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Editor's note
Recently, Tsinghua Associate professor was fired at the age of 50 because of the long-term employment system of "either promotion or departure" that failed to meet the assessment standards, it has attracted widespread attention from the academic community and the society.
The associate professor registered his personal public account "Shouxiangxingshi" to publish relevant information.
In the post published, the associate professor stated the entire process of studying for undergraduate, master and doctoral studies, joining Tsinghua University, 10 years of work, promotion failure and sad departure. He believed that from the pre-employment-long-term employment document to execution, from personal performance to final struggle, they were full of deep grievances. The associate professor pointed out that "the school seems to completely ignore the teachers' huge contributions and achievements in teaching, education, scientific research, service, etc., and only evaluates them from the perspective of publication." This once again triggered the academic community's criticism and reflection on the practice of "either promotion or departure" in China. This article points out that Chinese universities are undergoing long-term employment reforms with the core characteristics of "no promotion or departure" or "no promotion or departure". Professor Zhang Weiying played a relatively important role in the introduction of this system in Chinese universities. However, because he used the traditional game theory excessive abstract framework to grasp Schelling's game idea directly facing reality, there is a certain deviation in the cognition of the "responsibility-threat/commitment" logic or mechanism that can play a good role in "either rising or leaving", and he failed to understand the differences between "threat" and "promise" well; nor could he clearly recognize their "credibility" and "untrustworthy", which is not due to the game framework composed of participants, actions, information, strategies, and benefits, but the differences in personality status, social structure, cultural environment and other factors highlighted by participants outside the framework through "commitment". Since the realistic orientation of "asymmetric game" implicit behind Schelling's thoughts has not been truly understood, it has led to the undesirable replacement of the actual operation of the "either rising or leaving" theory. This is also the theoretical source of the "either rising or leaving" system in trouble in Chinese universities, because the good operation of this system requires meeting and creating three prerequisites. This official account is hereby launched for readers to think about.
50-year-old associate professor of Tsinghua University was fired from the assessment.
Why is it so difficult for "elevate or leave" in China?
Wang Shuixiong 丨Professor of the School of Social Sciences of Renmin University of China
This article was published in the 9th issue of "Exploration and Controversy" 2021
Specific content is quasi-directed by the official issue
The original title "Why is "Either rising or leaving" effective - also discussing the game framework with Professor Zhang Weiying"
without the description of the scriptures, all the pictures in the article are from the Internet
The statement about "no promotion or leaving" or "Either rising or leaving" (Up or Out) was originally derived from the translation and introduction of Western social and economic theories. In fact, it is similar to the Chinese common saying "foreign monks can recite scriptures". This statement and its derived specific systems are currently used in Chinese universities, and has also caused some heated controversy recently. This dispute can be traced back to the controversy caused by the "Peking University Teacher Appointment and Position Promotion System Reform Plan (Draft for Comments)" in 2003. Now we have reviewed this controversy and started to explore the relevant ideas and some practical misunderstandings of Professor Zhang Weiying, the main operator of the "reform plan", which will help us clarify the reality, and help us grasp the theory, and understand more specifically what practical dilemmas may lead to by biasing the theory.
"Everything or leaving" game model questions
Professor Zhang Weiying likes to use "Peking University Reform" as an example to apply it to his teachings and writings. The controversy caused by this reform has also been experienced by the author personally. Among them, a very important aspect is "implementing the system of "up or out".Specifically, in the "Peking University Teacher Appointment and Promotion System Reform Plan (Draft for Comments)" published online on June 17, 2003, the system stated as: "Article 23, newly hired lecturers have two opportunities to apply for promotion to associate professors within the contract period after working in this position for two years; newly hired associate professors have two opportunities to apply for promotions within the contract period after working in this position for five years (see Articles 29 and 30 for calculation of the number of promotions). If the first application is unsuccessful, the second application must be one year later; if the second application is not successful, the In addition to associate professors who have obtained a long-term position, the employment relationship will be automatically terminated one year from the date the school notifies him, and the contract will not be renewed. If the promotion application is successful, the employment relationship will be implemented according to the new position regulations. "
For this system, Professor Zhang Weiying wanted to prove through a game model and its transformation in the textbook "Game and Society": "'Leave if you don't advance, you will leave' is a promise of the school: you won't treat outstanding talents unfairly." According to his game theory modeling ideas, the so-called "commitment" here should refer to "Commitment" (about the translation of the Chinese language, which will be described in detail later). In Zhang Weiying's view, the "elimination or departure" system, and even the "university teacher appointment and position promotion system" embedded in it, involves both parties to the game: "teachers" and "school". Strictly speaking, the "school" here should refer to the departments and school administrators responsible for administrative review, plus the departments/discipline groups, academic departments, and school-level academic committees responsible for academic review. In fact, it should be referred to as "school" rather than "school". Because "school" must be without "teachers" and "students", and relying solely on managers is not enough to support the "school". The actions of "teacher" were simplified to two types of "work hard" and "not working hard", while the actions of "school" were simplified to "improvement" and "not improving". In this simplified game framework, he also roughly assigns the benefits of both parties. As shown in Figure 1, the previous value in the brackets is the benefits of the "teacher" and the latter value is the benefits of the "school".
