The military rank system implemented by our army in 1955 set very high standards for awarding personnel with the rank of marshal.
On February 8 of this year, the "Regulations on the Service of Officers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" passed by the Sixth Session of the Standing Committee of the First National People's Congress and approved by Chairman Mao Zedong stated: For the creation and leadership of the people's armed forces or Senior generals who have led battle regiments in combat and made outstanding achievements will be awarded the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China.
The approval of the marshal rank and the first grant of authority are also very high: the marshal rank is approved and decided by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and awarded by the order of the President of the country.
In the end, 10 people were awarded the rank of Marshal of the People's Republic of China: Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Liu Bocheng, He Long, Chen Yi, Luo Ronghuan, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Ye Jianying and so on.
Among them, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De ranks first among the top ten marshals.
Founding Father Zhu De, he is not only the First Marshal of the People's Liberation Army, but also one of the main founders of the People's Army. He is known as the "Father of the Red Army".
People respect Zhu De as the "Father of the Red Army". This is the greatest compliment to Zhu De, and Zhu De is worthy of this glorious title.
Among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhu De is the oldest. He is seven years older than Chairman Mao, more than ten years older than Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi, and he is highly respected.
Of course, people's respect for Zhu De is not just because of his age, but mainly because of his historical status, great role, and great achievements in the Chinese People's Revolutionary War.
First of all, Zhu De not only participated in leading the Nanchang Uprising which used revolutionary armed forces to fire the first shot against the Kuomintang reactionaries, but more importantly, when the revolutionary armed forces were dispersed and at the darkest moment of the revolution, he stood up and It turned the tide and retained a huge revolutionary fire, which played a huge role in the future development and growth of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
One of the important sources of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the last remaining sporadic team of 20,000 Nanchang Uprising troops led by Zhu De.
At first, the Nanchang Uprising Army was divided into two groups at Sanheba in northeastern Guangdong. The main force, led by Zhou Enlai, He Long, Ye Ting, Liu Bocheng and others, went straight to Chaoshan.
Zhu De led the 25th Division of the 11th Army and the Educational Group of the 9th Army. A total of more than 4,000 troops stayed in the area to prevent the enemy from copying the retreat of the main force of the rebel army.
Zhu De led his troops to basically complete the mission after three days and three nights of blocking. However, when the troops withdrew from Sanheba, only more than 2,000 people were left.
Zhu De originally wanted to find the main force, but he encountered more than 200 people from the defeated 24th Division. Only then did he learn that the main force of the rebel army had failed in the Chaoshan area, and the leaders of the rebel army had dispersed and evacuated separately.
Overnight, this unit became a lonely force, with all contact with its superiors cut off. It was surrounded by enemies on all sides, and it lost more than half of its troops. It was quite chaotic ideologically and organizationally.
Faced with such a severe and difficult situation, what should we do? The decision can only be made by Zhu De, who is temporarily in charge.
At this time, Zhu De was the deputy commander, the highest ranking, 41 years old and rich in military experience. He firmly opposed the disbandment of the team and proposed to go northward in hiding, pass through southern Jiangxi and go westward to southern Hunan.
Everyone was impressed by Zhu De's unusual persistence and determination. Finally, the large army set off from northeastern Guangdong.
Zhu De is like a leader holding a torch, leading his troops northward and westward. First they arrived at Wuping in western Fujian and encountered the enemy. After the battle, there were only more than 1,500 people left in the team.
Then, when the troops passed through the Shijingling area on the border of Fujian and Jiangxi, Zhu De personally commanded and charged at the front, and finally broke out a bloody road and marched to southern Jiangxi.When
entered southern Jiangxi, it was almost winter. The troops were short of food and ammunition, lacked medical care and medicine, the officers and soldiers were hungry and cold, and diseases were prevalent. They were often attacked by armed landlords and bandits, and the contact with the higher-level party committee had not been restored.
At this time, the combat effectiveness of the troops was getting weaker and weaker, but Zhu De still gritted his teeth and insisted on leading his troops westward. However, when we got to Tianxinwei in Anyuan County, Lainan, some people couldn't hold on anymore. Starting from division and regiment level chief officers, cadres at all levels left the team one after another.
Finally, the military and political leadership system began to collapse. Zhu De is the only military and political leader at division level and above, only Wang Erzhuo, chief of staff of the 74th Regiment, is the only military cadre at the regiment level, and Chen Yi, the political instructor of the 73rd Regiment, is the only political cadre left.
There are also very few company-level cadres at the grassroots level. Only Lin Biao, Zhao Erlu, Yang Zhicheng, Nie Heting, and Zhao Ming are left. The most determined among the soldiers is squad leader Su Yu.
