Jinggangshan is the first rural revolutionary base established by our party. It has a very high historical status. It was initially developed by Chairman Mao in 1927. Later, the remaining departments of the Nanchang Uprising and the Nanxiang Uprising led by General Zhu and Chen Yi, joined, greatly expanding their strength.
I wonder if you will have any questions when you see this experience. The communication level was not enough at that time, Chairman Mao and President Zhu didn’t even know the specific location of each other and the situation of the army, and they couldn’t contact each other accurately with a phone call or a positioning. So how did they successfully meet? There is a very key figure here - He Changgong .
He Changgong's early historical status was very high. He was not only an important figure in Zhu and Mao's meeting, but also had a deep friendship with Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. He designed the first military flag of our army, served as the commander of the Red Army in 1930, and served as the political commissar of the army on the way to the Long March.
Such an impressive qualification, but unfortunately, he stood on Zhang Guotao's side when he was divided into troops on the grassland, which affected his future military and political career. So, why should he, a "direct line among the direct line" like him, make a surprising choice?
1. The relationship between He Changgong and the main leaders
He Changgong was originally named He Kun. He was from Huarong, Hunan. After the May Fourth Movement, he went to France to work and study and became a member of the branch in Europe. During this period, he met Zhou Enlai, Zhao Shiyan and others, and was influenced by them and joined the party in 1922.
After He Changgong returned to China in 1924, he was sent to his hometown Hunan to carry out the peasant movement. At that time, he had a famous colleague, Chairman Mao. Both of them admired each other and had excellent work, so they became thorns in the side of the warlords. After the Ma Ri Incident, Hunan warlord Xu Kexiang offered a reward to capture He Kun. For safety reasons, Chairman Mao changed his name to "Changgong", which means to be the people's long-term worker forever.
He Changgong temporarily left Hunan with his new name and entered the Guard Corps of the Second Front Army General Command of the National Revolutionary Army under the actual leadership of the Communist Party. Later, the guard regiment was unable to pursue the Nanchang Uprising troops, so they stayed on the border of Hunan and Jiangxi to participate in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Then most of them followed the Chairman to Jinggangshan. He Changgong was particularly excited about being able to fight side by side with Chairman Mao again.
After the base was opened, Chairman Mao was very concerned about the situation of the Nanchang Uprising troops, so on October 5 of the same year entrusted He Changgong to contact Hunan Provincial Party Committee and Hengyang Special Committee, hoping to get news from it.
He Changgong arrived in Changsha on October 10. After searching for it, he joined the provincial party committee and reported on the work of the Autumn Harvest Uprising. The Hunan Provincial Party Committee told him that if you want to find Zhu De and Chen Yi in , you don’t have to contact the Hengyang Special Committee anymore. You can directly detour through the northern Guangdong area to search.
At the end of December, He Changgong arrived at Shaoguan and successfully found the 140th Regiment headquarters where Zhu De was located in a plow head more than 40 miles away from Shaoguan. Zhu De was very excited when he saw him: is so good. I saw the news about Jinggangshan from the enemy's newspaper. We ran around, and there was no place to stand. We were about to find you. It would be great that you could come.
Then Zhu De told He Changgong's troops that were instigating the uprising in southern Hunan and asked him to go back and contact Chairman Mao immediately. He Changgong did not dare to neglect and returned to Jinggangshan in January 1928 to report relevant information. After
, He Changgong served as an important contact person for the two departments. On April 28, 1928, Zhu Mao met at Longjiang Academy in Longjiang City, Ninggang. He Changgong acted as the role of introducing people and introduced each other to each other.
2. He Changgong's choice when he divided his troops on the grassland was unexpected
From the experiences mentioned above, you can see that He Changgong's relationship with the important leaders of Zhu, Mao and Zhou were extraordinary, and he was definitely the "direct line among the direct line." After the Zunyi Conference , Chairman Mao found He Changgong and asked him to serve as the political commissar of the Red Ninth Army, which fully demonstrated the central government's attention and trust in him.
