Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel.

Journal Introduction

"Security Studies" (Security Studies) collects and publishes innovative academic manuscripts - whether they are theoretical research, sharing of practical experience, or both. Security studies encompasses a wide range of topics, covering nuclear proliferation, nuclear deterrence, civil-military relations, strategic culture, ethnic conflict, epidemics and national security, democratic politics, foreign policymaking, and the development of qualitative and multi-method research. Journal Citation Reports shows that its impact factor in 2020 is 2.464.

Contents of this issue

1 Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel Israel

2 Cyber ​​Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises

3 Cyber ​​Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications

4 A Tiny Outpost? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance

Trivial Tripwires? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance

5 Overthrow the leader, preserve the regime? Autocratic Civil-Military Relations and Coup Behavior in the Tunisian and Egyptian Militaries during the 2011 Arab Spring

Oust the Leader, Keep the Regime? Autocratic Civil-Military Relations and Coup Behavior in the Tunisian and Egyptian Militaries during the 2011 Arab Spring

6 Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization

Article Summary

Eagle Kettle: The United States, Britain, France and Israel on the Nuclear Taboo and Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel

Author: Janina Dill, Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford; Scott D. Sagan, Stanford UniversityCaroline S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science and senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation; Benjamin A. Valentino, associate professor at Dartmouth College, USA.

Abstract: Recent academic research has confirmed that when Americans themselves are threatened, most Americans will support the use of nuclear weapons and violate the principle of non-combatant immunity. However, some scholars believe that these hawkish views are exceptions and that other Western democrats have fully internalized ideas such as the nuclear taboo and the prohibition on intentionally killing civilians. To investigate cross-country perceptions about these important international norms, this article conducts a polling experiment among citizens of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel. The study found that the American view is far from unique. Instead, Israeli respondents show the most hawkish preferences, France and the United States are about the same, and British citizens are consistently the least supportive of the use of nuclear weapons or targeting civilians. The belief that there is an absolute ban on the use of nuclear weapons or targeting civilians has little impact on shaping public opinion in the four countries mentioned. Public opinion in every country follows the same consequentialist logic: A majority or close to a majority of respondents are willing to support the use of nuclear weapons when they are more effective than conventional options, but as the incidental civilian death toll rises, Willingness to use nuclear weapons would decline. Respondents' preference for compatriots compared to foreign citizens and respondents' attitudes toward retribution help explain individual-level attitudinal differences.

Recent scholarship has established that a majority of Americans will support the use of nuclear weapons and violate the principle of noncombatant immunity when American lives are on the line. Some scholars contend, however, that these hawkish American attitudes are an outlier and that other Western democratic publics have more fully internalized the nuclear taboo, as well as the prohibition on deliberately killing civilians. To investigate cross-national attitudes on these important norms, we conducted a survey experiment of American, British, French, and Israeli citizens. We find that American attitudes are not exceptional. Rather, Israeli visitors display the most hawkish preferences; French and American citizens are roughly equally hawkish; and the British public is consistently the least supportive of nuclear use or targeting civilians. Categorical prohibitions—against nuclear use and targeting civilians— do little to shape public opinion in these four countries. Instead, public opinion in each state follows the same consequentialist logic: a majority or near majority of respondents are willing to support using nuclear weapons when they are more effective than conventional options, but support declines when collateral civilian deaths rise. Respondents' preferences for compatriots over foreign civilians and visitors' retributiveness help explain individual-level variation in attitudes.

Cyber ​​Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-escalation of International Crisis

Title: Cyber ​​Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-escalation of international crises -Escalation of International Crises

Author: Erica D. Lonergan, assistant professor at the Cyber ​​Institute of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, researcher at the Salzman Institute for War and Peace at Columbia University; Shawn W. Lonergan, U.S. Army Reserve officer, PricewaterhouseCoopers Senior Director of Cyber ​​Risk Regulation.