The army is facing the tendency of instantly disintegrating and dispersing. The spark left by the Nanchang Uprising may be extinguished immediately.
At this extremely serious moment, Zhu De spoke out.
At the Tianxinwei Military Conference, Zhu De said calmly: "Everyone knows that the great revolution failed, and our insurrectionary army also failed! But we still want revolution. Comrades, those who want revolution, follow me, those who do not want revolution You can go home! "
"The Russian Revolution failed, and what remained was the backbone of the October Revolution. By 1917, the Russian Revolution finally succeeded. The Russian Revolution in 1905 was dark, but the darkness was temporary. The Chinese Revolution was also dark now, but we only need to keep some people. , will play a big role in the future revolution. "
"I believe that China will have a revolution as long as it retains its strength."
There are not many people in the team. Although they knew about the Russian Revolution in 1905, they were all inspired by Zhu De's speech.
Zhu De went on to say: "When the warlords were fighting, one class could occupy a county. Now we can occupy dozens of counties. Therefore, everyone should not leave under any circumstances. I have decided not to leave."
In the most difficult situation , the most hopeless and most easily shaken moment, Zhu De showed a rock-solid revolutionary spirit and became the undisputed leader of this force, with Chen Yi and Wang Erzhuo becoming his main assistants.
When the troops moved to Dayu County in southern Jiangxi, they were in urgent need of rectifying the organization. Zhu De, Chen Yi and others agreed to temporarily reorganize the troops into the 5th Column of the National Revolutionary Army.
Zhu De is appointed as the commander of the column, Chen Yi is appointed as the political instructor of the column, and Wang Erzhuo is appointed as the chief of staff of the column. It has 3 infantry brigades, 1 special agent battalion, and 1 machine gun battalion. The remaining officers are organized into a teaching team. There are more than 800 people in the entire column.
Then, Zhu De led his troops to Shangbao Town, surrounded by mountains in Chongyi County, in southern Jiangxi, and conducted more than 20 days of training.
First, we strengthened organizational construction politically. In addition to registering party members, we also developed a group of revolutionary and resolute people to join the party; second, we strengthened military training while resting and recuperating; third, we began to learn to be a member of the masses. work to strengthen the army.
Zhu De led his troops to carry out the "Tianxinwei Reorganization", "Dayu Reorganization" and "Shangbao Reorganization" in southern Jiangxi, which were later called " Gannan Three Reorganizations ".
"Gannan Sanzheng" and Jinggangshan 's " Sanwan Adaptation " have both achieved great success and are major events in the history of our army's founding.
Of the more than 20,000 people in the Nanchang Uprising, what was truly preserved was the family wealth of less than a thousand people. This family background later became the foundation, mainstay and core of the Chinese People's Liberation Army's combat effectiveness. The fire of the Nanchang Uprising has never been extinguished since then.
In January 1928, Zhu De's department was renamed the 1st Division of the 1st Corps of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army.
In April 1928, Zhu and Mao joined forces and established the 4th Army of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army, which was soon renamed the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Zhu De's main force was organized into the 28th Regiment, with the first commander Wang Erzhuo and the second commander Lin Biao.
In January 1929, the 28th Regiment was renamed the 1st Column of the 4th Red Army.
In October 1930, the 1st Column of the 4th Red Army was reorganized into the 10th Division of the 4th Red Army.
In 1933, the entire army was reorganized, and the 10th Division of the 4th Red Army was reduced to the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Red Division.
In July 1935, the 294th Regiment of the 33rd Army of the Fourth Red Front Army was incorporated into the 4th Red Regiment.
In September 1935, the 4th Red Regiment was reorganized into the 4th Brigade of the 1st Column of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment.
The Red Army's Long March arrived in northern Shaanxi, and the 4th Brigade was reorganized into the 4th Regiment of the 2nd Red Division.
During the Anti-Japanese War, the 4th Red Regiment was reorganized into the 1st Battalion of the 685th Regiment, 343rd Brigade, 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.
In 1939, the 1st Battalion was expanded into the 1st Brigade of the Suluyu Detachment, later called the 1st Regiment.
In 1940, the 1st Regiment was renamed the 1st Regiment of the 1st Teaching Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army.
In 1941, the 1st Regiment was renamed the 19th Regiment of the 7th Brigade, 3rd Division of the New Fourth Army.
In 1946, the 19th Regiment entered the Northeast and was reorganized into the 46th Regiment of the 16th Division of the 6th Column of Dongye,
In November 1948, the 46th Regiment was renamed the 379th Regiment of the 127th Division of the 43rd Army, with the regiment leader Wu Chunren.
