Zaporoze is one of the so-called states where the four states have been referendum to Russia, but what is more interesting is that the capital of the state is not under the control of the Russian army, which is the biggest difference from the other three states.
At present, the Russian army generally controls the central and southern parts of Zaporoze Prefecture , with a total of about 70% of the areas. The more famous cities include Melitopol and Bernsjsk.
In addition, if we talk about the Zaporoze front here, we also include the central Donetsk front. They are all new fronts set up by the Russian southern military region troops after heading north, so the connection is closer.
Compared with the intensity of war on other fronts, in the more than 8 months since the war between Russia and Ukraine, the Zaporoze front basically belongs to the category of small-scale battles, with most of the offensive and defensive battles at battalions and companies.
After the Ukrainian counterattack in the direction of Khlsong and Kharkov began and made progress, the Ukrainian counterattack in the direction of Zaporozhe also increased.
Especially in Russian information, the Ukrainian army, which constantly emphasizes the direction of Zaporoz, is also gathering troops to prepare for a major counterattack in this direction. However, the Ukrainian counterattack on both east and west lines has been around for nearly two months, and the so-called Zaporoze counterattack has not arrived yet.
is actually not decided by us readers, but it does not prevent us from analyzing. Let’s talk about various situations of fighting or not fighting in this direction.
First of all, if the Ukrainian army really wants to counterattack, what is its tactical intention? If you want to say that you can recover lost land, it must be true, but combat operations must have a clearer purpose. The significance of the existence of the Russian army in the direction of Zaporoje is to connect Khlsson to the west and connect to Khlsson to the east, which not only makes Azov sea an inland sea under the actual control of the Russian side, but also makes Russia have a land channel from its homeland to Khlsson.
When we talked about the bombing of the Crimea Bridge, we said that the Russian army also has a logistics supply line on land, and Kherson's logistics will not be fatally threatened, but this line is closer to the war zone and is easily affected by war.
If the Ukrainian army launches a counterattack in Zaporoze, the main focus is to cut off the railway and road transportation lines connecting the Russian army east-west. At least we must push the front line forward so that our precise strike artillery fire can cover the Russian military transportation line. If this tactical purpose can be achieved, it will help the Ukrainian army in the direction of Helsong.
As for rushing to the seaside of astro or Mariupol in one breath, this combat expectation is not realistic at this stage.
Western half
Eastern half
Eastern half
Currently gathered on the front line of Zaporoze, the Ukrainian army is more clearly the first Tank Brigade, the 56th Movement Brigade, the 59th Movement Brigade, the 72nd Machinery Brigade, and the newly established 68th Hunter Brigade; the 9th Mobile Regiment and the 23rd Brigade; the 102nd Brigade, the 108th Brigade, and the 110th Brigade of the Territorial Defense Army.
Although there are many units such as these, the main forces of the regular army are mostly scattered battalion-level brigades that restore combat power after rest and recuperation, while the others are newly built brigades, National Guards and Territorial Defense Forces. In terms of the composition of the troops, the lack of mobile assault troops is more suitable for the garrison operations under the current tactics of the Ukrainian army.
Of course, the information we can obtain is limited after all, and it cannot be ruled out that the Ukrainian army is secretly mobilizing troops to strengthen the power on this line to carry out a large counterattack.
But just judging from the information obtained now, after the Ukrainian army concentrated its new forces on the counterattack on the east and west sides, it was difficult for it to take out the power of the corresponding lineup and open up the third counterattack battlefield in Zaporoze.
It is also worth noting that this battle line extends from Dnieper River to the southwest of Donetsk City. It not only needs to protect the Ukrainian army's supply line in the south road of Donbas , but also shoulder the defense of Zaporoze City and the Red Army City. It is difficult to attract enough new forces to launch a counterattack while ensuring the stability of the defense line.
Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the Ukrainian army's counterattack was a smoke bomb, and its main intention was to attract Russian mobile troops to this line and indirectly support the east and west lines.
In addition, from the perspective of the local Russian army and local Zaporozer institutions, their original strength was not too strong, and they were basically in a balanced state with the local Ukrainian army, and even weaker than the Ukrainian army, which put them under a lot of pressure.
In this context, taking advantage of the opportunity to spread the information that the Ukrainian army is approaching, it will also help to gain more resources for oneself in the crisis of the east and west fronts, rather than the other way around.
If the power in this area is really weakened, the Ukrainian army might really have to counterattack, after all, the possible strategic benefits are not small.
In fact, although the Ukrainian army on this front has not taken a large-scale attack so far, it is indeed gathering mobile troops and continuously launching tentative attacks on the battalion-company scale on the front.
This kind of attack is usually regarded as a precursor to the Ukrainian counterattack, but for such attacks on the Zaporoze front, the results are currently very little. The local Russian garrison has a relatively good perception of the battlefield situation and the artillery cooperation is also good, so it can often achieve quick detection and quick attack.
It is almost November now, and the Russian mobilization forces will be used immediately, and it is inevitable to head to the relatively calm battlefield of Zaporoz. If these Russian troops are in place before attacking, it will probably be too late.
Therefore, for the Wu army on this front, whether it is really planning to launch a big counterattack or bluff, the time window for operation is not sufficient.
In addition, there is another noteworthy point on this front, which is Zaporo Hep Nuclear Power Plant . Whether it is a shelling operation or a special force raid, the content of this area exceeds the scope of normal combat, so it needs to be a different analysis.