Abstract: signaling is a core element of international crisis negotiation and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in a crisis, a state must communicate to its adversaries that it has the ability to impose favorable outcomes and its determination to act, while also managing the risk of unintentional escalation and war. However, less studied in the signaling literature is how states use signals to manage the escalation of risks and even de-escalate crises. This article illustrates a theory of signaling in cyberspace. The study concludes that while cyber operations are not particularly well-suited for signaling costly resolve or capabilities in the context of coercive diplomacy, they are uniquely useful for signaling the risk of escalation. This article builds a framework around the causal mechanisms that regulate signals in cyberspace and does so through comparative case studies. Research finds that in some cases, cyber operations can function as signal moderators, particularly when policymakers face the tension between simultaneously modulating signals to domestic audiences and hostile governments.

Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalating crises. In this article, we develop a theory of signaling in cyberspace. We argue that, although cyber operations are not particularly well suited as costly signals of resolve or capabilities in the context of coercive diplomacy, they have a distinct utility for signaling to manage escalation risks. We build a framework organized around the causal mechanisms of accommodative signaling in cyberspace and test it against a set of comparative case studies. We find that cyber operations can act as accomodative signaling under some conditions, particularly when decision makers are faced with managing tensions between simultaneously signaling to domestic audiences and adversary governments.

Cyber ​​Arms Transfers: Significance, Limitations and Impact

Title: Cyber ​​Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications

Author: Max Smeets, Stanford University network security researcher G.

Summary: What are the motivations and opportunities for arms transfers in the cyber domain? Although academia has failed to systematically address this question, an accurate answer is critical to understanding the functioning of the cyber command and intelligence coalition, the functioning of NATO in the twenty-first century, and the enforceability of cyber arms control. First, this article introduces a new conceptual framework—the People-Behavior-Tools-Infrastructure-Organization (PETIO) framework—to understand the elements of offensive cyber capabilities. Second, the article explains how motivations for cyber weapons transfers differ across different elements of the PETIO framework. While such behaviors and tools can be replicated effortlessly, their ephemeral nature and the possibility of running a trace means there is little incentive to actually transfer these assets. If there is any motivation for inter-state transfers, it is to promote other state actors to develop their own offensive capabilities - that is, by providing expertise, infrastructure and organizational capabilities to adapt and innovate - because this does not reduce the Weapon effectiveness. Third, this paper argues that incentives for cyber weapons transfer capabilities are weaker than cyber espionage capabilities and that attribution dynamics add additional complexity to these transfer dynamics.

What are the motivations and opportunities for arms transfer in the cyber realm? Although scholarship has failed to systematically address this question, having an accurate answer is crucial for understanding the operationalization of cyber commands and intelligence alliances, the functioning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the twenty-first century, and the viability of cyber arms controls. First, this article introduces a new conceptual framework—the people-exploits-tools-infrastructure-organization (PETIO) framework—to understand the elements of an offensive cyber capability. Second , I explain how the incentives of cyber arms transfer differ across the different elements of the PETIO framework. Though exploits and tools can be effortlessly replicated, their transitory nature and potential for operational tracking means there is little incentive to actually transfer these assets. If any incentives exist for state-to-state transfer, it would be in facilitating other state actors to develop their own offensive capabilities—that is, by providing expertise, infrastructure, and organizational capacity to adapt and innovate—as this does not reduce the effectiveness of one's own arsenal. Third, I argue that the incentives for transferring cyber effect capabilities are weaker compared to cyber espionage capabilities, and attribution dynamics add an additional layer of complexity to these transfer dynamics.

A negligible outpost force? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance

Title: Trivial Tripwires? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance

Author: Brian Blankenship, Assistant Professor at the University of Miami and PhD in Political Science at Columbia University; Erik Lin-Greenberg, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Summary: How can countries best reassure allies? Existing research assessing commitment signals has focused on the role of determination in making assurances credible. This ignores important questions about the role of capabilities. This article argues that the effectiveness of soothing is a product of a combination of ability and determination, and suggests that high determination cannot offset low ability. The study introduces a new typology of pacification approaches based on the interplay of military capabilities and resolve, and uses an original survey of European foreign policy experts and a study of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Assurance Initiative in the Baltic Sea. Case studies to test which types of reassurance are most reassuring. This article finds that high-determination, low-ability signals such as first-line outposts on allied territory are no more reassuring than high-ability, low-determination signals such as troops stationed offshore. The study raises questions about the pacification value of outposts and contributes to scholarship on inter-state signaling.

