The " Indo-Pacific Economic Framework " (IPEF), led by the United States and joined by a total of 14 countries, recently held a ministerial meeting in Los Angeles, the United States. This is the first face-to-face formal high-level meeting of the framework since it was officially launched in May this year.
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), led by the United States and joined by a total of 14 countries, recently held a ministerial meeting in Los Angeles, the United States. This is the first face-to-face formal high-level meeting of the framework since it was officially launched in May this year.
According to the post-meeting statement, India is the only member that has not signed one of the four pillars of the framework, the trade negotiation agreement. The author believes that, like withdrawing from the " Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership " in 2019 (RCEP), India's move was beyond the expectations of many people, but it is reasonable to start from Indian thinking.
"Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" is an important measure that the United States intends to strengthen economic ties with regional countries after it withdrew from the then "TPP" (TPP) in 2017. The framework currently has 14 members, including the United States, Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand , Singapore , Vietnam and other countries.
India is very positive about the framework. Not only did it decide to join immediately, but it also praised it repeatedly on international occasions. So, how do you understand India's withdrawal from trade negotiations in this framework?
First of all, India reappears "Indian pride". The author believes that when examining India's policies in specific areas such as economy, diplomacy, and security, we cannot get rid of India's cultural and strategic traditions and look at them in isolation.
2014 BJP Since the rule of the Indian BJP , although India has largely not fully inherited the "non-aligned" foreign policy that belongs to the historical heritage of the Congress Party, and is moving towards deciding whether to cooperate based on different interests and positions on different issues and positions. but there is no doubt that India's ambition to become a "sensual and colorful power" and refuse to be a "second-rate role in international relations" has never changed.
In other words, India will not naturally continue this cooperation and coordination on other issues just because it maintains close cooperation with a certain country or group on a certain issue. On the contrary, if it does not match the national interests recognized by India on other issues, India will not hesitate to sing the opposite tune.
India's statement during the Ukrainian crisis proves this: it refuses to follow the political condemnation of the United States and the West and imposes economic sanctions on Russia, but instead increases the purchase of cheap Russian oil. Even if politicians from Washington and Brussels visit New Delhi repeatedly for this, it would be useless to persuade or even put pressure on them.
Secondly, India believes that trade negotiations under the framework are "unprofitable". According to US media disclosure, due to fear of protectionist sentiment in the United States, the framework did not provide preferential terms for US market access at the beginning of its launch, and did not make any commitments in tariff reduction and exemption of .
This means from the very beginning that developing countries such as India cannot obtain targeted tariff reductions in the United States through trade arrangements under this framework, giving Indian goods and services greater opportunities to enter the U.S. market.
In addition, the framework trade negotiations link the environment, labor and other terms with trade, and India expressed concerns. India's Commerce and Industry Minister Goyal said he hopes to avoid any clauses that could harm India's trade interests. "On the issue of environmental protection, developing countries must use low-cost and affordable energy to support economic development. It is a discrimination for developing countries to be demanded on this issue."
"Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" can be said to be a key move to make up for the economic shortcomings of its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and strengthen partnerships with East Asia-Pacific countries, and even "shape China's strategic environment." In addition to trade, the framework includes three pillars: supply chain, a clean economy and a fair economy (tax and anti-corruption).
This time, 14 member states reached an agreement on three other pillars in addition to trade. US Secretary of Commerce Raymondo said that "members are rapidly promoting cooperation in this framework." "The United States hopes that member states will reach a cooperation agreement in November 2023 ”.In fact, as early as the beginning of the launch, U.S. officials said that the Biden administration intends to reach a substantial cooperation agreement within 12 to 18 months.
Although it has great ambitions, this framework has inherent major flaws: it is essentially a tool for the United States to implement its global strategy and geopolitical strategy, and the United States is unwilling to use market access, tariff reduction and other fields for this purpose. Substantive concessions.
In short, the United States hopes to force other countries to board the ship, but at the same time, it allows other countries to buy tickets themselves and even pay high-priced tickets. After gradually discovering that this framework does not help the development of their own economic and trade, it is worth discussing how enthusiastic and substantive participation of member states can be.
At the same time, some member states, including India, have major differences with the United States, Japan and other countries in the fields of digital economy , cross-border data transfer, labor and environmental rules, which can be regarded as the North and South to a certain extent. The continuation and manifestation of contradictions, the contradictions between developed and developing countries within this framework, cannot be completely resolved in the foreseeable future.
Even Raymondo was forced to admit that member states failed to reach a consensus on when to complete the four "pillars" negotiations. Regarding the future of this framework, you can "listen to what you say and observe what you do." There are many internal contradictions, and the "paper tiger" cannot become a "real tiger".
Author Wang Shida is the deputy director of the South Asia Institute of China Institute of Modern International Relations
Source: Huanshi In-depth Observation