According to Figure 1, the "Peking University Teacher Appointment and Position Promotion System (Draft for Comments)" without the support of "either promotion or leaving" is an "old system". In the context of the "old system", the game between "teachers" and "schools" has been launched around the promotion issue, resulting in "teachers do not work hard, and schools do not improve." The "new system" means the blessing of the "either promotion or departure" system, and its purpose is to achieve the balanced result of "teachers work hard and school improvement". According to Professor Zhang Weiying's idea, the "either promotion or departure" system allows the "school" to lose "teachers" when choosing the "no promotion" option, so the "school"'s income value is 0.
However, if there is no problem with the game income assignment in Figure 1, and the "school" really wants to get the result of "teachers work hard and school improvement", the "school" does not need to adopt the "either advance or leave" system. According to Professor Zhang Weiying's ideas, the following approach can be adopted in the "old system" game to achieve "Commitment" and realize " Pareto optimal ": Before the game begins, the "school" takes out a margin of 4 and handed over to an independent third party, claiming that if the "school" does not choose to "improve" in the second stage of the game, the third party can confiscate its margin. Based on this, in the game of "old system", from top to bottom, the 7 of the "school" income in the second bracket becomes 3, and the 4 of the "school" income in the fourth bracket becomes 0. Peking University "will not treat outstanding talents unfairly" "promise" seems to be "more trustworthy" than under the "new system" of "either promotion or departure".
In addition, there is a less complicated solution: with the background of the "old system", as long as the "Commitment" of the "school" is done thoroughly and directly let the "teachers" make their choices on their own behalf, they can solve this dilemma, that is, let the "teachers" "fight with each other" based on the framework or script of the "old system" game (left) of the "old system".In this way, as long as the "teacher" is rational, there is no need to worry about "teacher work hard and school improvement" that cannot be achieved, because among all the results, only "teacher work hard and school improvement" can allow the "teacher" to achieve the maximum profit (its value is 4).
In this way, Professor Zhang Weiying's "old system" game only shows that the excessive participation of "school" in the promotion of "teacher" has led to bad results; but it is not enough to prove that a "elimination or departure" system is needed to avoid this bad result. The fact may be the opposite. The "elevate or leave" system will increase the "over-engagement" of the "school" in the process, which will lead to worse results.
Some people may question this. Figure 1 is just a simplified logical example. The reality is complex. Under various constraints of reality, the "Commitment" function contained in the "either rising or leaving" system is still valuable. Indeed, we cannot consider that the participation of the "school" in the job promotion process is optional based on the logical example of Figure 1. The problem lies in the complexity of reality. Once the reality is admitted to be complex, then the statement that "either promotion or departure" system makes "school" choose the "no improvement" option will lead to the "school"'s income value of 0, which is worth further questioning based on the actual conditions.
The real structure of "Commitment"
In the real context, according to Xie Lin's definition of "Commitment", it is actually necessary to ask this question: What "Commitment" has Peking University ("school") done based on the "either promotion or departure" system to make itself "because of responsibility, restriction or obligation to a certain behavior process, or a process of inaction, or a certain control over future behavior"? What options did Peking University ("school") give up because of the "elimination or departure" system, which options did it exclude, and which behavior it controls for its future? In short, what did the school "Commit" through the "Everything or Leaving" system to make itself appear weaker in the face of "teachers" ("outstanding talents")? So much so that people can believe that the school will definitely practice the "Promise" of "not treating outstanding talents unfairly", otherwise it is very likely to pay a huge price for it?
The fact is that the "new system" of "either promotion or departure" does not restrict or at least does not directly restrict the "school", it directly restricts the "teachers". Under the "old system", when teachers face promotion, there is no problem of "fighting against the water". They can "fight repeatedly" and have the opportunity to "fight repeatedly". And under the "new system" that includes the "elimination or departure" system, teachers may be in a situation of "fighting against the water". The result of this "responsibility" on Commit is that it makes the teacher (has to) "work hard" promises more believable. At the same time, given that the "teacher" has only two opportunities (number of times) as applicants for "promotion" for each level of position, each time they apply, it "may" poses a more credible "threat" to the school - and such "threat" "may" bring about the result of "survival of the fittest" of teachers, and "may" (but it does not necessarily) force the school to "not treat outstanding talents unfairly." The reason why it is said to be "possible" is because it also depends on the following three conditions: (1) The equality of the relative status of the two. (2) The consistency between the person who acts as a "school" for promotion and appointment and the "school" and "advance and retreat together". (3) The effectiveness of the evaluation criteria for "effort" ("performance").
