Withdrawal Chengde
When I continued to serve as the chief of staff of the Hebei-Chahar-Religious Military Region, it was on the eve of the launch of a full-scale civil war. In order to prevent the outbreak of a full-scale civil war, our party once again proposed to the Kuomintang government for a long-term ceasefire, restoring traffic, reorganizing the army and demobilizing the CPPCC. However, since Chiang Kai-shek's policy of launching a comprehensive civil war was established, he ignored all the peace requirements of our party and other aspects. Since June 15, he has repeatedly rudely proposed to withdraw from the south of Longhai Road, the entire Jiaoji Road, the Chengde region, the eastern coastal areas of Hebei and most of the northeast, as well as all areas liberated by our army from the puppet army in Shandong and Shanxi provinces. He claimed that only if our party withdraws from the above areas, we can consider stopping the civil war. After our party firmly rejected these unreasonable requests by the Kuomintang government, they took advantage of the world's ruling and first launched a large-scale besiege of our Central Plains Liberated Area in late June 1946. From then on, the Kuomintang government imposed an unprecedented scale of civil war on the Chinese people. He also threatened to destroy our army within three months.
At the beginning of the full-scale civil war, the Kuomintang government concentrated the forces of three armies to enter Rehe . At that time, our army had only the Yang Su Column and some local troops in Rehe at that time. The enemy has a great advantage in both military and economic power.
In mid-July, the signs of the Kuomintang preparing to attack Rehe have become increasingly obvious. The three-person military mediation team of Chaoyang District, Comrade Li Yimin, our representative, reported to the military region that he saw many American canned boxes piled up at Yebaishou Railway Station. After he asked the railway workers, he learned that this was a supply from the newly compiled 22nd Division of the Kuomintang stationed in Jinzhou , indicating that the division may have been transferred from Jinzhou to attack Chengde. At the same time, our translator of the Military Mediation Execution Group, Comrade Zhang Tianmin, also found out from the translator of the US representative that Nanjing had issued an order to Shi Jue, the commander of the 13th Army of the Kuomintang, asking them to prepare within two weeks to seize Chengde.
At that time, leaders such as Cheng Zihua, Xiao Ke, Huang Huoqing and other leaders of the military region felt the situation serious. But some comrades didn't believe it and said, "No, the peace negotiations have not yet been declared to break down. If you attack blatantly, isn't it a civil war? 1'. However, the military leaders believed that the enemy attacked Chengde was only a matter of time. We should prepare early if we are prepared. We immediately attacked the enemy's situation and analyzed it. It was estimated that the enemy might attack Chengde in three ways from the direction of Jinzhou, and the main force (the main force) went west from Ye Baishou, along Lingyuan and Pingquan , attacking head-on towards Chengde on the front line (the main force) from Lingyuan and Pingquan , attacking head-on towards Chengde , attacked from Chifeng south to Longhua Weichang, and advanced from south to south of Pingquan through east to west through Hebei. Based on this, we made corresponding arrangements for the troops.
, but after a while, the enemy did not come. At this time, in order to strengthen the defense force of Zhangjiakou , Yang Su Column was ordered to be transferred back to Zhangjiakou, and Comrade Xiao Ke also left the Hebei-Chare and Reliao Military Region, and was political commissar Cheng Zihua and commander of the military region. Except for the Reliao Column blocking the enemy attacking Chifeng in the Reliao region, the military region directly controlled only Zhou Renjie had a brigade with extremely weak troops. Under this situation, it was impossible to defend Chengde. Therefore, when the Kuomintang attacked Chengde in late August, our army voluntarily evacuated Chengde on August 28 after blocking the enemy.
After our army withdrew from Chengde, according to the Party Central Committee's policy of "making the way out and occupying the two hatches", we moved to the countryside and behind enemy lines and carried out extensive guerrilla warfare . During this period, we fought in Nailin, annihilated part of the enemy, and then continued to attack Ningcheng . Jianchang, completely wiped out the defending enemy, and effectively attacked the enemy's arrogance. Then, in order to avoid the enemy's edge, our army retreated to Chifeng and Linxi areas and continued to deal with the enemy.
went to Northeast to work
In December 1946, after we retreated to Linxi, Huang Oudong (Deputy Director of the Political Department of the Military Region), Yi Xiuxiang (Minister of the Provincial Party Committee Trade), and in accordance with the instructions of the Central Northeast Bureau, we arrived at Baichengzi at the end of December and met Comrade Deng Hua, commander of the Jiliao Military Region.Comrade Deng Hua was the political commissar of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" and the Second Regiment of the Red First Division during the Long March. After we separated during the Long March, we have not seen each other for more than ten years. The comrades met again after a long separation, and they were both particularly happy. It was approaching New Year's Day of 1947. Comrade Deng Hua warmly welcomed us and asked us to stay in Baichengzi. During the conversation and laughter, he said that he would suggest that I be the commander here and he be the deputy commander. I was moved by Comrade Deng Hua's sincerity and felt that I should leave here as soon as possible, so I told Comrades Huang and Yi that the owners here are too enthusiastic and we cannot stop for a long time. In this way, we took the train to Qiqihar without waiting for New Year's Day.
