chengwen, what are you doing? Other people's newspapers? We have all read the newspapers, and the things you sent back are all published in the newspapers."
Chai Chengwen pleaded aggrievedly: "This is what Kim Il-sung sends me every day, pretend it to me. Kim Il-sung was the only one on the phone, and none of the North Korean comrades dared to speak to me. He just made me deaf and mute! U.S. landing site.
On August 12, Ni Zhiliang, the ambassador to North Korea, arrived in Pyongyang to take office before he recovered. Chai Chengwen received a domestic call on September 2, asking him to report back to Beijing as soon as possible.When
was discussing with other members to report on the work of the central government, Chai Chengwen analyzed and put forward the judgment that "the enemy is likely to land in Incheon and other places" based on the intelligence.. After some discussion, others agreed.
Ni Zhiliang
On September 4, Ni Zhiliang and Chai Chengwen met with Kim Il Sung again to learn about the latest situation ahead, and put forward to him the idea that "the US military might land in Inchon". But according to the battle situation at that time, Kim Il Sung did not take seriously.
In the daytime of September 6th, when Chai Chengwen finished arranging all the Korean battlefield situation at hand and writing a report outline, he received an emergency call from Xihua Hall, Zhongnanhai, and the other party ordered him to return to China immediately to report on the situation . Chai Chengwen set off immediately and flew to Beijing in the early morning of the 7th. On the afternoon of the 8th, Chai Chengwen reported to the acting director Nie Rongzhen.
At that time, the Korean People's Army and the United States and South Korea were in a stalemate. While making every effort to prevent the People's Army from attacking, the U.S. military also stepped up its air blockade and destruction of the People's Army's rear lines of communication, and continued to reconnaissance and bomb coastal ports.
talked about judging the development trend of the war situation, Chai Chengwen pointed out in particular: "Intelligence shows that the US military has transferred the marines operating in the Busan defensive circle back to Japan and is actively organizing new marine divisions. This shows that the US military has been working hard. Prepare for the counter-offensive. Once the time is right, the counter-offensive will begin, and it is very likely that will log in behind the side of the People's Army, thus opening the curtain of the counter-offensive ."
Mr. Nie interrupted Chai Chengwen's report and asked: " Do you estimate that if the enemy is to land, where is the most likely landing site?"
Chai Chengwen replied: "We think that the landing site is likely to be in Incheon .Since ancient times, Incheon has been known as the west gate of Seoul, and it is of great importance both militarily and politically. As long as Incheon is captured, the enemy will be able to smash directly into Seoul, which can not only cut off the rear transportation line of the People's Army at one stroke, but also echo each other with the besieged troops in the defense circle of Nakdong River, causing front and rear attacks on the main force of the People's Army. It is understood that in the recent period, small groups of enemy troops have been active in Wolmi Island and Deokji Island off the coast of Incheon, which seems to be creating conditions for this strategic concept. "
During the several hours of reporting, Nie Rongzhen asked questions from time to time, while Chai Chengwen talked about it. After Chai Chengwen's report was finished, Nie Rongzhen took the report outline and said that it would be submitted to Chairman Mao immediately.
Chai Chengwen quickly said: "My outline was written by and in a hurry. It was very scribbled. I originally planned to transcribe it again after finishing it, but Beijing was in a hurry, so I had to fly back with the draft. Since Chairman Mao wants to see it, it's better for me to copy it and report it again? "
Nie Rongzhen said: "Don't delay any more, you can see clearly. "
Chai Chengwen's report outline to the Central Committee
That afternoon, this outline appeared on Mao Zedong's desk. "
In the middle of the night that day, Chai Chengwen was called into the West Flower Hall to report the Korean War to Premier Zhou.
Chai Chengwen believes that the People's Army is now at the end of its power and it is difficult to advance further, and it has no air and sea power. .
Zhou Enlai asked: "If there is a sudden change in the situation, if we need to send troops to fight in the DPRK, what difficulties do you think we will encounter? "
It can be seen that the top leadership of the central government has foreseen that North Korea will face a protracted war, and it is not too far away for China to send troops to resist the United States and aid Korea.
One day later, Chai Chengwen reported to Lin Biao again.
After listening, Lin Biao asked Chai Chengwen: "If the war situation is reversed, we will not send troops and let them go up the mountain to fight guerrilla, do you think it will work?" However, in the mountainous area near the northern part of the Yalu River, you can persevere. Put the logistics and hospitals in the northeast, and if you can't win, they will run to our territory." The changes in the Korean War situation brought about by the landing in Inchon, and his prior analysis and judgment are roughly the same, which aroused the close attention of Chinese high-level officials.
It can be seen from this that 's strategic vision that has experienced war is so vicious, it completely predicts MacArthur's amphibious landing strategy .
Friends who are familiar with the history of our army know that during MacArthur's planning of the Inchon landing, there were in our army who saw through MacArthur's plan more than half a month in advance, and some even counted almost all of MacArthur's attack time. .
In addition to Chai Chengwen, there are also Chief of Staff of the Volunteer Army Xie Fang , Director of the War Room of the General Staff Lei Yingfu .
It's a pity that the People's Army thought that victory was in sight. Although China was able to send its own ambassador to Pyongyang under Stalin's urging, they still could not get accurate and detailed information about the battle under Kim Il-sung's intentional blockade. Intelligence . Not only that, because Kim Il-sung has always been disgusted with China's involvement in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, it is almost impossible for Mao Zedong to exchange views with Kim Il-sung on this issue.
Therefore, before the battle, North Korea had only one weak division stationed at in Seoul.When MacArthur launched the Inchon landing on September 15, completed the strategic reversal with almost negligible casualties.
The rapid retreat of the People's Army also prevented the Volunteers from receiving targeted training and logistical preparations, so they could only rush into the DPRK.
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