First of all, from the perspective of relative equality of status, if the "faculty" fails to be promoted at Peking University and can turn around and seek promotional teaching positions in other high-quality universities, then its negotiated status relative to the "school" is higher. Correspondingly, if in China or even in Beijing, there are more than ten or even dozens of universities that are comparable to Peking University in terms of academic reputation, discipline status, and social resources, then Peking University "teachers" will have certain negotiating power compared to the "school".Only when the negotiation status is relatively equal can the "elimination or departure" system bring "teachers" the effectiveness of "commitment" and make the "threat" issued by "teachers" to the "school" to the "school" (this really means "if you don't improve me, I will leave") more believable. In the case of huge differences in status between the two, this threat from "teachers" is actually meaningless to the "school".
Secondly, from the perspective of consistency between school agents or management "advance and retreat with the school", Professor Zhang Weiying emphasized that "those who have constant property have perseverance" is very reasonable. This means that, on the one hand, this may require that the entire Chinese university system can allow private and multiple social forces to run universities, and encourage them to run large and strong universities, and ultimately form a star-studded, non-centralized university system that combines public and private universities. On the other hand, a huge "principal market" is needed, that is, if the principal is not good at doing well, he needs to resign like an ordinary teacher. In this way, the school agent or management can truly feel that the "teacher" is a credible "threat" to the "school" - it will strengthen the strength of its competitors. Otherwise, the "school" will inevitably have the mentality of "you cross your single-plank bridge, I walk my sunshine". I feel that the "threat" from the "teacher" is not enough to shake the school's status, and it is even more irrelevant to the school's agents or management.
Finally, from the perspective of the effectiveness of the evaluation criteria of "effort" (actually "performance"), university "faculty members" are difficult to form a concise and effective evaluation system for their "effort" (actually "performance" good or bad, especially the strength of innovation) because of the complexity of their labor (teaching and scientific research). Moreover, because "faculty members" are social people and related people, and the same work unit and the same professional field, frequent exchanges will be mixed with various factors, and it is difficult to judge objectively and fairly. In addition, due to the multidimensional nature of its goals (involving many aspects such as talent training, discipline construction, and social services), the degree of "working" of the "school" is more difficult to quantify and measure. When the evaluation standards are questionable, it is difficult to prove its innocence whether the teacher is "excellent"; and whether the school is "working hard and making great contributions", the right to evaluate whether the teacher does not lie with the teacher. Therefore, "teachers" are "either promoted or left" and it is difficult to "threate" the fur of the "school".
In short, since the above three conditions are difficult to meet in the "Peking University reform", although the "new system" has led to "teachers" breaking their heads and fighting with their backs, it is not enough to make "eliminate or leave" a "threat" to Peking University's "school", let alone "becoming a believable". In view of this, the school’s so-called “Promise” that “will not treat outstanding talents unfairly” is “unbelievable”. It can be seen that proving whether the "school" makes a "commitment" is not successful by changing the income assignment in the digital model, not to mention that this change lacks factual basis; more importantly, "a certain thing has a certain function" does not mean that "those with a certain function must be something"; instead, it is necessary to go deep into the game process and analyze the negotiation status, social structure, cultural environment of each party, and the possible practical activities of both parties outside the model. Moreover, even after the analysis reaches this level, it still needs to be tested from reality and judged from a social perspective. It is not advisable to replace reality with theory, and it is even more undesirable to replace specific reality operations with special model examples.
Professor Zhang Weiying mentioned: "In fact, many companies implement a system of 'no promotion', such as McKinsey Consulting Company. If employees cannot be promoted at any level, they must leave McKinsey." The author believes that this tends to confuse "special" into "general". It is easy to understand that in a field like a company, especially a consulting company, adopting a "either promotion or departure" system, calling it "commitment".Generally speaking, in some companies with relatively complete market economic systems, the three conditions mentioned above are usually met: (1) The negotiation status between employees and companies is relatively equal, and it is difficult for companies to form a monopoly position. Even if a monopoly is formed, the government will come forward to anti-monopoly. (2) The person who conducts job rating and appointment in the agency company has a high degree of consistency between the company and the company. (3) In the company field, the "performance" evaluation standard is relatively simple and effective, mainly depending on how much profit it can help the company. Only when these three conditions are met can the employee's "elimination or departure" be regarded as a "threat" to the company - if the company "treats outstanding talents in bad terms", the "excellent talents" will go to the competitors. Correspondingly, companies that adopt the "either promotion or departure" system can also be said to have given a credible "promise" (Promise) that "will not treat outstanding talents unfairly."
