My next major task is to fight alongside U.S. Navy Captain Pilot John Underwood in the "1985 Naval War" research project. As the title of this section suggests, the participants in this naval warfare research project are a large group of experts with different backgrounds and fields, from different departments of the defense and intelligence systems, with the goal of studying and clarifying how the United States and its allies launched a naval war against the Soviet Union in 1985 and won without escalating into nuclear war.
This is a difficult and important task. The research results of this project will seriously affect the future combat system, arms procurement, fleet deployment and overall strategy for advancing these operations. The key to conducting such research is to start with grand strategy and break down details such as tactics, technology and procedures.
The mission must be supported at the beginning to ensure that the overall premise of subsequent analysis is reliable, and that analysts who analyze various situations, analyze the Soviet combat capabilities, formulate action plans and details can have good intelligence. John Underwood and I embarked on this task with dedication and plenty of energy, and were assisted by a very capable staff and supported by intelligence from all channels.
" Five Eyes Alliance " high-quality intelligence collected from various channels has a crucial impact on whether it has a critical impact on the Soviet Union's launch of the "1985 Naval War", because this kind of intelligence will form our thinking framework and provide support for a large number of combat analysts and military exercisers to participate in this naval war.
In 1977, the United States had 600 warships , but the importance of maritime advantages to curbing the Soviet Union has not been fully understood, and no one in the U.S. Navy Department looked at it, and White House would not smile because of this. However, the work carried out by the "Naval War 1985" research project team and the "Five Eyes" intelligence agency laid the foundation for political change and promoted the general awareness of the urgent need to maintain maritime advantage, which would make a significant contribution to the containment of the Soviet Union.
When I, Underwood and the large-scale "1985 Naval War" research project team started this research in 1977, no one could have foresaw the disintegration of the Soviet Union, but we can be sure of one thing, that is, the powerful and well-led "Five Eyes" navy was able to resist any military operations initiated by the Soviet Union. To stay ahead, multiple key information must be known and understood and acted upon.
Looking back decades later, the situation back then became clear. But at that time, from all aspects of the Soviet Union's grand strategy, to their capabilities, actions, training, personnel, politics, military infrastructure and other details, to the communication system that links all links of the Soviet Union (this system actually has some inherent flaws), we did not receive a lot of detailed information, so it can be said that this large-scale research project has been advancing in the dark state, almost equivalent to a guessing game.
The weakest link in Soviet military organizations, intelligence organizations and military operations lies in the top-down highly centralized management model, which is determined by the characteristics of the Soviet Republic and Soviet political and military system.
In the eyes of the "Five Eyes Alliance", this defect has a very high value in utilization, because there is a strict hierarchical structure in terms of command, control and communication of the Soviets. Outside this hierarchical structure, their initiative is very limited, so their planning and operations will be carried out in a predictable way. Furthermore, from a psychological perspective, like their military plans and actions, the ideas of the Soviet leaders were conveyed step by step down through the command structure of the Soviet Navy , the Air Force and the Army, with highly structured and predictable characteristics and would not break through the scope that Western intelligence analysts could understand.
We can make reliable assumptions about what actions the Soviets would take in different scenarios, from the highest level of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the specific combat levels (such as how the commander of the Soviet submarine takes tactical actions).In my opinion, there are not only the internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union in this structure, but also the internal weaknesses of the entire socialist system during the Cold War. I firmly believe that the reason why the Soviet Union disintegrated was due to its own institutional defects and its personal cult of its leaders, and it was unable to escape the shackles of its internal defects.
After I left Washington , the "1985 Naval War" research project ended, but the huge impact it had continued and reached its peak in the 1980s, when President Reagan and his tough Navy Secretary John Lehman led the U.S. Navy with 600 warships.
Looking back, the 1980s was the golden age for the United States to develop its maritime strategy, which to a certain extent suppressed the Soviet Union towards decline and disintegration.
During the Cold War, the "Five Eyes Alliance" had superior signal processing capabilities than the Soviet Union. This advantage was reflected in various types of passive sonars, including fixed circular sonar arrays, flanking sonar arrays, and rear drag arrays. hydrophone technology is becoming more and more advanced, and its processing capabilities are becoming more and more powerful. The submarines are equipped with powerful computers and increasingly advanced mathematical algorithms. In addition, generations of sonar experts from the "Five Eyes Alliance" have been continually contributing to the development of sonar technology. The United States and Britain have built nuclear-powered attack submarine . Canada and Australia also have extremely quiet and excellent handling diesel-electric submarines. The enemies faced by the Soviets are becoming increasingly unbearable.