The Ninth Army was considered a relatively special force during the Long March, mainly responsible for the rear and cover. There were more than 11,000 people when they set off. When the Red 1st and Red 4th Front Army Maogong met, there were only less than a thousand people left. This result was very tragic.
is actually not just the Red Ninth Army. The entire Red Front Army is not optimistic, with serious staff reductions and very few materials and equipment. Most people, including Chairman Mao, looked haggard and malnourished. They thought that their situation would improve after meeting with the Red Fourth Front Army, but they did not expect that Zhang Guotao saw that the Central Red Army was so weak, and he actually had wrong ideas and kept asking for power.
The Central Red Army made concessions in many aspects to unite comrades, but this did not satisfy Zhang Guotao's ambitions.
In August of the same year, the two major fronts were mixed into left and right to prepare to go north. The Red 5th Army adapted from the Red 5th Army adapted from the Red 9th Army were incorporated into the left-road army dominated by the Red 4th Army. What is helpless is that not long after they separated, Zhang Guotao wanted both Red Army troops to go south, and even thought about using extreme methods.
For security reasons, the central organs of the Right Route Army had to lead the Red 1 and 3 armies (i.e., Red 1 and Red 3rd Army ) and the Military Commission Column to head north separately. Dong Zhentang, the commander of the Red 5th Army, strongly opposed Zhang Guotao after learning the news, and expressed his desire to lead his troops to follow the Central Committee. However, Huang Chao, a confidant sent by Zhang Guotao to serve as the political commissar of the Red 5th Army, slapped him in front of everyone.
In order not to undermine unity, Dong Zhentang endured it. Under pressure, other former Central Red Army members had to follow the Red Fourth Front Army south to Sichuan Kang.
On October 5, after Zhang Guotao led his troops to Zhuomu Tower, he no longer concealed his ambitions and held a meeting in a noble manner and claimed to be "established another". It was at this meeting that He Changgong's approach surprised many people.
Zhang Guotao knew that this kind of thing was a bit difficult to convince the public by relying on his subordinates alone, so he asked the former senior cadre of the First Front Army of Hong Kong to set an example. Four people spoke more fiercely: Director Shao Shiping, Minister of the Work Department of the Red 5th Army, He Changgong, Political Commissar of the Red 32nd Army, Luo Binghui, Commander of the Red 5th Army, and Li Zhuoran, Political Commissar of the Red 5th Army.
This has been recorded in the memoirs of many relevant personnel. Song Kanfu, who was the director of the Telecommunications Department of the Fourth Red Front Army at the time, recalled: was first spoken by several cadres of the First Red Front Army. Their words had a great impact on everyone, because they were cadres of the First Front Army and had been with the Chairman for a long time, so why did they oppose the Chairman? Many people are confused because of this. After the meeting, all these cadres were promoted.
Marshal Xu Xiangqian also felt incredible: the atmosphere in the venue was very dull, and no one wanted to stand out. So Zhang Guotao first appointed cadres from the Front Army to speak. These cadres listed some specific examples and were particularly excited. The comrades of the Fourth Front Army had never heard of it and couldn't help but be upset. At critical moments like
, the closer people, the worse the impact. He Changgong, who participated in the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the construction of Jinggangshan base area, and had close ties with the central leaders, misled many people's speeches.
3. Why did He Changgong do this?
Looking at the cadres of the former Red First Front Army who spoke at the Zhuomupai Conference, they are basically from the former Red Fifth Army and the former Red Ninth Army. Some of the experiences of the Long March can infer the reason why He Changgong did this.
1, the Red Fifth Army and the Red Ninth Army served as guards most of the time during the Long March. During the Long March, many Kuomintang warlords had the attitude towards the Red Army in . "Don't stop the head, do not cut the waist, only hit the tail." . After all, everyone wants to preserve their strength and fight with the Red Army, the result will be that Chiang Kai-shek will pick peaches. Wang Jialie, Guizhou, is a clear example.
So the Red Army's rear guards suffered particularly heavy casualties, and the Red Ninth Army had another experience of being almost wiped out as a suspect. After the three crosses of the Chishui River, Chairman Mao ordered the main force of the Red Army to turn around and go south, continue to cross the Wujiang River in the south, and go from the southwest corner of Guizhou toward Yunnan.
But this move is very risky. There must be an army disguised as the main force and made the illusion of crossing the Yangtze River 1 to join the Red Fourth Front Army, attracting the attention of the Kuomintang army. This task was handed over to the Red Ninth Army.