"Commitment" theoretical logic queries
The author believes that Professor Zhang Weiying's misunderstanding of some analysis and expressions of "either promotion or departure" and "Peking University reform" is rooted in the lack of grasp of the analysis framework of Commitment-Threat/Promise (responsibility-threat/commitment) and is also bound to special game examples in thinking.
As one of the important influential economists and educators in his book "Game and Society", he has problems with his understanding of the term "Commitment" (he translated it into "commitment") and its conceptual system behind it. This problem seems to be very small, but given that the word "Commitment" has a wide influence in the English world, and in recent decades, "Commitment" has frequently appeared in the Chinese world with the appearance of "commitment" as a keyword, the problem of grasping the word and the conceptual system behind it is very likely to cause systematic deviations, and even be unfavorable to the development of theoretical research and operational practices related to "game and society".
Professor Zhang Weiying pointed out in "Game and Society": " Thomas Schelling is recognized as the first person to propose and define the concept of 'commitment'." Indeed, in the influential book The Strategy of Conflict published in 1960, Schelling had a relatively detailed interpretation of the word "Commitment", which has a key position in his strategic thinking. Regarding the main ideas contained in the word "Commitment", Schelling also has a concentrated retrospective summary in his book Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays published in 2006. He said some colleagues speculated that he should be the founder of the concept of "Commitment". This certainly made him happy, but he had to deny it modestly. This is because Xenophon had some insights into this as early as 2400 years ago. At that time, Xenophon's troops were chased by the Persians and stopped on the side of an almost insurmountable gully. One of his generals expressed fear at this situation that might be nowhere to escape, but Xenophon comforted him that when the war was about to be fought, we were actually a situation that we should not seek. We should be happy with the enemy's belief that it is easy for them to retreat from any direction, but we ourselves should understand from our current position that there is no safety for us unless it is a battle victory. Obviously, Xenophon's idea is extremely similar to the "fight when the dead is fought" mentioned in " Sun Tzu's Art of War ".
starts from such an initial cause and combines traditional Chinese military thinking such as "fight when the dead is dead", and literally speaking, it is also relatively reluctant to translate the word "Commitment" (the corresponding verb is "Commit") into "commit". After deep thought, the author tends to translate it into "responsibility", which literally means "to assume a certain responsibility and face possible accountability." So, in Schelling's thoughts, what is "responsibility"? A passage from Schelling's 2006 book summarizes this. He said: I use the term "responsibility" to mean that I have become responsible, bound or obliged to a process of conduct, or inaction, or some control over future behavior.It means giving up certain options, excluding certain options, and succumbing to some control over the actor's future behavior. And doing this is intentional and has some purpose. The purpose is to influence the choice of someone else. Liability achieves this by influencing other people’s expectations of the responsible party’s behavior.
From this definition, we can see that "responsibility" on A means that the actor intentionally reduces or even closes the possibility of making other (non-A) behavior choices; in this way, when a certain situation or situation occurs, he can only do A, and no longer any (even including evading death) other behaviors, and even cannot do other behaviors at all. In addition to the saying "fight when the dead is dead" in "The Art of War", there is also the so-called "defeat the boat" and "fight with one's back" in Chinese idioms, which is to make your troops "responsible" to the possible option of "fighting" by "defeating the boat" - if the opponent attacks. The three words
Commitment, Threat and Promise (the author tends to translate it as "commitment") constitute a crucial conceptual framework in Sherling's conflict strategy, which can be called the "Commitment-Threat/Promise" framework. Professor Zhang Weiying (of course there are many other scholars) translated "Commitment" into "commitment", and translated "Promise" into "promise", which is inappropriate in my opinion. It is not only because "commitment" and "promise" are not easy to distinguish between "promise" in the Chinese world; but also because a certain behavior of "Commit" may contain a purpose that affects others' expectations, but is not as "most direct" as "promise" and "threat" as "threat" is an act directed at "other parties" (as the "opponent" or "partners" of the second party, and "third parties"), but more on oneself or one's own side.
Professor Zhang Weiying translated "Commitment" into "Commitment" and translated "Promise" into "Promise". This language limitation made some expressions inevitably have problems when introducing Schelling's strategic thoughts. He said: In game theory, if a participant takes some action, turning an unbelievable threat into an unbelievable threat, with pre-optimal and post-optimal, then this action is called a commitment. Note that the meaning of "promise" here is different from the aforementioned "promise". "Promise" and "threat" can be regarded as a verbal expression; while "promise" refers to an action, and is trustworthy. Language is a dwarf, action is a giant. This shows that commitment is more important than promise. Only through commitment can the originally unachievable Pareto optimization can be made into an equilibrium result.