In addition, in the air, since the US Navy and British Royal Navy (with the support of British Royal Air Force ) have powerful passive sonar buoys that can detect Soviet submarines, the Air Force can airdrop powerful anti-submarine torpedo based on the detection information.
The above hardware facilities are essential basic conditions in the intelligence workflow. Other links in this process are also complex. For example, how to determine what happened inside the Soviet Institute of Fluid Mechanics (an important submarine design agency)? How to determine what happened inside the submarine procurement agency in Moscow? Without mentioning the details of the Soviet Union's next design plan and possible performance improvements, how to determine the production plan of the Soviet shipyard?
To obtain this intelligence, espionage is indispensable, but under any circumstances, espionage is not easy. The U.S. or UK agent or trained agents play a central role in this regard, as they are responsible for convincing a foreign citizen to reveal the secrets of their country to him. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and other member states of the Warsaw Pact organization did a great job in counter-espionage work. Warsaw Pact domestic security agencies have formulated strict and high-pressure control measures. In this case, even those who hate the Soviet regime extremely and intend to act as spies for Western countries will find it difficult to successfully engage in continuous and regular contact with the agents or agents of the Five Eyes Alliance.
The Soviets could not find out who was engaged in espionage under the cover of diplomats without spending too much effort. The Soviet Union's ability to monitor and track diplomats and other staff members was surprising. For example, no matter how the official diplomatic roster is written, even the poorest Soviet counter-espionage agency can quickly figure out who is the real identity of the CIA intelligence station in the Soviet Union, and who is his (or her) subordinate staff.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union monitored the activities, external contacts and travel of diplomats of the Five Eyes Alliance 24 hours a day, which made it very difficult for intelligence personnel who were engaged in secret activities under diplomatic cover. An important benefit for these intelligence personnel is that if they are harmed by the Soviets, or arrested in the worst case, they can use the privileges enjoyed by diplomats to fight possible trials, imprisonment or executions. However, once a certain intelligence officer's cover identity is exposed, he will be deported and intelligence activities cannot be carried out around the world, because KGB will deliberately search for the person's next overseas mission.
Compared with intelligence staff in the traditional sense, naval officers from members of the Five Eyes Alliance stationed in the Soviet Union are more likely to witness or inquire about the development and activities of the Soviet Navy, because although they are often under close surveillance, they can travel normally on the premise of meeting specific requirements. For example, they can publicly go to St. Petersburg , do their best to visit some places of the Soviet Navy, see what is happening inside, or they can visit some docks of the Soviet Navy, publicly meet with Soviet Navy officials, publicly collect some data, and if they are not subject to official restrictions from the Soviet Union before the visit, they can also take photos.
Of course, even if the Soviet Union restricts photography, it does not prevent these military officers from taking photos secretly or collecting some things they encounter by chance. There is a typical example in this regard. Once, an military officer accidentally picked up a titanium welding piece that fell from a truck on the ground near an important Soviet dock. The welding sheet of
is of very high value, because the pressure-bearing hull of the "Akula"-class attack nuclear submarine made by the Soviet Union at that time was made of titanium, which is very light and strong. In addition, it uses a very advanced liquid metal nuclear reactor at that time, so the Soviet nuclear submarine sailed underwater very fast, and the intelligence and technical departments of the United States and the United Kingdom can analyze information on the Soviet manufacturing process and other aspects based on this titanium welding sheet.
If secret intelligence operations are carried out under the cover of an embassy or consulate in the traditional way, the possibility of successfully attracting, persuading or corrupting Soviet citizens to engage in espionage is very low. In fact, the most likely success is that the Soviets took the initiative to surrender, and accidentally met those who were interested in surrendering through embassy cocktail parties or other diplomatic occasions, because the Soviets who had the intention would take the initiative to show their attention on these occasions and actively talk to diplomats from members of the "Five Eyes Alliance". This is an early sign that they are willing to engage in espionage, but in fact, this kind of situation doesn't happen often.