When we arrived in Qiqihar, the Ximan Branch of the Communist Party of China held an enlarged party committee meeting and established the Ximan Military Region. As soon as we arrived, Comrade Li Fuchun, the secretary of the branch, asked us to attend the meeting. After the branch asked the Northeast Bureau for approval, he left me in the newly established Ximan Military Region as the chief of staff at that time, the Ximan Military Region had five divisions and two divisions under the jurisdiction of the Ximan Military Region. Comrade Huang Kecheng was appointed as the commander, Comrade Li Fuchun was appointed as the political commissar, Comrade Ni Zhiliang was appointed as the deputy commander, Comrade Zhang Pinghua was appointed as the director of the political department, and Comrade Chen Yi was appointed as the deputy director.
When the West Manchurian Military Region was established, our army in the Northeast was carrying out the famous "Three Gos to Jiangnan, Four Guard Linjiang " campaign. This is a battle that has a significant impact on the situation in the Northeast. At that time, the enemy troops in the Northeast tried to use the natural barrier of Songhua River to implement the plan of "attacking the south and defending the north, first south and then north, and annihilation of our army one by one." The purpose is to first obtain the consolidation of the area south of the Songhua River that they have occupied, then concentrate their forces, turn north, attack our army, and finally occupy the entire northeast. Although our army has only four counties in the South Manchuria base area: l Linjiang, Fusong , Manjiang , and Changbai , its strategic position is extremely important. Our army insists on South Manchuria, which can not only restrain the enemy's troops, but also put the enemy in an unfavorable position of fighting on both sides. If the South Manchuria is lost, the enemy can concentrate all its troops to attack, and then the entire Northeast situation will occur in an unfavorable situation. Therefore, the Democratic Alliance Command took advantage of the favorable opportunity of the Songhua River freezing and the weakness of the South Manchurian enemy's dispersed garrison. From the end of 1946 to the spring of 1947, it concentrated its superior forces across the Songhua River to attack the enemy for three consecutive times. Our army's tactic of advancing forward and retreating forward made the enemy dizzy. He took one eye to the other and turned the enemy's "attack and defense of the south" into our army's north-south attack, which not only consolidated our army's position in South Manchuria, but also annihilated five enemy divisions in mobile warfare.
Following the battle of "Three Goes to Jiangnan and Four Guards Linjiang", our army launched an summer offensive against the enemy in May . This attack lasted forty-nine days, annihilated more than 80,000 enemies, and recovered more than 40 northeastern enemy troops in the town, from then on, were compressed to a small number of data points on Zhongchang Road and Beining Road.
In order to continue to annihilate the enemy in large quantities, our Northeast Army launched an autumn offensive to the enemy in mid-September with the strength of nine field columns. Large-scale troops were put into combat. We require strong logistics agencies to provide timely and sufficient material support. For this reason, the Logistics Department of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army expanded before the launch of the autumn offensive in 1947. The former Ximan Military Region organs and the newly established Logistics Command were merged. Comrade Huang Kecheng, the former commander of the Northeast Democratic Alliance Army, served as deputy commander and political commissar of the Logistics Command, and former director of the Democratic Alliance Army, Comrade Zhong Chibing, was the deputy commander, Yang Zhi became the deputy political commissar, and I was the chief of staff of the Logistics Command. I changed from a military commander to a logistics work, which started from this time. During this period, our democratic coalition often moved to the vast areas east and west of Zhongchang Road. In order to keep up with the needs of the war, at the end of 1947, it formed two logistics headquarters of the East Line and the West Line respectively. Comrade Zhou Chunquan was the commander of the East Line Logistics Headquarters, and the Western Line Logistics Headquarters were commanded by me and political commissar.
In this way, when the troops were fighting east of Zhongchang Road, the logistics support work was responsible by the East Line Logistics Headquarters, and when the war was fighting west of Zhongchang Road, the logistics support work was responsible by the Western Line Logistics Headquarters.
At that time, our Western Front Logistics Command was stationed in Zhengjiatun in Shuangliao County, Jilin Province. Zhengjiatun is a transportation hub for water and land transportation in the Shuangliao region, and goods within a radius of hundreds of miles are distributed here. According to historical records of county annals, in 1908, when Zhang Zuolin was appointed as the commander of the Qianlu Middle Road Patrol Battalion after the court was recruited, he was stationed in Zhengjiatun by the governor of Fengtian Xu Shichang . It can be seen that Zhengjiatun is not an ordinary town. We have set up the Western Front Logistics Command here, which has indeed played a good role in transporting supplies and combat materials to the forward combat troops in a timely manner.