Although Professor Zhang Weiying mentioned the important contribution of Thomas Schelling when he used the term "Commitment". However, the above expressions and related discussions are actually far from Schelling's strategic thinking. To the bottom line, "'promise' and 'threat' can be seen as a verbal expression; while 'commitment' refers to an action, with confidence in words. Language is a dwarf, and action is a giant" is a problem. Indeed, "Commitment" (responsibility, which is what Professor Zhang calls "commitment") is "an action", but this action can also be "verbal expression"; while "Threat" ("threat") and "Promise" (promise, which is what Professor Zhang calls "promise"), because they may contain "Commitment", they are naturally not limited to "verbal expression". "I swear to God..." Such "verbal expressions" may become an important way for members of their society to carry out "Commitment" in a society that respects God very much. For example, when the emperor promises to give a prince the status of crown prince, as long as this "Promise" includes "Commitment", the emperor needs to take certain actions - at least hold a ceremony, or even release other competitive princes, rather than relying solely on "verbal expressions".
Because Professor Zhang Weiying believes that "'promise' and 'threat' can be regarded as a verbal expression", it is naturally easy to be misled, so it tends to cancel the difference between "Threat" and "Promise". He said: In life, such statements may be "threat", similar to "if you don't promise to do something, I will do it", or "promise", similar to "if you promise to do something, I will do it". In fact, a "threatening" statement can become a "promising" statement. For example, "If you don't promise to do something, I will do it" can be changed to "If you promise not to do something, I will do it". An example is that when parents discipline their children, they can threatenly say, "If you don't agree to give up playing games, I will deduct your pocket money this month"; or they can promise, "If you promise to give up playing games, I will not deduct your pocket money this month." Similarly, promised statements can become threatening statements. In this way, from an analytical perspective, there is no need to distinguish between threat statements and promise statements. In fact, the party that makes the statement hopes to influence the other party's actions. Therefore, we will collectively refer to these statements as "threats".
In this way, Professor Zhang Weiying "easily" unified "Threat" and "Promise", which also canceled the analytical value of "Promise". In this way, it is not difficult to understand what he calls "either rising or leaving" more "threatening" and less "commitment". The problem is that in life we can clearly feel the difference between "Threat" and "Promise", even if there is no blessing from "Commitment" behind them. For example, if both the child and the parent take it for granted to their children for pocket money each month, then whether the parents say "if you do not agree to give up playing games, I will deduct your pocket money this month" or express it as "if you promise to give up playing games, I will not deduct your pocket money this month", it poses a "threat" to the child.
However, the reason why people do not confuse "Promise" and "Threat" in life is that from a daily perspective, the first is that the person who receives "Promise" or "Threat" can judge the difference based on their own feelings: a "Promise" can bring some benefits to the recipient, if the recipient complies with his "request" behavior and the "Promise" is also practiced by the sender. On the contrary, a "Threat" will cause some tangible loss to the recipient if the recipient does not act according to its "direction", and the "actions that will be carried out when the conditions are not met" contained in "Threat" are practiced by the sender.
In addition, when they are "successful", the practice issues involved in those who send out "Promise" or "Threat" are different, especially when there is "Commitment" blessing behind them. When a successful "Promise" is practiced, the sender needs to pay the cost beyond the cost of the "Promise" issued (including but not limited to "verbal expression"); while a "successful" "Threat" does not require the sender to pay the additional cost of the practice in addition to the cost of the "Threat" issued (including but not limited to "verbal expression"). In other words, successful "Threat" does not need to be practiced by the sender; on the contrary, when "unsuccessful", that is, when the "Threat" recipient does not act according to its "direction", the "Threat" supported by the "Commitment" often needs to be practiced by the sender, which may cause the sender to pay additional costs. In some special circumstances, the losses it brings to the sender is even greater than the receiver. It can be said that although there is a certain degree of connection between the concepts of "threat" and "promise", they are two opposing concepts, and the participants in the game can clearly distinguish the two according to their perception, which will also have different effects on the results of the game. Relatively speaking, "Commitment" is a more basic concept. It is impossible to effectively distinguish between the three of them based on whether they are limited to "verbal expression".
Professor Zhang Weiying confused "Threat" and "Promise", ignoring the perception of the parties involved in the game, and also ignoring the different values of the two for game analysis. He simply compared "Commitment" (the so-called "commitment") with "Promise" (the so-called "promise"), and it is also undesirable to say that the former is more important than the latter; because the latter may include the former, that is, the former may become an important part of the latter, and the two are inseparable.