Chairman Mao sent a telegram to the Red Ninth Army for urgent need: Our field army decided to move south to seek maneuvers, and the Ninth Army temporarily retained the current active area to pinch the Zhou Wu Column to cooperate with our main force in the battle.
After receiving the order, the Red Ninth Army moved in the northern Guizhou area with great fanfare, built many fortifications on the spot, and made a decisive battle with the enemy. The troops also brushed slogans at many intersections: break through the Wujiang defense line and meet with the Red Fourth Front Army!
All these things made Chiang mistakenly think that this was the main force of the Red Army, so he ordered all units to attack with all their might. The Red Ninth Army dragged down six enemy divisions and successfully covered the main force across the river. However, because the Red Ninth Army was bitten very tightly by the enemy, it did not arrive at the river crossing location as agreed. Chen Geng demolished the floating bridge in advance without knowing it.
This made the Red Ninth Army not see any supporters when they arrived at the crossing point, and there was no pontoon bridge. However, the investigators reported that Wu Qiwei and Zhou Hunyuan were not far from them, and they had no time to build the pontoon bridge.
In desperation, the Red Ninth Army had to act alone and fought for more than two months before they met with the main force. They were on the verge of danger several times, and the casualties were particularly heavy, so Luo Binghui and He Changgong, the highest leader of the legion, were resentful.
2. This is related to the actual situation at that time. Because the incident suddenly happened, the central government only took away the Red 1 and Red 3 armies on the right side of the army, while the Red 5 and Red 32 armies on the left side of the army were unable to be notified. Even if they were notified, they could not leave together.
So some cadres of the Red 5 and Red 32nd Army also complained. Zhang Guotao's memoirs also said that "Privately leading the first and third armies to the north, but did not notify them, and unanimously expressed indignation."
3. After being under pressure and making wrong judgments about the situation, we know that Chairman Mao was correct from the perspective of later generations, but at that time, many people could not see this. He Changgong and others saw that the Red Fourth Front Army was strong and strong, thinking that following them would have a better way out, and then they blindly followed Zhang Guotao.
But no matter how many reasons are, after all, He Changgong and others are not determined and have insufficient determination in the face of major issues. Not all the cadres of the First Front Army of the First Army who have similar experiences are like them.
4. The performance of the former Red First Front Army cadres
Also in the former Red Ninth Army, they also experienced difficult solo actions. Huang Huoqing, director of the Political Department of the 32nd Army, firmly resisted Zhang Guotao's wrong behavior. He found He Changgong and asked to go north together, but unfortunately he was ineffective.
After Luo and He expressed their attitude, the cadres who supported the central government of the 32nd Army gathered around Huang Huoqing. Huang Huoqing's memoir:
After the meeting was over, cadres from the political department hurried to my room to tell the meeting situation, and were very angry. Luo Binghui and He Changgong had already gone to Zhang Guotao. Some cadres asked me to take them away. I also wanted to work with Red Fifth Army to go west through the Tibet area to find the central government, but the radio was transferred soon and there was no way to contact the central government.
Later, Zhang Guotao transferred Huang Huoqing from the 32nd Army and did not give him a position, which caused Huang Huoqing to almost die on the road.
Red 5th Army Commander Dong Zhentang also resolutely fought with Zhang Guotao. After the Zhuomudiao Conference, Liu Bocheng decided on the plan to "catch Zhang" and was ready to force Zhang Guotao to go north with force. Dong Zhentang was the main force to mobilize, but General Zhu did not agree to the overall situation.
If you want to talk about the guard mission during the Long March, the Red Fifth Army took longer. The commander of the legion Dong Zhentang joined the Red Army after the Ningdu Uprising , and He Changgong was also his introduction to the party, so he had no complaints. In this way, the gap was ashamed.
There are also Peng Shaohui, Chen Bojun and others. Basically, most of the cadres of the First Red Army are on the central side. These people did not move with the wind, and they are much more determined! The choice of
people is very important. He Changgong had such a high position, but later he mainly engaged in military education and military equipment. He was unable to participate in the awarding of the title in 1955. It can only be said that a series of events after the division of troops in the grassland affected He Changgong's later development.