The Red 28 Regiment went all the way, and by the time the entire army was conferred with titles in 1955, the following founding generals came out of the same bloodline:
General: Su Yu; Generals: Yang Zhicheng, Zhao Erlu, Xiao Ke, Xiao Hua, Lai Chuanzhu, Yang Chengwu.
Lieutenant Generals: Ouyang Yi, Tang Tianji, Deng Yifan, Liang Biye, Wang Huiqiu, Kang Zhiqiang, Zhang Renchu, Tan Guansan, Chen Zhengxiang, Zeng Siyu, Zhang Guohua, Tian Weiyang.
Major generals: Zi Feng, Liu Yongyuan, Liu Shaoqing, Zhu Yaohua, Wu Rongfeng, He Jingzhi, Huang Lin, Fang Zheng, Chen Fangren, Wang Dongbao, Huang Zuozhen, Liao Buyun, Ma Zeying, Deng Longxiang, Xiong Botao, Luo Huasheng, Wang Xueqing, Cai Yong, Liang Yuzhen, Hu Bingyun, Lu Rencan, Li Musheng, Jiang Yonghui, Zhang Wanchun, Wang Liangtai, Li Shicai, Long Shujin, Guo Chengzhu, Song Weiqiu.
Promoted to major general in 1961: Liu Zhen, Wu Chunren; promoted to major general in 1964: Liu Shihong.
Several years later, when the Chinese revolution was successful, Chen Yi recalled: "In the darkest days, when the mood of the masses was as low as zero and they were discouraged, Commander-in-Chief Zhu pointed out a bright future and increased the masses' revolutionary belief. , This is the greatness of the Commander-in-Chief."
Tan Zhenlin, who participated in the early struggle in Jinggangshan, said: "If the power left in Sanheba cannot be maintained to go to Jinggangshan, and Jinggangshan only has the strength of the Autumn Harvest Riot, it will be difficult to survive. . "
Second, Zhu De went from being one of the leaders of the Nanchang Uprising to the core of the "Zhu Mao Red Army", and finally became the main founder and leader of the Chinese People's Liberation Army together with Mao Zedong.
On May 25, 1928, the Jinggangshan Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong was reorganized into the 4th Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. This was the first army after the revolutionary army led by the Communist Party of China was officially called the "Red Army". Zhu De Serve as military commander.
After August 1930, Zhu De successively served as the commander-in-chief of the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army's , and the chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Soviet Republic.
In this way, Zhu De's important historical position in the Chinese People's Liberation Army was established. From then on, from the War of Resistance Against Japan and the War of Liberation to the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, until the eve of his conferment, Zhu De served as the commander-in-chief of the People's Army led by the Communist Party of China and became the symbol of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.
For decades, "commander-in-chief" has been a synonym for Zhu De within the party.
When recalling the history of the revolutionary struggle in Jinggangshan in the early years, General Xiao Ke said that Zhu De had high prestige among the troops, and the troops had some mysterious belief in Zhu De.
This "high prestige" and "somewhat mysterious belief" confirm the status of the commander-in-chief.It comes not only from the formal appointment by the Central Military Commission, but also from the obedience and respect of the Red Army soldiers to their superiors.
But it comes more from the revolutionary perseverance forged by the Communists in the most difficult moments, in the critical environment of being hunted, wanted, and "encircled and suppressed."
Third, Zhu De always showed the revolutionary nature and firmness of a Communist Party member at the most critical moments and in the face of major issues of right and wrong, safeguarding the highest interests of the party and the Red Army.
In June 1935, after the First and Fourth Red Army reunited, Zhu De was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army, and Zhang Guotao was appointed General Political Commissar.
In order to facilitate marching operations, the Red Army headquarters decided to mix the First and Fourth Red Army and march north to Shaanxi and Gansu in separate left and right routes.
Zhu De and Zhang Guotao commanded the left army. However, Zhang Guotao was ambitious and wanted to establish a separate central government, so he undermined the central government's northward policy in every possible way and attempted to lead the left route army southward.
Zhu De expressed his support for going north and opposed going south. Seeing that his persuasion was ineffective, Zhang Guotao took sudden action and ordered Zhu De to be detained.
Zhang Guotao told Zhu De various reasons why he could not go north to Shaanxi and Gansu and could only go south to Sichuan and Kangxi. He threatened Zhu De in a commanding tone and said: "First, you must publicly condemn Mao Zedong and sever all relations with Mao Zedong. Second, You must publicly condemn the Central Committee's decision to go north and draw a clear line with the Maoergai Conference."