Professor Zhang Weiying also has certain problems with the definition of "Commitment". He said, "In game theory, a participant takes some action to turn a 'threat' that was originally unbelievable after the fact into a 'threat' that is believed after the fact, and the pre-optimal and post-optimal are consistent, then this action is called a commitment... Only through commitment can the Pareto optimization that could not be achieved become an equilibrium result." This means that "Commitment" needs to be based on a specific game framework (constituted by participants, actions, information, strategies, and benefits), so that the "threat" contained in it, according to Professor Zhang's statement that there is no need to distinguish between the two, it also includes a promise) "turns into trustworthy afterwards" to be defined. Since he used the function of "Commitment" in a specific game framework here to replace its definition, doing so not only easily leads to cyclical arguments about , but also easily misleading. As we all know, "A certain thing has a certain function" does not mean "those with a certain function must be something."
It is obvious that "Commitment" does not need to be defined by a specific game framework at all; on the contrary, it points more to the call of the participant's body, personality, character, reputation, will, first in the deeds, as well as the resources such as the time and space position, social structure, cultural environment of the participant (all of this is outside the specific game framework and needs to be grasped from the perspective of social reality), to form constraints on oneself, and thus make the threats or commitments issued more trustworthy.
In the so-called "making a threat that was originally unbelievable after the fact becomes a threat that is believed after the fact, and the optimal before the fact is consistent with the optimal after the fact", what exactly does the "thing" in "after the fact" and "before before the fact" refer to? Is it a "Commitment", a "Threat" or a "Promise", or a certain action of the game example conceived by Professor Zhang Weiying, that is, a certain action of the other party targeted by the threat? To be precise, "thing" refers to "Commitment" (responsibility), and the two words "after" in the quotation "original after the fact" (i.e. after the Commitment) and "becoming after the fact" (also referring to after the Commitment) are incorrect and should be deleted. Because, in fact, a Commitment does not necessarily precede threats (or promises), it may occur simultaneously with the issuance of threats (or promises), and even the issuance of "information" or "signals" and "declarations" of threats (or promises) may occur completely before Commitment.
In addition, does the so-called "optimal" in the quotation refer to the "threat" (or "promise", that is, the best of the "threat" (or "promise") party, the best of the "threat" (or "promise") party, or the so-called "Pareto optimal" of the entire game? As mentioned earlier, Professor Zhang Weiying did not effectively distinguish between Commitment ("responsibility") and Promise (the author calls "commitment" and Professor Zhang calls "promise"). He did not notice that Threat ("threat") and Promise ("commitment") has different meanings for different players, and the costs to pay are also different, which will naturally affect his judgment on "optimal". This means that the statement that "only through commitment can the Pareto optimization that could not be achieved can be made into the equilibrium result" is ineffective. Although Commitment is very important for the "responsible party" to achieve a relatively good result in the game activities through self-discipline, it is not a necessary or sufficient condition to achieve this equilibrium. The "Commitment" (responsibility) often oriented towards the game results of "biased", which is significantly different from the results derived from the traditional game theory of mathematical "symmetry" such as "Pareto optimal equilibrium".
breaks the example set: "Special" ≠ "General"
Professor Zhang Weiying tends to use examples to describe "threat" and "commitment", and then directly extend it to the level of general discussion. This lecture will be more vivid, but it is necessary to be particularly cautious when forming textbooks, because if you are not rigorous in thinking, you will confuse the "special content" in the example with "general content". In this way, the form and content in the example will also limit their thinking to a certain extent and one-sidedly define their general expressions.
For example, before talking about the section "Commitment Behavior", Professor Zhang Weiying gave a "reverse induction example", roughly as shown in Figure 2.
This is a step-by-step game. Participant "1" takes action first. If he chooses U, the game ends; if he chooses D, he will go to the next step and chooses by participant "2". At this time, if participant "2" chooses L, the game ends; if R is selected, enter the third step and the participant "1" and then chooses between U' and D', and then the game ends. The values in the brackets in the figure, before the comma, correspond to the corresponding benefits of the participant "1", and after the comma, correspond to the corresponding benefits of the participant "2".
In this game framework, the equilibrium result of using reverse induction to solve the problem is: the participant selects U on "1" and the game ends, and the participant has no choice; the participant's "1" and "2" have the benefits of 2 and 0 respectively. Such a return value is obviously not as great as the return value that both parties can obtain (4 and 2 respectively) when the game enters the third step and the participants choose D’. In other words, in this game framework, there is a "Pareto optimal" result, that is, both parties in the game still have Pareto optimization space in addition to the existing equilibrium results. But special attention is needed here, not all games are so special.