How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Existing studies assessing signals of commitment focus on the role of resolve in making assurances credible. This sidelines important questions about the role of capability. We argue that reassurance effectiveness is the product of both capability and resolve, and suggest that high resolve cannot offset low capability. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on the interaction of military capability and resolve, and test which types of measures are most reassuring using an original survey fielded on European foreign policy experts and a case study of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization reassurance initiatives in the Baltics. We find that high-resolve, low-capability signals such as tripwire forces in allied territory are not viewed as any more reassuring than high-capability, low-resolve signals such as forces stationed offshore. Our study casts doubt on the reassurance value of tripwires and contributes to scholarship on interstate signaling.

Overthrow the leader, preserve the regime? Author : Risa Brooks, associate professor of political science at Marquette University and non-resident senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at West Point; Peter B. White, associate professor at the University of Sydney .

Abstract: This article theorizes how changes in autocratic civil-military relations affect the types of coups to which autocrats are more vulnerable. Autocrats rely on alternative control strategies that involve tensions between two imperatives—how to govern and preventing coups. In the "grand bargain," leaders ceded prerogatives to the military and compromised on governance emergencies. This insulates them from regime change type coups, but still leaves them vulnerable to government reshuffling type coups resulting from failed negotiations. Alternatively, political leaders may rely on “containment” and marginalize the military. Although they make fewer concessions on governance emergencies, the military is more likely to overthrow an entire regime when it has the opportunity to stage a coup rather than just reshuffle leaders. This study evaluates the theory using a within-case process tracing tool and paired case studies of Tunisia and Egypt, and conducts a descriptive quantitative analysis to demonstrate the generalizability of the theory.

We present a theory for how variation in autocratic civil-military relations affects the type of coups to which autocratic leaders are vulnerable. Dictators rely on alternative strategies of control that involve tensions across two imperatives—governance and coup prevention. In a “grand bargain, ” leaders cede prerogatives to the military and compromise on the governance imperative. This insulates them from regime-change coups but still renders them vulnerable to reshuffling coups that result from bargaining failures. Alternatively, political leaders may rely on “containment,” in which they marginalize the military. Although they make fewer concessions on the governance imperative, the military is more likely to oust the entire regime when the former has the opportunity to engage in a coup, not just reshuffle the leader. We evaluate this theory using within-case process tracing and paired case studies of Tunisia and Egypt, and conduct descriptive quantitative analyzes to demonstrate the generalizability of our theory.

Uneasy Lies the Crown: External threats to religious legitimacy and the militarization of interstate disputes

Title:Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization

Author: Ariel Zellman, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University, Israel; Davis Brown, Non-resident Scholar, Institute of Religion, Baylor University.

Abstract: Although it is often believed that religion should have a significant influence on international conflicts, empirical experience shows that this belief is mixed. For every recurring interreligious conflict, there are many examples of sustained interreligious cooperation. Interreligious conflicts also frequently undermine what are often assumed to be peaceful relationships between countries that share the same religion. This article advances the hypothesis that religion is an important intervening factor in the militarization of interstate disputes, especially between internally threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often accompanies oppression of co-religionists across national borders, whereas in dyads sharing the same religion, conflict occurs when one party disproportionately increases its official support for the religion hour. In both cases, militarization of disputes is primarily an attempt to weaken domestic rivals whose challenges are escalated by external threats to the leader's religious legitimacy. This study tests these ideas using new, long-term data on religious populations and state religious policies to identify rivals through prior interstate territorial disputes. These findings largely corroborate this hypothesis and generally shed light on the conditions under which religion contributes to the occurrence of international militarized conflicts.

Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent interreligious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained interreligious cooperation. Conflict also frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, whereas in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders' religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state- religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. The findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.

Compiled | Cui Yulai

Reviewer | Zhang Manna

Typesetting | Qiu Yiwen

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