Zhu De looked at Zhang Guotao with disdain. After hearing his "high talk", he said firmly: "You can I am split in two, but you will never be able to cut off my relationship with Mao Zedong. I raised my hand in favor of the Central Committee’s decision to go north. How could I oppose it?” Zhang Guotao expected that Zhu De would not give in easily, so he approached Zhu De and He shouted: "If you refuse these two orders, you will be shot! I advise you to think twice before you act, lest you regret it!"
Seeing Zhang Guotao's face, Zhu De looked serious. He frowned, glared at Zhang Guotao, and said: "I, Zhu De, have nothing special. Like the soldiers in our army, I have feelings for Mao Zedong and trust in the line of the Party Central Committee. If you want to be shot, just shoot me." I will never accept an 'order', and I will never have any regrets. All I have is great pride!"
"Because what you always dream about is betraying the party and joining the enemy, and selling yourself for glory, and what I dream of is. You must be proud! I would rather die than do anything that harms the party.” The next day, Zhu De used the pen and paper sent by Zhang Guotao for him to write a statement against Mao Zedong and his opposition to going north. A line of vigorous and powerful characters: "Support Mao Zedong! Support the Party Central Committee! Support going north!"
Fourth, Zhu De wrote a lot about military writings throughout his life, and his important works have been included in "Selected Works of Zhu De" and "Selected Military Works of Zhu De".
During the war years, Zhu De's military thoughts mainly focused on strategy, focusing on the construction of the people's army and materialism new methods of using troops.
Zhu De emphasized that the people's army has three major characteristics: national, people-oriented, and democratic. Therefore, serving the people is the general principle of the people's army. This is also the line of building the People's Army of Mao Zedong.
The people's army must be placed under the leadership of the Communist Party. Political commissars and political organs must be established in the army, and the company party branch should become the core of leadership and unity for the entire company. The military administrative system must implement the party's line and resolutions and complete the tasks assigned by the party.
At the same time, a large amount of work in implementing the party's line and resolutions needs to be completed through the military administrative system, and the party organization must also respect the military administrative system.
Regarding the materialist new method of using troops, Zhu De pointed out that the basic content of people's war is mass warfare, and the mass warfare strategy of integrating the army and the people is implemented.
All the best strategies and tactics are realistic and dialectical.The principle of using troops in the people's war should be to fight what kind of wars there are with the guns, against what enemies, and at what time and place.
In the selection of attack and annihilation targets, we must insist on avoiding the strong and attacking the weak, and defeat them one by one. In the form of combat, we must implement mobile warfare, positional warfare and guerrilla warfare to cooperate with each other.
We must flexibly use mountain warfare , defile warfare, pursuit warfare, mobile warfare, encounter warfare, assault warfare and other tactics according to the situation of each battle. In short, we should use military services to seek advantages and avoid disadvantages, strive for the initiative, and annihilate the enemy through maneuver.
Some people say that Zhu De is the "originator" of Chinese revolutionary guerrilla warfare .
Indeed, as early as 1925, when he was studying in the Soviet Union, Zhu De was the first to propose the prototype of the guerrilla warfare method of "big troops have a way of fighting, small troops have a small way of fighting" and "fight if you win, and leave if you can't". .
Later, he and Mao Zedong summarized and proposed the guerrilla warfare sixteen-character formula in the Central Soviet Area, and formulated the principles of Red Army mobile warfare with the main characteristics of advancing and retreating in large steps, luring the enemy deep, concentrating troops, and annihilating the enemy individually.
He published "How to Create an Iron Red Army" and "Discussing Several Basic Principles of Tactics", both of which proposed that the Red Army should use materialist dialectics to study and apply tactics.
Zhu De emphasized that when the enemy is obviously stronger than the revolutionary forces, guerrilla warfare should be used as a strategic weapon . Guerrilla warfare must be waged extensively and relied on the masses.
The activities of the guerrillas should adhere to the three principles of positivity, initiative and attack. The basic form of tactics is surprise attack, and the basic requirements for action are speed, secrecy and determination.
The principle of mobile warfare in the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines is: advance and retreat of small groups, attack with branches, concentrate the main force, take advantage of the weak and hide behind, move by day and night, attack in the east and west, deliberately expose, conceal in time, change interests and dangers, do not hesitate, decide the color of the fire, Transfer to the outside line.
Guerrilla warfare must be coordinated with mobile warfare to support each other. Although guerrilla warfare is very important, it cannot resolve the final outcome of the war. After the revolutionary forces grow stronger, they should gradually develop into mobile warfare.
Zhu De's military thought played a major role in the formation and development of Mao Zedong's military thought, in winning the victory of China's revolutionary war, and in guiding the construction of the people's army and national defense.