In such a artificially set and simplified game, participant 1 occupies a dominant position - the step-by-step game framework itself potentially gives him/her this dominant position. To obtain the results of Pareto optimization and get benefits (4, 2), participant "1" can provide participant "2" with a promise to advance the realization of this goal, that is, if participant "2" chooses R in the second step, then participant "1" will choose D' in the third step. And in order to make this promise (Promise) appear credible, he can make himself responsible for the option (commit) D’. The specific approach can be as Professor Zhang Weiying said: "Before the game begins, the participant '1' takes out a margin of '2' and handed it to an independent third party, claiming that if he does not choose D' in the third stage of the game, the third party can confiscate his margin."
Of course, the participant "1" makes himself responsible for the option of (commit) D', and it can also be done: when the game reaches the third step, the participant "1" will directly hand over the selector with only two buttons U' and D' to the participant "2", and let the participant "2" make a choice on his behalf, so as to transfer his right to choose. In addition, participant "1" can also be done more thoroughly, and let participant "2" choose instead of themselves from the first step; that is, let participant "2" play "two hands fighting with themselves" based on the framework or script of the game in Figure 1, so that there is no need to worry about "Pareto optimality" not being realized.
However, the real world game is obviously not such a game of "finding the largest number". Even if there is a "only selector with two buttons U' and D'" mentioned above, when participant "1" handed it to the hands of participant "2", he still faces the problem of trusting participant "2" not adding a button other than U' and D'. In order to gain this trust, participants "2" also need to be "responsible" (such as installing a device on the selector that will self-destruct if it is disassembled), indicating that they will not disassemble the new buttons of the selector.It can be seen that unlike the "starting framework" (this is the work done by traditional game theory) that provides a problem that requires a series of premises and assumptions to be established through abstraction, the "Commitment-Threat/Promise" (responsibility-threat/commitment) analysis framework points more to the "essential, meta-level abstraction and approximation" of social reality, especially interpersonal interaction. These are two theoretical models of different natures. The former is biased towards formalism, while the latter is biased towards substantiveness; the former is biased towards abstractness, while the latter is biased towards realisticness; the former is conducive to the discussion of long logical chains, while the latter focuses on grasping short logical chains.
Perhaps it is because he has been thinking about the example of reverse induction in Figure 2 and is bound by it that Professor Zhang Weiying believes that "in game theory, a participant takes some action to make an unbelievable threat that was originally unbelievable into a unbelievable threat, and the pre-optimal and post-optimal are consistent, so this action is called a 'commitment'... Only through commitment can the Pareto optimum that could not be achieved become an equilibrium result."
But with the example in Figure 2, the above confusing insights are not difficult to understand. In Professor Zhang Weiying's words, participant "1" provides a "threat" to participant "2". If participant "2" chooses R in the second step, then participant "1" will choose D in the third step (the English corresponding to "threat" here is Threat, but it is actually Professor Zhang's so-called "promise" is Promise. Given that Professor Zhang believes that there is no need to distinguish between the two, so following his ideas, the word "threat" can be used in this way). However, "the root cause lies in the inconsistency between pre-optimal and post-optimal", and this "threat" is unreliable. In other words, when the participant "2" has not yet chosen R (this should be the true meaning of "previously", the optimal choice of participant "1" in the third step is D'; when the participant "2" really chooses R (this is "afterwards"), and when the participant "1" in the third step, the optimal choice becomes U'. With the blessing of the so-called "commitment" mentioned above, an unbelievable "threat" (in fact, a Promise) that was originally "after the participant 2 chose R) became "a "threat" that could be believed after the fact (in fact, a Promise), that is, "participant '1' means that if participant '2' chooses R in the second step, then participant '1' will choose D in the third step". Obviously, through "commitment", "threat" (actually Promise) becomes convincing, and the "Pareto Optimal" that could not be achieved becomes the equilibrium result, and the benefits obtained by participant "1" and participant "2" are 4 and 2 respectively.
At this point, the mysteries of concepts such as "pre-optimal", "post-optimal", and "Pareto-optimal" proposed above have been solved. But can such an example be simply inferred to other examples? Can we conclude that “in game theory… commitment is more important than promise. Only through commitment can the Pareto optimization that could not be achieved become an equilibrium result”? After all, as mentioned above, the game in this example is so special that participant "1" can completely entrust participant "2" to engage in "two-handed fights" according to the game framework, and solve the dilemma by finding their own "maximum return value"! The example
may help illustrate the "reverse induction" method, and may help illustrate one of the important functions of "Commitment" - making "Promise" more trustworthy, but it is not suitable to define the concept of "Commitment", and it is not appropriate to draw a general conclusion that "Commitment is more important than promises". Only through commitments can the originally unachievable Pareto optimization can be made into an equilibrium result." In fact, sometimes, for certain games, simply maintaining information communication can "make the originally unachievable Pareto optimization become an equilibrium result." Here, Professor Zhang Weiying obviously confused the special with the general.
uses the function of "Commitment" in a specific game to replace its definition, confusing the special with the general, which leads Professor Zhang Weiying to generally believe that "Commitment" is a rational pre-design. Whether its threat (Threat) and promise (Promise) is "believable" or "unbelievable" does not depend on the game "opponent" or "partners", but on the game framework assumed by "game theorists outside the game parties", which is equivalent to assuming that all game parties think about problems along a unified framework similar to Figure 2 like game theorists. Therefore, in Professor Zhang's view, students will not be "responsible" to (Commit) themselves to retaliate against the teacher's "threat", because when the teacher fails, practicing such a "threat" cannot optimize their own benefits. Indeed, in Figure 2, "Commitment" can bring about "Pareto optimization" of the entire game. But special and general cannot be confused. It should be noted that "Commitment" in social games may not be rationally designed in advance, and the resources it relies on are not based on the mathematical framework of game theory. The key to "believable" or "unbelievable" lies in the parties involved in the game and their social environment. Traditional game theory has extremely limited ability to eliminate "unbelievable threats".
号: The starting framework and approaching reality
Chinese universities are still carrying out long-term employment reform with the core characteristics of "either promotion or leaving". Some scholars have pointed out the differences between the actual conditions of Chinese universities and the situation of foreign universities, and used this to reflect on what supporting policies are needed for Chinese universities to implement the "either promotion or leaving" system to better implement it.
The author believes that colleges and universities adopt a system of "elevating or leaving". In order to form an effective "threat" or "commitment" between the school and teachers and promote the common development of both parties, the fundamental reason lies in the fact that the "small habitat" or "field" where the college is located needs to meet the following three prerequisites: (1) The school and teachers who are both parties in the game have relatively equal status in negotiations; (2) The person who is a proxy for the school to conduct job ratings and appointments has a high degree of consistency between "advance and retreat" with the school; (3) In the relevant fields or in the higher education community, either the teacher's "performance" evaluation standards are relatively simple and effective, or there are more than one or two "nearest" universities in the specific colleges and universities, preferably six or seven "equal" competitors.
Although Professor Zhang Weiying played a relatively important role in the introduction of the "responsibility-threat/commitment" system in Chinese universities, he actually lacks a clear grasp of the "responsibility-threat/commitment" logic or mechanism that can play a good role in "responsibility-threat/commitment". Although "commitment" may contain purposes that affect others' expectations, it is more directed at oneself or one's own side, and is a behavior that is self-restricted, self-disciplined, and even self-"bound" nature. "Threat" and "Promise" are two important means by which game participants influence the expectations of game opponents or game partners. They are by no means limited to "verbal expression". Their differences can not only be felt by the sender, but also by the receiver. It is not advisable to confuse the two. To determine whether the actor has made a "threat" and "promise" containing "commitment" needs to be based on the perception of the party as a game participant. This requires delving into the game process, analyzing the negotiation status, social structure, cultural environment of each party, and possible practical activities of both parties. Moreover, even after the analysis reaches this level, for specific examples, it is still necessary to undergo tests from reality.
is not advisable to replace reality with theory, and it is even more unadvisable to replace specific reality operations with special model examples to show the correctness of a certain claim. The three "examples-mathematical models-general theory" have different meanings at the methodological level. It is necessary to note that they each serve different purposes, and cannot be confused in pairs, and must not be generalized. As for these three, the content they contain is diluted in order from left to right; in terms of abstraction, it is enhanced in order from left to right.What scholars need to pay special attention to is that "examples" and "mathematical models" are just scaffoldings that bridge "reality" and "theory", and are a tool for easy discussion and analysis. It not only simplifies "reality"; it also has "dimensionality reduction" and "theory", making its analysis more operational. When faced with "examples" and "mathematical models", we should not overly despise or be overly obsessed.
At the same time, researchers also need to note that the theory as the "starting framework" is different from the theory as the "approximate reality". Theories of the nature of the "starting framework" do help explain a concept or a general truth. However, if you take it as a model in advance and let your thinking be deeply bound, it is easy to confuse the "special content" in the theory with the "general content" and confuse the theory with reality. In this way, the "starting framework" will limit its thinking to a certain extent and one-sidedly translate its general expression. It should be noted that Schelling's "Commitment-Threat/Promise" is one of the important cornerstones for constructing social game theory, but it is more of a theory that "approaches reality".
In short, as a relatively micro rule arrangement, the "either rising or leaving" system depends on the relevant gamers to reach a coordinated consensus that there will be no open conflict. On the micro level, this depends on the mutual respect between both sides, especially the relatively weak parties have room to "quit" a specific game without losing dignity; on the macro level, it depends on the system and structural system of the higher education community embedded in the "either rising or leaving" system. The latter means that it is particularly necessary to form a "multipolar" balance of strength among universities.
